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Though  this  study  had  its  origins  in  the  consideration  of  children's  writing  and  their 
responses  to  reading  it  explores  in  a  wider context  the  nature  of  imagination  and  its  relation 
to  the  discursive.  Within  imagination  there  seem  to  be  three  modes  that  are  frequently 
conflated  -  fantasy,  identification  and  the  imagination  itself.  Each,  however,  has 
distinctive  epistemological  implications  and  significance  for  identity. 
In  normal  discourse  imagination  is  often  conflated  with  fantasy.  Whereas  fantasy  seeks 
to  exercise  power  in  attempting  to  transform  the  world  into  its  own  terms  and  imagination 
shares  this  capacity  for  refiguration,  the  one  is  associated  with  obfuscation  and  the  other 
with  insight. 
In  reading,  the  distinction  is  crucial.  Generally,  children  are  empowered  by  the  fantasy 
that  texts  exploit  or  stimulate.  Yet  the  absence  of  significant  cognitive  control  constitutes  a 
kind  of  blindness.  Identification  differs  from  fantasy  in  that  the  reader  is  drawn,  say,  into 
the  world  of  the  book  -  this  supposes  a  differentiation,  an  escape,  from  the  self  that  is 
merely  placated  in  fantasy.  Yet,  here  too,  is  blindness,  particularly  with  regard  to  the 
constitutive  aspects  of  the  writing.  On  the  other  hand  to  teach  texts  through  exerting 
cognitive  control  may  shift  the  text  too  quickly  into  the  discursive  with  the  danger  that 
students  are  expected  to  respond  to  experiences  that  they  have  not  had. 
The  distinctions  between  identification  and  imagination  are  manifest  in  some  of  the 
fictions  of  Chaucer  and  Kafka  where  differentiation  is  achieved  through  irony. 
Imagination  is  what  facilitates  the  shift  from  blindness  to  insight  and  is  associated  with 
holistic  understanding  -  as  opposed  to  the  disintegrating  scrutiny  of  the  discursive  that,  for 
example,  bifurcates  form  and  content. 
The  holistic  apprehension  associated  with  Hopkins's  inscape  or  the  paintings  of  Cezanne 
emerges  as  a  consequence  of  finding  a  limiting  frame  -  constituted  through  poetry  or  the 
painter's  `motif'  -  that  renders  the  material  enclosed  into  an  intelligible  structure  which,  in 
its  expressiveness,  discloses  value.  There  is  a  double  prescription  that  involves,  an 
initiating  selection  implicit  in  finding  the  frame,  and  subsequent  affective  power  that 
emerges  from  the  holistic  structure  to  shape  our  responses.  This  transaction  is  important for  the  argument.  It  is  the  source  of  the  sense  of  purposiveness  implicit  in  symbolism  and, 
in  the  context  of  nature,  may  lead  to  that  ascription  of  purpose  which  is  one  of  the  ways 
that  we  arrive  at  a  sense  of  the  sacred.  Double  prescription  is  the  paradigm  case  for 
imagining  in  so  far  as  it  is  associated  with  creativity  and  insight. 
To  arrive  at  double  prescription  involves  a  special  act  of  attention  both  from  the  artist 
and  from  the  observer.  It  involves  subverting  habits  of  perception  that  constitute  what  we 
take  to  be  reality.  Yet  we  are  deeply  conservative  in  upholding  these  habits  -  our  sense  of 
ourselves  is  bound  up  in  them.  There  are,  then,  barriers  to  imagining  which  are  reflected, 
particularly,  at  the  interface  between  cultures.  Imagination  has  implications  for  identity, 
for  our  individuation. 
Kant  argues  that  to  find  something  beautiful  is  to  perceive  it  as  an  aesthetic  whole 
without  a  specific  conceptual  purpose.  I  argue  that  conceptual  purpose  is  presupposed  in 
finding  aesthetic  wholeness  -  that,  for  many  writers  and  painters,  is  the  whole  point. 
Imagination  cannot  be  divorced  from  insight  -  but  disinterestedness  is  a  condition  of 
arriving  at  it.  Was  Kant  working  in  a  context  where  the  discursive  paradigm  prevailed  so 
that  form  and  content,  head  and  heart,  were  inevitably  bifurcated? 
But  if  imagination  is  associated  with  insight,  how,  more  specifically,  does  insight  come 
about?  An  examination  of  metaphor  suggests  that  it  defamiliarises  in  refiguring  some 
aspect  of  experience.  Refiguring  involves  projection  of  holistic  structures  -  it  is  in  this  way 
that  metaphor  establishes  the  prescriptive  limits  that  initiate  double  prescription.  Not  all 
metaphor  achieves  this.  The  discursive  has  a  role  in  amplifying  aspects  of  holistic 
structures  but  its  relation  to  imagining  is  dialectical. 
The  dialectical  shift  -  discursive  to  imaginative  -  is  clearly  reflected  in  the  parables  and 
the  Passion  as  they  are  presented  in  the  Gospels.  The  pattern  emerges  in  the  fiction  of 
Patrick  White  in  a  contemporary  reworking  of  the  mystery  plays.  The  centrality  of  the 
dialectic  points  to  its  significance  for  individuation  and  the  issue  is  explored  in  the  context 
of  Nietzsche  and  Jung. 
There  are  aspects  of  contemporary  culture  that  put  the  imagination  under  assault.  On 
the  other  hand,  we  constantly  and  spontaneously  move  between  the  modes  of  imagination as  easily  as  passing  from  sleep  to  wakefulness.  Our  fundamental  conceptions  depend  upon 
holistic  structures.  Imagining  does  not  supplement  reality  -  its  structures  and  refigurings 
are  constitutive  of  it.  In  many  ways,  in  the  larger  context,  the  imagination  is  alive  and  well 
-  but  this  cannot  absolve  us  from  the  struggle  with  ourselves  with  all  its  implications  for 
the  welfare  or  suffering  of  others.  The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  bring,  perhaps,  a  little 
more  clarity  to  some  of  the  conceptual  issues  so  that  in  our  relations  and  teaching  we  may 
be  more  careful  of  what  we  are  about. Table  of  Contents 
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4 Introduction 
At  noon  each  day  he  would  emerge  from  the  waves  and  come  ashore  to  rest 
in  the  shelter  of  the  rock.  [...  ]  It  was  the  propitious  moment  to  obtain  from 
wise  Proteus  a  revelation  of  what  fate  held  in  store;  for  he  saw  into  the 
future  and  spoke  the  truth.  But  [...  J  it  was  first  necessary  to  catch  hold  of 
him  -  no  simple  matter,  for  Proteus  could  change  shape.  1 
Imagination  and  Values 
My  interest  in  imagination  grew  out  of  observing  children's  responses  to  their  reading  and 
their  critical  and  creative  writing.  No  doubt  my  thinking  reflects  what  might  be  called  the 
Galapagos  syndrome  -  that  in  the  hothouse  of  teaching  I  developed  a  personal  vocabulary  that 
remained,  for  many  years,  untested  by  rigorous  scrutiny.  I  eventually  attempted  to  articulate 
my  responses  in  the  face  of  an  ideologically  driven  assault  on  the  imagination.  It  is 
engendered,  on  the  one  hand,  in  schools,  by  an  ever  more  prescriptive  examination  system 
with  its  accompanying  government  rhetoric  about  'values',  and  on  the  other,  by  a  system  of 
higher  education  where  to  find  a  wise  and  informed  approach  to  imaginative  issues  is  largely 
a  matter  of  accident. 
In  general,  the  grasp  of  imaginative  issues  is  frail.  Discussion  with  intelligent,  educated 
adults  frequently  reveals  a  notion  of  imagination  that  entirely  conflates  it  with  fantasy. 
Fortunately,  such  people's  conduct  and  judgements  often  testify  to  underlying  imaginative 
transactions  -  the  gap  between  behaviour  and  casual  assumptions  may  point  to  a  characteristic 
problem  of  a  system  that  produces  graduates  who  are  half  educated. 
Such  a  conflation  is,  perhaps,  associated  with  a  reaction  to  the  appropriation  of  'creativity' 
by  the  practitioners  of  'child-centred'  learning.  Left  to  itself,  most  children's  writing  resolves 
into  third  person,  chronologically  sequential  narrative,  involving  stereotypical  situations  and 
characters.  Here  imagination  is  more  or  less  undifferentiated  from  fantasy.  On  the  other 
hand,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  stimulation  of  fantasy  generates  the  motivation  that  draws 
children  into  the  habit  of  reading.  I  shall  argue,  however,  that  though  such  fantasy  is 
constitutive  of  identification  with  texts  and  is,  indeed,  a  mode  of  imagination,  it  is  associated 
New  Larousse  Encyclopedia  ofMythology,  trans.  by  Richard  Aldington  and  Delano  Ames  (London: 
Hamlyn,  1959),  p.  147. 
5 with  a  kind  of  blindness.  In  the  case  of  cartoons  there  must  be  a  family  resemblance  with  real 
cats  and  real  mice  but,  in  effect,  the  animals  are  hidden  by  the  emotional  closed  circuitry 
facilitated  by  the  caricatures.  This  is  not  to  claim  that  Tom  and  Jerry'  should  be  'about'  cats 
and  mice  -  it  is  merely  to  observe  something  of  how  this  mode  of  imagination  works.  Give 
youngsters  of  eleven  or  twelve  an  exercise  in  extending  the  story  where  the  lid  begins  to 
unscrew  on  the  alien  cylinder,  and  though  having  no  knowledge  of  the  title  of  H.  G.  Wells's 
War  of  the  Worlds,  their  stories  will  almost  inevitably  resolve  into  stereotypical  fantasies  of 
violence.  The  fascination  of  what  would  be  one  of  the  most  extraordinary  moments  in  human 
history  is  never  engaged  because  the  incident  is  mediated  through  fantasies  of  extermination 
largely  derived  from  films  and  computer  games.  Here  is  a  case  where  the  power  of  the 
fantasy  needs  to  be  carefully  and  subtly  diverted  to  facilitate  the  assimilation  of  skills  and 
techniques  that  would  generate  the  expressive  power  that  the  mere  iteration  of  fantasy  lacks. 
It  is  interesting  -  and  crucial  -  that  this  process  does  not  serve  merely  to  produce  more 
elegantly  expressed  fantasy;  rather,  successful  mediation  transfigures  the  vision.  Imagination 
involves  the  superseding  by  transfiguration  of  the  initial  stimulus  that  is  derived  from  fantasy. 
In  children's  responses  to  reading  a  similar  supersession  needs  to  be  achieved. 
Identification  with  stories  provides  the  emotional  energy  and  reward  for  reading  and  here,  too, 
it  constitutes  a  kind  of  blindness.  I  shall  argue  that  identification  and,  indeed,  awareness  of  its 
implications,  is  reflected  in  stories  by  Chaucer  and  Kafka  where  the  natural  impulse  to 
identify  ourselves  with  a  narrator  can  blind  us  to  his  or  her  unreliability. 
As  children  move  through  secondary  school  the  system,  rightly,  places  more  and  more 
emphasis  on  interpretative  and  critical  skills.  However,  in  these  areas  there  are  at  least  two 
sources  of  vitiation  of  the  imagination.  The  first  involves  the  premium  paid  to  the  reduction 
of  texts  to  information.  Knowing  about  a  text  proves  to  be  more  important  than  inhabiting  its 
world.  Such  an  inhabiting  is  not  simply  an  identification,  rather,  as  with  writing,  the  initial 
response  awaits  transfiguration  -  the  specifically  imaginative  transaction  -  through  the 
application  of  critical  skills  and  techniques,  the  products  of  which  are  ploughed  back  into 
understanding.  The  widespread  assumption  that  a  'critical'  approach  necessarily  'destroys' 
6 unique  and  fragile  personal  responses  to  literature  is largely  indulgent  nonsense.  The  logic  of 
the  unfolding  transaction  -  identification  mediated  through  imagination  and  thence  returning 
to  an  enlarged  vision  of  the  world  of  the  book  -  is,  as  I  shall  argue,  dialectical.  It  should  be 
said,  however,  that  the  transaction  remains  incomplete  where  the  dominant  paradigm  of 
understanding  is  fixed  in  the  discursive.  Assimilation  through  identification,  fantasy  and  the 
discursive  effect  different  kinds  of  vitiation  -  though  all  may  be  superseded  in  subsequent 
imagining. 
The  other  obvious  source  of  erosion  lies  in  the  nature  of  the  examination  system  in  so  far  as 
it  involves  large  amounts  of  time  spent  in  learning  the  skills  necessary  to  play  the  game 
implicit  in  the  eccentric  nature  and  discourse  of  the  examinations  themselves.  What  is  tested 
is  too  much  a  matter  of  skill  -  both  of  examination  candidates  and  teachers  -  in  the  negotiation 
of  a  system. 
Attitudes  that  assume  that  language  and  literature  constitute  a  subject  invoke  a  paradigm  of 
learning  at  odds  with  the  nature  of  the  enterprise.  Nowhere  is  this  modal  contradiction  more 
obvious  than  in  discussion  about  values.  It  is  assumed,  on  the  one  hand,  that  schools  are 
somehow  enclaves  that  can  detach  youngsters  from  their  social  contexts  so  that  nobly 
motivated  individuals  can  go  about  instilling  'values';  or,  on  the  other,  that  the  endorsed  values 
of  a  middle  class  may  be  seamlessly  'transmitted'  to  the  next  generation.  Education  about 
values  must  be  dependent,  in  the  end,  upon  children's  understanding  of  their  situations  - 
whatever  these  may  be  -  and  that  can  only  be  brought  about  through  the  mediation  of  the 
imagination.  I  shall  argue  that  imagination  has  relevance  to  value,  broadly,  on  two  counts: 
imaginative  transactions  in  the  context  of  literature  rehearse  the  processes  involved  in  moral 
transactions  generally;  secondly,  value  is  disclosed  in  the  very  process  of  imagining.  In  other 
words,  imagination  is  relevant  both  to  the  means  and  to  the  ends  of  our  moral  lives.  To 
practise  education  exclusively  within  a  discursive  paradigm  is  to  destroy  the  possibility  of  its 
moral  efficacy. 
7 Some  Conceptual  Issues 
Perhaps  the  roots  of  any  discussion  of  imagination  are  to  be  found  in  Aristotle's  discussion  of 
the  nature  of  Phantasia.  He  begins  by  considering  the  notion  that  'both  thinking  and 
understanding  are  thought  to  be  something  like  perceiving.  In  both  cases,  '  he  continues,  `the 
soul  discerns  and  has  cognition  of  the  things  that  exist.  'Z  However,  he  argues  that  `perceiving 
and  understanding  are  not  the  same'.  (p.  197).  I  would  argue  that  in  most  cases  Aristotle  is 
right  but  that  when  imagination  is  manifest  in  the  form  of  seeing  something  as  something  else 
-  i.  e.  metaphorically  -then  the  seeing  and  the  understanding  are  inseparable.  There  is  a  hint  of 
this  in  common  usage  where  'to  see'  may  be  associated  with  a  straightforward  perception  or 
with  the  dawning  of  understanding.  It  is  interesting  that  the  etymology  of  `idea'  points  to  the 
Greek  idein,  oida,  meaning  `form'  or  `kind'  with  its  root  in  id  -  `see'.  The  Latin,  videci, 
means  `I  see'  and  the  clearly  related  Sanskrit,  veda,  means  `knowledge',  or  `sacred 
knowledge'.  3 
Clearly,  the  imagining  that  produces  insight  by  way  of  metaphor  can  be  clearly 
differentiated  from  fantasy  which  may  or  may  not  involve  imagery  but  is  circumscribed  by  an 
altogether  different  intention.  In  his  Introduction  to  Aristotle's  De  Anima,  Hugh  Lawson- 
Tancred  suggests  that  Aristotle, 
[...  ]  under  the  single  heading  of  phantasia  [...  ]  wanders  from  the  treatment  of  the 
interpretation  of  sense-perception  to  that  of  the  production  of  mental  imagery.  In 
both  cases,  two  legitimate  subjects  of  philosophical  study  are  under  consideration 
but  their  related  separateness  is  not  acknowledged  by  Aristotle.  (p.  85). 
It  may  be  that  in  so  far  as  imagination  is  manifest  in  metaphor  the  image  is  precisely  a  means 
of  interpreting  sense  perception.  In  anticipating  Kant's  notion  of  imagination  as  the  capacity 
to  conceive  of  structures  holistically,  one  means  of  so  conceiving  is  surely  through  the 
mediation  of'seeing  as'. 
Already  there  is  a  clear  indication  here  that  imagination  has  epistemological  implications. 
Perhaps  my  fundamental  point  is  that  imagination  should  be  understood  as  a  family  of  modes 
of  relation.  Children  approach  books  as  sources  of  fantasy,  sources  of  identification  and  as 
2  Aristotle,  De  Anima,  trans.  By  Hugh  Lawson-Tancred  (London:  Penguin,  1986),  p.  197. 
3  See  J.  G.  F.  Powell,  `Introduction  to  Philology  for  the  Classical  Teacher'  (Cambridge:  University  Printing 
Services,  1988),  p.  16. 
8 imaginative  resources:  each  approach  has  its  characteristic  epistemological  implications  -  and 
that  suggests  that  each  constitutes  a  mode  of  relation.  In  the  experience  of  reading  they  -  and 
we  -  move,  apparently,  seamlessly  from  one  mode  to  another.  As  a  generic  concept 
imagination  includes  all  three  modes:  on  the  other  hand,  following  Coleridge,  I  shall  argue 
that  'seeing  as'  is  a  function  of  that  distinctive  mode  of  imagination  that  produces  the  insight 
that  we  associate  with  creativity.  A  fourth  mode  of  relation  important  to  the  argument  but 
which  lies  outside  the  concept  of  imagination  I  shall  designate  the  discursive.  Obviously, 
children  must  be  educated  in  handling  its  associated  skills.  On  the  other  hand,  its 
epistemological  characteristics  are  generally  ignored  so  that  it  becomes  the  source  of  endless 
confusions  and  conflation  with  the  modes  of  imagination. 
The  Argument 
That  there  can  be  no  neutral  observers  is  supposed  in  our  day  to  day  struggles  to  achieve 
impartiality.  What  criteria  for  neutrality  could  there  conceivably  be?  That  what  we  see  of  the 
world,  the  book,  the  play  is  selective  and  shaped  by  habit,  convention  -  favoured  perspectives 
-  is  well  documented,  indeed,  the  very  possibility  of  seeing  supposes  our  employment  of 
prescriptive  structures  of  interpretation.  Yet  we  remain  committed  to  the  idea  that  at  least 
some  of  our  imaginative  transactions  involve  the  disclosure  of  truth.  It  may  be  that  some  of 
the  contentious  issues  associated  with  this  paradox  can  be  usefully  approached  through  the 
consideration  of  the  modes  of  relation,  the  fundamental  and  exclusive  kinds  of  orientation, 
that  are  prior  to  whatever  we  find  to  say  about  art  or,  indeed,  persons.  Some  evidence  for  how 
the  modes  function  is  to  be  found  in  responses  and  critical  discourse  that  are  at  cross 
purposes. 
Our  most  characteristic  relation  with  texts  involves  a  rather  passive  mode  of  cognition.  We 
tacitly  recognise  and  affirm  the  world  of  the  book  but  we  hardly  arrive  at  insight.  This  I  call 
identification.  On  the  other  hand,  imagination  is  that  dynamic  process  involving  the  shift 
from  identification  into  what,  retrospectively,  can  be  designated  as  abstractive  cognition.  I 
shall  designate  this  retrospective  cognition  as  the  discursive.  That  identification  is  the 
9 primary  mode  of  assimilation  is  reflected  in  texts  ancient  and  modern. 
We  move  between  identification,  imagination  and  the  discursive,  each  stage  representing  a 
mode  of  relation  with  distinct  prescriptive  effects.  The  discursive  allows  us  to  posit  the 
conceptual  distinction  between  form  and  content.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  process  of 
imagining,  form  is  submerged,  latent  in  a  kind  of  seeing  that  is  also  understanding  and 
involves  a  synthesis  of  head  and  heart.  Both  Hopkins,  in  his  disclosure  of  inscape,  and 
Cezanne  in  his  pursuit  of  the  motif,  find  individuating  forms  in  the  context  of  nature.  Such 
disclosures  seem  to  be  products  of  a  double  prescription  whereby  the  imposition  of  a  frame 
structures  the  content  within  it  in  such  a  way  as  to  render  that  previously  latent  structure 
expressive  -  the  initial  prescription  makes  manifest  an  holistic  structure  which,  in  turn,  shapes 
the  complex  of  our  responses.  In  such  imaginative  transactions  content  is  form  is  content. 
The  nature  of  double  prescription  is  explored  more  fully  in  Chapter  2  and  elaborated 
throughout  the  text. 
It  is  possible  to  conceive  of  some  primal  state  where  the  discerning  of  inscape  -  holistic 
structures  -  had  implications  for  survival.  The  phenomenon  of  camouflage  in  animals  -  the 
disruption  of  pattern  -  supposes  this.  However,  in  a  modern,  urban  context  such  a  faculty  is 
hardly  exercised  -  indeed,  our  environment  is  saturated  with  cues  that  invite  ready 
identification  rather  than  discernment.  However,  in  reducing  the  world  to  manageable 
proportions  we  effectively  consign  areas  and  aspects  of  it  to  redundancy.  In  order  to  reach 
this  substrate  -  with  its  potentiality  of  wider and  richer  experience  -  our  habits  of  perception 
have  to  be  subverted.  Our  sense  of  ourselves,  however,  is  profoundly  dependent  upon 
conservative  paradigms  -  this  makes  the  passage  to  a  widened  experience  difficult  not  least 
because  such  paradigms  are  inescapably  competitive.  Once  superseded,  a  paradigm  that  has 
engaged  identification  will  appear  to  its  former  inhabitant  as  absurd  -  thereby  generating  a 
pervasive  sense  of  disturbance.  There  is,  then,  a  deeply  problematical  psychological 
dimension  to  our  modes  of  imagining. 
The  issues  concerning  the  modes  in  which  we,  as  individuals,  inhabit  paradigms  are 
reflected  on  the  larger  scale  at  the  interface  between  cultures.  This  is  evident  in  the 
10 circumstance  of  colonisation,  involving  the  projection  of  European  values  and  modes  of 
thought,  and  within  European  societies  themselves  in  periods  of  social  change.  The  modes  of 
imagination  are  revealed  in  how  we  assimilate  experience  in  both  the  geographical  and 
historical  contexts.  The  expressive  power  of  the  historical  novel  supposes  an  imaginative 
transfiguration  of  history  which  is  no  different  in  principle  from  the  rendering  of  other 
experience  which  we  have  considered  so  far. 
Failure  to  acknowledge  distinctions  between  identification,  imagination  and  the  discursive, 
and  the  shifting  relations  between  them,  results  in  muddles.  To  borrow  E.  M.  Forster's  terms, 
'mysteries'  are  manifest  as  'muddles'  to  discursive  scrutiny  -  put  in  another  way,  'muddles' 
obstruct  our  'passage'  to  'mysteries'.  '  In  his  analysis  of  dreams,  Freud  distinguishes  the 
manifest  dream  from  its  latent  content.  Priority  is  thereby  given  to  the  discursive.  This 
strategy  inevitably  reduces  the  content  of  dreams  to  signs  and  referents  whereas  there  are 
hints  in  Freud's  own  examples  that  the  logic  of  dreams  is  fundamentally  analogical. 
Discursive  explication  then  effects  that  vitiation  characteristic  of  the  fate  of  other  expressions 
of  the  imagination.  In  some  of  his  short  stories  James  Joyce  reflects  parallel  issues  in 
distinguishing  between  the  experience  of  children  and  adult  interpretation  of  it. 
It  follows  that  just  as  the  nature  of  an  artefact  changes  according  to  the  mode  in  which  it  is 
apprehended  so  the  nature  of  the  self  changes  -  the  imagination  has  implications  for  identity. 
Viewed  discursively  the  self  appears  as  an  object,  or  an  object  that  cannot  be  found,  or  a 
collection  of  selves.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  context  of  imagining,  the  self  and  the  world 
and  the  self  and  the  other  are  engaged  in  reciprocal  extension.  In  the  context  of  the  nihilism 
that  follows  from  the  apparent  contraction  of  the  Romantic  imagination  into  mere 
subjectivity,  Virginia  Woolf  seems  to  find  a  more  modest  role  for  imagining  that  escapes  the 
charge  of  subjectivity:  through  the  mediation  of  art,  we  manufacture  our  own  meaning  and, 
thereby,  further  our  individuation.  In  some  ways  her  thought  seems  similar  to  that  of 
Nietzsche  in  that  the  rejection  of  Romanticism  and  its  metaphysics  leads  to  nihilism  -  what 
4  E.  M.  Forster,  A  Passage  to  India,  cd.  by  Oliver  Stallybrass,  reprinted  from  the  Abinger  Edition  1982 
(London:  Penguin  Books,  1936). 
11 Nietzsche  calls  a  `sure  nothing's  -  and  out  of  the  far  side  of  this  suffering  we  struggle  to  some 
kind  of  aesthetic  affirmation. 
But  is  it  safe  to  generalise  about  Romanticism  and  its  association  with  subjectivity?  Is  it 
possible  to  distinguish  the  Romantic  concept  from  the  underlying  nature  of  the  imagination 
itself?  Rather  than  reflecting  some  subjective  escape,  what  seems  to  distinguish  much  of 
Wordsworth's  writing  is  precisely  the  clarity  of  his  observations  of  nature  and  its 
topographical  accuracy.  On  the  other  hand,  he  is  emphatic  that  certain  imaginative 
transactions  involve  not  only  a  shaping  power  in  the  observing  eye  but  power  as  disclosed  in 
nature  itself.  His  poetry  would  seem,  then,  to  reflect  an  awareness  of  double  prescription  -  but 
his  rationalisations  of  the  phenomenon  resort  to  metaphysics.  Paradoxically,  Wordsworth  is 
at  the  height  of  his  powers  in  lamenting  the  passing  away  of  his  imaginative  capacity  -  his 
account  of  such  experience  is,  characteristically,  retrospective.  Romantic  symbolism  seems  to 
presuppose  double  prescription  but  within  the  context  of  a  strong  sense  of  the  purposive:  in 
this  way  imagination  is  associated  with  access  to  the  sacred.  It  follows  that  when  the 
imaginative  capacity  is  lost,  so  too  is  the  numinous.  What  may  be  the  natural  history  of  every 
imagination  becomes  taken  up  in  a  myth  of  inevitable  decline. 
The  consideration  of  the  possible  distinctions  between  the  Romantic  Imagination  and 
imagination  as  we  conceive  it  may  be  reconstrued  in  terms  of  differences  in  outcomes, 
specifically,  between  subjective  pleasure  and  insight.  Such  a  discussion,  it  seemed  to  me, 
demanded  an  excursion  into  Kant. 
Beauty,  for  Kant,  seems  to  involve  the  disinterested  engagement  of  the  imagination  in 
aesthetic  structures.  In  finding  them  beautiful  we  conceive  of  such  structures  as  purposive 
wholes  but  wholes  without  a  specifically  conceptual  purpose.  This  bears  a  strong 
resemblance  to  Hopkins's  notion  that  poetry  is  speech  `employed  to  carry  the  inscape  for  the 
inscape's  sake.  '6  Such  an  argument  would  seem  to  confine  beauty  to  relatively  trivial 
experiences  in  the  context  of  the  fine  arts.  But  inscape  depends  upon  a  logic  that  supposes 
5  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  trans.  by  R.  J.  Hollingdale,  repr.  1990  (London:  Penguin 
Classics,  1973),  p.  40. 
6  Gerard  Manley  Hopkins,  'Poetry  and  Verse',  in  Gerard  Manley  Hopkins:  Poems  and  Prose,  ed.  by 
W.  H.  Gardner,  repr.  1985  (London:  Penguin,  1953),  p.  xxii. 
12 internal  relations  between  that  which  is  represented  and  forms  of  life.  Is  it  that  in 
representational  art,  Kant's  finality  of  form  presupposes  finality  of  ends  -  that  art  is 
inseparable  from  insight?  What,  perhaps,  in  the  end,  distinguishes  formal  finality  from 
finality  of  ends  is  a  specific  kind  of  intention.  This  aesthetic  mode  can  be  directly  engaged  by 
forms  in  nature  -  in  which  case  purposiveness  can  be  reconstrued  as  purpose.  Through  such  a 
transaction  nature  becomes  symbolic,  it  points  towards  a  creator  -  the  concrete  points  to  the 
abstract.  My  point  is,  that  where  the  imagination  arrives  at  insight  the  very  nature  of  the 
transaction  renders  it  available  to  the  further  step  of  the  ascription  of  purpose  -  but  that 
ascription  depends  upon  a  distinctive  metaphysical  rationalisation:  this  specific  aspect  of  the 
religious  has  its  ground  in  the  aesthetic. 
It  may  be  then  that  imagination  has  the  capacity  to  illuminate  reality  but  how,  more 
specifically,  does  this  come  about?  It  seems  that  the  epistemological  issues  are  sharply 
focused  in  the  nature  of  metaphor.  But  this  would  seem  to  involve  a  peculiar  paradox:  how  is 
it  that  'seeing  as'  -  seeing  some  state  of  affairs  through  the  mediation  of  something  else  -  can 
lead  to  insight? 
The  mediation  effected  through  metaphor  in  the  process  of  imagining  supposes  both  a 
semantic  context  and  a  projective  reference  whose  power  of  depiction  is  manifest  in  an 
holistic  structure.  On  the  other  hand,  the  explicative  power  of  the  discursive  is  confined  to  a 
cumulative  series  of  signs  and  referents.  In  other  words,  consideration  of  the  epistemological 
issues  must  take  account  of  the  relational  modes  within  which  our  relations  with  the  world 
and  texts  are  mediated.  This  is  a  fundamental  point  in  my  argument.  Critical  discourse  tacitly 
assumes  that  its  characteristic  discursive  relation  is  the  paradigm  case  of  understanding. 
However,  its  structures  of  interpretation  must  be  beside  the  point,  establishing  a  sort  of  critical 
idealism,  unless  their  role  as  elements  in  the  dialectic  of  imagining  is  understood.  The 
dialectic  involves  passage  between  modes.  Metaphor  supposes  insight  in  so  far  as  it  refigures 
aspects  of  the  world  and  extends  our  ways  of  being  in  it.  This  involves  the  disclosure  of 
internal  relations  in  the  context  of  projective  reference  -  Wittgenstein  refers  to  'the  law  of 
13 projection  which  projects  the  symphony  into  the  language  of  musical  notation.  " 
It  seems  to  me  that  this  dialectic,  though  it  may  be  obscure  in  my  exposition,  is  in  fact 
reflected  with  extraordinary  power  and  clarity  in  the  Gospels.  There,  figuralism  emerges  as  a 
characteristic  device  in  the  engendering  of  meaning.  Figuralism  involves  an  internal  relation 
projected  through  time.  Both  metaphor  and  figuralism  effect  closure  but  the  latter  is, 
characteristically,  couched  in  terms  of  the  fulfilment  of  God's  purposes.  Such  closure  is 
peculiarly  vulnerable  to  ideological  appropriation.  But  the  parables  and  miracles  of  Jesus 
exhibit  a  pattern  where  ideology  is  transcended  in  the  dialectic  of  imagining.  The  dialectic  is 
exemplified,  above  all,  in  the  climax  of  Christ's  Passion  where  ideological  man  is  transcended 
in  the  revelation  of  the  larger  -  in  this  case,  unconditional  -  self.  This  pattern  is  reiterated  in 
the  fiction  of  Patrick  White  where,  in  effect,  a  contemporary  re-working  of  the  mystery  plays 
is  offered.  The  centrality  of  the  dialectic  suggests,  that  in  the  psychological  context, 
imagining  is  a  key  process  in  facilitating  the  evolution  of  the  self  from  the  ego-identity  -  the 
point  is  anticipated  in  the  discussion  of  To  the  Lighthouse. 
Important  aspects  of  the  issues  regarding  both  epistemology  and  individuation  are  reflected 
in  The  Birth  of  Tragedy  -  though  Nietzsche's  immediate  aim  is  to  explore  Hellenic  art  and 
culture.  In  his  responses  both  to  Nietzsche  and  Schiller,  Jung  acknowledges  their 
contributions  to  the  understanding  of  individuation  -  he  can  see  reflected  in  their  work  his 
theory  of  psychological  types  -  but  judges  that  their  'aestheticism'  is  a  serious  shortcoming. 
Jung  would  locate  the  psychological  issues  in  the  religious  domain.  Any  discussion  of 
aesthetics  that  assumes  a  Kantian  disinterestedness  may  be  open  to  Jung's  charge.  However, 
our  imaginative  transactions  and  their  evolution  into  symbolism  -  the  revelation  of  value  in  a 
purposive  context  -  are  one  avenue  to  the  sacred  and  may  take  us  further  than  Jung  had 
supposed.  Indeed,  refiguration  through  metaphor  and  the  contingent  achievement  of 
impossible  perspectives  through  fictions  would  seem  to  be  important  means  of  achieving 
differentiation  from  the'shadow'.  Jung  observes: 
'  Ludwig  Wittgenstein,  Tractatus  Logico-Philosophicus,  trans.  by  D.  F.  Pears  and  B.  F.  McGuiness,  3rd 
impression  1966  (London:  Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul,  1961),  p.  39. 
14 Through  the  withdrawal  of  projections,  conscious  knowledge  slowly  developed. 
[...  ]  All  gaps  in  our  actual  knowledge  are  still  filled  out  with  projections.  We  are 
still  so  sure  we  know  what  other  people  think  or  what  their  true  character  is.  We 
are  convinced  that  certain  people  have  all  the  bad  qualities  we  do  not  know  in 
ourselves  [...  ].  We  must  still  be  exceedingly  careful  not  to  project  our  own 
shadows  too  shamelessly;  we  are  still  swamped  with  projected  illusions.  ' 
All  the  modes  of  imagination  must  have  roles  in  facilitating  or  obstructing  individuation. 
As  we  shift  from  one  to  another  so  Proteus  changes  his  shape  -  but  only  in  one  mode  will  he 
surrender  his  revelation. 
8  Carl  Jung,  Psychology  and  Religion:  West  and  East,  trans.  by  R.  F.  C.  Hull,  2nd  edn.  (London:  Routledge 
and  Kegan  Paul,  1969),  p.  83. 
15 Chanter  One 
Identification  and  Imagination 
There  can  be  no  neutral  observers.  That  what  we  see  of  the  world,  the  book,  the  play  is 
selective  and  shaped  by  habit,  convention  -  favoured  perspectives  -  is  well  documented, 
indeed,  the  very  possibility  of  seeing  supposes  our  employment  of  prescriptive  structures  of 
interpretation.  However,  that  there  are  prior  modes  of  relation,  fundamental  and  exclusive 
kinds  of  orientation,  seems  less  clearly  understood.  the  evidence  is  to  be  found  in 
responses  and  critical  discourse  that  are  at  cross  purposes.  Our  most  characteristic  mode 
of  relation  with  texts  involves  a  rather  elusive,  passive  mode  of  cognition,  where  we  are 
hardly  pushed  into  insight.  This,  I  call  identification.  On  the  other  hand,  imagination  is 
that  dynamic  process  involving  the  shift  from  identification  into  what,  retrospectively,  can 
be  designated  as  abstractive  cognition.  That  identification  is  a  primary  mode  of 
assimilation  is  reflected  in  texts  ancient  and  modern. 
Christopher  Hampton's  play  Savages  is  set  in  Brazil  in  the  early  1970s.  It  expresses  his 
outrage  at  the  genocide  practised  against  the  Brazilian  Indians  in  recent  times  -  though  the 
process  has  been  under  way  since  the  sixteenth  century. 
The  specifically  dramatic  impact  of  the  play  emerges  from  the  tension  generated  by  the 
kidnapping  of  a  British  diplomat  by  left-wing  guerrillas.  On  this  plot  is  hung,  on  the  one 
hand,  scenes  depicting  something  of  the  rich  traditions  of  myth  and  legend  associated  with 
the  forest  Indians  and  on  the  other,  accounts  of  atrocities  which  they  have  suffered.  The 
details  are  shocking.  The  horror  is  well  established  before  the  diplomat's  attendant  captor 
recounts  the  following  incident,  an  incident,  which,  in  my  experience,  makes  many  students 
laugh: 
CARLOS  I've  had  a  good  day,  very  successful  operation. 
WEST  Really? 
CARLOS  Yes,  I  rang  the  police  this  morning  and  told  them  the  American  Embassy 
was  being  attacked  by  a  gang  of  thugs  disguised  as  an  army  unit  and  then  I  rang 
army  headquarters  and  told  them  the  American  Embassy  was  being  attacked  by  a 
gang  of  thugs  in  police  uniform.  Then,  I  went  and  watched  from  a  safe  distance. 
Most  satisfactory. 
WEST  You  mean  it  worked? 
CARLOS  Three  dead,  a  dozen  or  so  wounded  and  a  certain  amount  of 
damage  to  property.  ' 
Christopher  Hampton,  Savages,  repr.  1990  (London:  Faber  and  Faber,  1974),  p.  63. 
16 Why  is  it  that  the  ready  sympathy  for  the  predicament  of  the  Indians  generated  in  earlier 
parts  of  the  play  is  not,  generally,  available  for  human  kind  slaughtered  in  these  different 
circumstances? 
It  is  as  if  the  power  of  the  grim  detail  concerning  the  atrocities  against  the  Indians,  and 
the  skill  of  its  representation,  draw  us  into  identification  with  their  plight:  a  favoured 
method  of  extermination  was  to  distribute  blankets  from  the  smallpox  wards  of  hospitals; 
sacks  of  sugar  laced  with  arsenic  were  dropped  from  aircraft  into  villages.  Such  detail  is 
placed  in  a  context  of  myth  and  legend  that  invites  recognition  of  common  humanity  and 
common  strategies  for  coping  with  the  vicissitudes  of  life.  Yet  the  paradox  remains:  it 
seems  that  the  very  success  of  this  presentation  effects  a  kind  of  blindness  to  the  humanity 
of  what  could  be  identified  as  the  enemy  -  though  not  even  the  specific  enemies  with  regard 
to  the  predicament  of  the  Indians.  That  somebody  suffers  we  seem  to  find  a  source  of 
satisfaction. 
The  pull  of  identification  is  considerably  enhanced  by  the  gratifying  complementarity  of 
the  intrinsic  irony  of  the  incident.  To  see  the  irony  supposes  a  detached,  `aesthetic' 
response.  As  we  enjoy  it  we  are  blinded  to  the  suffering  engendered  by  the  mayhem.  To 
arrive  at  the  suffering  is  now  a  conceptual  problem  involving  a  shift  in  Gestalt:  for  an  adult 
to  protest  against  Tom  and  Jerry  on  moral  grounds  involves  a  conceptual  mistake  which  is 
the  reverse  of  this  problem. 
In  Savages,  identification  is  not  the  final  response  calculated  by  the  playwright.  West  and 
Carlos  extend  the  scene  by  trading  stories  about  the  atrocities  of  the  Brazilian  Death  Squad 
and  it  concludes  with  an  observation  concerning  the  behaviour  of  children  cutting  up 
worms,  pulling  the  legs  from  lizards  and  so  on,  thereby  drawing  to  our  attention  a  basic 
disposition  to  inflict  suffering.  (p.  68)  The  theme  is  developed  in  the  following  scene  where 
there  is  a  numbing  account  of  a  young  Indian  girl  being  chopped  in  half  with  a  machete;  it  is 
taken  from  the  transcription  of  an  actual  interview  recorded  by  Padre  Edgar  Smith,  S.  J. 
sometime  in  1963.  (pp.  68-7  1) 
In  my  experience  it  is  at  this  point  that  the  weight  of  emotion  generated  by  the 
predicament  of  the  Indians  is  now  sufficient  to  crystallise  into  an  abstractive  cognition  that 
17 allows  connections  to  be  made  with  all  who  suffer.  The  concomitant  value  generated  in  the 
recognition  -  however  momentary  -  is  the  unconditional  value  of  human  life.  There  is  a 
change  in  Gestalt,  a  shift  in  paradigm  that  transcends  the  partiality  of  identification.  We  are 
shifted  from  natural  sympathy  -  grounded  in  the  specific  case  and,  therefore,  of  its  nature, 
partial  -  through  an  abstractive  cognition,  to  an  insight  universal  in  its  application. 
Crucially,  the  insight  is  charged  up  with  experience  of  the  value. 
Though  grounded  in  the  affective,  the  shift  in  Gestalt  is  associated  with  the  emergence  of 
a  controlled,  sequential  pattern  of  events  in  the  play;  given  the  affective  response,  the 
pattern  allows  Hampton  to  engineer  the  potential  abstractive  responses  of  the  audience 
without  incursion  into  the  didactic.  We  arrive  at  insight  through  experience  of  and  in  the 
text.  It  is  the  pattern  that,  in  effect,  serves  to  universalise  -  in  a  sort  of  Kantian  sense  -  the 
moral  values  adumbrated  in  the  fictional  events;  insight  can  now  be  reproduced  through  our 
controlled  imagining.  The  'imperative'  here  is  not,  of  course,  'categorical',  it  does  not  have 
the  force  of  logical  necessity.  On  the  other  hand  its  sanction  lies  precisely  in  its  being 
reproducible  -  given  access  through  the  imagination.  In  general,  the  aesthetic  imagination 
rehearses  the  activity  of  the  moral  imagination  -  that  is its  great  educational  value  -  and  in 
some  cases,  as  in  Savages,  these  operations  coincide. 
I  shall  argue  that  identification  is  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for 
imagination.  By'identification'  I  mean  something  akin  to  Edmund  Burke's'sympathy': 
For  sympathy  must  be  considered  as  a  sort  of  substitution,  by  which  we  are  put  into 
the  place  of  another  man,  and  affected  in  many  respects  as  he  is  affected  [....  ]  It  is 
by  this  principle  chiefly  that  poetry,  painting,  and  other  affecting  arts,  transfuse  their 
passions  from  one  breast  to  another.  2 
David  Hume  observes: 
[...  ]  wherever  we  go,  whatever  we  reflect  on  or  converse  about,  every  thing  still 
presents  us  with  the  view  of  human  happiness  or misery,  and  excites  in  our  breast  a 
sympathetic  movement  of  pleasure  or  uneasiness  [...  ]. 
2  Edmund  Burke,  A  Philosophical  Enquiry  into  the  Origin  of  our  Ideas  of  the  Sublime  and  Beautiful,  ed.  by 
Adam  Phillips,  World's  Classics,  repr.  1992  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1990),  p.  41. 
18 Every  movement  of  the  theatre,  by  a  skilful  poet,  is  communicated,  as  it  were  by 
magic,  to  the  spectators;  who  weep,  tremble,  resent,  rejoice,  and  are  enflamed  with 
all  the  variety  of  passions,  which  actuate  the  several  personages  of  the  drama.  3 
Natural  sympathy  is  the  basic  resource  out  of  which,  by  means  of  a  series  of  nudging, 
abstractive  cognitions,  Hampton  generates  our  insight.  The  insight  involves  bringing  to 
consciousness  the  cognition  that  is  latent  in  identification  but  which  is,  in  this  case, 
characteristically,  blocked  by  indignation.  This  shift  from  identification  to  the  abstractive  is 
my  first,  tentative,  definition  of  imagination:  it  is  manifest  as  the  process,  grounded  in 
empathy,  of  bringing  latent  abstractive  cognition  to  consciousness.  Given  the  sympathetic 
ground  of  imagining,  value  is  the  inevitable  accompaniment,  indeed,  is  bound  in,  to  the 
emergent  abstractive  cognition  before  its  polarisation  into  fact  and  value  -a  characteristic  of 
ratiocination.  I  shall  designate  the  mode  of  relation  associated  with  ratiocination  as  the 
discursive.  Imagination  facilitates  abstraction. 
It  is  not  my  intention  to  discuss  at  this  point  the  psychological  nature  of  identification  but 
to  explore  some  of  its  epistemological  implications  with  regard  to  our  assimilation  of  texts 
and  artefacts.  Nevertheless,  Freud's  discussion  of  identification  is  suggestive.  In  discussing 
the  'transmutation  of  instincts  of  the  super  ego'  he  writes: 
The  basis  of  the  process  is  what  we  call  an  identification,  that  is  to  say  that  one  ego 
becomes  like  another,  which  results  in  the  first  ego  behaving  itself  in  certain  respects 
in  the  same  way  as  the  second,  it  imitates  it,  and  as  it  were  takes  it  into  itself.  This 
identification  has  been  not  inappropriately  compared  with  the  oral  cannibalistic 
incorporation  of  other  persons.  Identification  is  a  very  important  kind  of 
relationship  with  another  person,  probably  the  most  primitive.  4 
Here  identification  is  associated  primarily  with  the  response  to  authority  figures; 
generalised,  identification  becomes  a  species  of  'the  libidinal  cathexis  of  objects'.  (p.  464.  ) 
It  is  in  this  broader  sense  that  I  would  adapt  the  concept  for  my  own  purposes  -  usefully 
retaining  the  association  of  the  artist's  authority.  Freud  clearly  relates  identification  to  the 
positing  of  the  super  ego.  I  would  argue  that  in  the  context  of  art,  imaginative  transactions 
are  brought  about  through  abstractive  activity  arising  out  of  identification  which  is,  indeed, 
'the  most  primitive'  relation  -  but  it  requires  to  be  transposed  through  abstraction  to  attain 
3  David  Hume,  An  Enquiry  Concerning  the  Principles  ofMorals,  ed.  by  J.  B.  Schneewind  (Indianapolis: 
Hackett,  1983),  p.  44. 
4  Sigmund  Freud,  New  Introductory  Lectures  on  Psychoanalysis  (London:  Hogarth,  1949),  pp.  85-86. 
19 its  aesthetic  or  moral  efficacy.  It  may  be,  then,  that  identification  is  the  ground  of  the 
imaginative  and  moral  life.  It  is  an  elusive  and  subtle  relation  that  can  shift  and  merge  into 
fantasy  or  imagining.  Fantasy  can  be  blindness;  imagination  is  associated  with  insight. 
Mimesis  and  Imagination 
Plato's  attack  on  tragedy  depends  on  his  analysis  of  the  logic  of  imitation  -  mimesis  -  and  the 
inherent  distortion  effected  by  representation  upon  reality.  Furthermore,  the  imitative  poet 
is  tempted  by  what  is  easiest  to  imitate  -  there  is  little  dramatic  potential  in  the  depiction  of 
'the  temper,  which  is  wise  and  calm':  his  business  is  with  the'peevish  and  changeful  temper's 
Drama  thrives  on  tension.  The  scope  of  Plato's  indictment  is  obvious  in  its  applicability  to 
much  that  occurs  in  the  popular  media,  in  things  'that  are  worthless  when  tried  by  the 
standard  of  truth.  '  (p.  349)  Yet,  his  heaviest  indictment  fell  upon  his  beloved  Homer,  in  that 
in  representing  the  suffering  hero  the  poet  excites  sympathy  so  powerful  that  we  'give 
ourselves  up  to  be  led  along.  '  (p.  350)  The  capitulation  to  emotion  runs  counter  to  that  self- 
control  through  the  exercise  of  reason  that  we'pride  ourselves  upon.  '  (p.  350). 
Traditionally,  the  attack  on  tragedy  and  the  poets  has  been  countered  by  the  assertion  of 
the  didactic  function  of  poetry  and  the  appropriation  of  Aristotle  in  the  rationalisation  of 
that  end.  Sir  Philip  Sidney  presents  a  typical  case  in  conceiving  of  poetry  as  a  sort  of 
inspired  propaganda  'full  of  virtue-breeding  delightfulness.  '6  But  his  defence  does  not 
adequately  address  the  logic  of  imagination  that  would  allow  for  the  emergence  of  art  as 
didactic  -  Sidney  merely  asserts  that  it  is  so.  In  effect,  the  moral  typology  is,  mercifully,  a 
function  of  a  retrospective  rationalisation  that  presupposes  prior  imaginative  engagement: 
Sidney  talks  as  if  poetry  is  propaganda  but  his  discourse  presupposes  prior  imagining. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  his  Poetics  Aristotle  seems  to  regard  the  ethical  as  incidental  and  is 
quite  clear  that  mimesis  in  tragedy  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  plot: 
S  The  Republic  of  Plato,  trans.  by  J.  L.  Davies  and  David  James  Vaughan  (New  York:  Macmillan,  1900), 
p.  349. 
6  Sir  Philip  Sidney,  A  Defence  of  Poetry,  this  edition  1984  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1966),  p.  74. 
20 [...  ]  it  is  not  for  the  purpose  of  presenting  their  characters  that  the  agents  engage  in 
action,  but  rather  it  is  for  the  sake  of  their  actions  that  they  take  on  the  characters 
that  they  have.  Thus,  what  happens  -  that  is,  the  plot  -  is  the  end  for  which  a 
tragedy  exists,  and  the  end  or purpose  is  the  most  important  thing  of  all.  What  is 
more,  without  action  there  could  not  be  a  tragedy,  but  there  would  be  without 
characterisation.  In  fact,  the  tragedies  of  most  of  our  recent  playwrights  are  lacking 
in  the  ethical  element.  7 
Whereas  a  casual  account  of  a  dramatic  plot  would  probably  represent  it  as  a  chronological 
sequence  of  events,  Aristotle  seems  to  have  something  more  subtle  in  mind.  Tragedy 
presupposes  mimesis,  but  involves  the  imitation  of  a  completed  action  -  that  is,  the 
magnitude  of  the  action  must  be  contained  within  a  period  of  time  'which  can  be  easily 
embraced  by  the  memory.  '  (p.  53)  It  is  as  if  the  plot  could  be  understood  only 
retrospectively  when  all  its  components  were  revealed. 
The  beginning  generates  a  necessity  or  probability  developed  through  the  middle  and 
connected  by  necessity  or  probability  to  the  end.  That  is,  the  plot  is  conceived  of  as  an 
autonomous,  causal  system  -  it  constitutes  an  intelligible  structure  extended  through  time. 
The  structure  is  to  be  comprehended  as  a  whole;  it  generates  its  own  probabilities  and 
necessities;  its  time  is  not  clock  time  -  it  is  a  function  of  the  structure  itself. 
Aristotle's  conception  seems  to  have  much  in  common  with  Socrates'  comments  in  the 
Phaedrus: 
[...  ]  every  discourse  must  be  organised,  like  a  living  thing,  with  a  body  of  its  own,  as 
it  were,  so  as  not  to  be  headless  or  footless,  but  to  have  a  middle  and  members, 
composed  in  fitting  relation  to  each  other  and  to  the  whole! 
The  organic  nature  of  Aristotle's  conception  of  plot  is  confirmed  in  the  dependence  of  its 
parts: 
[...  ]  the  events  [...  ]  must  be  so  organised  that  if  any  one  of  them  is  displaced  or 
taken  away,  the  whole  will  be  shaken  and  put  out  of  joint.  " 
In  the  work  of  a  superior  poet,  pity  and  fear  are  generated  by  the  inner  structure.  In  other 
words,  pity  and  fear  are  manifestations  of  our  experience  of  the  structure  in  its  expressive 
mode  -  we  are  caught  by  the  affective  power  of  the  plot.  These  emotions  are  a  function  of 
'  Aristotle,  Poetics,  trans.  James  Hutton  (New  York:  W.  W.  Norton,  1982  ),  p.  51. 
s  Plato,  Phaedrus,  from  Euthyphro,  Apology,  Crito,  Phaedo,  Phaedrus,  trans.  H.  N.  Fowler  (London: 
Heinemann,  1926),  p.  529. 
9  Aristotle,  Poetics,  p.  54. 
21 the  action  itself,  and  can  be  experienced  as  structure  only  retrospectively.  In  this  way, 
experience  -  grounded  in  immediate,  spontaneous  identification  -  is  rendered  through 
imagination  into  abstraction  so  that  the  plot  may  then  be  apprehended  as  a  connected, 
discrete  structure,  framed  by  the  limits  of  its  autonomous  causality  -  the  resolved  action  of 
the  play. 
It  is  my  contention  that  the  defining,  holistic  cognition  emerges  in  the  process  of 
catharsis  -  emotions  are  purged  in  the  act  of  understanding,  in  seeing  the  plot  as  a 
completed  structure.  For  the  Pythagoreans,  catharsis,  purification,  was  associated  with  the 
practice  of  philosophia,  the  extraction  of  limit  from  the  unlimited: 
[...  ]  the  purification  and  salvation  of  the  soul  depended  not  merely  [...  ]  on  initiation 
and  ritual  purity,  but  on  philosophia,  and  this  word,  then  as  now,  meant  using  the 
powers  of  reason  and  observation  in  order  to  gain  understanding.  10 
The  more  extended  the  plot,  'while  still  remaining  perspicuous',  11  the  more  beautiful:  here 
the  tension  between  what  has  been  unresolved  and  the  resolution  achieved  in  the  process  of 
imaginative  apprehension  is  nicely  caught. 
T.  S.  Eliot  touches  upon  the  significance  of  the  emergent  pattern  in'Four  Quartets': 
[...  ]  Words,  after  speech,  reach 
Into  the  silence.  Only  by  the  form,  the  pattern, 
Can  words  or  music  reach 
The  stillness,  as  a  Chinese  jar  still 
Moves  perpetually  in  its  stillness.  12 
Transposed  into  the  context  of  a  life  the  pattern  that  emerges  in  moments  of  imaginative 
apprehension  bestows  a  sense  of  higher  purpose: 
It  seems,  as  one  becomes  older, 
That  the  past  has  another  pattern,  and  ceases  to  be  a  mere 
sequence[...  ]. 
The  moments  of  happiness  -  not  the  sense  of  well-being, 
Fruition,  fulfilment,  security  or affection, 
Or  even  a  very  good  dinner,  but  the  sudden  illumination  -  We  had  the  experience  but  missed  the  meaning, 
And  approach  to  the  meaning  restores  the  experience 
10  W.  K.  C.  Guthrie,  A  History  of  Greek  Philosophy,  repr.  1997  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press, 
1962),  p.  205. 
11  Aristotle,  Poetics,  p.  53. 
12  T.  S.  Eliot,  Burnt  Norton',  from  Four  Quartets,  repr.  1968  (London:  Faber  and  Faber,  1959),  p.  19,1.139. 
22 In  a  different  form.  13 
It  is  the  location  of  such  patterns  of  life  in  the  larger  teleological  context  that  accounts,  for 
example,  for  the  sense  of  fatality  in  Greek  drama  and,  generally,  goes  some  way  to 
explaining  the  characteristic  association  of  the  imaginative  and  the  religious,  particularly,  in 
Romantic  art. 
It  would  seem  that  in  the  Poetics,  catharsis  is  a  precondition  for  and,  indeed,  constitutes 
the  experiential  context  for  the  very  process  of  concept  formation  itself  -  in  so  far  as  that 
involves  the  emergence  of  an  intelligible  structure  in  a  teleological  context.  The  plot, 
therefore,  as  Aristotle  claims,  is  precisely  'the  soul  of  tragedy'.  (p.  51)  In  this  way  the 
element  of  reason  is  reinstated  at  the  heart  of  the  unfolding  process  of  imagining:  what 
begins  in  the  excitation  of  pity  and  terror  is  resolved  in  the  understanding  of  an  implacable 
logic. 
In  his  Biographia  Literaria,  Coleridge  argues  that  the  practice  of  philosophy  involves 
making  distinctions.  He  suggests  that  the  concept  imagination  includes  the  concept  fancy  - 
'two  conceptions  perfectly  distinct  are  confused  under  one  and  the  same  word'.  14  Fancy  is 
the  mechanical  process  whereby  the  memory  is  exploited  to  find  appropriate  imagery  in 
which  to  dress  pre-existing  ideas.  The  examination  of  any  soliloquy  by  Hamlet,  for 
example,  shows  him  thinking  in  imagery  -  he  is  imagining,  on  the  other  hand,  Claudius 
thinks,  then  dresses  his  thought  in  the  colours  of  rhetoric  -  this  is  an  operation  of  fancy.  I 
would  suggest  that  imagination  contains  within  it  yet  another  concept  -  identification  -  and 
is  precisely  that  which  Plato  attacks  in  his  polemic  against  the  poets. 
Identification  is  that  unthinking,  appropriative  fantasy  that,  in  Plato's  terms,  gratifies  'that 
senseless  part  which,  instead  of  distinguishing  the  greater  from  the  less,  regards  the  same 
things  now  as  great,  and  now  as  small,  and  manufactures  fantastic  phantoms  that  are  very 
widely  removed  from  truth.  '"  We'earnestly  praise  as  a  good  poet  the  writer  who  can  bring 
us  as  much  as  possible  into  this  frame  of  mind.  '  (p.  350) 
13  T.  S.  Eliot,  'The  Dry  Salvages',  from  Four  Quartets,  1.85. 
14  Samuel  Taylor  Coleridge,  Biographia  Literaria,  ed.  by  George  Watson,  repr.  1977  (London:  Dent, 
1965),  Chapter  4,  p.  50. 
15  Plato,  The  Republic,  p.  350. 
23 It  follows  that  Aristotle's  argument  complements  but  does  not  refute  the  Platonic  attack 
for  Plato  has,  in  effect,  outlined  the  pitfalls  of  identification.  On  the  other  hand,  in 
describing  the  process  whereby  the  plot  emerges  in  the  context  of  catharsis  Aristotle  has 
acknowledged  that  an  imaginative  transaction  is  at  the  heart  of  the  drama  facilitating  the 
emergence  of  an  abstractive,  holistic  cognition.  The  distinction  between  Plato  and  Aristotle 
resolves  into  that  between  different  modes  of  assimilation  -  identification  and  imagination. 
Perhaps  for  his  own  didactic  purposes,  Plato  conflates  these.  Nevertheless,  Plato's 
indictment  of  fantasy  stands. 
There  is,  though,  a  further  complication:  the  nature  of  the  artefact  changes  in  relation  to 
shifts  in  the  assimilating  modes  -  that  is  to  say,  whether  the  text  is  mediated  through 
identification  or  imagination  has  epistemological  implications.  The  experiencing  of  a  text  as 
tragedy  depends,  logically,  in  the  experience  of  catharsis,  whereas,  the  text  may  be  engaged 
at  the  prior  level  of  identification  only.  On  the  other  hand,  some  level  of  cognition  is 
implicit  in  identification  -  at  least,  its  immediate  affects  presuppose  recognition. 
Imagination  can  be  understood  as  a  generic  concept,  which  includes  the  concepts  of 
fancy  and  identification.  On  the  other  hand,  more  specifically,  it  is  that  process  of 
understanding  that  posits  the  text/artefact  as  a  coherent  whole  and,  indeed,  includes 
moments  of  insight  on  the  lesser  scale  -  say,  the  delight  in  the  shock  of  metaphor.  It  is  a 
dynamic  process,  a  moment  of  transition  before  insight  decays  into  information.  The  text 
too  is  dynamic:  it  is  not  the  passive  object  of  alternative  kinds  of  scrutiny  -  the  modes  of 
connection  that  we  make  with  it  are  prescriptive  so  that  the  nature  of  the  artefact  changes 
according  to  the  mode  in  which  we  apprehend  it. 
In  order  to  illustrate  the  didactic  power  of  poetry  Sir  Philip  Sidney  cites  the  story  of 
Nathan  and  David  as  recounted  in  Samuel  -  the  context  is  David's  love  for  Bethsabe  and  his 
arranging  for  the  death  of  her  husband,  Urias: 
And  the  Lord  sent  Nathan  unto  David.  And  he  came  unto  him  and  said 
unto  him:  there  were  two  men  in  one  city,  a  rich  and  a  poor.  And  the 
rich  had  exceeding  great  abundance  of  sheep  and  oxen.  But  the  poor 
had  nothing  save  one  little  lamb  which  he  bought  and  nourished  up. 
And  it  grew  up  with  him  and  his  children,  and  did  eat  of  his  own  meat 
24 and  drink  of  his  own  cup,  and  slept  in  his  house,  and  was  as  dear  unto 
him  as  his  daughter.  And  there  came  a  stranger  unto  the  rich  man. 
And  he  could  not  find  in  his  heart  to  take  of  his  own  sheep  nor  of  his 
beasts  to  dress  for  the  stranger  that  was  come  unto  him.  But  took  the 
poor  man's  lamb  and  dressed  it  for  the  man  that  was  come  to  him.  And 
David  was  exceeding  wroth  with  the  man,  and  said  to  Nathan:  as 
surely  as  the  Lord  liveth  the  fellow  that  hath  done  this  thing  is  the  child 
of  death  and  shall  restore  the  lamb  fourfold  because  he  did  this  thing 
and  because  he  had  no  pity.  Then  Nathan  said  to  David:  thou  art  the 
man. 
Then  said  David  unto  Nathan:  I  have  sinned  against  the  Lord.  16 
The  story  strikingly  demonstrates  the  power  of  identification  -  manifest  in  David's 
indignation.  This  is  the  ground  of  imagination.  Subsequently,  Nathan  pushes  David  into 
recognition,  there  is  a  shift  through  imagination  into  the  abstractive  that  brings  insight.  In 
this  ancient  story  the  logic  of  imagination  is  displayed.  In  rationalising  the  process  to 
illustrate  the  didactic  function  of  art,  Sidney  has  inadvertently  misled  his  readers  by 
concentration  upon  the  outcome  at  the  expense  of  looking  at  how  the  outcome  comes  about. 
The  result  of  this  is  to  imply  that  the  imagination  is  fundamentally  abstractive.  Poetry  is 
thereby  implicitly  conceived  as  the  work  of  Fancy.  The  conceptual  basis  of  imagination  is 
not  explored.  This  cannot  be  said  of  Aristotle's  analysis  of  tragedy. 
Identification  involves  the  affective  appropriation  of  texts.  Even  so,  it  supposes  some 
level  of  recognition.  Imagination  involves  the  emergence  of  intelligible  structure  from  the 
ground  of  identification  -  we  experience  this  as  insight.  Plato's  attack  on  poetry  can  be 
understood  as  an  attack  on  identification.  Aristotle's  notion  of  catharsis  may  encompass  the 
experience  of  abstractive  cognition  emerging  from  identification  -  seen  retrospectively. 
Subsequently,  such  cognition  can  be  rationalised  into  a  didactic  defence  of  art.  The  text  is 
dynamic  and  changes  according  to  the  mode  of  assimilation:  it  can  be  mirror  or  insight. 
Identification 
In  Ovid's  account  of  the  story,  Pygmalion  seems  unable  to  cope  with  the  'many  faults  which 
nature  has  implanted  in  the  female  sex.  "7  and,  more  specifically,  seems  disgusted  by  female 
16  11  Samuel  12;  from  Tyndale's  Old  Testament,  cd.  by  David  Daniell  (New  Haven:  Yale  University  Press, 
1992),  p.  437. 
11  Ovid,  Metamorphoses,  trans.  by  Mary  M.  Inns  (London:  Penguin,  1955),  p.  231. 
25 sexuality.  Yet,  using  all  his  skills  as  a  sculptor,  he  makes  a  statue  'lovelier  than  any  woman 
born'  (p.  231)  then  falls  in  love  with  his  own  creation.  As  a  result  of  the  beneficence  of 
Venus,  Pygmalion's  statue  becomes  a  human  body.  The  imagery  suggests  though,  that  this 
human  will  have  no  autonomy,  that  Pygmalion's  power  over  his  creation  will  be  sustained: 
She  seemed  warm  [...  ]  at  his  touch  the  ivory  lost  its  hardness  [...  ]  his  fingers 
made  an  imprint  on  the  yielding  surface,  just  as  wax  [...  ]  worked  by  men's 
fingers,  is  fashioned  into  many  different  shapes,  and  made  fit  for  use  by  being 
used.  (p.  232) 
Is  it  significant  that  the  story  is  located  between  accounts  of  Apollo's  fatal  love  for  Hyacinth 
and  Myrrha's  incestuous  love  for  her  father?  Is  there  a  suggestion  of  perversity? 
The  element  of  perversity  is  certainly  present  in  The  Merchant's  Tale  where  wax  is  used 
by  Chaucer  as  a  charged,  tactile  metaphor  to  express  old  Januarie's  desire  for  a  beautiful, 
naive,  compliant  young  woman: 
But  certeynly,  a  yong  thing  may  man  gye, 
Right  as  men  may  warm  wex  with  handes  plye.  18 
The  aesthetic  criteria  by  which  Pygmalion's  artefact  is  to  be  judged  -  they  are  later  to  be 
incorporated  into  the  ideology  of  the  Renaissance  as  articulated,  for  example,  by  Vasari  - 
are  clearly  expressed: 
... 
]  with  marvellous  artistry,  he  skilfully carved  a  snowy  ivory  statue  [...  ]  the 
statue  had  all  the  appearance  of  a  real  girl,  so  that  it  seemed  alive  [...  ].  So 
cleverly  did  his  art  conceal  its  art.  (Metamorphoses,  p.  231) 
The  art  that  hides  art  serves  to  create  an  illusion  so  compelling  as  to  make  the  girl  seem 
alive.  Arguably,  we  are  presented  here  with  the  type  of  both  the  artist  and  his  creation  as 
understood  by  the  classical  world. 
Obviously  we  have  no  means  of  reaching  this  artefact  other  than  through  the  assimilating 
mode  that  is  represented  in  the  story  and  that,  clearly,  is  identification:  the  statue  is  a  trigger 
for  male  fantasy. 
It  is  fun  to  see  the  employment  of  such  triggers  in  popular  fiction,  say,  in  the  work  of  Ian 
Fleming: 
18  Geoffrey  Chaucer,  The  Merchant's  Prologue  and  Tale,  ed.  by  Maurice  Hussey,  repr.  1975 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1966),  p.  44,1.217. 
26 It  was  a  naked  girl,  with  her  back  to  him.  She  was  not  quite  naked.  She 
wore  a  broad  leather  belt  round  her  waist  with  a  hunting  knife  in  a  leather 
sheath  at  her  right  hip.  The  belt  made  her  nakedness  extraordinarily  erotic 
[...  ].  She  stood  in  the  classical  relaxed  pose  of  the  nude,  all  the  weight  on 
the  right  leg  and  the  left  knee  bent  and  turning  slightly  inwards,  the  head 
to  one  side  as  she  examined  the  things  in  her  hand. 
[...  ]  The  whole  scene,  the  empty  beach,  the  green  and  blue  sea,  the 
naked  girl  with  the  strands  of  fair  hair  reminded  Bond  of  something  [...  ]. 
Yes,  she  was  Botticelli's  Venus,  seen  from  behind. 
[...  ]  It  was  a  beautiful  face  [...  ].  It  was  a  serious  face  and  the  jawline  was 
determined  -  the  face  of  a  girl  who  fends  for  herself  And  once,  reflected 
Bond,  she  had  failed  to  fend.  For  the  nose  was  badly  broken,  smashed 
crooked  like  a  boxer's.  19 
It  is  as  if  this  Venus  had  resisted  Pygmalion's  enveloping  fantasy  -  hence,  the  broken  nose. 
In  Botticelli's  painting  the  woman's  neck  is  twice  as  long  as  it  should  be  and  her  left  arm 
seems  to  emerge  from  half-way  down  her  chest  -  the  painter  had  his  eye  on  painterly 
matters.  The  allusion  in  Fleming's  writing  is  impressionistic,  almost  as  if  he  assumed  that 
the  passage  would  be  only  skimmed.  The  invocation  of  Venus  is  appropriate  but  its  very 
vagueness  invites  us  to  boost  the  content  with  our  own  fantasy  -  the  broken  nose  is  a  sort  of 
masterstroke.  The  vagueness  of'made  her  nakedness  extraordinarily  erotic'  functions  as  a 
blank  cheque:  we  appropriate  Honey  Rider  through  our  own  wish-fulfilment. 
There  is  a  rich  aura  of  value  here  manifest  in  the  power  of  the  erotic  attraction.  This 
value  is  experienced  as  fascination,  exercised,  apparently,  by  the  stereotype.  The  person  is 
obscured  by  the  dazzle.  Abstractive  cognition  would  locate  the  value  as  an  identifiable 
aspect  of  the  stereotype:  but  then  it  would  no  longer  function  as  a  stereotype  -  Honey  Rider 
would  be  an  example.  Here,  one  way  or  another,  the  male  imagination  will  struggle  if  it  is 
to  arrive  at  the  woman's  otherness  as  a  person.  Fantasy  posits  a  self  only  ambiguously 
differentiated  from  the  object  of  attention  so  that  it  constitutes  a  kind  of  blindness.  A  closed 
circuit  is  established  so  that  the  object  is  reduced  to  a  mere  cue  for  the  appropriating 
subject. 
The  impulse  to  transform  some  aspect  of  the  world  through  fantasy  points  to  an  absence 
of  something  which  the  self  needs  to  fulfil  itself.  Such  a'fulfilment',  however,  is  at  the  same 
19  Ian  Fleming,  Dr  No  (London:  Heinemann  1963),  pp.  56-57. 
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27 time  a  starvation:  in  other  words,  what  subsumes  fantasy  and  identification  is  power, 
rendered  ever  more  urgent  in  the  escalating  poverty  of  the  fulfilment.  It  is  as  if  Pygmalion's 
creation  assuaged,  but 
[...  ]  what  she  gives,  gives  with  such  supple  confusions 
That  the  giving  famishes  the  craving.  20 
That  absence  is  merely  intensified  in  such  a  vicious  circle  is  implicit  in  the  relational  logic 
whereby  the  subject  effects,  paradoxically,  an  objectification  of  the  artefact  or  person 
appropriated.  In  this  case  the  issue  is  sharply  focused  in  so  far  as  what  is  objectified  is  a 
woman.  The  artefact  or  person,  in  being  transformed  into  a  mirror,  cannot  function  in  a 
mode  in  which  a  reciprocating  fulfilment  could  be  transacted. 
This  paradox  -  objectification  through  assimilation  into  subjectivity  -  is  clearly  illustrated 
in  the  imagery  of  The  Merchant's  Tale  where  young  girls  can  be  seen  to  be  represented  in 
the  Merchant's  fantasy  as  'warm  wex'  whereas  the  actual  girl,  May,  is  'brought  abedde  as 
stille  as  stoon.  '  (p.  57,1.606)  Wax  and  stone  -  fantasy  and  objectification. 
Such  objectification  is  a  denial  of  the  potentiality  of  that  which,  thereby,  is  reduced  to  a 
cue.  Yet,  in  teaching  children  and  young  adults,  identification,  appropriation  through 
fantasy,  is  a  precondition  for  the  assimilation  of  texts.  That  the  condition  has  not  been  met 
is  evident  in  the  declaration  that  a  text  is  boring.  Teaching  then,  initially,  involves  lifting  the 
recalcitrant  into  identification  through  the  exploitation  of  triggers  for  more  or  less 
controlled  fantasy.  The  frank  declaration  -  boring  -  is  a  useful  starting  point  and  healthier 
than  knowing  rationalisation.  In  both  cases  though,  the  text  is  effectively  locked  away. 
Perhaps  the  most  widespread  and  characteristic  problem  of  teaching  literature  is  to  expect 
students  to  articulate  responses  to  experiences  that  they  haven't  had.  For  the  teacher  to 
resort  to  presenting  information  about  texts  is  to  reinforce  the  problem  -  this  involves  a 
category  mistake.  The  vitiation  of  texts  that  follows  from  such  mistakes  also  results  in 
objectification.  This  is  not  to  deny  a  function  for,  say,  contextual  information  that  would 
help  to  make  meaning  clear  -  the  relation  between  the  imaginative  and  the  discursive  will  be 
discussed  more  fully  in  Chapter  9. 
20  T.  S.  Eliot,  'Gerontion',  from  Selected  Poems,  this  edn.  1966  (London:  Faber  and  Faber,  1954),  p.  32. 
28 Thus  it  is  that  the  reduction  of  texts  to  information  and  appropriative  fantasy  have  a 
common  result  in  objectification.  Identification,  though,  presupposes  latent  value; 
rationalisation  is  emotionally  barren  -  except  in  so  far  as  there  is  a  certain  satisfaction  in 
control.  If  realised,  the  latent  value  in  identification  would  resolve  the  wax/stone  paradox  in 
the  newly  found  integrity  of  the  other.  In  such  transactions  the  moral  implications  of 
imagination  are  clearly  disclosed. 
Though  identification  is  a  precondition  for  assimilation  it  is  the  further  shift  into 
imagination  that  frees  the  text  to  autonomy.  The  process  is  reciprocal  in  that  the  reader  too 
is  simultaneously  freed  -  it  is  in  this  mode  of  imagination  that  the  grounds  for  self- 
knowledge  are  posited.  Transposed  into  the  context  of  human  relations  -a  relational 
possibility  that  Pygmalion  never  reaches,  trapped  as  he  is  in  his  gleeful  adolescence  -  this 
mode  of  imagination  underpins  the  very  possibility  of  morality  itself.  Pygmalion's 
relationship  with  his  statue  was  perverse  but  contained  the  possibility  of  self-realisation  for 
both. 
Identification  and  Blindness 
Identification  constitutes  the  initial  motivating  engagement  with  artefacts  and  this 
motivation  finds  its  reward  in  the  self-aggrandisement  characteristic  of  fantasy.  In 
discussing  the  imaginative  life,  Roger  Fry  observes: 
[...  ]  one  of  the  first  effects  of  freeing  experience  from  the  necessities  of  responsive 
action  is  to  indulge  recklessly  the  emotion  of  self-aggrandisement.  The  daydreams 
of  a  child  are  filled  with  extravagant  romances  in  which  he  is  always  the  invincible 
hero.  Music  [...  ]  at  certain  stages  of  people's  lives,  has  the  effect  merely  of  arousing 
in  an  almost  absurd  degree  this  egoistic  elation.  2' 
Identification  fuels  the  pleasure  in  assimilating  texts  but  that  it  is  also  a  blindness  is  often 
exploited  by  Chaucer;  subsequent  seeing  is  achieved  through  the  liberation  of  irony  or 
symbolism.  Indeed,  in  The  Franklin's  Tale  this  process  seems  to  constitute  a  major  theme 
in  itself. 
In  order  to  establish  his  credentials  the  nameless  magician  presents  the  love-lom 
21  Roger  Fry,  Vision  and  Design,  quoted  in  Supplementary  Texts,  The  Open  University  (Portsmouth:  Eyre 
and  Spottiswoode,  1978),  p.  105. 
29 squire,  Aurelius,  with  a  vision: 
He  shewed  him,  er  he  wente  to  sopeer, 
Forestes,  parkes  ful  of  wilde  deer; 
Ther  saugh  he  hertes  with  hir  homes  hye, 
The  gretteste  that  evere  was  seyn  with  ye. 
He  saugh  of  hem  an  hondred  slain  with  houndes, 
And  somme  with  arwes  blede  of  bittre  woundes. 
He  saugh,  whan  voided  were  thise  wilde  deer, 
Thise  fauconers  upon  a  fair  river, 
That  with  hir  haukes  han  the  heron  slain. 
Tho  saugh  he  knightes  justing  in  a  plain; 
And  after  this  he  dide  him  swich  plesaunce 
That  he  him  shewed  his  lady  on  a  daunce, 
On  which  himself  he  daunced,  as  him  thoughte.  22 
As  in  the  Pygmalion  story,  the  climax  involves  the  triggering  of  a  response  in  fantasy  that 
makes  the  woman  seem  real  so  that  he  seems  to  be  dancing  with  her.  Such  is  the  power  of 
the  fantasy  that  he  is instantly  prepared  to  enter  into  a  contract  for  a  thousand  pounds  -a 
fortune.  The  impulsiveness,  the  blindness  to  the  consequences  of  his  actions  is  symptomatic 
of  a  more  comprehensive  blindness. 
The  magician  has  spectacularly  established  his  credentials  -  not  least,  as  a  businessman  - 
but,  paradoxically,  he  seems  to  go  out  of  his  way  to  lead  Aurelius  to  the  insight  that  his 
adulterous  infatuation  is  folly.  The  shift  into  recognition  from  fantasy  is  built  into  the 
symbolism  of  the  passage  or,  rather,  to  see  it  as  symbolic  would  be  to  achieve  liberation. 
Amidst  the  representations  of  pastimes  guaranteed  to  provoke  the  identification  of  a  young 
squire  there  is  a  subtext  of  cuckoldry  -  'hertes  with  hir  homes  hye'  -  and  violence.  One 
particular  image  has  long  been  prepared  for.  The  many  references  to  the  herte  have 
exploited  the  iconography  of  Courtly  Love: 
His  brest  was  hool,  withoute  for  to  sene, 
But  in  his  herte  ay  was  the  arwe  kene.  (p.  73,1.439) 
But  in  the  vision  it  is  precisely  the  hertes  that  with'arwes  blede  of  bittre  wounds'.  The  pun, 
with  its  liberating  perspective,  is  not  seen  by  Aurelius  -  he  has  been  unable  to  read  it,  his 
identification  remains  intact. 
zz  Geoffrey  Chaucer,  The  Franklin's  Prologue  and  Tale,  ed.  by  A.  C.  Spearing  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University  Press,  1966),  p.  75,1.517. 
30 Reading,  though,  is  precisely  what  we  are  doing  in  recognising  what  Aurelius  doesn't  see. 
But  what  of  our  identification  with  the  Franklin's  story?  We  are  suddenly  involved  in  a 
vertiginous  fall  through  the  levels  of  the  text.  Where  do  we  come  to  rest? 
The  magician  conjures  up  his  vision  in  his  study: 
And  yet  remoeved  they  nevere  out  of  the  hous, 
Whil  they  saugh  al  this  sighte  merveillous, 
But  in  his  studie,  -ther  as  his  bookes  be.  (pp.  75-76,1.533) 
There  is  a  splendid  note  in  my  edition  of  the  text: 
Cher  as  his  bookes  be  This  clause,  as  its  recurrence  [...  ]  indicates,  is  little 
more  than  the  kind  of  time-  and  space-filler  that  belongs  to  the  diffuse 
style  of  a  poem  intended  for  oral  delivery.  But,  though  a  formula,  it  has 
certain  significance  here,  for  it  is  presumably  his  books  that  have  enabled 
him  to  create  the  illusions.  (p.  101) 
There  is,  of  course,  the  famous  woodcut  of  Chaucer  reading  at  a  lectern,  but  the  magician  is 
in  his  library  and  the  space-filler  urgently  draws  our  attention  to  precisely  where  we  are 
likely  to  be  reading  the  story:  where  I  sit  at  this  moment  -  in  my  study.  The  fall  stops  here. 
Who,  then,  is  the  magician?  Is  it  the  Franklin?  He  is  certainly  a  self-conscious  story- 
teller,  and  proud  of  it  -  this  is  evident  in  the  diminutio  where  he  denies  his  skill  in  The 
Prologue  of  the  Franklin's  Tale:  in  denying  his  skill  he  displays  it.  He  clearly  attempts  to 
blind  us  with  science  -  reinforcing  his  illusion  -  in  his  account  of  the  magician's  method. 
Yet,  that  he  himself  is  part  of  the  fiction  is  slyly  hinted  at  in  a  wonderful  passage  where 
the  Franklin  is  represented  as  Janus,  the  god  of  doorways  -  for  the  Romans,  potent  with 
numinosity.  This  is  the  verbal  equivalent  of  an  illumination  in  a  medieval  calendar  or  book, 
i.  e.  something  that  is  looked  at  or  read: 
Phebus  wax  old,  and  hewed  lyk  laton, 
That  in  his  hoote  declination 
Shoon  as  the  burned  gold  with  stremes  brighte; 
But  now  in  Capricorn  adoun  he  lighte, 
Wher  as  he  shoon  ful  pale,  I  dar  wel  sen. 
The  bittre  frostes,  with  the  sleet  and  reyn, 
Destroyed  hath  the  grene  in  every  yerd. 
Janus  sit  by  the  fyr,  with  double  berd, 
And  drinketh  of  his  bugle  horn  the  wyn; 
Biforn  him  stant  brawen  of  the  tusked  swyn, 
31 And  'Nowel'crieth  every  lusty  man.  (p.  77,1.573) 
What  is  the  point  of  identifying  the  Franklin  with  Janus?  Certainly  the  Franklin  hoped  to 
reconcile  two  contradictory  styles  of  human  relationship  -  marriage  and  Courtly  Love.  But 
Chaucer  drives  the  Franklin  to  irreconcilable  paradox  in  the  endeavour: 
Thus  hath  she  take  hir  servant  and  hir  lord  - 
Servant  in  love,  and  lord  in  mariage. 
Thanne  was  he  bothe  in  lordshipe  and  servage.  (p.  63,1.20) 
Janus  looks  in  two  directions  -  past  and  future  -  and  like  the  Franklin'  paradox  these  are 
irreconcilable.  The  Franklin  is  a  fictional  character  with  a  contradictory  vision.  Through 
identification  we  would  be  trapped  in  that  vision,  sharing,  ultimately,  his  fatal  conflation  of 
material  and  spiritual  values: 
For  he  was  Epicurus  owne  sone, 
That  heeld  opinioun  that  pleyn  delit 
Was  verray  felicitee  parfit.  (p.  109,1.339) 
The  escape  from  identification  is  engineered  through  the  emergence  of  the  cognitive  -  in 
the  case  of  the  passages  we  have  considered,  largely  through  symbolism.  In  such 
symbolism  the  concrete  detail  points  beyond  itself  to  a  transcendent  idea  or  values,  the 
abstract  made  available  in  a  sort  of  retrospective  counterpoint.  In  terms  of  imagination  this 
pushes  the  text  towards  the  didactic.  We  become  aware  of  an  omniscient,  directing 
intelligence.  On  the  other  hand,  such  clear  differentiation  may  not  have  been  available  for  a 
contemporary  of  Chaucer  reading  in  the  context  of  a  culture  sensitive  to  the  power  of  icons 
-  it  was  this  dangerous  power  that  the  Renaissance  turned  from  in  contempt  in  its  pursuit  of 
the  real. 
In  a  modern  context  the  spell  of  identification  is  nowhere  more  startlingly  revealed  than 
in  the  work  of  Franz  Kafka.  For  example,  The  Trial  begins  with  the  treacherous  assurance: 
Someone  must  have  been  telling  lies  about  Joseph  K.,  for  without  having 
done  anything  wrong  he  was  arrested  one  fine  morning.  23 
Generations  of  readers  have  been  trapped  into  identification  with  the  predicament  of  the 
protagonist.  The  standard  response  was  articulated  by  George  Steiner: 
23  Franz  Kafka,  The  Trial,  trans.  Willa  and  Edwin  Muir,  repr.  1993  (London:  Minerva,  1992),  p.  7. 
32 [...  ]  the  key  fact  about  Kafka  is  that  he  was  possessed  of  a  fearful 
premonition,  that  he  saw,  to  the  point  of  exact  detail,  the  horror 
gathering.  24 
The  book  is  seen  to  be  prophetic  of  the  anonymous,  totalitarian  forces  gathering  against  the 
individual.  Such  a  view  succumbs  to  the  kind  of  projection  which  is  at  the  root  of  the 
protagonist's  predicament  -  identification,  not  with  an  artefact,  but  with  reality  itself. 
The  phenomenon  whereby  the  individual  projects  his  guilt  on  to,  or  into,  the  world  Kafka 
designated  motivation.  Guilt  is  seen  as  a  quality  of  the  world,  something  not  motivated  by 
the  Self  . 
2S  This  is  a  kind  of  identification  and  in  The  Trial  is  a  constituent  of  the  book's 
formative,  if  latent,  irony. 
Kafka's  wry  humour  is  bound  up  in  irony.  Identification  with  the  story,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  experienced  as  a  pervasive  Angst.  The  irony  is  often  established  through  literal 
metaphor.  In  The  Castle,  for  example,  Olga's  description  of  her  father's  roadside  vigil 
outside  a  market  gardener's  property  categorises  the  old  man  as  a  vegetable: 
[...  ]  he  was  convinced  that  his  job  was  to  go  on  waiting  in  Bertuch's  garden,  and  as 
he  was  in  no  state  now  to  go  there  every  day  himself,  we  should  have  to  push  him 
there  in  a  hand-barrow.  26 
The  first  chapter  of  The  Trial  is  richly  seeded  with  theatrical  metaphors  -  'if  this  was  a 
comedy  he  would  insist  on  playing  it  to  the  end'  (p.  11)  and  'K,  felt  he  must  put  an  end  to 
this  farce'.  (p.  13)  The  metaphor  becomes  literal  with  the  addition  of  spectators  -'watching 
from  his  pillow  the  old  lady  opposite  [...  ]  seemed  to  be  peering  at  him'  (p.  7)  and 
Across  the  street  the  party  of  three  were  still  on  the  watch,  and  their  original 
enjoyment  of  the  spectacle  received  its  first  slight  check  when  K.  appeared  at  the 
window.  (p.  20) 
On  the  night  after  his  arrest,  K.,  with  typical  childish  urgency,  obliges  Fräulein  Bürstner 
to  listen  to  his  story.  She  has  been  to  the  theatre  and  when  she  returns  she  is  treated  to 
another  performance: 
24  George  Steiner,  Language  and  Silence,  abridged  edn.  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1969),  p.  163. 
25  Theodore  Ziolkowsid,  Dimensions  of  the  Modern  Novel  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1969), 
p.  45. 
26  Franz  Kafka,  The  Castle,  trans.  by  Willa  and  Edwin  Muir,  repr.  1964  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1957), 
p.  206. 
33 `You  must  picture  to  yourself  exactly  where  the  various  people  are,  it's 
very  interesting.  I  am  the  Inspector[...  ].  Oh,  I've  forgotten  about 
myself,  the  most  important  person[...  ].  The  Inspector  shouts  as  if  he 
had  to  waken  me  out  of  my  sleep  [...  ].  '  Fräulein  Bürstner,  who  was 
listening  with  some  amusement,  put  her  finger  to  her  lips  to  keep  K.  from 
shouting,  but  it  was  too  late,  K.  was  too  absorbed  in  his  role.  (p.  35) 
It  is  precisely  in  his  self-absorption  that  his  blindness  lies  -  the  inspector,  like  many  others  in 
the  story,  attempts  to  waken  him  'out  of  [...  ]  sleep'.  (p.  35) 
The  evolving  irony  depends  on  the  discrepancies  between  his  egocentric  vision  and  the 
reader's  capacity  to  reconstruct  the  effects  of  this  partial  vision  on  the  world  around  him. 
The  Law  by  which  he  is  eventually  judged  is  constituted  of  the  values  and  standards  implicit 
in  the  expectations  and  judgements  which  he  espouses  but  so  desperately  fails  to  confirm  in 
his  own  behaviour.  As  Kafka  puts  it: 
Rossman  and  K.,  the  innocent  and  the  guilty,  both  executed  without  distinction  in 
the  end,  the  guilty  one  with  a  gentler  hand,  more  pushed  aside  than  struck  down.  ' 
The  brilliance  of  the  book  is  in  its  capacity  to  absorb  us  in  K's  experience  so  that  his  failure 
is  ours  -  the  judgement  upon  us  is  devastating. 
In  considering  the  logic  of  motivation  it  is  predictable  that  in  extreme  form  it  will  be 
manifest  as  paranoid  fantasy  and  this  is,  indeed,  frequently  confirmed,  notably,  in  the  first 
paragraph  of  the  penultimate  chapter.  Such  fantasy  is  also  confirmed  in  the  strong 
identification  that  would  see  Kafka  as  a  prophet  of  doom. 
In  these  stories  Chaucer  and  Kafka  share  some  common  purpose  and  common  strategies 
in  attempting  to  liberate  both  characters  and  readers  from  the  entrapment  of  identification. 
At  first  sight  this  may  seem  a  rather  startling  a-historical  claim  that  would  wish  away  the 
gap  in  time  and  differences  in  tradition.  On  the  other  hand,  the  roles  of  relational  modes 
involved  in  the  working  of  the  imagination  are  logically  prior  to  the  contexts  that  shape 
expression.  As  with  Samuel  in  his  account  of  the  story  of  Nathan  and  David,  these  story- 
tellers  are  perfectly  familiar  with  the  phenomenon  of  identification  and,  in  effect,  provide 
ostensive  definitions  and  comprehensive  analyses  of  its  ramifications.  Their  common 
27  The  Diaries  of  Franz  Kafka:  1910-1923,  ed.  by  Max  Brod  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1964),  pp.  343- 
344. 
34 intention  is  to  have  the  reader  undergo  the  transition  form  blindness  to  awareness  -  the 
imaginative  transaction. 
They  do  not  set  out  a  prescriptive  set  of  standards  and  values  -  morality  as  information  - 
they  reproduce  the  process  of  arriving  at  moral  insight  itself.  This,  surely,  is  the  role  of 
imagination  in  education:  if  the  moral  life  is  to  be  awakened  -  there  must  be  stories. 
35 Chapter  Two 
The  Possibility  of  Imaginative  Synthesis 
The  traditional  differentiation  between  form  and  content  is  a  result  of  abstraction  and 
indicative  of  a  shift  into  the  discursive  mode.  In  the  process  of  imagining,  form  is 
submerged,  latent  in  a  kind  of  seeing  that  is  also  understanding  and  involves  a  synthesis  of 
head  and  heart.  Hopkins,  in  his  disclosure  of  inscape,  and  Cezanne  in  his  pursuit  of  the 
motif,  find  individuating  forms  in  the  context  of  nature.  Such  disclosures  seem  to  be 
products  of  a  double  prescription  whereby  the  imposition  of  a  frame  structures  the  content 
within  it  in  such  a  way  as  to  render  that  structure  expressive.  In  such  imaginative 
transactions  content  is  form  is  content. 
In  both  The  Trial  and  The  Franklin's  Tale  release  from  identification  is  achieved  largely 
through  irony.  The  contriving  of  ironic  distance  makes  possible  a  resolution  in  terms  of  a 
double  perspective  upon  events  and  motives.  On  the  one  hand,  identification  seduces  us 
into  the  view  of  the  protagonist;  through  the  irony  we  achieve  some  critical  detachment. 
Inevitably,  such  irony  establishes  a  favoured  perspective  sanctioned  by  the  author's 
omniscience.  That  the  imaginative  transaction  is  thus  precisely  controlled  supposes, 
ultimately,  didactic  intent.  Given  awareness  of  the  dual  perspective  the  reader  is  hardly  free 
to  choose.  The  modes  of  relation  subsuming  the  perspectives  are  characterised  by 
identification  or  abstractive  cognition:  it  is  a  case  of  either/or  -  though  it  is  imagination  that 
allows  for  the  shift  through  the  mediation  of  irony.  Our  pleasure  is  in  the  seeing  and  our 
tacit  approval  of  what  is  seen  is  supposed. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  a  capacity  of  certain  kinds  of  art  to  bind  in  the  potentially 
abstractive  cognition.  Such  cognition  is  anticipated  in  a  distinctive  kind  of  understanding. 
Drawn  out  of  the  imagination  through  abstraction  and  made  available  for  ratiocination,  such 
understanding  changes  its  nature,  is  vitiated.  Bound  in,  understanding  is  an  integral 
product  of  imaginative  synthesis  -  to  think  is  to  feel  -  and  the  artefact  functions  as  a 
correlative  for  some  complex  of  human  experience  characterised  by  a  conspicuous 
expressiveness.  Such  a  correlative  is  very  different  from  T.  S.  Eliot's  conception: 
The  only  way  of  expressing  emotion  in  the  form  of  art  is  by  finding  an  "objective  correlative";  in  other  words,  a  set  of  objects,  a  situation,  a  chain  of  events  which  shall  be  the  formula  of  that  particular  emotion;  such  that  when  the  external 
36 facts,  which  must  terminate  in  sensory  experience,  are  given,  the  emotion  is 
immediately  experienced.  ' 
This  dualistic  differentiation,  where  events  are  conceived  as  a  'formula'  for  emotions, 
misses  the  point  that  emotion  is  already  inherent  in  the  understanding  of  the  situation  that 
is  represented.  In  other  words,  in  imaginative  apprehension  a  correlative  is,  indeed,  posited 
but  its  autonomy  is  a  function  of  its  expressive  power.  That  power  is  released  in  the 
transcending  of  identification  which,  left  to  itself,  reduces  art  to  mirror  images.  Autonomy 
is  impossible  where  identification  is  sustained  and  destroyed  where  scrutiny  shifts  into  the 
discursive.  The  autonomy  of  art  is  partly  a  function  of  the  mode  of  its  apprehension  -a 
function  of  the  process  of  imagining.  We  transform  the  ontology  of  the  artefact  through  the 
modes  in  which  we  see  it.  This  supposes,  of  course,  that  the  artefact  is  conceived  so 
thoroughly  as  to  be  expressive.  Such  potentiality,  together  with  apprehension  in  the 
appropriate  mode,  is  constitutive  of  autonomy. 
In  Kafka  and  Chaucer  the  ironic  distancing  is  made  possible  by  imagining  though  that 
process  ends  in  judgement  -  the  mode  shifts  into  the  didactic.  In  so  far  as  that  is  the  case 
the  imaginative  disclosure  is  a  means  to  an  end  -  autonomy  is  compromised.  On  the  other 
hand,  Ben  Jonson's  poem,  'On  My  First  Son'  involves,  as  I  shall  argue,  disclosure  contingent 
upon  the  binding  in  of  a  triple  perspective.  Such  diversification  strikingly  illustrates  the 
prescriptive  nature  of  language. 
Common  sense  suggests  that  naming  things  is  the  fundamental  activity  of  language,  that 
words  describe  things  rather  like  labels  on  jars.  Such  a  view  allows  for  a  comfortable 
identification  where,  as  Locke  puts  it,  'Men  [...  ]  often  suppose  their  Words  to  stand  also  for 
the  reality  of  Things.  i2  It  is  intriguing  then  -  following  Wittgenstein  -  to  glimpse  something 
of  the  prescriptive  power  that  we  experience  in  the  peculiar  twisting  that  follows  the 
renaming  of  the  parts  of'identical'  triangles:  3 
1  T.  S.  Eliot,  'Hamlet  and  his  Problems',  from  Selected  Essays  (New  York:  Harcourt,  Brace,  1950),  pp.  124- 
125. 
2  Quoted  in  Locke  on  Human  Understanding,  by  E.  J.  Lowe  (London:  Routledge,  1995),  p.  149.  3  Adapted  from  an  illustration  in  Ludwig  Wittgenstein's,  Philosophical  Investigations,  trans.  G.  E.  M. 
Anscombe  (Oxford:  Blackwell,  1963),  p.  200e,  IIxi. 
37 Fig.  1  apex  base  base 
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It  is  easily  suggested  that  the  figure  that  Wittgenstein  derives  from  Jastrow's  duck- 
rabbit  (p.  194e,  Ilxii)  is  a  rabbit,  so  that  the  duck  remains  to  be  discovered: 
Fig.  2 
Wittgenstein  distinguishes  between  the  continuous  seeing  and  the  dawning  of  an  aspect.  The 
dawning  here  involves  the  emergence  of  an  alternative  Gestalt  or stereotype. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  dawning  in  Ben  Jonson's  poem  involves  the  disclosure  of  a  state  of 
emotion  which,  in  its  raw  complexity,  cannot  be  mediated  through  the  controlling  familiarity 
of  a  stereotype: 
Farewell,  thou  child  of  my  right  hand,  and  joy; 
My  sinne  was  too  much  hope  of  thee,  lov'd  boy, 
Seven  yeeres  tho'wert  lent  to  me,  and  I  thee  pay, 
Exacted  by  thy  fate,  on  the  just  day. 
0,  could  I  loose  all  father  now.  For  why 
Will  man  lament  the  state  he  should  envie? 
To  have  so  soone  scap'd  worlds  and  fleshes  rage, 
And,  if  no  other  miserie,  yet  age? 
Rest  in  soft  peace,  and,  ask'd,  say  here  doth  lye 
Ben  Jonson  his  best  piece  of  poetrie. 
For  whose  sake,  hence-forth,  all  his  vowel  be  such, 
As  what  he  loves  may  never  like  too  much.  4 
4  Ben  Jonson,  'On  My  First  Sonne',  from  Poets  of  the  English  Language,  vol.  II,  cd.  by  W.  H.  Auden  and  N.  H. 
Pearson  (London:  Eyre  &  Spottiswoodc,  1952),  pp.  327-328. 
38 Jonson's  son  died  in  1607  when  he  was  seven  years  old.  The  poem  appears  to  present  a 
number  of  strategies  to  find  meaning  in  the  event.  The  imagery  suggests  a  contract  which 
has  been  broken  -  in  that  Johnson  invested  too  much  love  for  his  child  in  this  sublunary 
world.  If  he  had  sufficient  faith  he  would  accept  his  son's  elevation  to  a  higher  existence, 
find  consolation  in  the  thought  that  the  miseries  and  vicissitudes  of  life  had  been  left  behind. 
Three  perspectives  seem  to  open  from  the  word  'lye'.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  as  if  Jonson  is 
absorbed  in  the  sight  of  the  dead  child.  The  mystery  of  the  child  and  the  joy  in  him  are 
caught  in  the  thought  that  he  was  his  father's  'best  piece  of  poetrie'.  On  the  other  hand, 
reaching  some  understanding  of  the  event  resolves  into  acceptance  of  its  'justice'  and  the 
record  of  that  mediation  lies  before  him  -  the  poem  in  paper  and  ink.  Yet  this  resolution  is 
achieved  not  without  tension,  a  sense  of  ingenuity  in  such  rationalisation  -  the  characteristic 
tension  between  extreme  emotion  and  ideology.  The  unease  constitutes  a  subtext  for  the 
poem.  This  is  suddenly  brought  to  consciousness  -a  dawning  -  in  the  pivotal  verb  lye.  The 
collection  of  words  on  the  page  that  constitute  the  poem  lie  in  front  of  him;  yet  these  very 
words  are  now  seen  to  be  a  lie,  an  untruth.  As  Nietzsche  might  have  put  it,  the  language  is 
no  longer  an  adequate  defence  against  the  agony.  The  unspeakable  event  in  the  here  and 
now  is  overwhelming.  The  poem  floods  with  bitterness. 
At  least  three  possibilities  are  simultaneously  present:  joy  in  the  child;  the  strained 
understanding  in  terms  of  religious  orthodoxy;  the  collapse  into  despair.  We  realise  that  this 
is  not  a  case  of  either/or  -  that  the  intractable  stuff  of  grief  is  characterised  by  states  of  mind 
that  oscillate  between  meaning  and  meaninglessness  in  agonised  bewilderment. 
Ambiguity  at  the  conceptual  level  -  alternating  paradigms  for  the  meaning  of  the  poem  - 
is  itself  expressive  and  constitutes  a  correlative  for  a  complex  state  of  emotion.  It  is  the 
seeing,  the  dawning  -  the  emergence  of  understanding  -  that  unlocks  the  richer  meaning  of 
the  poem.  The  emotion  is  now  structured  -  that  is,  rendered  autonomous  -  because  it  is 
reproducible  in  the  experience  of  the  beholder.  We  shift  from  a  powerful  identification 
with  the  father  -  grounded  in  empathy  -  to  understanding  something  of  what  it  is  to  grieve. 
39 Dawning  and  Inscape 
Again  and  again  in  his  poetry  Gerard  Manley  Hopkins  takes  the  reader  through  dawning  to 
realisation  of  structure  -  he  calls  this  structure  inscape.  Hopkin's  first  ambition  was  to  be  a 
painter.  Two  of  his  brothers  were  professional  artists  and  the  poet  himself  was  an  excellent 
draughtsman.  '  It  is  as  if  inscape  emerged  from  the  contemplation  of  landscape: 
Hard  frost,  bright  sun,  a  sky  of  blue'water'.  On  the  fells  with  Mr.  Lucas. 
Parlick  Pike  and  that  ridge  ruddy  with  fern  and  evening  light.  Ground 
sheeted  with  taut  tattered  streaks  of  crisp  gritty  snow.  Green-white  tufts 
of  long  bleached  grass  like  heads  of  hair  or  the  crowns  of  heads  of  hair, 
each  a  whorl  of  slender  curves,  one  tuft  taking  up  another  -  however  these 
I  might  have  noticed  any  day.  I  saw  the  inscape  though  freshly,  as  if  my 
eye  were  still  growing,  though  with  a  companion  the  eye  and  the  ear  are 
for  the  most  part  shut  and  instress  cannot  come.  6 
Inscape  is  elusive,  it  must  be  worked  for,  its  manifestation  seems  to  require  a  rapt 
concentration: 
[...  ]  I  had  always  taken  the  sunset  and  the  sun  as  quite  out  of  gauge 
with  each  other,  as  indeed  physically  they  are,  for  the  eye  after  looking  at 
the  sun  is  blunted  to  everything  else  and  if  you  look  at  the  rest  of  the 
sunset  you  must  cover  the  sun,  but  today  I  inscaped  them  together  and 
made  the  sun  the  true  eye  and  ace  of  the  whole,  as  it  is.  It  was  all  active 
and  tossing  out  light  and  started  as  strongly  forward  from  the  field  as  a 
long  stone  or  boss  in  the  knop  of  the  chalice-stem:  it  is  indeed  by  stalling 
it  so  that  it  falls  into  scape  with  the  sky.  (p.  119) 
By  stalling  I  think  he  may  mean  placing  -  in  the  sense  of  placing  a  face.  It  is  through  the 
visual  analogy  with  the  chalice  stem  (or  scape  -  from  the  Greek  skapos)  that  the  relation 
between  sun  and  sky  'falls  into  scape'.  The  inscape  is  clinched  through  the  dawning  of  the 
analogue.  This  seems  to  be  confirmed  in  another  Journal  entry: 
This  skeleton  inscape  of  a  spray-end  of  ash  I  broke  at  Wimbledon  that  summer  is 
worth  noticing  for  the  suggested  globe.  (p.  121) 
Hopkins's  interest  in  the  onomatopoeic  theory  of  language  reflects  his  sensitivity  to  aural 
analogues  but,  clearly,  visual  analogues  too  have  generative  power: 
s  See,  Norman  White,  Hopkins:  A  Literary  Biography,  paperback  ed.  1995  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press, 
1992),  p.  163. 
6  Gerard  Manley  Hopkins,  Poems  and  Prose,  op.  cit.,  p.  127. 
40 The  various  lights  under  which  a  horn  may  be  looked  at  have  given  rise  to  a  vast 
number  of  words  in  the  language.  It  may  be  regarded  as  a  projection,  a  climax,  a 
badge  of  strength,  power  or  vigour,  a  tapering  body,  a  spiral,  a  wavy  object,  a  bow, 
a  vessel  to  hold  withal  or  to  drink  from  [...  ].  From  the  shape,  kernel  and  grafnim, 
grain,  corn.  From  the  curve  of  the  horn,  kopwvts,  corona,  crown.  (p.  89) 
Inscape  is  associated  with  the  emergence  of  intelligible  structure  -  for  Hopkins,  language 
itself  is  analogical:  there  is  no  difference  in  principle  between  the  discovery  of  inscape  in  the 
world  around  us  and  concept  formation  itself.  Inscape,  intelligibility,  is  potentially 
everywhere: 
[...  ]  and  looking  at  the  great  rudely  arched  timberframes  -  principals  (?  ) 
and  tie-beams,  which  make  them  look  like  bold  big  A's  with  the  cross-bar 
high  up  -I  thought  how  sadly  beauty  of  inscape  was  unknown  and  buried 
away  from  simple  people  and  yet  how  near  at  hand  it  was  if  they  had  eyes 
to  see  it  and  it  could  be  called  out  everywhere  again.  (p.  126) 
It  is  this  ubiquitous  potentiality  that  allows  Hopkins  to  reconcile  his  art  with  his  vocation  as 
a  priest,  for  to  discover  inscape  is  to  have  the  nature  of  God's  creation  revealed  in  the 
celebration  of  poetry. 
There  are  hints  that  at  its  most  intense  the  dawning  of  inscape  takes  him  across  a 
threshold  into  the  numinous: 
I  do  not  think  I  have  ever  seen  anything  more  beautiful  than  the  bluebell  I 
have  been  looking  at.  I  know  the  beauty  of  our  Lord  by  it.  It[s  inscape]  is 
[mixed  of]  strength  and  grace,  like  an  ash  [tree].  (p.  120) 
He  touches  upon  this  more  directly  in  his'On  the  Origin  of  Beauty:  A  Platonic  Dialogue': 
[...  ]  I  am  sure  there  is  in  the  higher  forms  of  beauty  -  at  least  I  seem  to 
feel  -  something  mystical,  something  I  don't  know  how  to  call  it.  (p.  104) 
In  'The  Windhover'  there  are  more  subtle  hints  that  the  threshold  is  crossed  in  that  the 
energy  of  the  imagery  in  the  octave  is  characteristically  kinetic: 
I  caught  this  morning  morning's  minion,  king- 
dom  of  daylight's  dauphin,  dapple-dawn-drawn  Falcon,  in 
his  riding 
Of  the  rolling  level  underneath  him  steady  air,  and  striding 
High  there,  how  he  rung  upon  the  rein  of  a  wimpling  wing 
In  his  ecstasy!  then  off,  off  forth  on  swing, 
As  a  skate's  heel  sweeps  smooth  on  a  bow-bend.  (p.  30) 
41 The  falcon  is  'dawn-drawn',  then  the  eye  follows  the  bird  upwards;  the  extravagant  'riding' 
and  'striding'  are  both  kinetic  and  psychological  images  -  the  manner  of  the  action  is  crucial. 
The  'rein  of  a  wimpling  wing'  gathers  its  potential  energy  to  release  it  in  'swing'  and  the 
incisive  cutting  of  the  'skate's  heel'.  Exhilaration  is  experienced  through  identification  with 
movement  and  power  and  these  energize  the  many  other  effects  of  the  imagery.  The  kinetic 
also  replicates  the  moving  towards  recognition  of  inscape. 
The  volta  marks  a  change  to  the  abstract  -'beauty',  'valour'  and  'act': 
Brute  beauty  and  valour  and  act,  oh,  air,  pride,  plume,  here 
Buckle!  AND  the  fire  that  breaks  from  thee  then,  a  billion 
Times  told  lovelier,  more  dangerous,  0  my  chevalier!  (p.  30) 
The  dawning  reaches  consummation  in  'buckle!  '.  The  enjambement,  the  alliterative  effects 
making  this  the  explosive  climax  of  the  poem:  the  inscape  is  made  manifest,  and  lest  we 
miss  it  Hopkins  'overs  and  overs'  it  through  the  rhetorical  'billion/Times  told  lovelier'.  At 
'buckle'  the  inscape  is  disclosed  -a  moment  of  illumination  -  both  for  Hopkins  and  in  the 
imagination  of  the  reader. 
It  is  as  if  the  real  subject  of  the  poem  were  not  so  much  the  Windhover  as  the  process  of 
arriving  at  inscape  itself.  The  first  verb  in  the  poem  is  'caught'  -  the  process  of  being  taken 
out  of  himself  has  begun:  'My  heart  in  hiding/stirred  for  a  bird'.  The  images  that  conclude 
the  poem  suggest  transfiguration.  In  the  first,  humble,  case  from  energy  to  burnished 
beauty  and,  ultimately,  to  death  and  resurrection  -  'blue-bleak  embers  [...  ]  gash  gold- 
vermilion.  '  The  power  of  the  instress  draws  him  from  introspection  to  rapt  concentration 
and  finally  across  a  threshold  into  the  numinous. 
The  concept  of  instress  is  intriguingly  illustrated  in  a  journal  entry: 
Mesmerised  a  duck  with  chalk  lines  from  her  beak  sometimes  level  and 
sometimes  forwards  on  a  black  table.  They  explain  that  the  bird  keeping 
the  abiding  offscape  of  the  hand  grasping  her  neck  fancies  she  is  still  held 
down  and  cannot  lift  her  head  as  long  as  she  looks  at  the  chalk  line,  which 
she  associates  with  the  power  that  holds  her.  This  duck  lifted  her  head  at 
once  when  I  put  it  down  on  the  table  without  chalk.  But  this  seems 
inadequate.  It  is  most  likely  the  fascinating  instress  of  the  straight  white 
stroke.  (p.  123) 
42 Whether  he  was  right  in  his  reading  of  the  situation  is  beside  the  point  -  the  significance  is  in 
his  conception  of  the  power  of  instress  to  bind  in  the  duck  to  the  inscape  of  the  line. 
Generally,  Hopkins  seems  to  use  instress  in  two  related  senses:  it  sustains  the  constituent 
elements  of  inscape  and  it  is  the  means  by  which  inscape  is  assimilated. 
Conversation,  indeed,  this  discourse,  is  always  arching  forward  to  complete  its  inscape, 
which  exercises  a  prescriptive  power  over  manifold  possibilities.  The  stress  passes  between 
the  interlocutors,  the  apex  seeking  its  base  in  the  consummation  of  intelligibility.  What  then 
distinguishes  poetry  from  normal  discourse? 
Some  matter  or meaning  is  essential  to  [poetry]  but  only  as  an  element 
necessary  to  support  and  employ  the  shape  which  is  contemplated  for  its 
own  sake.  (Poetry  is  in  fact  speech  employed  to  carry  the  inscape  of 
speech  for  the  inscape's  sake  -  and  therefore  the  inscape  must  be  dwelt 
on.  )  (Introduction,  p.  xxii) 
Instress  is  that  dynamic  tension  that  both  holds  inscape  in  being  and  negotiates  its  passage 
to  understanding. 
The  sequence  that  is  displayed  in  'The  Windhover'  -  the  process  of  arriving  at  inscape  -  is 
characteristic  of  many  of  the  poems,  as  is  their  resolution  in  terms  of  Hopkins's  Christian 
ideology.  In  other  poems,  the  experience  is  reported  rather  than  realised.  Such  poetry 
pushes  the  assimilating  mode  into  identification.  Acceptance  or  rejection,  then  become  the 
polarised  possibilities  and  the  potential  autonomy  of  the  artefact  -  which  would  be  achieved 
through  imagination  -  is  destroyed.  Ideology  and  identification  are  logically  related  -  for 
identification  is  the  source  of  the  power  of  ideology.  In  the  poems  that  can  be  apprehended 
mostly  though  the  imagination  the  immediacy  of  the  realised  experience  is  frequently 
powerful  enough  to  make  the  ideological  resolution  a  mere  confirming  footnote  -  though 
for  the  believer  the  passage  across  the  modes  would  be  apparently  seamless. 
Perhaps  the  most  striking  example  of  the  pattern  is  displayed  in  the  first  ten  stanzas  of 
'The  Wreck  of  the  Deutschland'.  The  'Joy's  grape'  of  Keats,  '  with  its  mildly  astringent 
melancholy,  becomes  Hopkins's  burst  sloe: 
7  John  Keats,  'Ode  on  Melancholy',  from,  A  Selection  from  John  Keats,  cd.  by  E.  C.  Pcttct,  fourth 
impression  1982  (Harlow: Longman,  1974),  p.  87,1.28. 
43 How  a  lush-kept  plush-capped  sloe 
Will,  mouthed  to  flesh-burst, 
Gush!  -  flush  the  man,  the  being  with  it,  sour  or  sweet, 
Brim,  in  a  flash,  full!  (Hopkins,  p.  15) 
In  this  extraordinary  moment  the  disintegrating  paradoxes  of  the  poem  -  focused  in  the 
irreconcilability  of  our  experience  of  suffering  with  God's  Grace  -  are  simultaneously 
synthesised  in  the  overwhelming  dawning  that  only  through  suffering  and,  thence,  through 
identification  with  the  suffering  of  Christ  can  the  love  of  God  be  understood.  Within  the 
world  of  the  poem,  whatever  our  beliefs,  the  imaginative  power  of  the  writing  brings  us  to 
recognition  -  in  the  same  way,  one  doesn't  have  to  be  a  king,  and  eighty,  to  enter  into  the 
world  of  King  Lear.  The  imagery  draws  us  into  the  experience  of  dawning  and  thereby 
becomes  an  analogue  of  the  realisation  that  Hopkins  wishes  the  reader  to  undergo:  in  this 
way  we  are  carried  through  identification  to  understanding. 
In  the  second  part  of  the  poem,  with  the  paradigm  established,  Hopkins  goes  on  to 
reconstruct  the  shipwreck.  There  is,  though,  for  all  its  beauties,  a  pervading  sense  of  the 
didactic.  The  poetry  invites  identification  -  Luther  becomes  the  'beast  of  the  waste  wood': 
we  are  driven  merely  to  agree  or  disagree.  Crucially,  the  dawning  is  not  so  much  displayed 
as  dramatically  reported  with  the  use  of  anacoluthon  and  ellipsis: 
But  how  shall  I 
...  make  me  room  there: 
Reach  me  a  ... 
Fancy,  come  faster  - 
Strike  you  the  sight  of  it?  look  at  it  loom  there, 
Thing  that  she  ...  there  then!  (p.  21) 
Criticism,  as  such,  is  always  dangerous,  in  so  far  as  judgement  -  compare  with  the 
experience  of  Joseph  K.  -  may  be  based  in  an  inadequate  imaginative  grasp  of  the  text,  a 
sort  of  negative  identification.  This  merely  confirms,  though,  the  logic  of  the  elusive 
phenomena  under  discussion  and  how,  in  the  process  of  reading,  imagination  can  pass  into 
identification  and  back  again  as  easily  as  waking  into  sleeping,  though  with  such 
dramatically  contrasting  results  as  insight  and  blindness. 
But  to  categorise  inscape  as  structure  is  to  reduce  the  experience  merely  to  abstraction. 
Placing  a  face  is  not  just  recognition,  it  is  accompanied  by  a  surge  of  satisfaction  -  'Ah  yes! 
It's  Bill  Fordyce!  '  Such  satisfaction  is  complex,  incorporating  a  sort  of  egotistical 
44 component  and  an  evaluation  of  the  individual  -  even  if  we  hated  Fordyce  the  satisfaction  in 
the  recognition  might  survive.  But  whatever  the  reaction  the  individuality  of  Bill  Fordyce  is 
presupposed  in  it  -  the  face  is  resolved  in  recognition  of  identity  and  simultaneously 
evaluated.  Hopkins  saw  in  the  work  of  Duns  Scotus  corroboration  of  the  idea  that  arriving 
at  inscape  was  reaching  the  individuating  form  or  haecceilas: 
[...  ]  like  each  tucked  string  tells,  each  hung  bell's 
Bow  swung  finds  tongue  to  fling  out  broad  its  name; 
Each  mortal  thing  does  one  thing  and  the  same: 
Deals  out  that  being  indoors  each  one  dwells; 
Selves  -  goes  itself,  myself  it  speaks  and  spells, 
Crying  What  I  do  is  me:  for  that  I  came.  8 
For  Hopkins  the  affirmation  in  the  recognition  was  affirmation  of  divinity: 
These  things,  these  things  were  here  and  but  the  beholder 
Wanting;  which  two  when  they  once  meet, 
The  heart  rears  wings  bold  and  bolder 
And  hurls  for  him,  0  half  hurls  earth  for  him  off  under  his  feet.  9 
In  the  context  of  imagination  our  apprehensions  of  the  world  are  value  laden  precisely 
because  inscape  is  also  a  correlative  for  value  itself.  The  value  is  bound  into  the 
understanding:  meaning  and  value  are  one  and  the  same.  They  can  be  separated  only 
retrospectively  and  then  according  to  the  use  for  which  the  insight  is  required.  This, 
characteristically,  shifts  value  into  the  mode  of  power,  where  it  no  longer  functions  as  value, 
rather,  it  provides  sanctions.  This  explains  why  Hopkins  again  and  again  returns  in  his 
poetry  to  depicting  the  process  of  arriving  at  inscape;  its  purpose  is  to  charge  up  the 
sanctions  for  his  faith.  The  numinous  is,  characteristically,  hijacked  by  his  ideology. 
To  experience  the  arrival  at  inscape  through  Hopkins'  poetry  bears  at  least  a  'family 
resemblance'  to  the  process  of  understanding  experienced  in  catharsis;  and  the  Pythagorean 
arriving  at  ekstasis  through  the  practise  of  philosophia  would  surely  recognise  the  nature  of 
the  passage  that  Hopkins  frequently  makes. 
Children  will  often  make  emphatic  outlines  of  the  figures  and  objects  in  their  paintings. 
This  may  reflect  their  education  in  the  time-honoured  exercise  of  'colouring  in'  -  equally,  it 
B  Hopkins,  'As  Kingfishers  Catch  Fire'  p.  51. 
9  Hopkins,  'Hurrahing  in  Harvest',  p.  3  f. 
45 may  reflect  the  urge  to  define.  If  the  figures  are  already  sufficiently  realised  the  outlines  will 
be  redundant;  if  the  outlines  are  necessary  to  establish  identity  then  the  content  is  not 
sufficiently  realised.  Form  is  implicit  in  intelligibility.  Individuation  presupposes  the 
disclosure  of  form.  The  discrimination  between  form  and  content  supposes  an  abstractive 
rationalisation  in  the  discursive  mode.  In  imagining,  content  and  form  are  synthesised. 
The  Conceptual  Basis  of  Imaginative  Synthesis 
Setting  a  map  involves  the  adjustment  of  the  diagrammatical  representation  by  means  of  a 
compass  so  that  points  of  contact  can  be  established  between  the  map  and  the  landscape 
itself.  The  map  is  read,  a  route  is  chosen  in  response  to  the  available  information  -  is  that  a 
slope  to  be  avoided?  The  depiction  in  two  dimensions  can  be  translated  into  three  -  there 
are  rules  of  transformation  for  this. 
Envisaging  the  route  brings  selected  areas  of  the  map  to  our  attention,  leaving  huge  areas 
redundant.  The  landscape  becomes  structured  round  an  intention.  It  becomes  possible  to 
debate  alternative  routes.  The  criteria  involved  normally  suppose  facility  of  resultant  action. 
What  are  the  difficulties?  How  long  will  it  take?  Behind  these  criteria,  though,  are  others. 
Pride  in  achievement  might  include  another  Munro;  perhaps  the  view  from  that  ridge  is 
spectacular. 
By  transforming  a  section  of  the  map  into  a  vertical  analogue  the  representation  now 
offers  potential  for  a  different  kind  of  intentional  relation: 
Fig.  3 
Frame  an  area  of  the  new  analogue  and  it  resolves  itself  into  a  characteristic  structure: 
46 Fig.  4 
There  are  strong  diagonals  and  the  focal  point  is  slightly  off-centre.  The  structure  is 
inscaped  into  something  resembling  a  classical  landscape.  With  other  framings  the 
landscape  cannot  be  'read'  until  the  intention  is  clear: 
Fig.  5 
Switch  the  intention  from  engagement  with  classical  landscape  to  the  consideration  of 
responsive  action.  Now  the  structure  becomes  intelligible:  that  slope  is  very  steep  -  is  there 
an  easier  route?  On  the  other  hand,  it  might  make  a  challenging  climb.  Whatever 
significance  is  extracted  is  at  the  same  time  a  sort  of  limit  that  pushes  the  other  manifold 
possibilities  into  redundancy.  What  might  these  mountains  be  for  a  deer  stalker,  a  geologist, 
a  raven,  a  bee? 
There  is  no  passage  to  the  'landscape'  itself  except  in  terms  of  some  prescriptive 
structuring  -  the  prescriptions  presuppose  possibilities  but  these  can  only  be  inferred 
through  a  transcendental  argument.  That  the  world  is  intelligible  at  all  is  the  mystery. 
Hopkins  selects  that  genus  of  intelligibility  disclosed  in  the  exhilaration  of  foredrawing, 
through  the  imagination,  inscapes  that  are  at  the  same  time  celebratory  illuminations  of  his 
47 creator  God.  That  poetry  is  `inscape  of  speech  for  the  inscape's  sake'  is  at  a  great  remove 
from  `Art  for  Art's  sake'. 
Clearly,  for  Hopkins,  inscape  is  characteristically  apprehended  in  a  context  of  vivid 
sensation.  Light  and  shadow  are  favoured,  for  in  combination  they  display  sharpness  of 
definition: 
Down  roughcast,  down  dazzling  whitewash,  wherever  an  elm 
arches, 
Shivelights  and  shadowtackle  in  long  lashes  lace,  lance  and 
pair.  '° 
(The  loss  of  such  definition  is  crucial  in  `Spelt  from  Sibyl's  Leaves'.  )  Visual  and  kinetic 
images  catch  the  complex  movements  of  the  shadows  cast  by  the  elms  in  the  'boisterous' 
wind.  Yet  this  clarity  of  definition  is  not  a  precise,  literal  reconstruction  of  visual 
experience  -  it  has  the  powerful,  because  compact,  efficacy  of  cartoon.  Later  in  the  poem 
our  fate  as  individuals  is  vividly  realised: 
But  quench  her  bonniest,  dearest  to  her,  her  clearest-selved 
spark 
Man,  how  fast  his  firedint,  his  mark  on  mind,  is  gone!  (p.  66) 
Like  sparks  from  God-the-blacksmith's  forge,  we  glow  in  momentary  incandescence  before 
being  swallowed  'in  an  unfathomable  [...  ]  dark'.  (p.  66)  Here  inscape  itself  is  inscaped.  Our 
essence  -  inscape,  the  divine  spark  -  is  inscaped  through  the  'firedint'.  The  radical 
simplification  'illuminates'. 
But  to  talk  of  a  context  of  emotion  presupposes  a  dualistic  categorisation  of 
abstractive  cognition  and  sensation.  Rather,  as  I  have  already  suggested,  in  the  mode  of 
imagination,  inscapes  are  analogues  for  complex  states  of  mind  and  emotion. 
Prescriptive  intentions  are  what  ultimately  switch  the  modality  -  abstractive  cognition  or 
imagination.  That  inscape  can  carry  the  complex  amalgam  of  cognition  and  sensation  is 
implicit  in  Wittgenstein's  remarks: 
4.014  A  gramophone  record,  the  musical  idea,  the  written  notes,  and  the 
sound-waves,  all  stand  to  one  another  in  the  same  internal  relation  of  depicting  that 
holds  between  language  and  the  world. 
io  Hopkins,  That  Nature  is  a  Heraclitcan  Fire',  p.  65. 
48 They  are  all  constructed  according  to  a  common  logical  pattern  [...  ]. 
4.0141  There  is  a  general  rule  by  means  of  which  the  musician  can  obtain  the 
symphony  from  the  score,  and  which  makes  it  possible  to  derive  the  symphony 
from  the  groove  on  the  gramophone  record,  and,  using  the  first  rule,  to  derive  the 
score  again.  That  is  what  constitutes  the  inner  similarity  between  these  things  [...  ]. 
And  that  rule  is  the  law  of  projection  which  projects  the  symphony  into  the 
language  of  musical  notation.  It  is  the  rule  for  translating  this  language  into  the 
language  of  gramophone  records.  '  1 
An  implication  of  this  is  that,  in  the  mode  of  imagination,  inscape  cannot  be  value  free  - 
there  is  no  intelligibility  without  value.  Or  is  it,  more  radically,  that  intelligibility  itself 
cannot  be  value  free,  for  value  is  bound  in  by  the  very  logic  of  intentionality?  The  value  in 
the  apparently  incoherent  fig.  3  emerges  simultaneously  with  finding  the  intention  that  makes 
it  expressive;  but  there  is  no  value  until  it  becomes  expressive,  that  is,  an  intelligible 
structure. 
It  may  be  that  poetry  is  the  paradigm  case  for  the  intelligibility  that  is  manifest  in 
language.  Then  problems  arise  in  discourses  that  purport  to  be  value  free  -  and  that  takes 
us  into  the  territory  of  Derrida,  who  asks  us 
[...  ]  to  study  the  philosophical  text  in  its  formal  structure,  in  its  rhetorical 
organization  [...  ]  drawing  upon  the  reserves  of  a  language,  cultivating,  forcing,  or 
making  deviate  a  set  of  tropic  [metaphorical]  resources  older  than  philosophy 
itself  12 
The  skill  of  the  poet  is  to  'over  and  over'  such  intelligibility,  above  all,  through  metaphor, 
which  provides  prescriptive  analogues  that  render  structure  from  that  potentially  rich  source 
of  experience  which,  in  the  blindness  of  identification,  we  consign  to  redundancy.  Such 
rendering  is  also  manifest  through  the  different  skills  of  the  landscape  painter. 
The  early  work  of  Cezanne  displays  the  characteristics  of  identification.  The  paintings 
often  present  triggers  for  sexual  fantasy  and,  generally,  exhibit  a  strong  iconoclastic  urge. 
Furthermore,  some  of  the  work  is  derivative.  The  Feast,  1870,  is  typical  -  the  influence  of 
something  like  Rubens's  Nymphs  and  Satyrs  seems  not  far  away.  There  is  a  violence  of 
theme  and  execution.  Some  of  the  works  seem  to  find  their  rationale  in  the  need  to  shock  - 
11  Tractatus,  op.  cit.,  p.  39. 
12  Jacques  Derrida,  Margins  of  Philosophy,  trans.  by  Alan  Bass  (Chicago:  Chicago  University  Press,  1982), 
p.  293. 
49 but  that,  perhaps,  is  to  misread  a  passionate  integrity  that  is  struggling  for  adequate 
expression. 
The  Rape,  1867,  depicts  the  rape  of  Persephone  -  Mount  Etna  figures  in  the  background, 
a  detail  from  Ovid's  account  that  confirms  the  scene  is  in  Sicily.  The  unspecific  title 
generalises  the  theme,  suggests  typicality.  The  generality  is  reinforced  by  the  symbolism: 
the  volcano,  and  Pluto  -  the  manifestation  of  chthonic  darkness  -  struggling  with  the  'pallid', 
'swooning'  Persephone.  13  In  Rubens's  Rape  of  the  Daughters  of  Leucippus,  male  and 
female  are  differentiated  in  terms  of  dark  and  light.  Cezanne  came  to  distrust  the  literary  in 
art.  The  assimilation  of  allusion  involves  a  reaching  out  beyond  the  immediate  imaginative 
transaction  which  compromises  the  autonomy  of  the  painting.  The  case  of,  say,  'The  Waste 
Land'  suggests  that  allusion  need  not  necessarily  function  in  this  way  but  here  the 
combination  with  symbolism  pushes  the  response  into  the  cognitive.  The  painting  has  a  rich 
potential  to  engage  identification  through  its  sexual  content.  This  could  provide  the  ground 
for  imaginative  synthesis  but  the  cognitive  is  destructively  obtrusive.  It  is  as  if  the  cognitive 
is  used  to  balance  the  potentially  powerful  fantasy  -  but  the  result  is  polarisation  rather  than 
imaginative  integration. 
Richard  Verdi's  account  of  The  Rape,  (p.  35)  by  linking  its  content  with  the  Page  of 
Studies,  1865-69,  depicting  male  advances  upon  reclining  females,  fails  to  distinguish 
between  the  obvious  invitation  to  fantasy  contained  in  the  sketches  and  the  cognitive 
control  of  The  Rape.  Cezanne  eschews  the  possibility  for  wholesale  identification.  It 
remained  for  him  to  find  the  means  of  synthesising  his  work,  of  rendering  it  autonomous. 
By  1880  we  see  him  working  to  bind  the  cognitive  into  the  motif.  He  was  later  to  say 
that  he  wished  'to  re-do  Poussin  over  again  according  to  nature  [...  ]  to  become  classical  by 
way  of  nature,  that  is  to  say  by  sensation.  '  (p.  120-121)  As  Richard  Verdi  puts  it,  this  was  a 
classicism  which  was  to  be  found  rather  than  made'.  (p.  121)  In  Le  Chateau  de  Medan 
(fig.  6  overleaf.  )  the  issues  are  clearly  displayed.  '4 
13  Richard  Verdi,  Cezanne  (London:  Thames  and  Hudson,  1992),  pp.  34-35. 
14  Illustration  from  Richard  Verdi,  Cezanne  and  Poussin:  The  Classical  Vision  ofLandscape  (London: 
National  Galleries  of  Scotland,  Lund  Humphries,  1990),  p.  121. 
50 Figure  6.  Paul  Cezanne,  Le  Chateau  de  Medan  1879-81 
51 At  first  sight  the  painting  appears  to  be  rigidly  structured,  through  the  stratification  into 
five  layers  and  by  the  vertical  proportioning  round  the  axis  of  a  more  or  less  central  tree 
trunk.  A  degree  of  unity  is  also  achieved  through  the  brush  strokes,  the  greatest  proportion 
of  which  run  diagonally  from  top  right  to  bottom  left. 
The  dearth  of  conventional  depth  cues  suggests,  to  the  casual  glance,  flatness.  But  depth 
is  achieved  by  other  means,  for  example,  by  modulation  through  the  strata.  The  river  in  the 
foreground,  distinguished  by  horizontal  brush  strokes,  is  integrated  into  the  next  stratum 
through  the  reflections  of  the  vegetation  of  the  bank.  The  ochres  and  browns  of  the  bank 
are  reflected  in  the  colours  of  the  houses  above  and  in  the  greenery  -  the  brush  strokes  here 
tend  to  the  vertical.  The  greenery  is  extended  into  the  boscage  of  the  fourth  stratum  which, 
in  turn,  is  tied  to  the  sky  by  obtruding  trees.  We  experience  this  modulation  as  a  kinetic 
impulse  directed  into  the  painting  by  the  strong  verticals  of  the  eight  trees.  These  are 
symmetrically  disposed  round  the  axis  of  the  central  trunk  that  is  made  emphatic  in  its 
centrality  by  the  two  black  windows. 
Zola's  house,  pushed  into  the  final  vertical  quarter  at  the  right  is  strangely  anomalous  in 
the  tones  of  its  facade.  The  other  habitations  almost  defy  identification.  They  are  distanced 
by  the  barriers  of  the  river  and  the  bank  of  encaging  trees.  In  this  way  potential  human 
content,  anecdotal  interest,  is  neutralised,  the  houses  transmuted  to  pictorial  sensation.  It  is 
through  methods  such  as  these  that  Cezanne  seeks  to  integrate  the  scene,  inscape  it  - 
though  Zola's  house  remains  personalised. 
It  is  interesting  to  compare  The  Road  at  Pointoise,  1875,  painted  by  his  friend  and 
mentor,  Camille  Pissarro,  with  Cezanne's  painting  of  the  same  motif,  1875-77.11  (fig.  7 
overleaf)  Pissarro  invites  identification  with  his  anecdotal,  rural  scene.  The  leisurely  sweep 
of  the  road  is  structured  by  a  horse  and  cart  left  of  centre  and  by  counterbalancing  human 
figures  with  an  ox  cart  on  the  left.  Remove  the  figures  and  the  painting  becomes  oddly 
diffuse.  Its  composition  is  strongly  dependent  on  its  anecdotal  content  which  provides 
triggers  for  identification. 
ýs  Illustration  from  Verdi,  Ozanne,  p.  77. 
52 Camille  Pissarro,  The  Roud  at  Pontoise,  1875 
Figure  7b.  ('czanne,  Road  al  Ponloisc,  1,  N/,  )  // 
53 On  the  other  hand,  Cezanne  pulls  the  scene  much  closer.  The  treatment  is  structurally 
bold  and  dramatic.  The  scene  is  conceived  in  three  integrated  strata.  Did  Pissarro  reduce 
his  trees  to  fit  his  frame?  Cezanne  decapitates  his  for  the  sake  of  a  bold  triangular  form,  the 
line  of  the  trees  extending  in  a  strong  diagonal.  Buildings  are  dramatically  drawn  forward 
to  clinch  the  controlling  structure.  Characteristically,  there  are  no  human  figures  to  distract 
from  the  simplifying  logic. 
Cezanne  re-locates  a  tree,  shifts  it  to  the  far  side  of  the  road  -  or  is  it  another  tree  pushed 
many  yards  to  the  right?  He  takes  the  tree  out  of  the  top  of  his  canvas  -  framing  trees  are 
characteristic  of  Poussin's  landscapes.  The  location  of  the  buildings  in  the  middle  ground 
anticipates  The  Chateau  de  Medan  and  the  road  is  pulled  down  to  the  horizontal  to  frame 
that  stratum.  In  the  Pissarro  the  road  curves  into  the  centre  of  the  picture.  One  senses  that 
the  edges  of  the  painting  could  be  extended  laterally  without  much  rearrangement;  on  the 
other  hand,  the  frame  of  the  Cezanne  constitutes  an  emphatic,  structuring  limit. 
It  may  be,  though,  that  the  structure  of  The  Chateau  de  Medan  is  too  emphatic,  that 
despite  the  vividness  of  its  colours  the  controlling  intellect  is  dominant.  With  the  series  of 
L'Estaque  paintings,  however,  the  imaginative  synthesis  seems  to  be  achieved. 
In  May  1883  Cezanne  wrote  to  Emile  Zola: 
I  have  rented  a  little  house  and  garden  at  L'Estaque  [...  ].  I  am  still  busy  painting  -I 
have  here  some  beautiful  views  but  they  do  not  quite  make  motifs.  -  Nevertheless, 
climbing  the  hills  as  the  sun  goes  down  one  has  a  glorious  view  of  Marseilles 
. 
16 
Of  this  letter  and  the  series  of  L'Estaque  paintings,  Richard  Verdi  writes: 
In  this  distinction  [...  ]  Cezanne  reminds  us  of  how  carefully  he  deliberated  over 
his  choice  of  a  landscape  subject  [...  ]  As  L'Estaque  demonstrates,  the  latter  was  a 
scene  in  nature  which  was  itself  intrinsically  balanced  and  harmonious  and  already 
contained  the  germ  of  a  composition.  Once  discovered,  such  sites  may  have 
aroused  in  the  artist  a  sense  of  their  potential  for  formal  integration  even  before  he 
picked  up  a  brush.  " 
The  'motif,  the  'potential  for  formal  integration'  Hopkins  would  recognise  as  'inscape',  the 
discovery,  the  disclosure  of  which  -  `these  things  were  here  and  but  the  beholder  wanting" 
16  Cezanne:  Artists  by  Themselves  cd.  by  Rachel  Barnes  (London:  Bracken  Books,  1990),  p.  26.  17  Verdi,  C6zanne  and  Poussin,  p.  133. 
18  Hopkins,  `Hurrahing  in  Harvest',  p.  31. 
54 -  would  be  the  central  transaction  in  his  writing  about  it.  There  is,  though,  a  distinction 
between  Cezanne  at  this  stage  and  Hopkins  in  that  the  disclosure  for  the  poet  would  occur 
in  a  teleological  context  whereas  we  begin  to  sense  such  a  context  only  in  Cezanne's  late 
paintings. 
In  the  L'Estaque  painting  in  the  Fitzwilliam  Museum,  Cambridge,  (fig.  8  overleaf)  there  is 
a  characteristic  stratification  into  four  areas  but  all  are  linked  by  the  strong  verticals  of  the 
framing  trees.  19  Indeed,  the  trunks  on  the  right  and  the  factory  chimney  resolutely  demand 
the  attention  of  the  eye.  The  integrating  'Z'  bend  of  the  main  trunk  sweeps  us  down  into  the 
framing  foliage,  then  up  through  the  foliage  on  the  left.  Indeed  the  boscage  functions  as  a 
sort  of  informal,  naturalistic  window,  framing  the  ochres  and  oranges  of  the  roofs  of 
L'Estaque  which  are  modulated  through  green  to  the  blue-with-green  that  finally  resolves 
itself  into  the  intense  blue  of  the  Mediterranean. 
Through  such  modulation  Cezanne  attempted  to  realise  his  aim  of  rejecting  conventional 
depth  cues  -  'I  try  to  render  perspective  solely  by  means  of  colour.  '20  The  kinetic  effect 
achieved  in  The  Chateau  de  Medan  by  the  juxtaposition  of  modulation  and  strong  verticals 
is  here  fascinatingly  enhanced  by  the  reversal  of  depth  cues.  The  dominant  factory  chimney 
that  projects  into  the  sea  initiates  a  strong  diagonal  running  to  the  left  that  picks  up  a 
second  factory  chimney  then  the  chimney  of  a  house.  But  the  size  of  the  chimneys 
diminishes  as  they  approach  the  foreground  thus  reversing  the  classical  cue.  The  effect  of 
the  accelerated  movement  of  the  eye  is  to  induce  a  sense  of  depth  between  the  framing  trees 
and  the  roofs. 
The  small  house  chimney  is  the  apex  of  an  inverted  triangle  which  is  completed  by  the 
conspicuous  church  tower  in  light  ochre.  This  functions  as  a  formal  analogue  for  the 
naturalistic  frame  -'overs  and  overs'  it. 
Of  all  the  verticals  perhaps  the  most  subtle  runs  through  the  centre  of  the  picture:  the 
two  foreground  boulders  are  structural  analogues  of  the  island  -  Lile  Maire  -  on  the 
19  Illustration  from  Verdi,  Cezanne  and  Poussin,  p.  132. 
20  Quoted  by  Frank  Elgar  in  Cezanne  (London:  Thames  and  Hudson,  1969),  p.  242. 
55 Figoure  K.  Paul  ('czanne,  U  le  de  l'I:  clcýý/ur,  /880 
50 horizon,  the  blue  of  the  tallest  cliffs  being  reflected  in  the  parallel  blue  brushstrokes  on  the 
central  rock.  The  tones,  though,  are  reversed  out  -  the  light  rocks  against  the  dark  foliage 
and  the  dark  mountains  against  the  lighter  sky.  This  vertical  is  extended  through  the  middle 
factory  chimney  and  through  a  modulation  of  green  into  the  sea.  The  effect  of  this  is  to 
draw  the  eye  up  through  the  modulations  in  a  kinetic  experience  of  perspective. 
It  is  in  considering  devices  such  as  this  that  it  becomes  possible  to  envisage  what 
Cezanne  meant  by  his  intention  to  'become  classical'.  The  vividness  of  sensation  through 
colour  -  and,  thence,  through  colour,  the  formal  control  -  the  subtle  proliferation  of  formal 
analogues,  the  assured  prescriptions  controlling  the  eye,  the  extraordinary  coherence, 
achieve  precisely  that  autonomy  towards  which  he  was  working  in  his  earlier  paintings: 
There  are  two  things  in  the  painter,  the  eye  and  the  mind;  each  of  them  should  aid 
the  other.  It  is  necessary  to  work  at  their  mutual  development,  in  the  eye  by 
looking  at  nature,  in  the  mind  by  the  logic  of  organized  sensations  which  provides 
the  means  of  expression.  21 
In  summary,  the  dawning  associated  with  Wittgenstein's  ambiguous  figure  involves  the 
emergence  of  an  already  familiar  Gestalt.  Cezanne's  motif  and  Hopkins'  inscape  involve  the 
emergence  of  form  from  contexts  whose  content  has  previously  been  perfectly  familiar  - 
trees,  house,  whatever  -  but  here  the  dawning  constitutes  a  discovery. 
Obviously,  there  are  areas  of  art  that  are  confined  to  the  decorative.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  are  certain  kinds  of  imaginative  transactions  that  involve  discovery  through  the 
simultaneous  emergence  of  rendered  forms  together  with  their  inherent  expressive  power. 
That  which  has  been  discovered  has  been  latent  in  the  world  and  is  released  through  the 
artist's  depiction  in  paint  or  imagery.  The  notion  that  art  is  merely  a  decorative  supplement 
confines  our  responses  to  the  pleasurable  and  denies  the  essential  connection  between 
certain  kinds  of  art  and  insight. 
Double  Prescription 
The  following  sequence  of  illustrations  is  based  on  a  fanciful  reconstruction  of  how  an  artist 
21  Cezanne:  Artists  by  Themsleves,  p.  58. 
57 may  have  found  her  'motif 
. 
The  end  point  is  a  postcard  I  received  from  the  Lake  District 
entitled,  Wasdale  Showers'.  The  first  represents  a  panoramic  view:  22 
Fig.  9 
The  second  shows  that  the  artist  has  selected  a  motif 
Fig.  10 
The  artist's  intention  constitutes  a  prescriptive  limit,  a  foredrawing,  that  renders 
intelligible  that  which  is  thereby  limited.  In  the  process  of'cropping'  artists  manipulate  the 
limit  -  adjust  the  frame  -  so  that  the  motif  will  emerge  the  more  strongly.  From  this  initial 
prescription  there  emerges  a  structure  which  is  overed  and  overed,  consciously  enhanced  in 
its  expressiveness  by  the  painter's  skill: 
22  Jill  M.  Aldersley.  Wasdale  Showers!  (Ambleside:  Aldersley  and  Hilton). 
58 Fig.  ll 
The  motif,  the  inscape,  presupposes  a  double  prescription:  through  it  the  selected  fragment 
of  the  world  becomes  expressive.  The  first  prescription  is  effected  through  the  selecting 
focus  of  intentionality;  the  second  is  simultaneously  directed  from  the  world  itself  Value  is 
hound  in  to  the  emergent  intelligibility  as  a  function  of  the  double  prescription.  This  is  the 
conceptual  basis  of  imagination  in  so  far  as  it  is  engaged  with  the  world  around  us.  That 
metaphor  functions  in  a  similar  manner  -  by  framing,  structuring  and  disclosing  inherent 
value  -I  shall  argue  in  later  chapters.  Art  supposes  a  mode  of  intentionality  that  is 
responsive  to  the  inscape  for  the  inscape's  sake:  but,  paradoxically,  that  essential  autonomy 
is  a  condition  for  disclosures  about  the  world. 
The  end  product  is  the  achieved  painting  -  but  it  awaits  the  imaginative  transaction  that 
will  release  its  impact.  Such  a  disclose  cunurot  be  illustrated: 
59   
Figure  12.  Jill  M.  Aldersley,  Wasdale  Showers! 
Fig.  12 
In  double  prescription  form  and  value  are  simultaneously  disclosed:  the  differentiation 
into  head  and  heart  presupposes  a  shift  from  imagining  to  a  discursive  mode.  The  painter 
must  inevitably  say:  'I  want  knowledge  in  order  to  achieve  deeper  feeling,  and  I  want 
feeling  in  order  to  achieve  deeper  knowledge.  '  That  is  his  discursive  rationalization  of  his 
23  imaginative  pursuit. 
23  Quoted  by  Elgar.  p.  181. 
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Paradigms:  Entrapment  or  Freedom 
Our  day  to  day  lives  are  negotiated  by  our  engaging  a  relatively  narrow  range  of 
intentions.  In  reducing  the  world  to  manageable  proportions  we  effectively  consign  areas 
and  aspects  of  it  to  redundancy.  In  order  to  reach  this  substrate  -  with  its  potentiality  of 
wider  and  richer  experience  -  our  habits  of  perception  have  to  be  subverted  Our  sense  of 
ourselves,  however,  is  profoundly  dependent  upon  conservative  paradigms  -  this  makes  the 
passage  to  a  widened  experience  difficult,  not  least  because  such  paradigms  are 
inescapably  competitive.  Once  superseded,  a  paradigm  that  has  engaged  identification 
will  appear  to  its  former  inhabitant  as  absurd  -  thereby  generating  a  pervasive  sense  of 
disturbance.  There  is,  then,  a  deeply  problematical  psychological  dimension  to  our  modes 
of  imagining. 
Redundancy  and  Perception 
In  Beyond  Good  and  Evil  Nietzsche  berates  the  modem  reader: 
As  little  as  a  reader  today  reads  all  the  individual  words  (not  to  speak  of  the 
syllables)  of  a  page  -  he  rather  takes  about  five  words  in  twenty  haphazardly  and 
'conjectures'  their  probable  meaning  -  just  as  little  do  we  see  a  tree  exactly  and  entire 
with  regard  to  its  leaves,  branches,  colour,  shape;  it  is  so  much  easier  for  us  to  put 
together  an  approximation  of  a  tree.  Even  when  we  are  involved  in  the  most 
uncommon  experiences  we  still  do  the  same  thing:  we  fabricate  the  greater  part  of 
the  experience  [...  ].  All  this  means:  we  are  from  the  very  heart  and  from  the  very 
first  -  accustomed  to  lying.  ' 
The  point  about  reading  is  merely  one  example  of  what  he  takes  to  be  a  pervasive 
carelessness  in  the  way  we  perceive.  Typically,  Nietzsche  invests  the  epistemological  point 
with  moral  disapproval.  Setting  aside  the  value  judgement,  Nietzsche  strikingly  anticipates 
contemporary  theories  of  reading: 
Reading  is  a  selective  process.  It  involves  partial  use  of  available  minimal  language 
cues  selected  from  perceptual  input  on  the  basis  of  the  reader's  expectation.  As  this 
partial  information  is  processed,  tentative  decisions  are  made  to  be  confirmed, 
rejected,  or  refined  as  reading  progresses. 
[...  ]  reading  is  a  psycholinguistic  guessing  game  [...  ].  Efficient  reading  does  not 
result  from  precise  perception  and  identification  of  all  elements,  but  from  skill  in 
selecting  the  fewest,  most  productive  cues  necessary  to  produce  guesses  which  are 
right  the  first  time.  The  ability  to  anticipate  that  which  has  not  been  seen  [...  ]  is 
I  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  op.  cit.,  p.  115. 
61 vital  to  reading,  just  as  the  ability  to  anticipate  what  has  not  yet  been  heard  is  vital  in 
listening.  2 
In  his  discussion  of  visual  perception  Hochberg  extends  a  similar  point: 
[...  ]  most  or  all  visual  perception  [...  ]  involves  highly  skilled  sequential  purposive 
behaviours,  and  [...  ]  some  large  component  of  the  perceptual  process  in  the  adult  is 
best  understood  in  terms  of  the  "expectations"  and  "maps"  that  underlie  these  skilled 
behaviours.  3 
The  expectation  shapes  an  informed  guess  that  is  tied  into  the  text  at  intervals: 
The  better  the  reader,  the  more  widespread  can  be  the  fixations  by  which  he  samples 
the  text  -just  so  long  as  the  text  provides  him  with  contextual  redundancy.  (p.  67) 
Fluency  and  speed  of  reading  depend  upon  such  redundancy  -a  certain  kind  of  skilled 
writing  would  anticipate  the  needs  of  such  dependency.  On  the  other  hand,  some 
imaginative  writing  might  aspire  to  subvert  the  norm,  to  disrupt  the  sequences. 
Presumably,  scanning  a  book  is  no  different  in  principle  from  scanning  other  aspects  of 
potential  experience.  In  other  words,  there  must  be  areas  of  redundancy  in  both  texts  and 
the  world  and  these  are  presupposed  in  the  nature  of  perception  itself.  In  addition  to  what 
is  posited  by  its  conceptual  nature,  there  is  a  psychological  aspect  to  redundancy.  Leibniz 
observes: 
[...  ]  there  are  hundreds  of  indications  leading  us  to  conclude  that  at  every  moment 
there  is  in  us  an  infinity  of  perceptions,  unaccompanied  by  awareness  or  reflection; 
that  is,  of  alterations  in  the  soul  itself,  of  which  we  are  unaware  because  these 
impressions  are  either  too  minute  and  too  numerous,  or  else  too  unvarying,  so  that 
they  are  not  sufficiently  distinctive  on  their  own  [...  ].  Memory  is  needed  for 
attention:  when  we  are  not  alerted,  so  to  speak,  to  pay  heed  to  certain  of  our  own 
present  perceptions,  we  allow  them  to  slip  by  unconsidered  and  even  unnoticed. 
But  if  someone  alerts  us  to  them  straight  away,  and  makes  us  take  note  [...  ]  then  we 
remember  it  and  are  aware  of  just  having  had  some  sense  of  it.  4 
There  are  then  at  least  two  sources  of  redundancy:  what  we  cannot  see  because  selection  is 
a  condition  of  seeing  itself  and  what  we  'see'  but  do  not  'notice'. 
2  Goodman,  Kenneth  S.,  `Reading:  A  Psycholinguistic  Guessing  Game'  in  Language  and  Literacy:  The 
Selected  Writings  ofKenneth  S.  Goodman:  Vol.!,  Process,  Theory,  Research,  cd.  by  Frederick  V.  Gollasch 
(Boston:  Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul,  1982),  p.  33. 
3  Julian  Hochberg,  'The  Representation  of  Things  and  People',  from  Art,  Perception  and  Reality,  E.  H. 
Gombrich,  Julian  Hochberg  and  Max  Black,  paperback  edn.,  1973  (Baltimore:  The  John  Hopkins 
University  Press,  1972),  p.  63. 
4  G.  W. Leibniz,  New  Essays  on  Human  Understanding,  trans.  and  cd.  by  Peter  Remnant  and  Jonathan 
Bennet,  abridged  edn.  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1982),  pp.  53-54. 
62 It  is  identification  and  its  concomitantly  posited  redundancy  that  allows  for  the  triggering 
ironies  of  Chaucer  and  the  literal  metaphors  of  Kafka  to  pass  unnoticed,  that  constitutes  the 
gaps  that  subsequently  allow  us  to  notice  for  the  first  time  an  image  or  a  line  from  a  very 
familiar  Shakespeare  play.  How  could  I  have  missed  it?  I  return  from  sight  seeing  in 
Prague  and  find,  for  a  short  time,  that  I  am  seeing  aspects  of  architecture  in  Edinburgh  that 
I  have  never  seen  before.  My  Edinburgh  map,  shaped  by  the  practical  urgencies  of  day  to 
day  actions,  has  pushed  aesthetic  triggers  into  redundancy. 
In  a  modern  city  the  stress  associated  with  successful  responsive  action  ruthlessly 
narrows  the  range  of  intention.  This  constitutes  the  theme  of  e.  e.  cummings's  `what  a  proud 
dreamhorse': 
what  a  proud  dreamhorse  pulling(smoothloomingly)through 
(stepp)this(ing)crazily  seething  of  this 
raving  city  screamingly  street  wonderful 
flowers  And  o  the  Light  thrown  by  Them  opens 
sharp  holes  in  dark  places  paints  eyes  touches  hands  with  new- 
ness  and  these  startled  whats  are  a(piercing  clothes  thoughts  kiss 
-ing  wishes  bodies)squirm-of-frightened  shy  are  whichs  small 
its  hungry  for  Is  for  Love  Spring  thirsty  for  happens 
only  and  beautiful 
there  is  a  ragged  beside  the  who  limps 
man  crying  silence  upward 
-to  have  tasted  Beautiful  to  have  known 
Only  to  have  smelled  Happens-skip  dance  kids  hop  point  at 
red  blue  yellow  violet  white  orange  green- 
ness 
(o  what  a  proud  dreamhorse  moving(whose  feet 
almost  walk  air).  now  who  stops.  Smiles.  he 
stamps 
More  often  than  not,  students  are  bewildered  by  this  loosely  adapted  'sonnet'  -  there  are  two 
quatrains,  abcd,  abcd,  and  a  more  vague  sestet.  That  bewilderment  is  often  expressed  in 
hostility  -  the  value  of  the  familiar  map  is  presupposed  in  this.  Paradoxically,  the  least  well 
read  are  the  most  conservative  -  in  other  words,  the  least  responsive  are  the  most  map- 
s  E.  E.  Cummings,  'What  a  Proud  Dreamhorse',  Complete  Poems:  1913-1935,  (London:  MacGibbon  and  Kee,  1968),  p.  437. 
63 dependant.  The  use  of  an  underlying  traditional  form  draws  attention  to  the  anomalies  with 
a  spice  of  irony.  The  syntactic  landscape  is  unfamiliar  because  cummings  deliberately 
eliminates  much  of  the  redundancy  that  is  latent  in  conventional  patterns  of  meaning. 
To  take  but  a  few  points,  the  measured  tread  of  the  horse  is  rhythmically  paralleled  in 
(step)this(ing).  The  new  prescription  displaces  and  restructures  the  familiar  concept  so  that 
it  is  made  to  illustrate  itself.  Conventional  syntax  is,  indeed,  frequently  latent,  but  the 
absence  of  punctuation  -  the  familiar  syntactic  cues  -  means  that  the  syntax  must  be  worked 
for:  'the  light  thrown  by  them  opens  sharp  holes  in  dark  places,  paints  eyes,  touches  hands 
with  newness.  And  these  startled  "whats?  "  are  a  [...  ]  squirm  of  frightened  shy,  are 
"whichs.  "  To  find  the  frame  -  the  syntax  -  is  to  find  the  sequence  expressive.  There  is  a 
double  prescription  at  work.  The  familiar  is  rediscovered  by  a  more  rigorous  act  of 
attention. 
It  is  striking  how,  in  engineering  our  reading,  Cummings  reflects  the  concerns  of  the 
Russian  Formalists.  For  Shldovsky  the  devices  of  poetry  serve  to  defamiliarize,  to  challenge 
the  mere  recognition  of  words  so  that  they  can  be  recharged  with  sensation: 
The  purpose  of  art  is  to  impart  the  sensation  of  things  as  they  are  perceived,  and  not 
as  they  are  known.  The  technique  of  art  is  to  make  objects  'unfamiliar',  to  make 
forms  difficult,  to  increase  the  difficulty  and  length  of  perception,  because  the 
process  of  perception  is  an  aesthetic  end  in  itself  and  must  be  prolonged.  6 
The  form  is  unearthed  with  a  shock  of  surprise  -  but  the  most  fundamental  rediscovery  is 
reflected  in  the  central  theme. 
It  is  revealed  in  cummings's  ingenious  use,  or  misuse,  of  pronouns:  passers  by,  in  the 
turmoil  of  the  city,  are  designated  'whats',  'whichs'  and  'its'.  Their  estrangement  is  precisely 
caught  in  the  use  of  pronouns  that  conventionally  designate  animals  or  things  -  the  'whats' 
is  expressive  of  surprise.  These  dehumanised  entities  are  hungry  for  'Is'  -  for  being.  Their 
hunger,  the  product  of  their  alienation,  is  met  in  experiencing  beauty  -  the  cart  full  of 
flowers. 
6  Viktor  Shklovsky,  'Art  as  Technique',  quoted  in  A  Reader's  Guide  to  Contemporary  Literary  Theory,  by 
Raman  Seldcn  and  Peter  Widdowson  (New  York:  Harvester  Whcatshcaf,  1993),  p.  31. 
64 Efficient  negotiation  of  a  complex  environment  -  responsive  action  in  the  city  -  depends 
on  the  effective  elimination  of  distractions.  What,  in  other  circumstances,  would  constitute 
cues,  is  pushed  into  redundancy.  The  human  cost  of  this  is  objectification  -  to  act 
mechanically  is  a  condition  for  efficiency.  On  the  other  hand,  the  poem  demands  closeness 
of  attention  by  ruthlessly  reducing  possibilities  for  redundancy.  It  refuses  to  allow  access 
through  conventional  cues.  It  makes  itself  strange  in  order  to  achieve  greater  impact  in  the 
engineering  of  dawnings.  In  this  way  cummings  contrives  that  reading  itself  should  be 
therapeutic  in  that  the  theme  is  not  so  much  discussed  as  undergone  in  the  imaginative 
transactions  that  are,  at  the  same  time,  the  emergence  of  meaning. 
It  is  the  capacity  of  imagination  to  render  what  has  been  redundant  into  expressive 
structure.  We  see  a  mature  painting  of  Cezanne  first  as  a  reduction  of  experience  -  an 
abstracting,  because  of  the  dearth  of  familiar  cues  -  before  we  see  it  as  inscape.  What  has 
been  redundant  is  now  brought,  through  sensation,  to  cognition  -  the  landscape  is  inscaped. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  the  prescriptions  of  the  familiar  that  constitute  the  conceptual  basis 
of  identification: 
To  apprehend  a  pattern  is  to  discern  the  principle  on  which  its  elements  are  ordered. 
To  see  the  elements  only  will  not  suffice,  for  the  pattern  does  not  reside  in  the 
elements  [...  ]  (but)  in  the  rule  which  governs  their  relations  to  each  other  (...  ]. 
Stereotyped  vision  sees  only  those  patterns  which  its  stereotypes  have  permitted  it 
to  anticipate.? 
It  is  identification,  for  example,  facilitated  by  the  projection  of  stereotypes,  that  underpins 
the  possibility  of  camouflage.  We  are  predisposed  to  structure  experience  through 
canonical  forms'8  the  edges  of  which  constitute  depth  cues  that  allow  us  to  separate  shapes 
from  their  contexts.  The  bold  pattern  on  the  flank  of  the  tiger  imitates  such  cues  so  that  the 
identifying  form  of  the  cat  is  effectively  disintegrated.  The  success  of  the  tiger  as  hunter 
presupposes  the  efficacy  of  the  visual  norm. 
7  J.  Taylor,  Design  and  Expression  in  the  Visual  Arts,  quoted  by  Hochberg  in  The  Representation  of  Things  and  People',  op.  cit,  p.  68. 
8  Hochberg,  p.  74. 
65 In  a  sense,  Chaucer  and  Kafka  exploit  identification  in  a  similar  way.  The  Franklin's 
comfortable  conflation  of  material  and  spiritual  values  effectively  camouflages  a  form  that 
emerges  only  when  the  latent  cues  are  brought  to  consciousness  through  our  awareness  of 
Chaucer's  irony. 
In  the  absence,  or  disguising,  of  many  conventional  cues  Cummings  refuses  to  allow  us 
easy  reading.  It  is  interesting  to  contrast  his  intentions  with  those  of  Petrarch  in  the 
Canzoniere,  cxxvi: 
Waters  fresh  and  sweet  and  clear 
where  the  fair  limbs  reclined 
of  the  one  creature  who  to  me  seems  woman; 
and  gentle  tree-trunk  where, 
with  sighs  I  call  to  mind, 
the  leaning  side  once  loved  to  find  a  column; 
flowers  and  grass  that  often 
the  light  gown  hid  from  sight 
with  the  angelic  breast; 
airs  breathing  holy  rest 
where  Love  with  those  fair  eyes  opened  my  heart: 
come,  and  together  grant 
a  hearing  to  my  last  lament.  9 
In  his  choice  of  imagery  Petrarch  is  deliberately  unspecific.  Where,  say,  Hopkins  is 
characteristically  precise  -  his  burn  is'horseback  brown'  and  the'fäwn-froth/Turns  and 
twindles  over  the  broth/Of  a  pool'10  -  Petrarch  is  content  with  a  generic  noun  -'waters'  - 
and  three  rather  unspecific  adjectives  -'fresh  [...  ]  sweet  [...  ]  clear'.  In  his  introduction  to 
his  translations  of  some  of  Petrarch's  poems  Anthony  Mortimer  notes: 
The  nouns  are  generic  and  the  adjectives  obviously  fitting  rather  than  strikingly 
accurate.  We  may  look  for  the  details  of  a  specific  landscape,  but  we  find  only  the 
basic  elements  from  which  a  landscape  may  be  composed.  (p.  6) 
The  pattern  is  extended  throughout  the  stanza  -'fair  limbs',  'tree  trunk',  'flowers  and  grass', 
and  so  on. 
9  Petrarch:  Selected  Poems,  trans.  by  Anthony  Mortimer  (Alabama:  University  of  Alabama  Press,  1977), 
p.  51. 
10  Hopkins,  'Inversnaid',  from  Poems  and  Prose,  op.  cit.,  p.  50. 
66 There  is,  perhaps,  a  parallel  with  some  of  the  backgrounds  in  Giotto.  The  Renaissance 
pursuit  of  depth  has  begun  but  in,  say,  his  fresco  The  Raising  of  Lazarus  the  background 
detail  could  reasonably  be  called  generic. 
Petrarch's  strategy  is  deliberately  to  invite  identification.  The  syntax  is  a  little 
complicated  in  that  the  main  verb  is  in  the  twelfth  line,  but  that  is  the  price  paid  for  drifting 
us  past  a  series  of  cues  which  are  augmented  by  our  own  emotional  dispositions  -  that  is, 
they  invite  identification.  Thus  primed,  there  is  a  seamless  transition  into  the  sentimentality 
of  the  third  stanza:  the  persona  imagines  his  mistress  returning  to  this  place,  finding  him 
dead,  then  being  moved  to  pray  for  his  soul.  We  are  now  in  the  grip  of  a  familiar  fantasy. 
The  exquisite  fourth  stanza  reconstructs  his  first  sight  of  Laura  in  this  location.  She  sits 
in  a  rain  of  flowers  like  Flora  herself.  The  implication  of  divine  origin  is developed  in  the 
following  stanza: 
How  often  I  exclaimed, 
seized  by  a  sudden  fear: 
"For  certain  she  was  born  in  Paradise!  "  (p.  55) 
Having  skilfully  engineered  the  reader's  identification,  Petrarch  now  pushes  us  into  a 
cognitive  dilemma: 
so  faintly  did  I  seize 
the  image  truth  would  show, 
that  I  said  sighing  then: 
"How  came  I  here,  or  when?  "  (p.  55) 
Was  Laura  real  or  imaginary?  The  spell  of  nostalgia  is  destroyed  but  the  warmth  of  the 
fantasy  lingers  like  the  memory  of  an  erotic  dream.  The  congedo  -  the  poet's  address  to  the 
poem  -  directly  confronts  us  with  the  artifice  of  what  we  have  read: 
Song,  had  you  beauty  as  you  have  desire, 
intrepidly  you  could 
go  out  among  the  crowd  and  leave  this  wood.  (p.  55) 
The  pattern  -  the  inducing  of  identification,  luxurious  fantasy,  ambiguity  with  regard  to 
the  reality  of  the  vision,  final  awakening  -  strikingly  anticipates  the  patterns  of  imagination 
in  some  of  the  great  Odes  of  Keats.  Indeed,  in  'Ode  on  a  Grecian  Urn',  in  the  context  of 
67 music,  Keats  celebrates  the  complete  absence  of  cues  -  aural  fantasy  proliferates  from 
triggering  pictorial  cues  derived  from  the  urn: 
Heard  melodies  are  sweet,  but  those  unheard 
Are  sweeter;  therefore,  ye  soft  pipes,  play  on; 
Not  to  the  sensual  ear,  but,  more  endeared, 
Pipe  to  the  spirit  ditties  of  no  tone.  I  i 
Trapped  in  the  spell,  the  poetry  evolves  into  rather  vague  erotic  fantasy: 
More  happy  love,  more  happy,  happy  love! 
For  ever  warm  and  still  to  be  enjoyed, 
For  ever  panting,  and  forever  young  - 
All  breathing  human  passion  far  above.  (p.  85) 
Such  writing  is  characterised  by  considerable  areas  of  redundancy.  This  loss  of  control,  of 
the  actual,  is  extended  in  the  inconsequential  fantasy  that  leads  him  far  from  the  vase: 
Who  are  these  coming  to  the  sacrifice? 
To  what  green  altar,  0  mysterious  priest, 
Lead'st  thou  that  heifer  [...  ]?  (p.  86) 
The  reader's  attention  is  sustained  through  identification.  Keats,  like  Petrarch,  finally  wakes 
up  -'Cold  Pastoral'.  (p.  86)  Only  the  memory  of  the  distinctively  rapt  contemplation  implicit 
in  the  imagery  that  opens  the  poem  -'Thou  still  unravished  bride  of  quietness,  /  Thou  foster- 
child  of  silence  and  slow  time'  (p.  85)  -  is  now  available.  The  vase  speaks  to  him  of  what  he 
has  lost  -  'Beauty  is  truth,  truth  beauty'  (p.  86)  -  not  through  the  attrition  of  time,  but  by 
indulging  in  more  or  less  free-wheeling  fantasy.  The  inverted  commas  are,  effectively,  cues 
for  the  double  prescription  characteristic  of  imagination  -  in  that  mode,  beauty  must  be 
truth. 
The  poem  begins  in  precision,  displays  the  decay  of  imagination  into  fantasy,  then 
redeems  itself  through  its  knowing  differentiation  between  fantasy  and  imagination.  Aware 
of  the  dangers  of  such  indulgence  in  fantasy  -  he  calls  it  poesy  -  it  was  in  the  aborted 
Hyperion'  and  'Fall  of  Hyperion'  that  Keats  fought  to  spell  out  his  manifesto  of  the 
imagination.  12 
11  John  Keats,  'Odeon  a  Grecian  Urn,  from  A  Selection  from  John  Keats,  op.  cit.,  p.  85. 
12  'Hyperion'  and  'The  Fall  of  Hyperion'  are  discussed  more  extensively  in  Chapter  11. 
68 Cummings  eschews  redundancy;  Petrarch  skilfully  exploits  it  to  catch  the  ambivalence  of 
the  spell  of  love;  Keats  loses  control  but  seeks  to  recovers  himself  in  the  insight  learned 
through  that  experience.  In  both  Petrarch  and  Keats  the  poems  display  an  evolution  in 
imagining  from  identification  to  the  abstractive-cognitive.  It  is  crucial  that  the  reader 
undergoes  these  imaginative  transitions  so  that  he  can  be  freed  from  the  spell  of 
identification  with  its  inherent  seduction  of  sentimentality.  Cummings  mounts  a  radical 
challenge  and  demonstrates  how  in  imagining  we  can  transcend  the  limitations  of  our  habits. 
The  creativity  of  imagination  lies  in  its  exploitation  of  potential  cues  hitherto  cloaked  in 
redundancy.  It  thereby  challenges  the  familiar,  not  necessarily  in  deliberate  iconoclasm,  but 
by  its  very  nature  it  extracts  alternative  patterns  of  intelligibility.  The  familiar  also  supposes 
intelligibility,  but  arrived  at  in  the  pressing  need  for  responsive  action  in  a  dangerous  world. 
The  capacity  to  select  canonical  cues  quickly  is  an  obvious  evolutionary  adaptation. 
Nietzsche's  judgement  is  appropriate  in  so  far  as  it  indicts  the  blindness  of  identification, 
but  inappropriate  in  so  far  as  it  fails  to  acknowledge,  at  this  point,  its  efficacy.  Nietzsche's 
analysis  would,  in  any  case,  be  impossible  to  conceive  without  the  insight  contingent  upon 
that  exercise  of  imagination  that  leads  him  to  a  concept  of  redundancy  -  it  presupposes  his 
own  escape.  In  failing  to  acknowledge  that  possibility  he  commits  himself  to  paradox. 
Inhabiting  Paradigms 
The  capacity  to  interpret  from  a  minimum  number  of  easily  anticipated  -  canonical  -  cues  is 
crucial  where  speed  of  reaction  is  important.  The  assumption,  though,  that  new  patterns  of 
interpretation  become  available  merely  through  the  leisured  scrutiny  of  previously 
redundant  cues  is  hardly  tenable.  It  supposes  that  redundant  cues  are  there  for  the  seeing  - 
but  the  'seeing'  is  a  function  of  an  already  familiar  model  or  paradigm.  Inscape  does  not 
gratuitously  disclose  itself  -  it  must  be  rendered  through  the  struggle  with  words  or  paint. 
Furthermore,  the  limits  or  edges  of  a  paradigm  are  not  generally  available  from  perspectives 
within  it.  Awareness  of  limitations  emerges  from  scrutiny  of  internal  anomalies  : 
Discovery  commences  with  the  awareness  of  anomaly,  i.  e.,  with  the  recognition  that 
nature  has  somehow  violated  the  paradigm-induced  expectations  that  govern  normal 
69 science.  It  then  continues  with  a  more  or  less  extended  exploration  of  the  area  of 
anomaly.  And  it  closes  only  when  the  paradigm  theory  has  been  adjusted  so  that  the 
anomalous  has  become  the  expected.  Assimilating  a  new  sort  of  fact  demands  a 
more  than  additive  adjustment  of  theory,  and  until  that  adjustment  is  completed  - 
until  the  scientist  has  learned  to  see  nature  in  a  different  way  -  the  new  fact  is  not 
quite  a  scientific  fact  at  all.  13 
Anomalies  cannot  be  apparent  where  the  mode  of  relation  of  the  observer  involves 
identification.  Paradigms  inhabited  in  identification  are  inevitably  entrapping.  Releasing 
readers  from  entrapment  by  obliging  them  to  negotiate  anomalies  is  precisely  what  has  been 
recorded  in  Chaucer,  Kafka  and  cummings. 
In  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  in  developing  part  five,  'On  the  Natural  History  of  Morals', 
Nietzsche  can  be  seen  working  towards  the  notion  of  entrapment: 
It  was  precisely  because  moral  philosophers  knew  the  facts  of  morality  only 
somewhat  vaguely  in  an  arbitrary  extract  or as  a  chance  abridgement,  as  morality  of 
their  environment,  their  class,  their  church,  the  spirit  of  their  times,  their  climate  and 
zone  of  the  earth,  for  instance  -  it  was  precisely  because  they  were  ill  informed  and 
not  even  very  inquisitive  about  other  peoples,  ages  and  former  times,  that  they  did 
not  so  much  as  catch  the  sight  of  the  real  problems  of  morality  -  for  these  come  into 
view  only  if  we  compare  many  moralities  [...  ].  What  philosophers  called'the 
rational  ground  of  morality'  and  sought  to  furnish  was  [...  ]  only  a  scholarly  form  of 
faith  in  the  prevailing  morality,  a  new  way  of  expressing  it,  and  thus  itself  a  fact 
within  a  certain  morality.  (B.  G.  E.,  op.  cit.,  pp.  108-109) 
Trapped  within  their  paradigms  the  'philosophers'  were  condemned  to  circularity. 
Postmodernism  could  be  said  to  have  its  origins  in  just  such  self-consciousness  of  the 
prescriptive  nature  of  paradigms  as  Nietzsche  exhibits.  Indeed,  Modernism  itself  reflects 
the  impulse  to  explore  multiple  perspectives  and  in  doing  an  incipient  self-awareness  is 
inevitably  engendered.  In  the  context  of  'many  moralities'  the  very notion  of  comparability 
may  be  questionable. 
Ibsen's  notion  of  the  Saving  Lie  that  he  elaborates  in  The  Wild  Duck  (1884)  -  Beyond 
Good  and  Evil  was  published  in  1886  -  involves  Hjalmar  Ekdal  living  and  working  within  a 
sustaining  fiction  that  Gregers  Werle  destroys  by  introducing  a  new  perspective  on  events 
that  makes  Hjalmar's  'paradigm'  untenable.  So  caught  up  is  he  in  his  own  obsessions  that 
13  T.  S.  Kuhn,  The  Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions,  2nd  edn.  1970  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago 
Press,  1962),  pp.  52-53. 
70 Gregers  cannot  see  the  effects  of  his  actions.  14  Here  Ibsen  focuses  upon  a  characteristic 
moral  paradox:  in  the  dubious  urgency  of  our  intention  we  can  read  neither  the  subtlety  of 
our  motives  nor  the  situation  of  the  recipient  of  our  actions.  This  could  be  said  to  involve 
an  identification  with  our  own  endorsed  purposes  that  awaits  the  liberating  distance  of 
imagining. 
In  Heart  of  Darkness  (1902),  on  the  other  hand,  Marlow  cannot  bring  himself  to  destroy 
the  Intended's  sustaining  vision  of  Kurtz  and,  hence,  the  vistas,  values  and  'lies'  of  that 
vision  remain  intact.  Perhaps  the  supreme  value  for  Marlow  at  that  moment  is  that  the 
Intended  loved  Kurtz: 
"I  heard  his  very  last  words  [...  ].  "  I  stopped  in  a  fright. 
"Repeat  them,  "  she  murmured  [...  ].  "I  want  [...  ]  something  [...  ]  to  live  with.  " 
I  was  on  the  point  of  crying  at  her,  "Don't  you  hear  them?  [...  ]  The  horror!  The 
horror!  " 
"His  last  word  -  to  live  with  [...  ].  Don't  you  understand  [...  ]  I  loved  him!  " 
I  pulled  myself  together  and  spoke  slowly. 
"The  last  word  he  pronounced  was  -  your  name.  "  15 
Here  our  urgent  and  poignant  need  to  find  meaning  is  acknowledged  as  a  component  in  a 
typically  Modernist  dilemma  whose  options  are  illusion  or  nightmare.  Yet  this  predicament 
is  as  old  as  the  first  choice  -  innocence  or  knowledge.  But  only  in  fiction  is  the  choice 
possible.  Eve  cannot,  conceivably,  be  in  a  position  to  make  a  choice  until  after  she  has 
made  it.  16 
As  he  arrives  at  the  Intended's  door,  Marlow  is  arrested  by  the  sight  of  Kurtz  in  the 
'glassy  panel'.  (p.  117)  It  is,  of  course,  himself  that  he  sees  -  but  does  Marlow  ever  make 
the  connection?  The  meaning,  however,  is  clear  for  the  reader.  We  are  given  privileged 
access  through  the  writer's  art.  Marlow  himself  has  no  Archimedean  point  from  which  to 
prise  apart  his  own  illusions  from  reality  -  though  he  can  do  so  in  the  case  of  Kurtz.  From 
this  parable  we  realise  that  only  through  the  impossible  privileged  access  is  it  possible  for  us 
14  Henrik  Ibsen,  The  Wild  Duck,  trans.  by  R  Farquharson  Sharp,  Eleanor  Marx-Aveling  and  Linda 
Hannas,  this  edn.  1958  (London:  Dent,  1910). 
15  Joseph  Conrad,  Heart  of  Darkness,  repr.  1985  (London:  Penguin,  1973),  p.  120. 
16  For  the  Eve  paradox,  see  David  Jasper,  Readings  in  the  Canon  of  Scripture:  Written  for  our  Learning 
(Basingstoke:  Macmillan,  1995),  pp.  79-80. 
71 to  realise  that  we  are  deluded.  From  the  inside  -  the  only  possible  perspective  from  our 
quotidian  lives  -  the  Intended  and  Halmar  Ekdal  live  in  incorrigible  realities.  Following  the 
insight  visited  upon  him  by  Gregers,  Ekdal  will  come  to  live,  literally,  in  a  different  -  and 
intolerable  -  world. 
We  touch  here  upon  an  unnerving  capacity  of  imaginative  fictions  -  and  in  that,  perhaps, 
lies  their  fundamental  moral  efficacy.  Kafka's  The  Trial  is  striking  for  the  scrupulous 
integrity  with  which  it  depicts  Joseph  K's  experience.  It  serves  as  a  paradigm  case  both  for 
our  experience  as  individuals  and  for  reading  itself  the  reciprocal  logic  of  fiction  allows  for 
an  impossible  existential  perspective  in  so  far  as  we  are  enabled  to  shift  from  identification 
to  imagining. 
Inhabited  in  the  mode  of  identification,  paradigms  can  never  be  neutral  in  that  they 
incorporate  an  incalculable  sanction  -  they  constitute  reality.  The  relatively  undifferentiated 
consciousness  of  identification  deepens  the  sanction  through  the  binding  in  of  the  self  to 
that  posited  reality.  This  helps  to  explain  the  murderous  tenacity  of  certain  political, 
religious  and  historical  paradigms.  Even  imagining  itself,  in  its  inherent  instability,  decays 
because  its  disclosures  of  value  degenerate  into  canonical  conventions  inviting  identification 
and  thereby  engendering  new  entrapment.  In  this  way  value  slides  into  ideology  in 
preparation  for  aggressive  defence. 
Such  conventions  are  the  traces  of  value,  the  photographic  plates  of  decayed  phenomena. 
The  world  of  the  other,  the  painting  or  the  book  can,  though,  be  re-inhabited,  though  it  will 
be  a  world  of,  at  least,  a  subtly  different  nature. 
Aggressive  defence  points  to  the  psychological  dependency  that  we  have  upon 
conservative  paradigms.  Indeed,  how  could  one  live  except  within  the  conservative 
paradigms  -  cultural,  ideological  -  that  sustain  identification  and,  thence,  the  ego  identity? 
Such  paradigms  are  structurally  conservative  -  they  include  what  might  otherwise  be  seen 
as  radical  perspectives:  it  is  the  mode  of  habitation  that  counts. 
It  is  as  if  in  our  quotidian  lives  we  existed  in  a  complex  'space'  or,  rather,  series  of  spaces, 
posited  by  paradigmatic  relics  that  may  or  may  not  be  compatible.  Each  space  posits  an 
72 aspect  of  self.  The  conceptual  issues  suggested  here  are  given  psychological  expression  in 
Dr  Jekyll  and  Mr  Hyde  (1885),  another  precursor  to  Modernism: 
[...  ]  I  thus  drew  steadily  nearer  to  that  truth  [...  ]  that  man  is  not  truly  one,  but  truly 
two.  I  say  two,  because  the  state  of  my  own  knowledge  does  not  pass  beyond  that 
point  [...  ].  I  hazard  the  guess  that  man  will  be  ultimately  known  for  a  mere  polity  of 
multifarious  incongruous  and  independent  denizens.  '7 
Each  space  is  tethered  to  the  knowing  self  only  through  disjunctive  -  because  objectifying  - 
pragmatically  sanctioned  rationalisations.  Dr  Jekyll,  in  potential,  is  a  fictional  embodiment 
of  Nietzsche's  'many  moralities'  -  now  to  be  understood  as  existing  simultaneously  in  any 
individual,  each  seeking  rationalisation  in  the  elaboration  of  their  'forms  of  faith'.  Outwith  a 
monolithic  ideology  -  in  life  -  identification  presupposes  fragmentation.  The  disturbance 
generated  by  such  alienation  is  given  visual  expression  through  the  multiple  perspectives  of, 
say,  Van  Gogh's  Bedroom  at  Arles.  Though  questions  of  identity  can,  in  normal 
circumstance,  be  more  or  less  resolved  within  a  confederation  of  shared  relics  -a  family,  a 
class,  a  country  and  so  on  -  we  cannot  exactly  inhabit  the  same  spaces  and,  indeed,  the 
prescriptive  nature  of  paradigms  suggests  that  we  modify  and  are  modified  by  the  spaces  of 
others  -  in  a  sort  of  social  relativity.  In  the  larger  scale,  this  reciprocity  is  manifest  in 
transculturation. 
Individuation  -  in  contrast  to  ego  identity  -  is  not  the  once-for-all  discovery  of  a'self  -  an 
ideological  stasis  -  it  is  what  is  posited  in  the  committed  process  of  imagining  in  a  context  of 
relics.  The  ethical  is  that  mode  of  imagination  which  characteristically  negotiates,  in  good 
faith,  with  the  spaces  of  others  and  avoids  identification  with  canonical  cues  -  conventional 
behaviour  and  judgement  is  the  mode  of  action  of  identification,  and  its  sustaining  motive  is 
power. 
Viewed  from  the  perspective  of  the  outsider,  intentional  behaviour  within  a  closed  -  that 
is,  a  superseded  -  paradigm  is  experienced  as  absurdity.  Behaviour  is  seen  in  terms  of 
stereotypes,  language  becomes  cliche.  Yet  relics  can  be  reinvested  with  significance  when 
regarded  as  illustrative. 
17  Robert  Louis  Stevenson:  The  Complete  Short  Stories,  cd.  by  Ian  Bell,  vol.  2  (Edinburgh:  Mainstream 
Publishing,  1993),  p.  150. 
73 In  The  Birthday  Party,  a  difference  between  Stanley's  compulsive  fantasy  and 
conversations  overheard  at  bus  stops  is  that  through  Pinter's  art  the  characters' 
predicaments  are  made  expressive.  Cliches  themselves  become  significant  -  but  this 
presupposes  the  imaginative  involvement  of  the  observer: 
Then  after  that,  you  know  what  they  did?  They  carved  me  up.  Carved  me  up.  It 
was  all  arranged,  it  was  all  worked  out  [...  ].  All  right,  Jack,  I  can  take  a  tip. 
They  want  me  to  crawl  down  on  my  bended  knees.  '8 
All  language  is,  in  an  obvious  sense,  conventional,  but  in  Pinter's  world  cliche  involves  a 
quite  specific  use  of  convention  -  in  Austin's  terms,  it  becomes  a  distinctive  illocutionary 
act.  In  the  case  of  Stanley,  cliche  is  employed  to  achieve  the  entrapment  of  his  interlocuter, 
to  invite  identification.  This  constitutes  a  subtle  -  indeed,  a  sophisticated  -  use  of  language. 
Generally,  we  might  ask:  is  the  use  of  cliche  ever  as  naive  as  it  seems?  Is  this  partly  Pinter's 
point?  We  are  nowhere  wiser  than  in  the  knowledge  of  how  to  manipulate  others.  It  is 
precisely  through  double  prescription  -  by  framing  the  cliche  -  that  our  imaginations  achieve 
psychological  insight. 
Stanley's  space  is  structured  by  sustaining  paradigmatic  relics.  A  witness  trapped  within 
the  same  relics  must  find  the  unfolding  spectacle  bewilderingly  boring.  (As  in  The  Trial, 
there  is  an  uncomfortable  potential  for  self  revelation  on  the  part  of  the  observer.  )  Meg 
wants  a  little  boy  -  Stanley  needs  a  mother:  the  paradigmatic  fantasies  partly,  but  only 
accidentally,  coincide,  providing  momentary  definition  and  stability.  This  unstable 
'accommodation'  -  symbolised  in  the  boarding  house  -  cannot  be  sustained  in  the  face  of  a 
stronger,  intrusive  alliance  of  the  paradigmatic  relics  characteristic  of  suburban  man,  circa 
late  1950s: 
GOLDBERG  [...  ]  You  know  one  thing  Uncle  Barney  taught  me?  Uncle  Barney 
taught  me  that  the  word  of  a  gentleman  is  enough.  That's  why,  when  I  had 
to  go  away  on  business  I  never  carried  any  money.  One  of  my  sons  used  to 
come  with  me.  He  used  to  carry  a  few  coppers.  For  a  paper,  perhaps  to  see 
how  the  MCC  was  getting  on  overseas.  Otherwise  my  name  was  good. 
(p.  28) 
18  Harold  Pinter,  The  Birthday  Party,  Student  Edition  1981  (London:  Methuen,  1960),  p.  23. 
74 Like  a  vulnerable  caddis  grub,  Goldberg,  sensitive  to  his  Jewish  background,  has 
constructed  a  protective  case  from  fragments  of  relics.  He  identifies  with  the  hierarchic 
social  order  in  that,  like  the  Queen,  he  carries  no  money.  From  the  basis  of  this  strength  he 
destroys  Stanley  then  reconstructs  him  in  his  own  image: 
GOLDBERG  We'll  make  a  man  of  you.  [...  ]  You'll  be  re-oriented.  [...  ]  You'll  be 
adjusted.  [...  ]  You'll  be  a  mensch.  [...  ]  You'll  be  integrated.  [...  ]You'll  make 
decisions.  (p.  28) 
Mccann,  too,  joins  in  the  game: 
MCCANN  You'll  be  rich.  [...  ]  You'll  be  our  pride  and  joy.  [...  ]  You'll  be  a 
success.  [...  ]  You'll  give  orders.  (pp.  83-84) 
Pinter  takes  a  step  beyond  Chaucer  or  Kafka  in  that  there  appears  to  be  no  latent  irony  - 
that  would  suppose  an  alternative  paradigm,  an  omniscient  perspective  from  which  we 
could  glean  a  set  of  favoured  values.  In  the  absence  of  such  a  privileged  perspective  we 
experience  unease,  we  have  no  purchase.  We  are  aware  of  absurdity  -  the  paradigms  are 
washed  up  -  but  we  are  offered  no  resolution.  We  experience  the  disturbing  disorientation 
that  is  the  hallmark  of  Pinter. 
In  Hamlet  a  possible  psychological  consequence  of  the  dislocation  of  a  sustaining 
paradigm  is  disclosed  in  the  fate  of  Ophelia.  With  this  potentiality  established,  Hamlet  is  left 
to  pursue  the  logic  of  his  disintegration  into  the  absurdity  that  is  finally  confirmed  in  the 
graveyard.  Interestingly,  it  is  precisely  the  heroic  paradigm  that  has  been  closed  -  seen  from 
the  outside  -  which  is  restored  in  Fortinbras: 
Rightly  to  be  great 
Is  not  to  stir  without  great  argument, 
But  greatly  to  find  quarrel  in  a  straw 
When  honour's  at  the  stake.  19 
It  is  as  if  the  outsider's  vision  -  that  of  the  estranged  Hamlet  -  must  not  be  allowed  to 
challenge  a  conservative  paradigm  justifiable  in  terms  of  its  social  utility.  From  within  this 
paradigm  the  experience  of  the  outsider  appears,  retrospectively,  as  a  mere  aberration. 
19  William  Shakespeare,  Hamlet,  ed.  by  T.  J.  B.  Spencer  (London:  Penguin,  1980),  IV.  4.53. 
75 That  we  experience  the  conclusion  of  the  play  as  ironic,  however,  presupposes  that  we 
are  no  longer  comfortable  in  identification  with  the  ruling  paradigm.  We  are  left  with  an 
unresolved  question  -  that  is,  anomalies  have  been  brought  to  our  awareness. 
By  contrast,  in  the  case  of  King  Lear,  the  sustaining  ideology  with  which  he  identifies  is 
monolithic.  Lear,  thereby,  begins  by  exhibiting  a  power  which  Hamlet  has  already 
irretrievably  lost.  However,  King  Lear  is  concerned  not  so  much  with  rival  paradigms  as 
with  how  paradigms  are  inhabited. 
Goneril  and  Regan  appear  to  conform  to  the  conventions  of  Nature  but  their  conformity 
is  merely  manipulation.  They  intuitively  grasp  that  for  their  father,  trapped  in  identification, 
their  conventional  responses  must  appear  authentic.  They  share  with  Edmund  a  knowing 
exploitation  which,  in  his  case,  is  characteristically  expressed  in  parody.  For  both  Lear  and 
Gloucester,  Nature  is  a  source  of  conventions  that  provide  authenticating  criteria  -  their 
love  is,  thereby,  conditional  and  that  conditionality  constitutes  its  blindness.  It  follows,  that 
the  play  must  make  extensive  use  of  the  imagery  of  'seeing'.  Indeed  this  binary  logic  is 
startlingly  confirmed  in  Gloucester's  seeing  precisely  at  the  moment  that  he  is  blinded  -  the 
emergence  of  a  dawning:  `I  stumbled  when  I  saw.  '20  The  failures  of  ideological  man,  of 
Lear  and  Gloucester,  are  failures  of  imagination  -  the  context  prescribes  that  we  see  these 
as  failures  of  love. 
The  power  of  the  first  scene  of  'King  Lear'  is  largely  derived  from  its  ritualistic  nature. 
Ritual  is  enacted  symbolism.  From  within,  it  is  experienced  in  strong  identification.  But 
ritual  has  an  inherent  fragility  in  that  the  paradigm  would  close  if  a  participant  were  tipped 
into  abstractive  cognition  -  in  which  case  other  participants  would  be  revealed  as  actors. 
Self-dramatisation  is  one  of  Lear's  characteristic  resorts: 
Does  any  here  know  me?  This  is  not  Lear. 
Does  Lear  walk  thus,  speak  thus?  Where  are  his  eyes? 
Either  his  notion  weakens,  his  discernings 
Are  lethargied  -  Ha!  Waking?  'Tis  not  so?  (1.4.226.  ) 
20  William  Shakespeare,  King  Lear,  cd.  by  G.  I.  Duthie  and  C.  B.  Young,  repr.  1969  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  1960),  IV.  1.19. 
76 It  is  the  vestigial  awareness  of  this  instability  that  generates,  at  times,  a  compensating, 
fanatical  adherence.  The  ritualised  paradigm  of  Nature  -  mythic,  rigidly  hierarchical  and 
prescriptive  -  is  Lear's  characteristic  space  and  integral  to  his  identity. 
Cordelia's  dumb  challenge  rocks  the  inherent  fragility  of  Lear's  paradigm  and  this 
instantly  establishes  her  as  an  outsider  -  literally,  she  is  banished.  The  knowing 
machinations  of  her  sisters  establish  them,  too,  as  outsiders  -  so  they  are  capable  of 
manipulating  the  system.  They  are  actors,  therefore,  aware  of  their  power. 
Edmund,  the  bastard,  may  espouse  an  alternative  'Nature'  appropriate  for  a'natural'  child, 
but  the  full  power  of  his  first  words  comes  from  their  being  the  ringing  declaration  of  an 
outsider  who  revels  in  the  manipulation  of  a  conservative  paradigm  that  he  sees  at  ironic 
distance: 
Thou,  Nature  art  my  goddess  [...  ] 
Wherefore  should  I 
Stand  in  the  plague  of  custom  [...  ]  (I.  2.1) 
Like  Iago,  he  intuitively  recognises  how  others  are  psychologically  dependent  on 
conservative  paradigms.  Their  own  exhilarated  sense  of  themselves,  founded  in  villainy,  is 
derived  from  a  sort  of  epistemological  parasitism.  The  shared  standpoint  allows  for 
temporary  confederation  with  Goneril  and  Regan,  temporary,  because  their  wills  to  power 
are  fervently  individualistic  and  share  no  ideological  commitment. 
The  Fool  and  Edgar,  through  different  circumstances,  stand  outside  the  magic  circle  of 
the  play's  ideological  centre.  Again,  Shakespeare  uses  madness,  feigned  madness,  as  with 
Edgar  and  Hamlet,  to  warn  us  of  a  potentiality,  and  actual  madness,  as  with  Lear  and 
Ophelia,  to  illustrate  the  terrifying  disintegration  that  awaits  those  who  cross,  or  are  pushed, 
across  the  magic  threshold.  Shakespeare  is,  inevitably,  a  man  of  his  time  -  but  is  fascinated 
by  the  vistas  over  the  edge. 
Kent  and  Albany  exist  within  the  paradigm.  Kent's  service,  ironically,  would  re-stabilise 
what  Lear  has  been.  In  the  pressure  of  the  circumstances  the  well-meaning  Albany  can 
produce  only  moral  platitudes  -  the  conventions  of  the  conservative  paradigm  -  which  are 
devastatingly  undercut  by  events: 
77 ALBANY  All  friends  shall  taste 
The  wages  of  their  virtue,  and  all  foes 
The  cup  of  their  deservings  [...  ]. 
LEAR  And  my  poor  fool  is  hanged!  (V.  3.302.  ) 
At  the  other  side  of  his  disintegration  Lear,  too,  arrives  at  a  situation  of  detachment  - 
having  assimilated  the  Fool's,  he  comes  to  God's  standpoint: 
And  take  upon's  the  mystery  of  things, 
As  if  we  were  God's  spies.  (V.  3.16.  ) 
The  paradigm  has  been  seen  at  a  wry  distance: 
So  we'll  live, 
And  pray,  and  sing,  and  tell  old  tales,  and  laugh 
At  gilded  butterflies,  and  hear  poor  rogues 
Talk  of  court  news.  (V.  3.11) 
Lear's  dawning  was  depicted  in  literal  metaphor  -  an  awakening.  Cordelia's  space  is 
acknowledged  in  reconciliation.  He  now  operates  at  the  level  of  the  personal  rather  than 
the  mythic  -  his  individuation  is  presupposed  in  this. 
The  means  of  such  arrival  is  more  fully  explored  in  the  experience  of  Gloucester.  His 
blinding  makes  him,  in  effect,  another  exile,  takes  him  beyond  the  magic  circle  of  the 
dominant  paradigm.  At  the  sight  of  the  mad  Lear  he  effectively  provides  a  definition  of 
imagination: 
LEAR  [...  ]  you  see  how  this  world  goes. 
GLOUCESTER  I  see  it  feelingly.  (IV.  6.146.  ) 
In  order  to  avoid  the  pitfalls  of  the  obstructive  loyalty  of  Kent,  the  reconciliation  with 
Cordelia  must  come  as  Lear  emerges  from  the  far  side  of  madness,  otherwise,  she  too, 
would  seek  to  sustain  the  mythic  self  -  Royal  Lear. 
Implicit  in  this  is  an  important  paradox.  It  points  to  the  understanding  of  why  the  play 
resolutely  refuses  to  resolve  itself  in  affirmation  of  the  'justice'  that  Albany  -  and  the 
audience,  perhaps  -  would  envisage.  Such  a  resolution  would  constitute  the  restoration  of  a 
paradigm  whose  fatal  seductive  power  is  now  understood.  Value  is  reconstituted  through 
the  rediscovery  of  the  personal,  through  the  operation  of  imagination. 
There  are,  then,  good  reasons  why  imagining  can  be  difficult.  It  challenges  our  habits  of 
perception  and  our  very  sense  of  ourselves. 
78 Chapter  Four 
Frontiers 
The  issues  concerning  the  modes  in  which  we,  as  individuals,  inhabit  paradigms  are 
reflected  on  the  larger  scale  at  the  interface  between  cultures.  This  is  evident  in  the 
circumstances  of  colonisation  involving  the  projection  of  European  values  and  modes  of 
thought  and  within  European  societies  themselves  in  periods  of  social  change.  The  modes 
of  imagination  are  revealed  in  how  we  assimilate  experience  in  both  the  geographical  and 
historical  contexts.  The  expressive  power  of  the  historical  novel  supposes  an  imaginative 
transfiguration  of  history  which  is  no  different  in  principle  from  the  rendering  of  other 
experience  which  we  have  considered  so  far. 
The  cover  of  Mary  Pratt's  book,  Imperial  Eyes  Travel  Writing  and  Transculturation  depicts 
an 
Andean  silletero  carrying  a  European  across  the  Cordillera  on  his  back.  But  for  the 
rain,  the  passenger  would  probably  have  been  depicted  reading  a  book,  the 
recommended  way  to  pass  the  time  while  riding  this  way.  ' 
Elevated  to  the  cover,  this  image  comes  to  symbolise  European  hegemony;  it  grows  in 
power  and  significance  as  the  book  unfolds. 
In  Waverley,  Walter  Scott  describes  to  us,  through  a  clansman,  the  retinue  of  the 
Highland  chieftain,  Fergus  Mac-Ivor,  Vich  Ian  Vohr: 
[...  ]  there  is  his  hanchman,  or  right-hand  man;  then  his  bard,  or poet;  then 
his  bladier,  or  orator  [...  ]  then  his  gilly-more,  or  armour  bearer  [...  ]  then  his 
gilly-casfliuch,  who  carries  him  on  his  back  through  the  sikes  and  brooks.  2 
That  Mac-Ivor  maintains  these  men  is  a  matter  of  pride  for  his  clansman,  Evan  Dhu.  At 
least  in  certain  circumstances  the  images  -  silletero  and  gilly-casfliuch  -  would  be 
interchangeable;  but  each  assumes  very  different  values  according  to  the  prescriptive 
paradigm  within  which  it  is  placed. 
Clearly,  Mary  Platt  selected  the  image  to  express  her  indignation.  Interestingly,  she 
refers  to  a  letter  from  David  Livingstone  as  'from  an  Englishman  in  Africa  to  his  nephew'. 
(p.  4)  By  designating  a  Scotsman  an  Englishman  she  unwittingly  confirms  the  dominance  of 
a  habit  of  thought  that  conflates  English  with  British,  an  unthinking,  benign,  conflation  that 
Mary  Louise  Pratt,  Imperial  Eyes:  Travel  Writing  and  Transculturation  (London:  Routledge,  1992), 
caption  for  an  illustration,  p.  154. 
2  Sir  Walter  Scott,  Waverley,  rcpr.  1976  (London:  Dent,  1969),  p.  153. 
79 reflects  her  identification  with  assumptions  that  appear  from  the  outside  as  arrogant.  She 
thereby  unconsciously  reinforces  the  very  mode  of  inhabiting  paradigms  that  she  is  at  pains 
to  expose:  we  cannot  be  conscious  within  the  paradigmatic  relics  that  we  inhabit  because 
such  assimilation  would  change  the  condition  of  our  seeing.  We  become  responsible  only 
retrospectively  -  this  is  the  essence  of  the  Eve  paradox:  we  cannot  reasonably  chose  until 
we  know.  We  inevitably  inhabit  a  range  of  paradigms,  characteristically,  in  happy  ignorance 
of  their  inherent  contradictions  and  prescriptive  power. 
Because  paradigms  are  not  value  free  they  seem,  whether  viewed  from  within  or  between 
cultures,  to  be  inescapably  competitive.  Is  it  possible  to  engineer  neutrality?  In  1667 
Bishop  Thomas  Sprat  published  the  History  of  the  Royal  Society,  the  aims  of  which  had 
been  incorporated  by  Royal  Decree  in  1662: 
Their  purpose  is,  in  short,  to  make  faithful  Records,  of  all  the  Works  of  Nature,  or 
Art  [...  ]  that  so  the  present  Age,  and  Posterity,  may  be  able  to  put  a  mark  on  the 
Errors,  which  have  been  strengthened  by  long  prescription  [...  ].  And  to  accomplish 
this,  they  have  indeavor'd,  to  separate  the  knowledge  of  Nature,  from  the  colours  of 
Rhetorick,  the  devices  of  Fancy,  or  the  delightful  deceit  of  Fables.  They  have 
labor'd  to  inlarge  it,  from  being  confin'd  to  the  custody  of  a  few;  or  from  servitude 
to  private  interests.  They  have  striven  to  preserve  it  from  being  over-press'd  by  a 
confused  heap  of  vain,  and  useless  particulars;  or  from  being  strait'ned  and  bounded 
too  much  by  General  Doctrines.  They  have  try'd,  to  put  it  into  a  condition  of 
perpetual  increasing;  by  settling  an  inviolable  correspondence  between  the  hand  and 
the  brain.  They  have  studi'd,  to  make  it,  not  onely  an  Enterprise  of  one  season,  or  of 
some  lucky  opportunity;  but  a  business  of  time;  a  steddy,  a  lasting,  a  popular,  an 
uninterrupted  Work.  They  have  attempted,  to  free  it  from  Artifice,  and  Humors, 
and  Passions  of  Sects;  to  render  it  an  Instrument,  whereby  Mankind  may  obtain  a 
Dominion  over  Things,  and  not  onely  over  one  anothers  Judgements.  And  lastly, 
they  have  begun  to  establish  these  Reformations  in  Philosophy,  not  so  much,  by  any 
solemnity  of  Laws,  or  ostentation  of  Ceremonies;  as  by  solid  Practice,  and 
examples:  Not,  by  a  glorious  pomp  of  Words;  but  by  the  silent,  effectual,  and 
unanswerable  Arguments  of  real  Productions.  3 
The  phenomena  of  Nature  are  to  be  recorded.  Truth  has  lain  neglected  or  remained 
unrevealed.  The  reasonable  and  laudable  assumption  is,  that  once  the  great  liberal 
principles  are  established  -  that  science  should  be  free  from  considerations  of  religion, 
3  Thomas  Sprat,  History  of  the  Royal  Society,  quoted  in  The  Craft  of  Prose,  ed.  by  A.  F.  Scott  (London: 
Macmillan,  1963),  p.  105. 
80 politics  and  accident  of  birth  -  an  objective  science  will  be  possible:  the  world  can  be 
described. 
To  all  appearances,  Karl  Linne's  system  of  classification  of  plants  would  seem  to 
exemplify  the  aims  and  principles  that  the  Royal  Society  had  in  mind.  It  is  a  popular  myth 
that  Linne  invented  the  system  of  classification  -  he  merely  rationalised  it.  Mary  Pratt 
discusses  at  length  Linne's  apparently  benign,  neutral  paradigm. 
Linne  published  his  Systema  Naturae  in  1735: 
Here  was  an  extraordinary  creation  that  would  have  a  deep  and  lasting 
impact  [...  ]  on  the  overall  ways  European  citizenries  made,  and  made  sense  of,  their 
place  on  the  planet  [...  ].  It  was  a  descriptive  system  designed  to  classify  all  the 
plants  on  the  earth  [...  ]  according  to  the  characteristics  of  their  reproductive  parts. 
[...  ]  Born  out  of  earlier  classificatory  efforts  [...  ]  Linnaeus'  approach  had  a  simplicity 
and  elegance  unapproached  by  his  predecessors.  [...  ]  His  schema  was  perceived  [...  ] 
as  making  order  out  of  chaos.  " 
In  their  excitement  in  extending  the  range  and  scope  of  their  project,  taxonomists  used  the 
facilities  and  routes  already  established  by  overseas  trading  companies.  Indeed,  the 
international  scientific  expedition  became,  'one  of  Europe's  proudest  and  most  conspicuous 
instruments  of  expansion'.  (p.  23) 
The  Royal  Botanic  Garden  in  Edinburgh  precisely  reflects  the  paradigm  in  terms  of  its 
tradition  of  plant  collection,  work  in  taxonomy,  and  in  the  very  layout  of  the  garden  itself  - 
according  to  genera.  It  also  contains  within  it  a  statue  of  Linnaeus.  The  Garden  was 
established  on  its  present  site  between  1820  and  1823  incorporating  a  collection  from  a 
physic  garden  established  elsewhere  in  1630. 
Darwin's  involvement  in  the  voyage  of  the  Beagle  -  begun  in  1831  -  was  typical.  Captain 
FitzRoy  had  two  objectives:  to  continue  charting  the  South  American  coast  and  to  establish 
a  more  accurate  fixing  of  longitude  by  carrying  out  a  series  of  chronological  reckonings 
round  the  world.  The  refining  of  the  geographical/  navigational  paradigms  was,  though  of 
obvious  scientific  import,  at  the  same  time  indicative  of  the  impulse  to  extend  European 
influence  -  in  this  case  associated  with  sea  power.  To  extend  the  exploration,  however,  into 
the  hinterland,  as  practised  by  Darwin  when  he  could  find  the  opportunity,  was  typical  of 
4  Imperial  Eyes,  pp.  24-25. 
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up  territories  through  discovery. 
There  is,  then,  an  obvious  sense  in  which  the  Linnean  paradigm  was  sustained  and 
extended  through  pathways  directly  associated  with  the  expansion  of  economic  and  political 
power.  Yet  there  is  a  more  subtle,  prescriptive  power  which  was,  and  still  is,  manifest  in  the 
very  vocabulary  which  naturalists  use.  The  following  describes  a  miniature  Brazilian  orchid, 
Laelia  regina: 
This  tiny  laelia  is  named  after  Regina  Angerer,  who  flowered  the  type  specimen  in 
cultivation  after  she  discovered  it  while  collecting  in  the  Serra  da  Caraca  in  Minas 
Gerais.  5 
The  concept  discovery  is  revealing.  In  an  ongoing  survey  of  one  hectare  of  forest  in  the 
Serra  do  Mar,  the  Botanical  Garden  of  Rio  de  Janeiro  have  discovered  three  new  species  of 
tree.  We  hear  of  this  with  delight,  and  a  kind  of  awe:  new  species  are  still  being  discovered 
in  an  area  so  well  documented  as  Rio  State? 
On  the  other  hand,  there  are  no  indigenous  Indians  left  in  this  area  of  Brazil. 
Characteristically,  the  knowledge  of  indigenous  peoples  has  been  ignored  in  the  discovery 
and  description  of  new  species.  Yet  the  knowledge  of  these  people  is  extensive: 
The  Amazon  Indians  and  other  rainforest  peoples  have  learnt  to  adapt  to  the 
phenomenal  species  diversity  of  their  forests.  They  have  found  uses  for  many  of  the 
plant  species  that  surround  them. 
Brian  Boom,  of  the  New  York  Botanical  Garden,  worked  first  with  the  Chäcobo 
Indians  of  Bolivia.  His  sample  hectare  contained  649  trees  of  94  species  [...  ].  The 
Indians  had  uses  for  76  species  (79.7  per  cent)  either  as  food  or  in  building,  crafts 
medicines  or commerce.  6 
This  account  is  typical. 
I  do  not  wish  to  deny  the  scientific  efficacy  of  the  Linnean  paradigm.  I  merely  wish  to 
draw  attention  to  one  of  the  hidden  consequences  of  involvement  in  an  apparently  neutral, 
indeed,  benign  construct.  Practical  knowledge  has,  characteristically,  been  undervalued  as  a 
S  Carl  L.  Withner,  The  Cattleyas  and  their  Relatives,  Volume  2:  The  Laelias  (Portland:  Timber  Press, 
1990),  p.  117. 
6  Ghillean  Prance,  'Fruits  of  the  Rainforest',  in  New  Scientist,  1699  (1990),  42-45  (pp.  42-43). 
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geographical  and  economic  expansion. 
It  is  at  the  edges  of  paradigms  -  at  frontiers  -  that  the  discovery  of  their  distinctive 
prescriptions  becomes  possible.  Insight  is  often  available  with  the  passage  of  time,  the 
achievement  of  historical  perspective. 
My  copy  of  The  Lake  Regions  of  Central  Africa  was  awarded  as  a  school  prize  in  1893  - 
this  would  seem  to  guarantee  its  political  correctness  and  assumptions  about  value.  It  is 
pervaded  by  the  language  of  discovery.  Indigenous  peoples  provide  a  context  for 
adventure.  The  myth  of  cannibalism  lends  a  pervasive  spice  -'the  countries  occupied  by  the 
Nyam-Nyam  tribes,  that  singular  region  of  dwarfs  and  cannibals.  ''  We  are  informed  that, 
'the  Dinka  tribes  [...  ]  are  among  the  lowest  in  the  scale  of  human  beings.  Utterly  innocent 
of  clothing  [...  ]  they  are  equally  destitute  of  moral  qualities.  '  (pp.  43-44)  The  inhabitants  of 
'intertropical  Africa'  like  'other  Africans  [...  ]  are  children  of  impulse,  credulous,  suspicious, 
often  lying,  cowardly,  and  treacherous.  '  (p.  47)  We  learn  of  a  project  to  establish  an 
'ethnological  museum'  in  Cairo,  'for  the  reception  of  curious  specimens  of  the  human  family.  ' 
(p.  94)  Were  the  specimens  to  be  stuffed?  Negro  kings  are  'the  greatest  nuisances  in 
Africa.  '  (p.  49)  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  exceptions:  Karagwe  is  'ruled  over  by  a 
respectable  and  mild-mannered  old  black  king'  (p.  56)  Imagine  Queen  Victoria  described  by 
a  black  contemporary  as  'a  respectable  and  mild-mannered  old  white  queen.  ' 
Values  associated  with  the  natural  world  are  revealing.  The  characteristic,  and 
contradictory,  designations  of  nature  as  paradise  and  as  green  hell  are  well  represented. 
We  learn  that, 
In  many  parts  of  savage  Africa  [...  ]  the  "game  laws"  are  as  strictly  enforced  as  in 
civilised  England,  and  a  usual  arrangement  is  for  the  hunter  to  share  his  booty  with 
the  black  "lord  of  the  soil.  "  (p.  252) 
Presumably  the  following  reflects  the  values  of  the  hunt  transposed  from'civilised  England': 
Elton's  party  enjoyed  several  days  of  most  exciting  elephant-stalking  [...  ]  the  herd 
was  at  last  sighted;  two  or  three  of  the  elephants  dozing  under  the  shade  of  some 
trees,  others  engaged  in  munching  branches  [...  ].  They  were  soon  aroused  from  this 
7  John  Geddie,  The  Lake  Regions  of  Central  Africa  (London:  Nelson,  1889),  p.  38. 
83 delightful  Elysium  [...  ]  by  the  hunters,  who  had  crept  up  to  within  ten  or  fifteen 
yards  unseen.  Singling  out  the  biggest  elephant  [...  ]  Elton  and  [...  ]  Rhodes,  each 
planted  a  bullet  behind  his  shoulder.  He  trumpeted,  staggered  forward,  tripped  over 
into  the  rocky  bed  of  a  "nullah",  scrambled  out  on  the  other  side,  and  there  receiving 
other  two  shots,  crashed  down  lifeless  [...  ]. 
Chase  was  then  given  [...  ]  to  the  next  largest  elephant  -a  cow  accompanied  by 
her  calf  -  which  deliberately  charged  [...  ].  Allowing  her  to  approach  to  within  about 
three  yards,  he  gave  her  a  forehead  shot,  which  turned  her  round;  and  then  Rhodes 
"doubled  her  over  like  a  rabbit.  "  The  retreating  herd  were  pursued  to  the  top  of  the 
pass,  where  [...  ]  a  big  bull  elephant,  receiving  a  shot,  stumbled  and  fell  [...  ]  "holding 
my  Henry  rifle  like  a  pistol,  I  shot  him  again  at  the  root  of  the  tail.  The  shock  was 
irresistible;  over  the  edge  of  the  ravine  he  went,  head  foremost,  the  blood  gushing 
out  of  is  trunk  [...  ].  "  Still  the  hunt  was  continued  [...  ]  many  a  man  at  home  would 
have  given  one  thousand  pounds  for  such  a  day's  sport.  (pp.  266-267) 
On  the  other  hand,  throughout  the  book,  slavery,  as  it  was  still  practised  by  Arab  slavers, 
is  roundly  condemned.  In  his  exploration  of  what  proved  to  be  the  headwaters  of  the 
Congo,  begun  in  1866,  Livingstone  writes:  'I  am  heart-broken  and  sick  of  the  sight  of 
human  blood.  '  (p.  142)  Stanley,  though,  seems  to  have  fought  a  private  war  in  his 
exploration  of  the  Congo  (1877).  His  trip  is  reported  to  have  cost  the  lives  of  114  members 
of  his  own  party  and  countless  casualties  amongst  the  native  peoples.  (p.  189) 
It  was  following  his  reading  of  Sir  Roger  Casement's  report  on  the  atrocities  committed 
in  the  Belgian  Congo  that  Conrad  inveighed  against  the  situation  that  prevailed  in  that 
fiefdom  of  the  King  of  the  Belgians.  Even  in  Conrad's  vision,  though,  certain  European 
paradigms  prevail.  The  myth  of  the  green  hell  is  proliferated  and  despite  the  open-eyed 
description  of  atrocities  and  the  heavy  indictment  of  European  practice,  the  African  people 
remain  more  or  less  invisible  behind  a  typically  reductive  paradigm.  Conrad's  perspective 
reflects  a  passionate  assumption  of  guilt  but  there  is  a  concomitant  identification  which 
precludes  the  alternative  perspective  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  victim.  Conrad's  values 
are  operative  within  a  paradigm  beyond  the  edges  of  which  he  cannot  see  -I  do  not  intend 
this  as  a  judgement,  but  as  an  observation  on  how  we  inhabit  paradigms. 
The  transactions  of  imagination  are  not  confined  to  words  comfortably  contained  within 
the  covers  of  a  book,  or  to  paint  contained  within  the  limit  of  a  frame.  They  have  effected, 
and  continue  to  effect,  basic  issues  of  life  and  death  wherever  cultures  meet  -  at  the 
84 interface  of  paradigms.  The  consequences  of  failing  to  differentiate  between  imagination  and 
identification  are  reflected,  in  the  larger  scale,  in  the  cost  of  human  lives. 
Imagination  and  History 
Specifically  imaginative  issues  are  raised  by  Sir  Walter  Scott,  typically,  in  Waverley,  a  novel 
which  explores  a  clash  of  cultures  and  the  resultant  psychological  tensions  within  the  mind 
of  its  protagonist,  Edward  Waverley.  The  very  name  -'Waverley'  -  reflects  how  the  young 
man  is  swayed  by  conflicting  paradigms. 
His  father,  Richard,  a  second  son,  has,  for  that  very  reason,  to  make  his  own  way  'in  the 
race  of  life'.  Under  this  pressure,  'adopting  a  political  creed  more  consonant  both  to  reason 
and  his  own  interest  [...  ]  entered  life  as  an  avowed  Whig,  and  friend  of  the  Hanover 
succession.  '  (Waverley,  op.  cit.,  p.  67) 
Edward,  though,  is  heir  to  his  uncle,  Sir  Everard,  with  'Tory  or  High-church  predilections 
and  prejudices  which  had  distinguished  the  house  of  Waverley  since  the  Great  Civil  War.  ' 
(p.  66)  Edward  spends  eight  months  of  the  year  under  his  uncle's  tutelage  while  his  father 
prosecutes  his  own  plans  and  ambitions.  The  neglected  child,  with  his  quick  intelligence, 
indulged  by  his  uncle,  more  or  less  educates  himself  in  his  uncle's  library.  Consequently,  his 
'idle  reading'  renders  him  unfit  for  'serious  and  sober  study;  (p.  78)  together  with  his  natural 
'temper'  it  results  in'that  wavering  and  unsettled  habit  of  mind'.  (p.  98) 
The  child  is  drawn  into  identification  with  a  romanticised  history,  a  heady  melange  of 
legend  and  romantic  values: 
The  deeds  of  Wilibert  of  Waverley  in  the  holy  land,  his  long  absence  and  perilous 
adventures,  his  supposed  death,  and  his  return  on  the  evening  when  the  betrothed  of 
his  heart  had  wedded  the  hero  who  had  protected  her  from  insult  and  oppression 
during  his  absence  [...  ]  to  these  and  similar  tales  he  would  hearken  till  his  heart 
glowed  and  his  eyes  glistened.  (pp.  79-80) 
In  the  context  of  self-aggrandising  fantasy,  control  and  the  cognitive  are  undervalued: 
[...  ]  he  was  losing  for  ever  the  opportunity  of  acquiring  habits  of  firm  and  assiduous 
application,  of  gaining  the  art  of  controlling,  directing,  and  concentrating  the  powers 
of  the  mind  for  earnest  investigation.  (p.  74-75) 
85 These  habits  are  to  cost  Edward  dear  in  his  naive  failure  to  analyse  and  evaluate  his 
situation  and  obligations  to  Colonel  Gardener,  indeed,  to  the  twenty  men  from  his  uncle's 
estate  who  are  enlisted  to  form  Captain  Waverley's  'troop'.  That  dawning  will  mark  a 
crucial  awareness: 
Yes  [...  ]  I  have  indeed  acted  towards  you  with  thoughtless  cruelty  [...  ]  and  when  I 
had  subjected  you  to  all  the  rigour  of  military  discipline,  I  shunned  to  bear  my  own 
share  of  the  burden  [...  ]  0,  indolence  and  indecision  of  mind!  (p.  328) 
Edward's  is  a  flawed  but  attractive  character.  The  child  is  failed  by  both  father  and  uncle: 
the  former,  through  neglect  and  ready  political  pragmatism;  the  latter,  through  self- 
indulgence  in  romantic  Jacobitism.  Both  authority  figures,  in  their  self-absorption  -  but 
from  different  perspectives  -  reinforce  the  child's  disposition  for  fantasy.  Primed  in  this 
way,  Edward  arrives  at  Tully-veolan.  It  is  at  once  a  place  -  through  which  the  frontier  can 
be  drawn  between  Lowlands  and  Highlands;  an  ideological  frontier  -  roughly,  between 
Whiggery  and  Jacobitism;  and  a  point  of  departure  -  between  adolescence  and  adulthood. 
By  choosing  an  English  hero  -  Scott  uses  the  term  so  often  as  to  undermine  it  with  irony 
-  the  author  is  able  to  present  the  far  side  of  the  frontier  with  a  vividness  appropriate  to 
initiation.  A  cattle  raid  marks  the  intrusion  of  the  competing  paradigm: 
'[...  ]  robbers  from  the  neighbouring  Highlands.  We  used  to  be  quite  free  from  them 
while  we  paid  black-mail  to  Fergus  Mac-Ivor  Vich  Ian  Vohr.  '  (p.  144) 
The  characteristic  conflict  between  settled  and  heroic  values  is  engaged.  Indeed,  Edward's 
first  contact  is  with  the  Gael  as  warrior: 
[...  ]  a  stout,  dark,  young  man,  of  low  stature,  the  ample  folds  of  whose  plaid  added 
to  the  appearance  of  strength  which  his  person  exhibited.  The  short  kilt,  or 
petticoat,  showed  his  sinewy  and  clean-made  limbs;  the  goat-skin  purse, 
flanked  by  the  usual  defences,  a  dark  and  steel-wrought  pistol,  hung  before  him  [...  ] 
a  broadsword  dangled  by  his  side,  a  target  hung  upon  his  shoulder,  and  a  long 
Spanish  fowling-piece  occupied  one  of  this  hands.  (p.  151) 
It  was  the  fate  of  writing  such  as  this  to  establish  a  national  stereotype,  that  is,  to  invite 
unthinking  identification,  the  power  of  whose  entrapment  is  still  manifest  in  popular 
assumptions,  at  least  amongst  the  young,  that  the  '45  was  a  conflict  between  the  Scots  and 
86 the  English  and  that  Culloden  was  a  national  catastrophe.  On  the  other  hand,  Scott's 
careful  analysis  of  Edward  Waverley  suggests  that  he  intended  no  such  thing. 
Scott  is  at  pains  to  emphasise  the  effect  of  the  setting  on  Edward  who,  once  across  the 
frontier,  gives  himself  up  to  'the  full  romance  of  his  situation.  '  (p.  156)  The  crossing  of  the 
frontier  itself  is  clearly  established  as  a  crossing  into  the  sublime: 
It  was  towards  evening  as  they  entered  one  of  the  tremendous  passes  which 
afford  communication  between  the  high  and  low  country;  the  path  which  was 
extremely  steep  and  rugged,  winded  up  a  chasm  between  two  tremendous  rocks, 
following  the  passage  which  a  foaming  stream,  that  brawled  far  below,  appeared  to 
have  worn  for  itself  in  the  course  of  ages.  A  few  slanting  beams  of  the  sun,  which 
was  now  setting,  reached  the  water  in  its  darksome  bed,  and  showed  it  partially, 
chaffed  by  a  hundred  rocks  and  broken  by  a  hundred  falls.  (p.  154) 
The  figures  in  this  charged  landscape  are  perceived  by  Edward  in  terms  of  legend: 
Here  he  sate  on  the  banks  of  an  unknown  lake,  under  the  guidance  of  a  wild  native, 
whose  language  was  unknown  to  him,  on  a  visit  to  the  den  of  some  renowned 
outlaw,  a  second  Robin  Hood,  perhaps  [...  ]  What  a  variety  of  incidents  for  the 
exercise  of  a  romantic  imagination.  '  (pp.  156-157) 
Georg  Lukäcs  agrues  that  in  his  choice  of  the  `middling  [...  ]  hero'  Scott  expressed  `a 
renunciation  of  Romanticism's  There  may,  indeed,  have  been  good  commercial  reasons 
why  Scott  was  driven  to  invent  a  type  that  could  be  easily  differentiated  from  the  Byronic 
hero.  On  the  other  hand,  the  taste  for  the  picturesque  is  a  precursor  to  Romanticism  and 
the  celebration  of  the  heroic  values  located  in  such  landscape  suggest  that  Scott  exploited 
what  was  fashionable  as  an  anachronistic  spice  for  his  deeper  concerns  in  the  illumination  of 
his  historical  themes. 
A  reversal  of  values  -  settled  to  heroic  -  is  clearly  established: 
`But  to  be  the  daughter  of  a  cattle-stealer  -a  common  thief!  " 
"Common  thief!  -  No  such  thing:  Donald  Bean  Lane  never  lifted  less  than  a  drove 
in  his  life.  " 
"Do  you  call  him  an  uncommon  thief,  then?  " 
"No  -  he  that  steals  a  cow  from  a.  poor  widow,  or  a  stirk  from  a  cotter,  is  a  thief; 
he  that  lifts  a  drove  from  the  Sassenach  laird,  is  a  gentleman  drover  [...  ]" 
`But  what  can  this  end  in,  were  he  taken  in  such  an  appropriation?  " 
8  Georg  Lukäcs,  The  Historical  Novel,  trans.  by  Hannah  and  Stanley  Mitchell,  paperback  edn.  1989 
(London:  Merlin,  1962),  p.  33 
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strapped  up  on  the  kind  gallows  of  Crieff.  s9 
The  heroic  paradigm  is  associated  with  the  skills  of  savage  peoples  -  for  example, 
following  a  path  in  the  dark  is  achieved,  'by  instinct,  without  the  hesitation  of  a  moment.  ' 
(p.  156)  Edward  sees  a  Highlander,  'crawling  on  all  fours  with  the  dexterity  of  an  Indian'. 
(p.  284)  Indeed,  the  invasion  of  the  Lowlands,  'conveyed  [...  ]  as  much  surprise  as  if  an 
invasion  of  African  Negroes,  or  Esquimaux  Indians,  had  issued  forth  from  the  northern 
mountains  of  their  own  native  country.  '  (p.  323) 
The  law  is  associated  with  settled  peoples;  beyond  the  frontier  order  depends  upon 
patriarchal  authority  which  is  represented  in  the  Chief.  Such  authority  clearly  shapes  the 
behaviour  and  destinies  of  women.  For  reasons  of  political  expediency  Fergus  would  have 
his  sister,  Flora,  marry  Edward. 
Generally,  the  plot  anticipates  that  of  the  typical  Western.  In  both,  the  struggle  to 
accommodate  and  transfigure  heroic  values  is  the  central  concern.  Nietzsche  has  sharply 
focussed  the  issues: 
There  are  certain  strong  and  dangerous  drives,  such  as  enterprisingness, 
foolhardiness,  revengefulness,  craft,  rapacity,  ambition,  which  hitherto  had  not  only 
to  be  honoured  from  the  point  of  view  of  their  social  utility  [...  ]  but  also  mightily 
developed  and  cultivated  [...  ]  these  drives  are  [...  ]  now  that  the  diversionary  outlets 
for  them  are  lacking  [...  ]  gradually  branded  as  immoral  and  given  over  to  calumny. 
The  antithetical  drives  and  inclinations  now  come  into  moral  honour;  step  by  step 
the  herd  instinct  draws  its  conclusions.  '0 
More  specifically,  the  issues  are  focussed  by  Scott,  particularly,  in  the  shifting  relationships 
between  Waverley,  Flora  and  Rose. 
Both  Fergus  and  Flora  are,  in  some  important  aspects,  outsiders.  Their  father  married 
while  in  exile,  in  France,  so  that  their  education  allows  them  to  view  Highland  society  as  a 
closed  paradigm.  In  common  with  Edmund  in  King  Lear,  this  gives  Fergus  the  stance  to 
assert  manipulative  power,  deliberately  exploiting  his  feudal  authority  for  his  own  political 
ends  and  personal  ambition.  On  the  other  hand  he  is,  indubitably,  a  clan  chief.  Flora's 
9  Waverley,  pp.  165-166. 
10  Freidrich  Neitzsche,  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  op.  cit.,  p.  123. 
88 detachment  is  manifest  differently,  in  idealism  which,  of  course,  empowers  her  ideology, 
gives  it  moral  authority: 
Her  love  of  her  clan,  an  attachment  which  was  almost  hereditary  in  her  bosom  was, 
like  her  loyalty,  a  more  pure  passion  than  that  of  her  brother.  He  was  too  thorough 
a  politician,  `,  regarded,  Iiis  patriarchal  influence  too  much  as  the  means  of 
accomplishing  his,  own  aggrandizement,  that  we  should  term  him  the  model  of  a 
Highland  Chieftain.  Flora  felt  the  same  anxiety  for  cherishing  and  extending  their 
patriarchal  sway,  but  it  was  with  the  generous  desire  of  vindicating  from  poverty,  or 
at  least  from  want  and  foreign  oppression,  those  whom  her  brother  was  by  birth, 
according  to  the  notions  of  the  time  and  country,  entitled  to  govern.  (p.  185) 
It  is  precisely  the  tensions  within  the  characters  as  they  are  manifest  in  their  contribution  to 
events  that  Lukäcs  identifies  as  Scott's  distinctive  contribution  to  the  historical  novel: 
Scott's  greatness  lies  in  his  capacity  to  give  living  human  embodiment  to  historical- 
social  types.  The  typically  human  terms  in  which  great  historical  trends  become 
tangible  had  never  before  been  so  superbly,  straightforwardly  and  pregnantly 
portrayed.  " 
There  a  certain  circularity  in  these  remarks  in  that  the  'evidence'  for  the  types  is  largely 
derived  from  Scott  himself. 
Tensions  within  the  characters  are  also  reflected  in  ideological  issues  within  battle  itself. 
In  a  skirmish  before  the  battle  of  Preston  -  Prestonpans  -  there  is  an  interesting  juxtaposition 
of  values: 
Waverley  rather  gained  than  lost  in  the  opinion  of  the  Highlanders,  by  his  anxiety 
about  the  wounded  man.  They  would  not  have  understood  the  general  philanthropy, 
which  rendered  it  almost  impossible  for  Waverley  to  have  passed  any  person  in  such 
distress;  but,  as  apprehending  that  the  sufferer  was  one  of  his  following,  they 
unanimously  allowed  that  Waverley's  conduct  was  of  a  kind  and  considerate 
chieftain,  who  merited  the  attachment  of  his  people.  (p.  327) 
There  is  no  dawning  for  the  Highlanders  here,  rather,  the  insight  comes  from  Waverley  who 
has  an  alternative  perspective  not  available  to  them. 
The  conduct  and  outcome  of  the  battle  itself  reflect  paradigmatic  issues  on  the  larger 
scale.  The  government  troops  are  deployed  according  to  a  model  evolved  in  the  experience 
of  fighting  in  Flanders,  where,  as  Colonel  Talbot  bitingly  remarks,  'sixty  or  a  hundred 
thousand  men'  were  'in  the  field  on  each  side'.  (p.  415)  The  rebellion  is  a  local  difficulty:  the 
11  Lukäcs,  p.  35 
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strength  of  the  Jacobites  -  four  thousand,  with  two  thousand,  perhaps,  adequately  armed  - 
reveals  their  enterprise  to  be,  in  the  long  run,  utter  folly.  Johnny  Cope  has  'a  complete  army 
[...  ]  flanked  by  cavalry  and  artillery'.  (p.  336) 
Against  the  lines  of  the  regular  Government  troops  the  rebels  are  drawn  up  in  lines. 
Closer  analysis  reveals,  though,  that  the  Jacobite  'line'  is  composed  of  distinct  clans: 
[...  ]  each  a  sort  of  separate  phalanx,  narrow  in  front,  and  in  depth  ten  twelve,  or 
fifteen  files  according  to  the  strength  of  the  following.  The  best-armed  and  best- 
born,  for  the  words  were  synonymous,  were  placed  in  front  of  each  of  these 
irregular  sub-divisions.  (pp.  335-336) 
The  highest  born  and  best  armed  are  disposed  at  the  head  of  the  clan.  The  traditional 
Highland  Charge  precisely  reflects  their  social  paradigm:  in  effect,  they  charge  in  wedges. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  extended  line  of  General  Cope's  army  seems  to  reflect  a  continental 
model.  The  battle  is  resolved  not  through  insight  but  merely  through  one  side  being  better 
adapted  to  the  immediate  circumstances  -  and  that  is  a  sort  of  accident.  The  extended 
Government  line  is  'pierced  and  broken  in  many  places.  '  (p.  337)  But  what  the  Government 
troops  learn  here  to  their  cost  will  be  employed  with  murderous  efficiency  at  Culloden. 
Each  infantryman  will  tackle  the  clansman  immediately  to  his  right  rather  than  head  on, 
thereby  compromising  the  defensive  efficacy  of  the  highland  target  -  the  tactic  involves  an 
imaginative  leap. 
On  the  larger  scale,  paradigmatic  issues  are  clearly  implicit  in  Tolstoy's  analysis  of  French 
strategy  after  the  capture  of  Moscow.  How  is  a  catastrophic  retreat  following  upon  a  great 
victory  to  be  explained? 
Let  us  imagine  two  men  who  have  come  out  to  fight  a  duel  with  rapiers  according  to 
all  the  rules  of  the  art  of  fencing  [...  ]  suddenly  one  of  the  combatants,  feeling  himself 
wounded  [...  ]  throws  down  his  rapier,  and  seizing  the  first  cudgel  that  comes  to 
hand  begins  to  brandish  it.  Then  let  us  imagine  that  the  combatant  who  so  sensibly 
employed  the  best  and  simplest  means  to  attain  his  end,  was  at  the  same  time 
influenced  by  traditions  of  chivalry,  and,  desiring  to  conceal  the  facts  of  the  case, 
insisted  that  he  had  gained  his  victory with  the  rapier  according  to  all  the  rules  of  his 
art.  One  can  imagine  what  confusion  and  obscurity  would  result  from  such  an 
account  of  the  duel. 
The  fencer  who  demanded  a  contest  according  to  the  rules  of  fencing  was  the 
French  army;  his  opponent  who  threw  away  the  rapier  and  snatched  up  the  cudgel 
90 was  the  Russian  people;  those  who  try  to  explain  the  matter  according  to  the  rules 
of  fencing  are  the  historians  who  have  described  the  event.  i2 
The  imaginative  issues  are  clear.  The  French  are  trapped  in  an  inappropriate  paradigm  and 
destroyed  as  a  consequence. 
The  romantic  interest  in  Waverley  is  instructive.  Flora's  vision  of  Edward,  as  spelt  out  to 
Rose  Bradwardine,  is  devastatingly  frank: 
"For  mere  fighting  [...  ]  I  believe  all  men  are  pretty  much  alike  [...  ].  They  have  [...  ]  a 
certain  instinct  for  strife,  as  we  see  in  other  male  animals  [...  ].  But  high  and  perilous 
enterprise  is  not  Waverley's  forte  [...  ].  I  will  tell  you  where  he  will  be  at  home,  my 
dear,  and  in  his  place,  -  in  the  quiet  circle  of  domestic  happiness,  lettered  indolence, 
and  elegant  enjoyments,  of  Waverley-Honour.  And  he  will  refit  the  library  in  the 
most  exquisite  Gothic  taste  [...  ]  he  will  draw  plans  and  landscapes,  and  write  verses, 
and  rear  temples,  and  dig  grottoes  [...  ]  And  he  will  repeat  verses  to  his  beautiful 
wife.  "  (pp.  364-365) 
The  caricature  is  a  function  of  her  own  passionate  idealism.  There  is,  of  course,  an  element 
of  truth  in  her  portrait,  but  it  clearly  reveals  her  own  failure  of  integration  -  her  inability  to 
accommodate  instinct,  both  sexual  and  aggressive. 
In  the  event,  Waverley  breaks  the  mould  of  the  caricature  as  a  consequence  of 
undergoing  his  rites  of  passage: 
[...  ]  it  was  in  many  a  winter  walk  by  the  shores  of  Ulswater,  that  he  acquired  a  more 
complete  mastery  of  a  spirit  tamed  by  adversity,  than  his  former  experience  had 
given  him;  and  that  he  felt  himself  entitled  to  say  firmly,  though  perhaps  with  a  sigh, 
that  the  romance  of  his  life  was  ended,  and  that  its  real  history  had  now  commenced. 
He  was  soon  called  upon  to  justify  his  pretensions  by  reason  and  philosophy.  (p.  406) 
His  father  dies.  Fergus  Mac-Ivor  is  executed  at  Carlisle.  Waverley  marries  Rose 
Bradwardine.  We  see  adumbrated  here  something  of  the  function  of  the  modes  of 
imagination  in  the  process  of  individuation:  Edward's  relations  to  the  world  are  first 
characterised  by  fantasy  -  in  his  case  this  constitutes  regression,  failure  to  accommodate  to 
reality.  The  attraction  to  Fergus  constitutes  a  move  towards  integration,  but  the 
identification  is  with  an  individual  who  proves  to  be  self-destructive.  Similarly,  the 
attraction  to  Flora  is  compensatory,  but  her  fanatical  ideological  commitment  is  also 
profoundly  destructive.  Edward's  eventual  accommodation  to  reality  is  indicated  in  his 
12  Leo  Tolstoy,  War  and  Peace,  trans.  Louise  and  Aylmcr  Maude,  repr.  1965  (London:  Oxford  University 
Press,  1941),  bk.  XIll,  p.  287. 
91 attachment  to  Rose.  What  seems  rather  arbitrary  in  the  experience  of  the  fiction  is,  perhaps, 
vindicated  psychologically.  Generally,  Scott  has  integrated  the  psychological  issues  with 
the  historical  circumstances.  On  the  other  hand,  we  suspect  that  Waverley's  passage  from 
fantasy,  through  imagination  to  moments  of  realisation,  may,  in  the  end,  be  compromised  by 
a  comfortable  identification  with  his  role  as  country  gentleman. 
The  significance  of  Scott's  historical  novels  for  Lukäcs  is  that  in  depicting  characters  on 
the  periphery  of  events  they  can  be  seen  to  be  'subject'  to  events.  13  They  react  to  profound 
change  without  understanding  the  nature  of  that  change.  In  other  words,  as  in  the  paradigm 
case  of  Joseph  K.,  fictional  reconstruction  provides  the  impossible  perspective  that  allows 
for  understanding. 
The  issues  in  the  context  of  the  specifically  historical  novel  resolve  into  a  paradox:  how 
can  the  past  be  rendered  into  impossible  insight  and  yet  remain  faithful  to  the  experience  of 
the  past?  The  knowing,  surely,  must  change  the  nature  of  the  experience. 
Lukäcs  approaches  these  issues  from  a  different  angle  but  his  quotation  from  Goethe's 
observations  on  Manzoni's  Adelchi  is  apposite: 
"We  pronounce  in  his  defence  what  may  seem  paradoxical:  that  all  poetry  in  fact 
moves  in  the  element  of  anachronism.  Whatever  in  the  past  we  evoke,  in  order  to 
recite  it  after  our  own  fashion  to  our  contemporaries,  we  must  grant  a  higher  culture 
to  the  ancient  happening  than  it  in  fact  had  [...  ].  The  Iliad  and  the  Odyssey,  all  the 
great  tragedians  and  all  that  has  remained  of  true  poetry  lives  and  breathes  only  in 
anachronism.  To  all  conditions  one  lends  the  modern  spirit,  for  only  in  this  way  can 
we  see  and,  indeed,  bear  to  see  them.  "  (p.  61) 
Hegel's  concept  of  'necessary  anachronism',  Lukäcs  sees,  provides  a  theoretical  explication 
of  the  issue: 
"The  inner  substance  of  what  is  represented  remains  the  same,  but  the  developed 
culture  in  representing  and  unfolding  the  substantial  necessitates  a  change  in  the 
expression  and  form  of  the  latter.  "  (p.  61) 
Lukäcs  observes: 
Scott's  "  necessary  anachronism"  consists,  therefore,  simply  in  allowing  his 
characters  to  express  feelings  and  thought  about  real,  historical  relationships  in  a 
much  clearer  way  than  the  actual  men  and  women  of  the  time  could  have  done.  But 
13  Lukäcs,  p.  35. 
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historically  and  socially  correct.  (p.  63) 
The  paradox  has  been  well  observed  but  not  yet  resolved. 
In  his  discussion  of  Hegel's  historicism,  Frederick  Beiser  suggests  that  the  difficulties  and 
obscurities  in  Hegel's  introduction  to  his  Lectures  on  World  History  may  be  explicable  in 
terms  of  his  introduction  to  Phenomenology: 
Hegel's  [...  ]  phenomenological  method  [...  ]  demands  that  the  philosopher  bracket 
his  own  principles  and  presuppositions  and  permit  consciousness  to  examine  itself 
according  to  its  own  standards.  The  philosopher  will  then  find  that,  through  its  self- 
examination,  ordinary  consciousness  will  be  compelled  to  admit  the  truth  of  subject- 
object  identity.  Ordinary  consciousness  will  discover  through  its  own  experience 
that  the  object  is  not  given  to  it  but  essential  to  its  own  self-consciousness.  '4 
It  follows  that 
If  this  account  of  Hegel's  method  is  correct,  then  the  subject  matter  of  his 
philosophy  of  history  should  be  not  historical  events  simpliciter,  which  can  be 
described  by  some  reflective  historian  or  external  observer,  but  the  agent's 
consciousness  of  these  events.  In  other  words,  the  subject  matter  of  history  should 
be  the  self-consciousness  of  a  nation  or,  more  precisely,  the  dialectic  by  which  it 
arrives  at  its  self  consciousness.  (p.  285) 
It  is  just  such  self-consciousness  that  is  implicit  in  Waverley  brought  about  by  Scott's 
attempt  to  'render'  the  history  of  'sixty  years  since'  -  the  attempt  to  forge  a  national  identity. 
It  is  an  irony  of  history  that  his  imaginative  rendering  should  come  to  manifest  itself  in 
national  stereotypes  -  this  is  testimony  to  the  power  of  identification. 
The  phenomenological  method  was,  according  to  Beiser,  already  current  in  Hegel's  day: 
[...  ]  Herder  had  castigated  those  historians  who  judged  the  past  in  the  light  of  their 
own  contemporary  standards  of  right  and  wrong.  He  demanded  that  the  historian 
should  examine  each  age  according  to  its  own  standards  and  values.  The 
fundamental  precept  of  the  historian  became  "empathy"  (Einfühlung)  with  the  past, 
a  sympathetic  reconstruction  of  its  guiding  ideals.  Herder  preached  to  the  new 
generation  of  historians:  "go  into  the  age,  into  the  region,  into  the  whole  of  history, 
feel  yourself  into  everything  -  only  now  are  you  on  the  path  of  understanding.  "  In 
following  a  phenomenological  approach,  then,  Hegel  was  simply  following  Herder's 
advice.  (p.  286) 
What  is  supposed  here  is  the  possibility  of  imaginative  engagement  with  history  - 
interestingly,  the  concept  of  empathy  suggests  a  response  arising  out  of  identification.  We 
14  Frederick  C.  Beiser,  'Hegel's  Historicism',  in  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Hegel,  ed.  by  F.  C.  Beiser, 
repr.  1995  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1993),  p.  284. 
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conceptual  issues  are  no  different  in  principle  from  the  rendering  of  experience  in  other 
genres  of  imaginative  fiction.  In  art,  successful  expression  -  by  its  very  nature  -  must 
outstrip  consciousness,  and  its  means  of  doing  so  is  double  prescription.  It  is  the  selection 
and  framing  of  events  that  renders  them  expressive,  lifts  them  from  what  would  otherwise 
be  a  fog  of  redundancy.  Double  prescription  is  the  key  to  the  paradox  of  authenticity  and 
representation:  the  past  and,  indeed,  experience  in  general  are  transfigured  by  imagination. 
Those  who  imagine  are  thereby  brought  to  consciousness. 
There  are  hints  in  Hegel's  notion  of  history  that  the  phenomenological  approach  has  some 
family  resemblance  to  imagining  -  in  which  case,  the  logic  of  imagination  may  prove  to  be 
dialectical. 
An  interest  for  the  Marxist  Lukäcs  in  Scott's  enterprise  is  that  it  reflects  a  new  paradigm 
of  history  emerging  from  the  objective  social  circumstances  of  the  time.  The  contrast  with 
the  assumptions  in,  say,  Shakespeare's  history  plays  is  clear,  where  there  is  a  strong  sense 
that  episodes  of  history  are  taken  to  be  exemplary  in  the  illumination  of  contemporary 
ideological  issues.  We  see  from  this  that  the  concept  of  history  itself  is  subject  to 
paradigmatic  change. 
94 Chapter  Five 
Token  Symbolism  and  Vitiation 
Failure  to  acknowledge  distinctions  between  identification,  imagination  and  the  discursive, 
and  the  shifting  relations  between  them,  results  in  muddles.  This  chapter  discusses  some 
of  the  implications  of  such  muddles  in  the  consideration  of  symbolism.  A  fuller  discussion 
of  the  literary  symbol  is  left  to  later  chapters.  In  his  analysis  of  dreams  Freud's  strategy 
involves  distinguishing  between  the  manifest  dream  and  its  latent  content.  Priority  is 
thereby  given  to  the  discursive.  This  strategy  inevitably  reduces  the  content  of  dreams  to 
signs  and  referents  whereas  there  are  hints  in  Freud's  own  examples  that  the  logic  of 
dreams  is  analogical.  Discursive  explication  then  effects  that  vitiation  characteristic  of 
the  fate  of  other  expressions  of  the  imagination.  In  some  of  his  short  stories  James  Joyce 
reflects  these  issues  in  distinguishing  between  the  experience  of  children  and  adult 
interpretation  of  it. 
That  the  rites  of  passage  associated  with  individuation  can  be  represented  in  symbolism,  is  a 
fundamental  assumption  in  Bruno  Bettelheim's  The  Uses  of  Enchantment,  a  psychoanalytic 
exposition  of  fairy  stories.  Bettelheim  argues  that  such  stories  allow  children  to  deal  with 
unconscious  problems  and  fears  and  that  these  are  given  expression  through  symbolism: 
There  is  general  agreement  that  myths  and  fairy  tales  speak  to  us  in  the  language  of 
symbols  representing  unconscious  content.  Their  appeal  is  simultaneously  to  our 
conscious  and  unconscious  mind  [...  ]  and  to  our  need  for  ego-ideals  as  well.  ' 
That  such  tales  have  a  moral  function  is  implicit  in  the  claim  that  they  shape  'ego-ideals'. 
There  are,  perhaps,  a  number  of  difficulties  in  these  assumptions  regarding  the  simultaneity 
of  the  appeal  of  fairy  stories.  Clearly,  at  one  level,  assimilation  is  through  identification: 
It  is  not  the  fact  that  virtue  wins  out  at  the  end  which  promotes  morality,  but  that 
the  hero  is  most  attractive  to  the  child,  who  identifies  with  the  hero  in  all  his 
struggles.  [...  ]  The  child  makes  such  identifications  all  on  his  own,  and  the  inner  and 
outer  struggles  of  the  hero  imprint  morality  on  him. 
[...  ]  Furthermore,  a  child's  choice  is  based,  not  so  much  on  right  versus  wrong,  as  on 
who  arouses  his  sympathy  and  who  his  antipathy.  (p.  9) 
Identification,  however,  entails  blindness  that  can  be  resolved  only  in  the  subsequent  shift  to 
imagining.  Derived  from  the  enhanced  vision,  which  is  the  product  of  imagining,  insight 
may  be  subsequently  consolidated  into  moral  prescriptions  but  this  supposes  at  the  least,  a 
weighing  up  and  subsequent  choice.  There  is  an  involuntary  element  in  identification  so  that 
'  Bruno  Bettelheim,  The  Uses  of  Enchantment,  reprinted  1991  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1975),  p.  36. 
95 the  notion  that  morality  may  be  imprinted  seems  hardly  tenable.  On  the  other  hand, 
imprinting  neatly  captures  the  transactions  of  value  involved  in  identification. 
In  distinguishing  between  fantasy  and  imagination  Roger  Scruton  observes: 
[...  ]  we  should  distinguish  the  kind  of  disciplined  story-telling  which  illuminates 
reality  and  enables  us  in  a  novel  way  to  come  to  terms  with  it,  from  the  undisciplined 
flight  from  reality  into  worlds  of  sentimentality  and  make-believe  [...  ].  The  nature  of 
the  fantasy  object  is  dictated  by  the  passion  that  seeks  it.  (Pornography,  therefore, 
is  a  prime  instance  of  fantasy.  )  By  contrast,  the  truly  imaginative  object  produces 
and  controls  our  response  to  it,  and  thereby  educates  and  renews  our  passions,  so  as 
to  redirect  them  towards  the  actual  world.  2 
This  differentiation  is  hardly  subtle  enough  in  that  it  fails  to  catch  the  significance  of  the 
instability  of  the  modes  of  assimilation  and  how  the  one  can  slide  into  the  other.  Even 
make-believe  supposes  the  vestigial  awareness  that  underpins  identification  and,  indeed,  we 
easily  and  habitually  transform,  'disciplined  story  telling'  through  the  mode  in  which  we 
assimilate  fictions.  On  the  other  hand,  identification  can  empower,  and  it  is  precisely  the 
latent  understanding  experienced  within  the  mode  that  may  subsequently  be  rendered  in  the 
double  prescription  at  the  heart  of  imagining.  That  the  object'controls  us'  is  an  assumption 
that  acknowledges  only  one  source  of  prescription  in  imagining.  It  suggests  passivity  on  the 
part  of  the  assimilating  imagination  whereas  the  transaction  involves  a  quite  specific  act  of 
intention,  an  initial  framing  prescription  that  releases  the  expressive  potential  of  the  artefact 
-  or  landscape,  for  that  matter.  One  can  only  agree  with  Scruton,  though,  that  fantasy  vis  ä 
vis  imagination  is  a  'distinct  exercise  of  the  mind'  (p.  215)  but  the  modes  are  more  subtle 
and  dynamic  in  their  relations  than  he  acknowledges. 
Bettelheim's  assumptions  cut  across  modes  of  assimilation  which  are  exclusive  but 
fundamentally  at  issue  in  his  remarks  is  the  nature  of  symbolism.  It  may  be  that  the 
representational  logic  of  symbolism  is  characterised  by  the  underlying  mode  of  assimilation 
of  which  it  is  an  expressive  component  -  in  other  words,  the  nature  of  the  symbol  changes 
according  to  how  we  relate  to  its  context.  Symbolism  in  the  mode  of  identification  may, 
indeed,  function  at  the  'unconscious'  level  in  so  far  as  that  mode  supposes  only  a  limited 
2  Roger  Scruton,  'Imagination',  in  A  Companion  to  Aesthetics,  cd.  by  David  Cooper,  paperback  cdn.  1995 
(Oxford:  Blackwell,  1992),  pp.  215-216. 
96 differentiation  between  subject  and  object  -  unconscious  contents  are,  according  to  Jung, 
manifest  in  projection: 
So  long  as  they  are  unconscious  our  unconscious  contents  are  always  projected,  and 
the  projection  fixes  upon  everything  "ours,  "  inanimate  objects  as  well  as  animals  and 
people? 
On  the  other  hand,  symbolism  in  the  discursive  mode  supposes  a  clear  differentiation 
between  sign  and  referent  -  with  the  inevitable  loss  of  the  fascination  that  accompanies 
symbolism  in  the  context  of  identification.  In  the  discursive  mode  symbolism  could  be 
designated  as'token'  -  irrespective  of  its  immediate  interest.  The  nature  of  symbolism  in  the 
mode  of  imagining  will  be  discussed  in  a  later  chapter. 
It  seems  that  Bettelheim's  claims  involve  a  confusion  and  conflation  of  categories.  How 
can  'morality'  be  'imprinted'  in  the  mode  of  identification?  Is  a  'language'  of  symbolism 
conceivable  outside  the  context  of  the  discursive? 
So  far,  taking  the  cue  from  Plato,  Chaucer  and  Kafka,  fantasy  has  been  considered  to  be 
reductive,  an  obstruction  to  reason  and,  thence,  to  truth  -  both  the  Franklin  and  Joseph  K. 
are  seen  to  be  deluded.  On  the  other  hand,  the  very  empowering  capacity  of  fantasy  implicit 
in  self-aggrandisement  can  serve  an  individuating  function,  for  example,  as  Bettelheim 
argues,  in  sustaining  self-worth  in  children  in  the  face  of  otherwise  debilitating 
vulnerabilities.  In  a  similar  way,  in  certain  circumstances,  the  stimulation  of  sexual  fantasy 
in  adults  can  be  therapeutically  empowering.  As  we  have  argued,  identification  is  a 
precondition  for  catharsis  and  it  energises  and  motivates  students'  assimilation  of  texts. 
It  is  the  context  of  fantasy  and  how  it  is  resolved,  rather  than  the  nature  of  fantasy  itself, 
that  makes  it  productive  or  reductive.  Shaped,  ultimately,  through  transition  to  the 
cognitive  in  the  transactions  of  imagination,  it  leads  to  discovery;  subverted  by  the  locked 
set  of  neurosis  it  debilitates: 
Because  some  people  withdraw  from  the  world  and  spend  most  of  their  days  in  the 
realm  of  their  imaginings,  it  has  been  mistakenly  suggested  that  an  over-rich  fantasy 
life  interferes  with  our  coping  successfully  with  reality.  But  the  opposite  is  true: 
those  who  live  completely  in  their  fantasies  are  beset  by  compulsive  ruminations 
which  rotate  eternally  around  some  narrow,  stereotypical  topics.  Far  from  having  a 
3  C.  G.  Jung,  Psychology  and  Religion,  op.  cit.,  p.  256. 
97 rich  fantasy  life,  such  people  are  locked  in,  and  they  cannot  break  out  of  one  anxious 
or  wish-fulfilling  daydream.  But  free-floating  fantasy,  which  contains  in  imaginary 
form  a  wide  variety  of  issues  also  encountered  in  reality,  provides  the  ego  with  a 
abundance  of  material  to  work  with.  This  rich  and  variegated  fantasy  life  is 
provided  to  the  child  with  fairy  stories,  which  can  help  prevent  his  imagination  from 
getting  stuck  within  the  narrow  confines  of  a  few  anxious  or  wish-fulfilling 
daydreams  circling  around  a  few  narrow  preoccupations.  4 
This  distinction  is  clearly  reflected  in  Joyce's  story,  'An  Encounter',  where  the  young 
narrator  is  seen  to  be  drawn  into  the  world  of  the  fictions  that  he  reads: 
The  adventures  related  in  the  literature  of  the  Wild  West  were  remote  from  my 
nature  but,  at  least,  they  opened  doors  of  escape.  I  liked  better  some  American 
detective  stories  which  were  traversed  from  time  to  time  by  unkempt  fierce  and 
beautiful  girls.  ' 
The  identification  is  strong  enough  to  empower  the  child  to  move  to  act  in  terms  of  the 
values  of  the  fantasy: 
But  when  the  restraining  influence  of  the  school  was  at  a  distance  I  began  to  hunger 
again  for  wild  sensations,  for  the  escape  which  those  chronicles  of  disorder  alone 
seemed  to  offer  me.  The  mimic  warfare  of  the  evening  became  at  last  as  wearisome 
to  me  as  the  routine  of  school  in  the  morning  because  I  wanted  real  adventures  to 
happen  to  myself.  (pp.  19-20) 
It  is  as  if  the  power  of  the  immediate  fantasy  diminishes  as  it  is  transformed  in  the  urgent 
need  to  realise  it. 
In  the  contemporary  debate  regarding  the  exposure  of  children  to  sexually  explicit  or 
disturbing  material,  the  logic  of  identification  makes  it  clear  that  such  fictions  exert 
powerful  prescriptions,  which,  of  their  nature  are  without  significant  cognitive  control  and 
cannot,  while  these  prescriptions  are  engaged,  be  brought  within  the  possibilities  of  moral 
choice.  Morality  cannot  emerge  directly  from  identification. 
In  'An  Encounter'  the  child's  realisation  of  fantasy  is  expressed  in  the  need  to  free  himself 
from  'the  weariness  of  school  life'  through  finding  'real  adventures'.  (p.  20)  A  day  of  truancy 
is  resolved  in  a  disturbing  encounter  with  'a  queer  old  josser'.  (p.  26)  The  fantasies  of  the 
'old  josser'  are  clearly  obsessive: 
4  Bettelheim,  pp.  118-119. 
s  James  Joyce,  Dubliners  (London:  Triad  Paladin,  1988),  pp.  18-19. 
98 There  was  nothing  he  liked,  he  said,  so  much  as  looking  at  a  nice  young  girl,  at  her 
nice  white  hands  and  her  beautiful  soft  hair.  He  gave  me  the  impression  that  he  was 
repeating  something  he  had  learned  by  heart  or  that,  magnetized  by  some  words  of 
his  own  speech,  his  mind  was  slowly  circling  round  and  round  in  the  same  orbit. 
(p.  26) 
His  strategy  is  to  invite  the  boy's  identification  -  whose  vulnerability  is  already  revealed  in 
the  fantasies  stimulated  by  his  reading  -  so  that  gradually  he  can  bring  the  boy  to  acquiesce 
in  his  real  intention: 
He  began  to  speak  on  the  subject  of  chastizing  boys.  His  mind,  as  if  magnetized 
again  by  his  speech,  seemed  to  circle  slowly  round  and  round  its  new  centre.  He 
said  that  when  boys  were  that  kind  they  ought  to  be  whipped  and  well  whipped. 
(p.  27) 
The  dangers  for  the  boy  are  never  brought  to  his  awareness.  He  experiences  unease, 
agitation  and  makes  his  escape.  The  brilliance  of  the  story  lies  in  Joyce's  completely 
satisfying  account  of  the  youngster's  experience  in  a  context  of  innocence  while,  at  the  same 
time,  presenting  cues  to  the  reader  that  allow  for,  but  do  not  guarantee,  a  shift  into 
abstractive  awareness.  That  the  shift  is  not  guaranteed  is  a  function  both  of  the  success  of 
Joyce's  rendering  of  the  child's  experience,  and  of  the  naive  identification  characteristic  of 
the  initial  responses  of  many  students. 
Revealed  here  is  a  crucial  distinction  between  the  naivety  of  the  child  and  the  insight  of 
the  reader.  It  is  an  either/or  that  in  his  discussion  of  fairy  stories  Bettelheim  would  seem  to 
wish  away: 
When  speaking  here  of  an  intellectual  understanding  of  the  meaning  of  a  fairy  tale,  it 
should  be  emphasized  that  it  will  not  do  to  approach  the  telling  of  fairy  tales  with 
didactic  intentions.  When  in  various  contexts  throughout  the  book  it  is  mentioned 
that  a  fairy  tale  helps  the  child  to  understand  himself  [...  ]  this  is  always  meant 
metaphorically.  6 
What  is  it  to  'understand'  metaphorically?  In  any  event  he  warns  that  a  shift  to  the 
abstractive,  which  might  be  a  temptation  for  a  parent  reading  a  story,  can  be  'destructively 
overwhelming';  it  compromises  the  potential  of  the  story  to  enchant  thereby  destroying  its 
individuating  efficacy: 
6  Bettelheim,  p.  153 
99 Our  meddling  intellect 
Mis-shapes  the  beauteous  forms  of  things:  - 
We  murder  to  dissect.  7 
Once  incorporated  into  the  tale  itself,  abstractive  cognition  -  manifest  in  the  knowing 
manipulation  of'correct'  values  -  would  shift  the  genre  so  that  it  would  become  a  cautionary 
tale  or  moralistic  fable.  The  imagery  of  fable  invites  identification,  characteristically  through 
the  humanising  of  animals,  but  the  pressure  of  abstractive  cognition  pushes  such  imagery 
into  token  symbolism:  animals  represent  human  values  or  dispositions  -  the  fox  is  cunning, 
the  crow  vain  and  so  on.  But  such  polarisation  is  already  implicit  in  the  assumption  that 
fairy  stories  themselves  are  symbolic.  In  other  words  the  exegetical  mode  that  purports  to 
reveal  the  psychological  subtext  of  fairy  stories  reduces  the  stories  to  the  very  mode  where 
their  efficacy  is  said  to  be  compromised. 
The  point  is  illustrated  in  Bettelheim's  discussion  of'The  Goose  Girl': 
[...  ]  this  story  impresses  any  child  because  on  a  preconscious  level  the  child 
comprehends  that  the  tale  deals  with  oedipal  problems  which  are  very  much  his  own. 
(p.  139) 
In  the  context  of  a  child's  identification  'oedipal  problems'  cannot  conceivably  be 
'comprehended'  -  they  may,  of  course,  be  manifest  in  projection.  Bettelheim's  assumptions 
involve  an  inherent  paradox:  such  projections  can  be  brought  to  consciousness  only  by 
shifting  into  an  exegesis  that  would  destroy  the  imaginative  efficacy  of  the  story. 
The  locus  classicus  of  the  assumption  that  such  unconscious  content  is  expressible  in 
the  language  of  symbols  is  to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  Freud.  In  his  lecture  'Symbolism  in 
Dreams'  Freud  distinguishes  between  the  'manifest  dream'  -  what  we  experience  as  dream  - 
and  the  latent  'dream  thought': 
A  constant  relation  of  this  kind  between  a  dream  element  and  its  translation  is 
described  by  us  as  a'symbolic'  one,  and  the  dream  element  itself  as  a'symbol'  of  the 
unconscious  dream-thought.  8 
William  Wordsworth,  'The  Tables  Turned',  in  William  Wordsworth:  The  Prelude,  Selected  Poems  and 
Sonnets,  ed.  by  Carlos  Baker,  repr.  1966  (New  York:  Holt,  Rinehart  and  Winston,  1948),  p.  79. 
s  Sigmund  Freud,  Introductory  Lectures  on  Psychoanalysis,  trs.  by  James  Strachey,  ed.  by  Strachey  and 
Angela  Richards  (London:  Penguin,  1991),  pp.  183-184.. 
100 Symbolism  is  an  archaic,  a  'primal'  language,  an'ancient  but  extinct  mode  of  expression.  ' 
(p.  201)  : 
In  the  case  of  the  dream-work  it  is  clearly  a  matter  of  transforming  the  latent 
thoughts  which  are  expressed  in  words  into  sensory  images,  mostly  of  a  visual  sort. 
Now  our  thoughts  originally  arose  from  sensory  images  of  that  kind:  their  first 
material  and  their  preliminary  stages  were  sense  impressions,  or,  more  properly, 
mnemic  images  of  such  impressions.  Only  later  were  words  attached  to  them  and 
the  words  in  turn  linked  up  into  thoughts.  The  dream-work  thus  submits  thoughts  to 
regressive  treatment.  (p.  215) 
The  regression  is  from  'thoughts',  to  imagery,  sensation.  The  very  conceptualisation  reveals 
Freud  to  be  working  within  a  powerfully  prescriptive  philosophical  paradigm,  reflected,  for 
instance,  in  the  first  sentence  of  Hume's  Treatise  on  Human  Nature: 
All  perceptions  of  the  human  mind  resolve  themselves  into  two  distinct  kinds,  which 
I  shall  call  impressions  and  ideas  [...  ].  Those  perceptions  which  enter  with  most 
force  and  violence,  we  may  name  impressions;  and,  under  this  name,  I  comprehend 
all  our  sensations,  passions,  and  emotions  [...  ].  By  ideas,  I  mean  the  faint  images  of 
these  in  thinking  and  reasoning.  9 
There  is,  perhaps,  an  internal  relation  between  the  Enlightenment  paradigm  and  the  mode  of 
symbolic  interpretation  associated  with  the  'scientific'  analysis  of  dreams:  the 
epistemological  issues  resolve  into  an  essentially  allegorical  or  cryptological  mode  of 
interpretation. 
Freud  acknowledges  the  difficulty  in  defining  a  symbol: 
The  essence  of  this  symbolic  relation  is  that  it  is  a  comparison  [...  ].  We  must 
admit  [...  ]  that  the  concept  of  a  symbol  cannot  at  present  be  sharply  delimited:  it 
shades  off  into  such  notions  as  those  of  a  replacement  or  representation,  and  even 
approaches  that  of  an  allusion.  " 
Freud  is  uncharacteristically  vague  here.  It  is  just  such  vagueness  that,  in  another 
context,  he  would  zealously  explore.  In  the  next  lecture  he  is  more  committed: 
The  third  achievement  of  the  dream-work  is  psychologically  the  most  interesting.  It 
consists  in  transforming  thoughts  into  visual  images.  [...  ]  they  comprise  the  essence 
of  the  formation  of  dreams.  (p.  209) 
It  is  instructive  to  look  at  what  have  become  the  stereotypical  Freudian  symbols: 
9  David  Hume,  A  Treatise  of  human  Understanding,  in  David  flume  on  Yuman  Nature  and  the 
Understanding,  ed.  by  Anthony  Flew  (London:  Collier-Macmillan,  1962),  p.  176. 
10  Introductory  Lectures,  p.  185. 
101 The  male  genitals  [...  ]  are  represented  in  dreams  in  a  number  of  ways  that  must  be 
called  symbolic,  where  the  common  element  in  the  comparison  is  mostly  very 
obvious  [...  ]  the  male  organ,  finds  symbolic  substitutes  in  the  first  instance  in  things 
that  resemble  it  in  shape  [...  ]  such  as  sticks,  umbrellas,  posts,  trees  and  so  on. 
(pp.  187-188) 
There  are  equivalent  symbols  for  the  female  genitalia  (though  it  appears  that  the  translator 
may  have  created  a  problem  of  syntax): 
Among  animals,  snails  and  mussels  at  least  are  undeniably  female  symbols. 
(pp.  189-190) 
It  is  striking  that  the  context  of  Freud's  explication  -  involving  the  discursive  elaboration 
of  a  psychological  theory  -  must  inevitably  designate  'sticks'  and  'snails'  as  symbols; 
furthermore,  because  of  their  association  with  the  discursive  they  must  be  manifest  as  token 
symbols.  Even  in  couching  these  concepts  in  universals  -  'the  male  genitals'  and  'sticks'  -  the 
representational  mode  is  irrevocably  fixed  in  sign  and  referent.  There  is  a  conspiracy 
between  the  discursive  intention  and  the  mode  of  representation  -  which  can  only  be 
symbolic  in  the  circumstances. 
Imagine  such  discussion  in  the  unlikely  context  of  Hopkins's  diary.  Inscape  would 
emerge  from  the  careful  observation  of  internal  relations,  visual  and  tactile  analogues  -  its 
disclosure  would  come  through  metaphor.  Only  in  ideologically  committed  passages  would 
aspects  of  the  natural  world  be  reduced  to  token  symbols. 
In  his  earlier  lecture,  'Difficulties  and  First  Approaches'  Freud  recounts  a  dream  'reported 
by  an  intelligent  observer': 
"I  dreamt  [...  ]  that  one  spring  morning  I  was  going  for  a  walk  and  was  strolling 
through  the  green  fields  till  I  came  to  a  neighbouring  village,  where  I  saw  the 
villagers  in  their  best  clothes,  with  hymn-books  under  their  arms,  flocking  to  the 
church.  Of  course!  It  was  Sunday,  and  early  morning  service  would  soon  be 
beginning.  I  decided  I  would  attend  it;  but  first,  as  I  was  rather  hot  from  walking,  I 
went  into  the  churchyard  [...  ]  to  cool  down.  While  I  was  reading  some  of  the 
tombstones,  I  heard  the  bell-ringer  climbing  up  the  church  tower  and  at  the  top  of  it 
I  now  saw  the  little  village  bell  which  would  presently  give  the  signal  for  the 
beginning  of  devotions.  For  quite  a  while  it  hung  there  motionless,  then  it  began  to 
swing,  and  suddenly  its  peal  began  to  ring  out  clear  and  piercing  -  so  clear  and 
piercing  that  it  put  an  end  to  my  sleep.  But  what  was  ringing  was  the  alarm-clock. 
(p.  121) 
102 The  aural  cue  -  the  alarm  ringing  -  is  not  represented  symbolically  but  through  an  aural 
analogue  -a  metaphor.  The  dreamer  is  intrigued  by  what  seems  to  him  a  problem  about 
time  -  'for  quite  a  while  it  hung  there'  -  in  that  the  rationalising  narrative  seems  to  predate 
the  aural  stimulus.  The  problem  disappears  though  if  the  narrative  is  understood  as  a 
structuring  Gestalt  triggered  by  a  single  cue.  It  is  rather  like  a  metaphysical  conceit  with  all 
its  elements  simultaneously  present  but  rationalised  through  time.  It  strikingly  illustrates  the 
nature  of  identification:  pinned  by  a  single  cue  the  rationalising  Gestalt  is  unchallenged  by 
the  need  to  mediate  with  other  cues;  the  dreamer  is  literally  blind  to  the  visual  cues  that 
would,  in  a  waking  state,  need  to  be  encompassed.  There  is,  nevertheless,  an  unequivocal 
structure  to  the'story'. 
The  world  of  Joseph  K.  reflects  a  similar  modal  logic.  Joseph  cannot  read  the  'parable' 
delivered  by  the  priest  in  the  cathedral;  neither  can  Chaucer's  Aurelius  'read'  the  instructive 
content  of  the  Magician's  sequence  of  illusions.  Failure  to  see  is  a  characteristic  source  of 
humour  in  Chaucer  but  it  becomes  altogether  blacker  in  Kafka.  Though  Joseph's  world  is 
littered  with  cues  -  and,  indeed  with  good  advice  -  he  responds  only  to  those  cues  which 
sustain  his  self-delusion.  The  sense  of  nightmare  in  Kafka  is  generated  in  a  context  of 
intense,  self-replicating  and  proliferating  projection.  He  tries  desperately  to  hunt  down  the 
additional  cues  that  would  allow  him  to  identify  his  predicament  -  but  this  would  involve  a 
fundamental  shift  in  perspective  and  he  fails  to  do  so.  The  claustrophobia  of  nightmare 
grows  intense. 
Again  and  again  Freud  commits  himself  to  the  central  importance  of  visual  imagery  in  the 
manifest  dream  and  the  notion  that  such  imagery  is  a'translation'  of  the  underlying  thought, 
or  latent  dream.  The  resultant  'stratification'  depends  upon  the  assumption  that  the 
expressive  mode  is  symbolism: 
Without  assuming  the  projective  busyness  of  the  mind  as  hardened  into  symbols, 
Freud  was  unable  to  complete  his  therapeutic  understanding. 
[...  ]  Symbolism  indicates  that  language  is  a  prison,  and  traces  all  modes  of 
perception  back  to  stereotyped  desires.  [...  ]  The  task  of  the  Freudian  science 
103 remains  a  kind  of  literary  criticism,  the  discovery  of  equivalences  of  symbols  and 
actions  through  perceptual  analogies.  Symbols  are  the  natural  forms  of 
imagination.  ii 
Another  key  interpretative  method  is  to  arrive  at  the  latent  dream  through  the  process  of 
free  association.  Freud  gives  an  example  in  discussing  a  typical  parapraxis: 
The  forgetting  of  proper  names  is  actually  an  excellent  model  of  what  happens  in 
dream-analysis;  the  difference  is  only  that  events  that  are  shared  between  two  people 
in  dream-analysis  are  combined  in  a  single  person  in  the  parapraxis.  [...  ]  I  noticed 
one  day  that  I  could  not  recall  the  name  of  a  small  country  on  the  Riviera,  of  which 
Monte  Carlo  is  the  chief  town. 
[...  ]  I  gave  up  reflection  and  allowed  substitute  names  to  occur  to  me  [...  ].  They 
came  rapidly:  Monte  Carlo  itself,  then  Piedmont,  Albania,  Montevideo,  Colico.  Of 
this  series  I  was  struck  first  by  Albania,  which  was  at  once  replaced  by  Montenegro, 
no  doubt  because  of  the  contrast  between  white  and  black.  I  then  saw  that  four  of 
these  substitute  names  contained  the  syllable  'mon',  then  suddenly  I  had  the 
forgotten  word  and  exclaimed  aloud:  'Monaco!  '  So  the  substitute  names  had  in  fact 
arisen  from  the  forgotten  one:  the  first  four  came  from  its  first  syllable  while  the  last 
reproduced  its  syllabic  structure  and  its  whole  last  syllable.  12 
If  this  is  indeed  typical  of  the  free  association  that  leads  to  the  latent  thought,  what  is 
striking  is  that  it  is  reached  through  a  series  of  aural  analogues:  Monte  Carlo,  Piedmont, 
Montevideo  and  Montenegro;  the  syllabic  structure  of  Mon/a/co  is  anticipated  in  Co/li/co. 
Freud  is  aware  of  this  but  does  not  realise  its  implications:  the  logic  of  dreams  is,  perhaps, 
analogical  rather  than  symbolic. 
If  the  manifest  dream  is  understood  to  be  couched  in  symbolism,  Freud  is  committed  to 
an  intrinsically  reductive  mode  of  rationalisation.  There  is  a  circularity  here  between  the 
mode  of  the  discourse,  as  he  envisages  it,  and  the  nature  of  the  intelligibility  of  the  latent 
dream:  this  constitutes  a  logical  determinism,  a  locked  set. 
Intriguingly,  in  another  passage,  Freud  presents  another  paradigm  without  realising  its 
implications: 
What  in  other  ways  gives  an  impression  of  arbitrariness  -  in,  for  instance,  the 
interpretation  of  symbols  -  is  done  away  with  by  the  fact  that  as  a  rule  the 
interconnection  between  the  dream-thoughts,  or  the  connection  between  the  dream 
and  the  dreamer's  life,  or  the  whole  psychical  situation  in  which  the  dream  occurs, 
selects  a  single  one  from  among  the  possible  determinations  presented  and  dismisses 
the  rest  as  unserviceable. 
11  Philip  Rieff,  Freud:  The  Mind  of  the  Moralist  (London:  Methuen,  1965),  pp.  144-145. 
12  Introductory  Lectures,  pp.  140-141. 
104 [...  ]  Let  us  recall  that  we  have  said  that  the  dream-work  makes  a  translation  of  the 
dream  thoughts  into  a  primitive  mode  of  expression  similar  to  picture  writing.  All 
such  primitive  systems  of  expression,  however,  are  characterised  by  indefiniteness 
and  ambiguity  [...  ]  without  justifying  us  in  casting  doubts  on  their  serviceability  [...  ]. 
The  Chinese  language  is  full  of  instances  of  indefiniteness  which  might  fill  us  with 
alarm  [...  ].  It  is impossible  to  tell  of  any  of  the  monosyllabic  words  whether  it  is  a 
noun  or  verb  or  an  adjective  [...  ].  Thus  the  language  consists  [...  ]  solely  of  the  raw 
material,  just  as  our  thought-language  is  resolved  by  the  dream  work  into  its  raw 
material,  and  any  expression  of  relations  is  omitted.  In  Chinese  the  decision  in  all 
cases  of  indefiniteness  is  left  to  the  hearer's  understanding  and  this  is  guided  by  the 
context.  (pp.  267-269) 
In  Freud's  comments  is  adumbrated  the  phenomenon  of  double  prescription  -  the  framing 
context  or  intention  -  whereby  words  are  brought  to  expressiveness.  Presupposed  here  is 
the  logic  of  inscape  and  in  so  far  as  dreams  have  an  analogical  structure  they  share  that 
logic:  the  structure  is  already  expressive  and  thereby  cannot  be  dependent  upon  or 
determined  by  a  rationalising  subtext.  Freud  would  reduce  dreams  to  an  expression  of 
Coleridge's  fancy,  whereas  the  logic  of  metaphor  and  inscape  identifies  them  as  products  of 
the  imagination. 
The  efficacy  of  the  fairy  tale  depends  on  identification  controlled  through  the 
prescriptions  of  characterisation  and  imagery.  These  constituent  elements  have, 
presumably,  been  refined  by  a  sort  of  natural  selection,  the  fundamental  control  being 
children's  responses.  In  this  way  the  inner  experiences  of  children  have  been  hypostatised  in 
stories.  Whereas  the  'inscape'  of  Hopkins  or  'motifs'  of  Cezanne  point  to  some  illumination 
of  the  'world',  fairy  stories  must  inevitably  reflect  inner  dispositions:  but  the  fundamental 
natures  of  that  world  and  that  subjectivity  are  inaccessible  -  the  discourse  itself  exemplifies 
the  limits  of  what  is  sayable.  Here,  in  such  rendering,  is  reflected  what  might  be  called  the 
social  utility  of  imagining. 
The  imaginative  power  of,  say,  'Hansel  and  Gretel',  is  initially  bound  up  in  its  capacity  to 
engage  identification.  A  pervasive  theme  is  the  problem  of  hunger.  The  story  begins  at  a 
time  of  famine  -  it  is  difficult  now,  in  Western  Europe,  to  imagine  an  agrarian  economy 
where  poverty  was  endemic.  It  is  interesting  and  poignant  that  the  temptation  for  the 
children  is  represented  in  confectionery.  The  luxury  is  set  at  a  double  remove  -  from  both 
their  hunger  and  poverty.  Subsequently,  a  witch  is  burnt  in  an  oven. 
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The  imaginative  difficulty  that  some  contemporary  students  have  with  the  first  scene  of 
Macbeth  is  instructive  here.  The  encounter  with  the  Weird  Sisters  is  merely  quaint,  if  not 
absurd,  until  they  realise  that  Shakespeare's  patron,  James  I,  took  a  personal  interest  in  the 
interrogation  of  witnesses  at  the  trial  of  the  Witches  of  North  Berwick,  that  he  wrote  a 
book  on  Daemonologry13  and  that  in  Scotland  between  1560  and  1707,  `considerably  more 
than  3,000  people,  and  perhaps  as  many  as  4,500,  perished  horribly  because  their 
contemporaries  thought  they  were  witches.  '  14  To  regard  the  fairy  story  as  symbolic  is  to 
deny  the  power  of  its  context  and  thereby  to  deny  the  role  of  that  context  in  engaging 
identification. 
Hunger  is  what  motivates  the  stepmother  to  destroy  the  children;  they  are  placated  in  the 
forest  with  fire  and  bread;  the  benevolent  intervention  of  the  white  bird  and  the  duck 
follows  the  birds  eating  Hansel's  trail  of  crumbs;  lost  in  the  forest,  the  children  are  reduced 
to  eating  berries;  the  constitution  of  the  witch's  house  is  a  fantastical  resolution  of  their 
basic  predicament;  the  witch  is  resolved  to  fatten  the  children  in  order  to  eat  them;  in  the 
end,  their  wealth  ensures  that  they  will  never  be  hungry  again.  Hunger  and  its  associations 
pervades  the  story  -  so  much  so  that  the  stepmother's  solution  to  the  problem  of  starvation 
is  an  attempt  -  albeit,  a  wicked  one  -  to  resolve  a  genuine  dilemma. 
There  are  more  subtle  cues  for  identification.  The  father  begins  by  referring  to  our 
children;  this,  troublingly  becomes  my  children;  his  wife  becomes  the  woman,  then  their 
stepmother.  This  escalation  happens  within,  roughly,  the  first  twenty  lines  of  the  story  in 
the  context  of  the  children  overhearing  the  woman's  scheme  to  abandon  them.  For  children 
to  overhear  themselves  being  discussed  by  adults  can  be  devastating.  The  frank  assessment, 
even  if  fundamentally  loving,  can  hardly  be  understood  as  referring  to  themselves.  The 
objectification  is  anticipated  in  the  word  choice  and  confirmed  in  the  implicitly  dysfunctional 
nature  of  the  family:  their  physical  predicament  -  the  deprivation  implicit  in  hunger  -  is 
paralleled  in  their  psychological  predicament  -  deprivation  of  love. 
13  King  James  I,  Daemonologie,  in  Forme  of  a  Dialogue,  Divided  in  three  Bookes  (Edinburgh:  Printed  by 
Robert  Walde-grave,  Printer  to  the  King's  Majestic,  An.  1597). 
14  T.  C.  Smout,  A  History  of  the  Scottish  People  1560-1830  (London:  Fontana,  1989),  pp.  184-185. 
106 Typically  of  the  brothers  Grimm,  the  style  is  ruthlessly  economical.  This  supposes  that 
identification  is  the  primary  relational  mode  -  hence  the  imaginative  difficulties  for  readers 
of  very  different  experience,  the  deterioration  through  time  into  the  quaint.  Imagery,  on  the 
few  occasions  when  it  does  occur  is,  thereby,  conspicuous.  The  white  pebbles  that  Hansel 
uses  to  lay  his  trail  are  'like  silver  coins;  '5  as  they  guide  the  children  home  they,  'glittered 
like  bits  of  silver'  (p.  155).  The  imagery  underlines  their  visual  function  -  they  stand  out. 
Characterisation  is  in  terms  of  types.  Speech  and  actions  frequently  resolve  into  patterns  - 
the  stepmother's  injunction,  'Get  up,  you  lazy  bones'  (p.  152)  is  precisely  echoed  by  the 
witch.  Hansel's  cunning  is  balanced  by  Gretel's.  Generally,  the  story  has  been  thoroughly 
worked,  thoroughly  rendered. 
Bettelheim  argues, 
After  they  have  become  familiar  with  "Hansel  and  Gretel,  "  most  children 
comprehend,  at  least  unconsciously,  that  what  happens  in  the  parental  home  and  at 
the  witch's  house  are  but  separate  aspects  of  what  in  reality  is  one  total  experience. 
Initially,  the  witch  is  a  perfectly  gratifying  mother  figure  [...  ].  Only  on  the  following 
morning  comes  the  rude  awakening  from  such  dreams  of  infantile  bliss  [...  ]. 
This  is  how  the  child  feels  when  devastated  by  the  ambivalent  feelings, 
frustrations,  and  anxieties  of  the  oedipal  stage  of  development,  as  well as  his 
previous  disappointment  and  rage  at  failures  on  his  mother's  part  to  gratify  his  needs 
and  desires  as  fully  as  he  expected  [...  ]. 
Thus,  the  parental  home  "hard  by  a  great  forest"  and  the  fateful  house  in  the 
depths  of  the  woods  are  on  an  unconscious  level  but  the  two  aspects  of  the  parental 
home:  the  gratifying  one  and  the  frustrating  one. 
The  child  who  ponders  on  his  own  the  details  of  "Hansel  and  Gretel"  finds 
meaning  in  how  it  begins.  That  the  parental  home  is  located  at  the  very  edge  of  the 
forest  where  everything  happens  suggests  that  what  is  to  follow  was  imminent  from 
the  start.  16 
On  the  other  hand,  where  else  would  a  story  concerning  a  woodcutter  and  his  family  be 
located  other  than  at  'the  edge  of  a  wood'?  The  reader  is  pushed  from  the  gratification  of 
enthralling  identification  to  the  ingenious  unfolding  of  a  locked  set: 
The  house  stands  for  oral  greediness  and  how  attractive  it  is  to  give  in  to 
it  [...  ].  The  witch,  who  is  a  personification  of  the  destructive  aspects  of  orality,  is 
as  bent  on  eating  up  the  children  as  they  are  on  demolishing  her  gingerbread  house. 
(pp.  161-162) 
15  Amy  Ehrlich,  The  Walker  Book  of  Fairy  Tales  (London:  Walker  Books,  1986),  p.  151.  16  Bettelheim,  p.  163. 
107 The  story  is  immediately  polarised,  the  psychoanalytic  subtext  reducing  the  imagery  to  the 
merely  illustrative. 
Something  of  these  issues  can  be  seen  in  'Araby',  another  of  Joyce's  stories  concerning 
childhood.  In  the  sequence  of  Dubliners  it  immediately  follows  upon  'An  Encounter'.  The 
pre-adolescent  sexual  fantasy  of  the  narrator,  typically,  is  reductive  of  the  girl  -  she  has  no 
name,  she  is  'Mangan's  sister.  '  The  ghost  of  a  mythic  subtext  -  the  quest  -  provides  more 
than  an  appropriate  context  for  the  fantasy  -  the  myth  and  the  mode  of  imagination  share  a 
reciprocal  logic.  As  is  characteristic  of  Joyce's  stories  of  childhood,  the  fantasy  empowers: 
Her  image  accompanied  me  even  in  places  the  most  hostile  to  romance.  On 
Saturday  evenings  when  my  aunt  went  marketing  I  had  to  go  to  carry  some  of 
the  parcels.  We  walked  through  the  flaring  street  [...  ]  amid  the  curses  of  labourers, 
the  shrill  litanies  of  shop-boys  [...  ].  These  noises  converged  in  a  single  sensation  of 
life  for  me:  I  imagined  that  I  bore  my  chalice  safely  through  a  throng  of  foes.  " 
The  erotically  charged  imagery  hovers  at  the  brink  of  sexual  awareness  without  ever  coming 
to  explicit  consciousness: 
She  was  waiting  for  us,  her  figure  defined  by  the  light  from  the  half-opened  door 
[...  ].  and  I  stood  by  the  railings  looking  at  her.  Her  dress  swung  as  she  moved  her 
body  and  the  soft  rope  of  her  hair  tossed  from  side  to  side.  (p.  30) 
It  is  as  if  the  polarities  of  self  and  other  are  held  in  suspension.  Such  suspension  is  entirely 
characteristic  of  the  imaginative  mode  of  fairy  stories  -  it  could  be  said  that  the  mode  is 
intransitive  in  that  the  self  is  not  posited  as  an  object  in  the  context  of  compelling 
identification.  Yet  in  Joyce's  story  it  is  as  if  the  polarities  are  implicit  in  the  descriptive 
imagery  with  its  persistent  chiaroscuro: 
The  light  from  the  lamp  opposite  our  door  caught  the  white  curve  of  her  neck,  lit  up 
her  hair  that  rested  there  and,  falling,  lit  up  the  hand  upon  the  railing.  It  fell  over  the 
side  of  her  dress  and  caught  the  white  border  of  a  petticoat,  just  visible  as  she  stood 
at  ease.  (p.  32) 
These  painterly  cues  potentially  differentiate  the  experience  of  the  child  -  the  girl  as  icon  - 
from  that  of  the  reader.  Joyce  has  engineered  a  privileged  perspective.  It  is  not  until  near 
the  end  of  the  story  that  knowing  sexuality  is  clearly  differentiated  as  a  point  of  comparison 
for  the  reader. 
V7  Dubliners,  pp.  30-31. 
108 In  the  end,  the  child's  empowering  fantasy  is  not  strong  enough  to  sustain  his  vision  in  the 
general  darkness  of  the  adult  world;  the  Chapel  Perilous  resolves  into  the  market  place: 
Nearly  all  the  stalls  were  closed  and  the  greater  part  of  the  hall  was  in  darkness.  I 
recognized  a  silence  like  that  which  pervades  a  church  after  a  service.  I  walked  into 
the  centre  of  the  bazaar  timidly.  (p.  35) 
Failing  in  his  quest,  the  child  comes  to  articulate  his  failure  in  concepts  associated  with  the 
world  of  the  dead  priest  -  piety  and  stultifying  conventionality: 
Gazing  up  into  the  darkness  I  saw  myself  as  a  creature  driven  and  derided  by  vanity; 
and  my  eyes  burned  with  anguish  and  anger.  (p.  36) 
The  child  comes,  not  to  self-knowledge,  but  to  a  false  self,  mediated  through  an  alienating 
ideology.  The  story  serves  as  a  parable.  In  assimilating  fairy  stories  the  child's  imagination 
operates  within  intransitive  identification.  In  this  context  ideological  intrusion  is 
enormously  destructive.  In  his  estrangement  the  child  becomes  a  clone  of  the  dominant 
ideology.  The  competing,  hegemonic  power  of  the  chilling  adult  paradigm  is  assimilated. 
Such  issues  were  at  the  heart  of  R.  D.  Laing's  objections  to  classical  psychoanalysis: 
The  most  serious  objection  to  the  technical  vocabulary  currently  used  to  describe 
psychiatric  patients  is  that  it  consists  of  words  which  split  man  up  verbally  in  a  way 
which  is  analogous  to  the  existential  splits  we  have  to  describe  here. 
[...  ]  The  words  of  the  current  technical  vocabulary  either  refer  to  man  in  isolation 
from  the  other  and  the  world,  that  is,  as  an  entity  not  essentially  'in  relation  to'  the 
other  and  in  a  world,  or  they  refer  to  falsely  substantialized  aspects  of  this  isolated 
entity.  Such  words  are:  mind  and  body,  psyche  and  soma  [...  ]  we  take  a  single  man 
in  isolation  and  conceptualize  his  various  aspects  into  'the  ego',  'the  superego',  and 
'the  id'.  The  other  becomes  either  an  internal  or  external  object  or  a  fusion  of  both.  18 
An  exploration  of  the  modes  of  imagination  provides  the  logic  which  explains  how  such 
reduction  inevitably  comes  about  through  the  conceptual  prescriptions  of  Freud's  symbolic 
method  and  the  ideology  consolidated  through  them. 
18  RD.  Laing,  The  Divided  Self  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1965),  p.  19. 
109 Chapter  Six 
Identity  and  the  Manufacture  of  Meaning 
Just  as  the  nature  of  an  artefact  changes  according  to  the  mode  in  which  it  is  apprehended 
so  the  nature  of  the  self  changes  -  the  imagination  has  implications  for  personal  identity. 
Viewed  discursively  the  self  appears  as  an  object,  or  an  object  that  cannot  be  found,  or  a 
collection  of  selves.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  context  of  imagining,  the  world  and  the  self, 
and  the  other  and  the  self  are  engaged  in  a  reciprocal  extension.  In  the  context  of  the 
nihilism  contingent  upon  the  apparent  contraction  of  the  Romantic  imagination  into 
subjectivity,  Virginia  Woolf,  nevertheless,  seems  to  find  a  role  for  imagining  in  the 
possibility  that  we  manufacture  our  own  meaning  and  thereby  further  our  individuation. 
It  is  as  if  by  individuation  we  commonly  meant  the  achievement  of  an  integrated  self,  an 
achieved  identity.  This  suggests  that  the  self  is  an  essence.  Does  this  essence,  however, 
amount  to  anything  more  than  a  stasis  of  empowering  paradigmatic  relics,  the  type  of  the 
weary  caricature  by  which  I  know  myself?  Such  is  the  self  envisaged  by  Larkin: 
And  what  cohered  in  it  across 
The  years,  the  unique  random  blend 
Of  families  and  fashions,  there 
At  last  begin  to  loosen.  ' 
The  contingency,  the  relativism  implicit in  such  a  conception  is  essentially  nihilistic. 
In  The  Birthday  Party,  as  we  noted  earlier,  Stanley  is  reconstructed  from  the  often 
contradictory  paradigmatic  flotsam  and  jetsam  that  constitute  the  world,  primarily,  of 
Goldberg.  From  a  contemporary  perspective,  Stanley's  new  'self  is  like  a  disturbed 
archaeological  site  set  in  concrete.  The  clear  implication  of  the  satire  is  that  such  an  identity 
is  a  monstrous  aberration. 
It  may  be  that  the  modes  of  thinking  which  so  prescribe  and  vitiate  such  a  self  are  the 
very  modes  which  vitiate  imaginative  experience  generally.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  as  if 
individuation  were  not  so  much  the  arriving  at  an  essence  as  that  which  is  affirmed  in  the 
mediation  between  world  and  self  in  the  process  of  imagining.  That  is  to  say,  such  a  self  is 
a  function  of  an  elusive,  dynamic  process  which  only  becomes  'visible'  in  terms  of 
1  Philip  Larkin,  'Ambulances',  in  Collected  Poems,  paperback  cdn.  1990  (London:  Faber  and  Faber,  1988), 
pp.  132-133. 
110 objectifying,  reductive  modes.  This  may  be  what  is  behind  the  age-old  notion,  particularly 
associated  with  the  mystical  tradition,  that  to  find  yourself  it  is  necessary  to  lose  yourself: 
the  finding  involves  crossing  a  threshold  between  modes.  In  the  social  context,  imagination 
is  manifest  in  the  transactions  of  the  moral  life  -a  practical  mode  of  imagination  -  and  the 
moral  life  is  as  subject  to  the  vitiation  of  reductive  modes  as  other  imaginative  transactions. 
It  is,  then,  as  if  the  self  were  manifest  in  a  number  of  modalities.  For  the  sceptical  Hume 
the  concept  of  self  is  a  'mistake'  and  a'fiction'.  2 
[...  ]  when  I  enter  most  intimately  into  what  I  call  myself,  I  always  stumble  on  some 
particular  perception  or  other,  of  heat  or  cold,  light  or  shade,  love  or  hatred,  pain  or 
pleasure.  I  never  can  catch  myself  at  any  time  without  a  perception,  and  never  can 
observe  anything  but  the  perception.  When  my  perceptions  are  removed  for  any 
time,  as  by  sound  sleep,  so  long  am  I  insensible  of  myself,  and  may  truly  be  said  not 
to  exist. 
[...  ]  I  may  venture  to  affirm  of  [...  ]  mankind,  that  they  are  nothing  but  a  bundle  or 
collection  of  different  perceptions,  which  succeed  each  other  with  inconceivable 
rapidity,  and  are  in  a  perpetual  flux  or movement.  (p.  259) 
The  self  is  not  an  entity  but  a  function  of  memory  and  habit.  The  notion  of  the  'bundle'  is 
more  or  less  confirmed  in  the  imagery  of  Larkin  and  the  characters  of  Pinter.  Such  a 
discussion  involves  a  paradox:  in  denying  the  self  it  posits  it  as  an  object  which  cannot  be 
found.  Whether  or  not  the  self  is  an  entity  is  a  discussion  trapped  within  the  assumptions  of 
a  shared  paradigm  conceived  within  a  single  modality. 
By  contrast,  the  imaginative  mode  of  fairy  stories  and  the  depiction  of  children's 
experience  in  Dubliners  suggests  that  discursive  argument  posits  a  self  -  or  absent  object  - 
which  seems  to  have  little  relation  to  the  experience  of  self  as  it  is  manifest  in  identification. 
There  the  self  is  manifest  in  wishes  and  desires,  undifferentiated  except  in  the  experience  of 
pain  or  frustration:  I  am  at  one  with  my  world  except  when  it  resists  appropriation  through 
fantasy.  In  such  failure  lies  the  germ  of  an  incipient  self-conscious  identity.  Desire 
mediated  through  awareness  of  the  claims  of  others  engenders  the  possibility  of  adjudication 
and  pushes  the  self  into  the  public  domain.  In  this  way,  imagining  becomes  the  very 
condition  of  morality. 
2  David  Hume,  A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature,  op.  cit.,  p.  261. 
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fantasy,  imagining  -  each  with  its  associated  and  contingent  'self.  The  self  that  we 
experience  in  the  self-consciousness  of  shame,  for  example,  is  radically  different  from  the 
self  in  joy. 
Hegel's  discussion  of  'Lordship  and  Bondage'  is  instructive  here.  That  the  exploration  of 
the  modes  of  imagination  should  lead  to  a  consideration  of  the  self  and  its  modes  of  being, 
mirrors,  to  some  extent,  Hegel's  shift,  from  how  we  apprehend  and  represent  the  world,  to 
issues  of  identity  and  self-consciousness:  'everything  turns  on  grasping  and  expressing  the 
True,  not  only  as  Substance,  but  equally  as  Subject.  i3  In  this  scheme  truth  becomes  a 
function  of  self-consciousness: 
Only  this  self-restoring  sameness,  or  this  reflection  in  otherness  within  itself  [...  J  is 
the  True.  It  is  the  process  of  is  own  becoming.  (p.  10) 
Such  a  'process'  can  only  be  realised  in  the  context  of  negotiations  with  another  self- 
consciousness. 
But  the  first  stages  of  such  a  transaction  are  encompassed  by  the  urgent  need  for  self- 
realisation.  Self-consciousness  seeks  to  transform  or  appropriate  the  other  and  thereby 
consolidate  itself  but  in  doing  so  destroys  the  very  relation  that  is  the  condition  of 
realisation  -  namely,  the  self-consciousness  of  the  other.  Self-consciousness  is  dependent 
upon  a  reciprocal  transaction.  On  the  other  hand,  appropriation  reduces  the  other  to  the 
status  of  a  'thing'.  The  dominant  self-consciousness  now  takes  enjoyment  in  using  the 
'object',  an  enjoyment  enhanced  by  the  other's  self-consciousness  of  his  situation:  in  other 
words,  the  participants  are  polarised  into  lord  and  bondsman.  The  lord,  however,  has 
forfeited  the  recognition  that  his  self-consciousness  demands  by  effecting  such  a  reduction: 
the  necessary  reciprocity  is  fatally  compromised.  On  the  one  hand,  the  bondsman  is driven 
to  pay  close  attention  to  the  wishes  and  motives  of  the  lord,  and  this  involves  a  passage 
from  the  confinement  of  his  own  desires  in  order  to  fulfil  the  wishes  of  the  other;  on  the 
3  G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  trans.  by  A.  V.  Miller  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1977), 
p.  10. 
112 other  hand,  the  world  of  the  bondsman  is  opaque  to  the  lord.  Paradoxically,  only  the 
bondsman  achieves  the  self-consciousness  that  the  lord  set  out  to  achieve.  4 
Reflected  here  are  the  transactions  of  imagination  and  their  role  in  individuation.  The 
discursive  posits  the  self  as  an  object  or  absent  object.  On  the  other  hand,  identification 
contains  within  it  the  possibility  of  the  evolution  of  self-consciousness:  identification  effects 
a  reduction  of  the  other  and  the  associated  self  is  coextensive  with  its  own  desires.  Pushed 
into  consciousness,  such  desire  resolves  into  the  wilful  manipulation  of  the  other.  In 
imagining,  the  self  is  introduced  into  the  public  domain  and  comes  to  know  itself  in  its 
differentiation  from,  and  assessment  of,  others  -  implicit  in  this  is  the  adjudication  that  is 
associated  with  the  moral  life.  From  unlikely  origins  within  the  blindness  of  identification 
the  self  evolves  as  a  function  of  subsequent  imagining. 
At  issue  here  is  the  reciprocal  relation  between  imagining  and  identity:  indeed,  the  one  is 
locked  into  the  other.  In  the  historical  novels  of  Scott,  arguably,  a  new  paradigm  of  history 
emerges  involving  a  coming  to  consciousness  through  the  rendering  of  the  past.  This 
process  is  precisely  mirrored  in  Proust's  A  La  Recherche  du  Temps  Perdu.  In  ally  fiction 
with  the  capacity  to  engage  identification  there  lies  the  potential  for  imaginative  engagement 
with  all  its  implications  for  self-consciousness.  What  is  distinctive  in  Proust  is  that  he  brings 
this  potentiality  to  awareness  in  the  practise  and,  thereby,  recognition  of  his  vocation. 
Whether  in  the  context  of  artefacts,  or  in  our  quotidian  dealings  with  one  another,  the 
imagination,  as  I  have  argued,  discloses  value  in  the  very act  of  imagining.  Value,  then,  is 
disclosed  simultaneously  with  the  self.  The  relativism  of  the  static  self  is  deterministic, 
contingent:  value  is  manifest  in  habituated  responses,  codes,  conventions  and  ideology  -  this 
is  the  self  that  becomes  the  object  of  analysis  for  deconstruction.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
relativity  manifest  in  the  relations  of  the  individuating  self  reflects  a  mutual  accommodation 
-  world  and  self,  other  and  self,  are  changed  reciprocally.  In  the  very  next  instant,  though, 
such  transactions  can  be  objectified  by  a  shift  into  the  discursive,  the  dynamic  process 
resolving  to  empowered  self.  The  discursive  posits  the  self  as  a  construct;  identification  is 
See  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  pp.  111-119. 
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the  characteristic  relational  mode  of  the  undifferentiated  self;  imagination,  facilitates  the 
individuating  self. 
Competitive  discourses  that  would  claim  exclusive  insight  into  the  nature  of  the  self  from, 
say,  the  perspectives  of  deconstruction  and  phenomenology,  are  simply  at  cross  purposes. 
In  the  course  of  an  hour  we  move  through  radically  exclusive  experiences  of  self  as 
seamlessly  as  we  move  from  identification  to  imagination. 
It  is  the  possibility  of  liberation  through  commitment  to  the  imagination  that  seems  to 
emerge  in  the  final  part  of  T.  S.  Eliot's  'The  Waste  Land'.  In  the  context  of  individuation, 
the  intellect  inevitably  fails  us,  for  it  posits  the  essential  self  -a  prison: 
We  think  of  the  key,  each  in  his  prison 
Thinking  of  the  key,  each  confirms  a  prison.  5 
On  the  other  hand,  commitment  to  the  moral  imagination  is  implicit  in  the  Sanskrit 
prescriptions:  'give',  'sympathise',  'control'. 
Generally,  in  The  Birthday  Party,  identity  is  maintained  and  sustained  through  fantasy  -  in 
Ibsen's  terms,  Meg  and  Stanley  are  constituted  round  saving  lies  in  a  sort  of  symbiotic 
equilibrium.  Stanley  and  Goldberg,  particularly,  are  struggling  to  complete  pictures  of 
themselves  in  the  medium  of  fantasy.  There  is  a  spontaneous,  fundamental  -  indeed, 
perhaps  the  fundamental  -  function  of  the  imagination  at  work  here,  clearly  bound  in  to  the 
search  for  identity  -  Stanley  the  piano  player,  whose  father  nearly  came  to  hear  him; 
Goldberg,  whose  obsession  is  to  supersede  an  identity  that  perpetually  proclaims  itself  in  the 
attempted  denial. 
The  urgency  of  the  imagination  to  complete  pictures  was  clearly  manifest  in  the  dream 
that  Freud  recounted  regarding  the  response  to  the  alarm  clock.  A  similar  process  is  at 
work  in  Meg's  garbled  version  of  the  concert  fantasy.  Every  sentence  that  she  utters 
contains  a  cue  picked  up  from  Stanley  and  'rationalised'  in  her  own  terms.  The  motive  of 
her  fantasy  is  to  project  to  Goldberg  a  sort  of  appropriative,  motherly  pride  regarding 
Stanley. 
5  T.  S.  Eliot,  Selected  Poems,  op.  cit.,  p.  67. 
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projected.  Like  Pozzo's  in  Beckett's  Waiting  for  Godot,  Goldberg's  identity  is  constituted 
round  a  polarity  of  brutality  and  sentimentality.  The  common  impulse  that  is  thus  bifurcated 
is  the  need  for  control,  to  transform  reality  into  his  own  terms.  The  dysfunctional, 
disintegrative  effects  of  the  vitiated  imagination  -  fantasy  -  are  clearly  displayed. 
The  effect  of  the  systematic  ambiguity  in  the  play  regarding  origins  and  motives  is  to 
universalise  the  predicaments  it  displays.  There  is,  therefore,  a  clarity  of  focus,  an 
uncompromising  lucidity  in  its  analyses. 
Only  the  enigmatic  Petey  achieves  insight.  He  provides  a  dramatic  focus  for  the  dismay 
and  anxiety  that  the  audience  urgently  needs  to  express.  The  play's  circularity  relentlessly 
confounds  such  a  release.  Meg  will,  no  doubt,  happily  circumscribe  Stanley's  departure  in 
another  accommodating  fantasy.  She  has  learned  nothing. 
We  become  caricatures  of  ourselves  in  so  far  as  we  succumb  to  the  dysfunctional  allure 
of  fantasy.  Commitment  to  the  moral  life  -  in  effect,  to  imagining  in  the  context  of  mutual 
self-consciousness  -  is  just  as  surely  a  commitment  to  completing  pictures,  but  pictures  - 
inscapes  -  with  bridging,  cognitive  links  to  the  world  and  others.  The  bridging  underwrites 
mutual  growth. 
That  individuation  is  not  a  once  for  all  achieved  identity  is  reflected  in  the  depiction  of 
Edward  Waverley.  He  is  pushed  into  imagining,  arriving  at  a  mediation  between  world  and 
self,  thereby  achieving  insight  into  how  he  has  been  manipulated  by  both  persons  and  the 
force  of  circumstance.  This  imaginative  transaction  is  implicit  in  the  text  and  is  not  brought 
to  focus  by  Scott  though  he  is  very  clear  about  the  circumscribing  ideological  issues.  How 
Edward's  imaginative  life  will  be  sustained,  is  not  addressed  by  Scott.  That  he  has  arrived  at 
himself  but  once  in  his  lifetime  and  will  subsequently  subside  into  the  static  identity  of  a 
country  gentleman  seems  his  inevitable  fate.  The  flirtation  with  heroic  values  is  resolved  in 
the  settled  life. 
Edward's  is  the  solid  identity  of  the  fulfilled  desire.  Like  Chaucer's  Franklin  such 
fulfilment  is  identified  with  felicity.  Outwith  the  dialectic  of  self-consciousness  the  subject 
becomes  object  within  an  apparently  limitless  consolidating  paradigm.  Waverley  will 
115 become  the  real  child  of  a  marriage  that  will  constitute  a  magic  circle  whose  domain  is 
coextensive  with  his  distinctive  social  enclave. 
Heroic  identity  -  typified  in  the  Homeric  heroes  -  is  only  sustainable  through 
identification  within  an  unselfconscious  -  that  is,  a  limitless  -  paradigm.  It  is  an  exclusively 
retrospective  phenomenon.  In  fact,  training  for  battle  involves  the  systematic  objectification 
of  self  and  enemy  -  the  aim  is  to  eliminate  the  personal.  John  Keegan  observes  of  the  aim  of 
officer  training: 
That  aim  [...  ]  is  to  reduce  the  conduct  of  war  to  a  set  of  rules  and  a  system  of 
procedures  -  and  thereby  to  make  orderly  and  rational  what  is  essentially  chaotic  and 
instinctive.  6 
Such  an  education  serves  to  block  imaginative  transactions  -  with  their  implications  for 
mutual  recognition  -  so  that  it  is  associated  with  deliberately  reductive  concepts: 
For  by  teaching  the  young  officer  to  organize  his  intake  of  sensations,  to  reduce  the 
events  of  combat  to  as  few  and  as  easily  recognizable  a  set  of  elements  as  possible, 
to  categorize  under  manageable  headings  the  noise,  blast,  passage  of  missiles  and 
confusion  of  human  movement  which  will  assail  him  on  the  battlefield,  so  that  they 
can  be  described  -  to  his  men,  to  his  superiors,  to  himself  -  as'incoming  fire', 
'outgoing  fire',  'airstrike',  'company-strength  attack',  one  is  helping  him  to  avert  the 
onset  of  fear  or,  worse,  of  panic  and  to  perceive  a  face  of  battle  which,  if  not 
familiar,  and  certainly  not  friendly,  need  not,  in  the  event,  prove  wholly  petrifying.  ' 
(p.  20) 
Keegan  describes  the  results  of  an  American  study  during  the  Second  World  War  which 
challenged  the  assumption  that  the  outcome  of  battle  is  determined  by  the  skill  of 
commanders: 
[...  ]  ordinary  soldiers  do  not  think  of  themselves,  in  life-and-death  situations,  as 
subordinate  members  of  whatever  formal  military  organization.  [...  ]  but  as  equals 
within  a  very  tiny  group  -  perhaps  no  more  than  six  or  seven  men  [...  ].  But  it  will  not 
be  because  of  his  or anyone  else's  leadership  that  the  group  members  will  begin  to 
fight  and  continue  to  fight.  It  will  be,  on  the  one  hand,  for  personal  survival,  which 
individuals  will  recognize  to  be  bound  up  with  group  survival,  and,  on  the  other,  for 
fear  of  incurring  by  cowardly  conduct  the  group's  contempt.  (p.  51) 
Fundamentally  everything  depends  upon  the  individual  soldier's  'motivation  to  combat'. 
(p.  52) 
6  John  Keegan,  The  Face  of  Battle,  repr.  1987  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1978),  p.  18. 
116 Herein  lies  the  role  of  the  mythic  with  its  leavening  of  heroic  values.  It  is  the  function  of 
such  art  to  draw  the  reader  into  identification  -  such  identification  constitutes  its  whole 
scope  and  success.  In  Shakespeare's  Henry  V  the  process  of  evolution  from  reality  to  myth 
is  clearly  displayed.  The  truth  is  articulated  by  the  common  soldier,  Williams: 
[...  ]  when  all  those  legs,  and  arms,  and  heads,  chopped  off  in  a  battle,  shall  join 
together  at  the  latter  day,  and  cry  all  -  We  died  at  such  a  place;  some,  swearing; 
some,  crying  for  a  surgeon;  some,  upon  their  wives  left  poor  behind  them  [...  ]  I  am 
afeared  there  are  few  die  well  that  die  in  a  battle.  7 
The  myth  in  the  making  is  represented  in  the  heroic  rhetoric  of  the  King: 
He  that  outlives  this  day,  and  comes  safe  home, 
Will  stand  a  tip-toe  when  this  day  is  nam'd, 
And  rouse  him  at  the  name  of  Crispian  [...  ]. 
Old  men  forget;  yet  all  shall  be  forgot, 
But  he'll  remember,  with  advantages, 
What  feats  he  did  that  day.  (IV.  3.41) 
The  Anglo  Saxon  fragment,  The  Battle  ofMaldon,  recording  an  encounter  in  991,  serves  as 
a  paradigm  case  for  the  heroic  'battle  piece'  where  the  issues  are  clearly  drawn  in  so  far  as  a 
military  fiasco  is  transfigured  into  a  moral  victory.  The  heroes  become  icons  for  posterity. 
Such  heroic  fiction  shares  with  fantasy  the  empowering  of  the  self  through  denial.  The 
heroic  involves  the  ultimate  objectification  of  the  other  in  death  and,  thereby,  the  most 
securely  'objective'  self  is  posited.  The  joy  in  the  fulfilled  wish  accompanies  the 
momentarily  complete  appropriation  of  reality  by  the  subject  and,  at  that  moment,  the 
subject  is  never  more  fully  himself.  Pushed  into  consciousness  such  knowing  becomes 
satanic.  This  is  clearly  illustrated  in  Dr  Jekyll's  account  of  Hyde's  pleasure  in  the  murder  of 
Sir  Danvers  Carew: 
Instantly  the  spirit  of  hell  awoke  in  me  and  raged.  With  a  transport  of  glee,  I  mauled 
the  unresisting  body,  tasting  delight  from  every  blow  [...  ].  I  [...  ]  fled  from  the  scene 
of  these  excesses,  at  once  glorying  and  trembling  [...  ]  my  love  of  life  screwed  to  the 
topmost  peg.  8 
Jekyll's  is  the  consciousness  brought  to  Hyde's  gratification.  Without  such  consciousness, 
the  objectified  self,  on  cool  reflection  -  removed  from  any  possibility  of  the  affirming 
1  William  Shakespeare,  Henry  V,  ed.  by  J.  H.  Walter  (Oxford:  Heinemann,  1967),  IV.  1.128.  6  R.  L.  Stevenson,  The  Complete  Short  Stories,  op.  cit.,  p.  158. 
117 reciprocity  of  revealed  value  in  mutual  self-consciousness  -  finds  value  only  in  itself  as  an 
object  for  others: 
I  do  not  believe 
earthly  estate  is  everlasting  [...  ] 
Wherefore,  for  earl  whosoever,  it  is  afterward, 
the  praise  of  livers-on,  that,  lasting,  is  best: 
won  in  the  world  before  wayfaring, 
forged,  framed  here,  in  the  face  of  enmity, 
in  the  Devil's  spite:  deeds,  achievements. 
That  after-speakers  should  respect  the  name.  9 
The  seductive  power  of  such  a  naive  mode  of  self-validation  is  reflected  in  the  enthralling 
power  of  the  epic  and,  in  our  own  more  modest  times,  in  the  popularity  of  the  classic 
western. 
By  contrast,  the  self  posited  in  imagining  is  intrinsically  dynamic  -  it  creates,  and  operates 
within,  spaces  made  variable  in  the  open  transaction  with  others,  for  whom,  in  such 
unsustainable  moments  of  encounter,  we  experience  reverence.  We  move  from  a 
Newtonian  universe  to  a  mutually  interactive  space. 
Issues  regarding  static  and  dynamic  identity  are  explored  by  Henry  James  in  The  Portrait 
of  a  Lady.  Isabel  Archer  is  depicted  as  in  search  of  an  identity  but  the  combination  of  her 
romantic  sensibility  -  that  sets  a  supreme  value  on  her  freedom  -  and  her  naive  impulse  to 
construct  herself  in  terms  of  how  she  would  wish  to  appear  for  others,  proves  to  be  a 
contradiction  that  leads  to  a  false  choice.  She  is  attracted  by  Madame  Merle  who  seems  to 
project  precisely  what  she  lacks  -  the  achieved  identity: 
She  had  become  aware  more  than  before  of  the  advantage  of  being  like  that  -  of 
having  made  one's  self  a  firm  surface,  a  sort  of  corselet  of  silver.  10 
Ironically,  but  rightly,  she  has  rejected  in  Lord  Warburton  and  Caspar  Goodwood  precisely 
the  promise  of  the  achieved  identity  of  which  she  is in  pursuit.  They  offer  little  or  nothing 
to  the  imagination.  She  sees  in  the  aestheticism  of  Madame  Merle  and  Osmond  an  arcane 
Anon.,  The  Seafarer',  in  The  Earliest  English  Poems,  trans.  by  Michael  Alexander,  2nd  edn.  1977 
(Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1966),  p.  76. 
10  Henry  James,  The  Portrait  of  a  Lady,  cd.  by  Geoffrey  Moore,  1986  (London:  Penguin,  1963),  p.  452. 
118 knowledge,  a  mode  of  power  that  in  her  vulnerability  she  finds  compelling.  She  is, 
however,  aware  of  a  fault  in  Madame  Merle: 
She  was  [...  ]  too  perfectly  the  social  animal  [...  ].  Isabel  found  it  difficult  to  think  of 
her  in  any  detachment  or  privacy,  she  existed  only  in  her  relations,  direct  or  indirect, 
with  her  fellow  mortals.  One  might  wonder  what  commerce  she  could  possibly  hold 
with  her  own  spirit.  (p.  244) 
Nevertheless,  Isabel  becomes  vulnerable  to  the  attentions  of  Gilbert  Osmond  who,  like 
Pinter's  Goldberg,  is  committed  to  reconstruction,  in  this  case  of  Isabel  as  an  artefact  for  his 
collection.  He  provides  precisely  what  she  sees  herself  as  lacking.  He  is  her  lord  and  she  is 
an  accomplice  in  his  role  for  her: 
Isabel  waited,  with  a  certain  unuttered  contentedness,  to  have  her  movements 
directed;  she  liked  Mr  Osmond's  talk,  his  company.  (p.  310) 
She  compensates  in  fantasy  for  what  she  cannot  find: 
This  would  have  been  rather  a  dry  account  of  Mr  Osmond's  career  if  Isabel  had  fully 
believed  it;  but  her  imagination  supplied  the  human  element  which  she  was  sure  had 
not  been  wanting.  (p.  316) 
The  `human  element'  had  been  precisely  available  in  Ralph  Touchett  but,  cruelly,  although 
he  is  associated  with  the'exclusively  personal',  (p.  388)  as  an  invalid,  he  will  not  allow 
himself  to  pursue  his  love  for  her. 
Isabel's  passage  to  herself  will  come  to  depend  upon  her  moral  imagination.  This  is 
anticipated  in  her  moving  insight  into  Madame  Merle's  situation: 
'Ah,  poor,  poor  woman!  '  cried  Isabel,  who  herewith  burst  into  tears.  (p.  590) 
Isabel  eschews  the  possibility  of  freedom  from  a  cruel  marriage  to  return  to  Gilbert  Osmond 
and  fulfil  her  promise  to  Pansy,  whom  she  has  discovered  to  be  the  illegitimate  daughter  of 
Madame  Merle  and  Osmond. 
In  the  context  of  her  romantic  impulse  -a  mode  of  fantasy  that  presupposes  an  absence 
of  imaginative  relation  -  Isabel  embarks  upon  the  self-conscious  construction  of  an  ego  that 
draws  her  into  identification  with  the  power  -  in  Hegel's  terms  -  of  her  lord.  This 
characteristic  polarisation  -  of  fantasy  and  a  false  self  sustained  by  power  -  is  ultimately 
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resolved  through  imaginative  transactions  that  have  the  reciprocal  felicity  of  establishing  an 
authentic  self.  The  bondsman  comes  to  know  herself. 
In  Virginia  Woolf  s  To  the  Lighthouse  the  process  of  imagining  is  represented,  amongst 
other  ways,  but  very  distinctively,  in  the  role  of  the  artist,  Lily  Briscoe,  and  in  the 
individuation  of  James  Ramsay.  It  is  with  the  experience  of  James,  aged  six,  that  the  novel 
begins. 
As  in  the  stories  concerning  childhood  in  Dubliners,  Woolf  has  to  tackle  the  difficulty  of 
rendering  the  child's  experience  at  the  same  time  as  offering  interpretation.  The  opening 
paragraphs  invite  strong  identification  with  James'  Oedipal  fantasies: 
Had  there  been  an  axe  handy,  a  poker,  or  any  weapon  that  would  have  gashed  a  hole 
in  his  father's  breast  and  killed  him,  there  and  then,  James  would  have  seized  it. 
Such  were  the  extremes  of  emotion  that  Mr  Ramsay  excited  in  his  children's  breasts 
by  his  mere  presence;  standing,  as  now,  lean  as  a  knife,  narrow  as  the  blade  of  one.  ' 
The  knife,  the  blade,  later  the  scimitar,  the  tower  will  be  exploited  as  typical  Freudian 
symbols  -  and  in  this  case  they  have  become  symbols  through  their  association  with 
Freudian  ideology.  The  prescriptions  that  posit  these  as  symbols  originate  in  the  ideology 
so  that  their  expressive  potential  as  metaphor  is  compromised.  The  Hogarth  Press,  in  which 
Virginia  Woolf  and  her  husband  were  involved,  was  the  first  to  publish  the  work  of  Freud 
translated  into  English. 
The  issue  of  going  to  the  lighthouse  is  used  to  differentiate  clearly  between  the  father's 
characteristic  relational  mode  -  reason  -  and  the  mother's  -  identification.  In  her  case, 
identification  evolves  through  imagination  to  insight.  The  fantasy  that  he  will  go  to  the 
lighthouse  is  clearly  empowering  for  the  little  boy.  His  characteristic  imaginative  mode  is 
implicit  in  the  transactions  engaged  by  his  mother  in  reading  him  a  fairy  story  -  'The 
Fisherman  and  his  Wife.  '  (p.  49)  Cognitive  intrusion  is  effected  through  the  father  -a 
philosopher,  Mr  Ramsay  -  who  would  make  of  life  itself  a  grim,  cautionary  tale,  driven  as  he 
is by  his  sense  of  failure:  such  intense  projection  of  the  rational  and  the  didactic  prescribe 
that  his  relation  with  the  child  will  be  dysfunctional.  In  competition  with  the  child's 
empowering  fantasy  is  heroic  failure  -  reflected,  for  example,  in  Ramsay's  obsessive 
11  Virginia  Woolf,  To  The  Lighthouse  (London:  Triad  Grafton,  1977),  p.  10. 
120 renderings  of  'The  Charge  of  the  Light  Brigade'.  The  poem,  too,  strives  to  empower 
through  its  reversal  of  values.  As  in,  say,  The  Battle  ofMaldon,  actual  defeat  is  transformed 
into  moral  victory. 
Ramsay's  work  seems  to  have  its  origins  in  the  Idealist  tradition  of  Berkeley  and  Bradley: 
Whenever  she  'thought  of  his  work'  she  always  saw  clearly  before  her  a  large  kitchen 
table.  It  was  Andrew's  doing.  She  asked  him  what  his  father's  books  were  about. 
'Subject  and  object  and  the  nature  of  reality,  '  Andrew  had  said.  And  when  she  said 
Heavens,  she  had  no  notion  what  that  meant.  'Think  of  the  kitchen  table  then,  '  he 
told  her,  'when  you're  not  there'.  (p.  29) 
The  philosophical  ideology  is  symptomatic.  It  is  the  dissociation  in  the  subject/object 
split  that  necessitates  resort  to  the  reversal  of  values  in  fantasy  for  no  value  can  be 
spontaneously  found  in  the  context  of  such  an  epistemological  disposition  -  except  in  a  sort 
of  aestheticism.  What  is  intolerable  -  his  failure  -  he  seeks  to  assuage  through  fantasy,  for 
Ramsay  has  no  immediately  available  imaginative  resources  through  which  to  mediate  with 
reality:  they  are  blocked  by  his  ideological  commitment.  On  the  other  hand,  he  pushes  the 
child,  and  everyone  else,  towards  the  reality  that  he  cannot  face,  thereby,  enjoying  the 
exercise  of  power.  Shakespeare  gives  the  enjoyment  of  power  in  the  failed  rationalist  a 
demonic  twist  in  depicting  lago. 
The  transactions  of  imagination,  on  the  other  hand,  are  beautifully  represented  in  the 
experience  of  William  Bankes  and  Lily  Briscoe: 
So  off  they  strolled  [...  ]  to  that  break  in  the  thick  hedge,  guarded  by  red-hot  pokers 
like  brasiers  of  burning  coal,  between  which  the  blue  waters  of  the  bay  looked  bluer 
than  ever. 
They  came  there  regularly  every  evening  drawn  by  some  need.  It  was  as  if  the 
water  floated  off  and  set  sailing  thoughts  which  had  grown  stagnant  on  dry  land,  and 
gave  to  their  bodies  even  some  sort  of  physical  relief.  First,  the  pulse  of  colour 
flooded  the  bay  with  blue,  and  the  heart  expanded  with  it  and  the  body  swam,  only 
the  next  instant  to  be  checked  and  chilled  by  the  prickly  blackness  on  the  ruffled 
waves. 
They  both  smiled,  standing  there.  They  both  felt  a  common  hilarity,  excited  by  the 
moving  waves.  (pp.  26-27) 
The  experience  involves  crossing  a  threshold  -  the  break  in  the  hedge.  Their  fantasies  are 
'set  sailing'  to  be  structured  through  contact  with  the  seascape:  crucial  to  this  mediation  is 
the  transcending  of  dissociation  represented  here  in  the  tactful  imagery  of  the  pulse  of 
121 colour'  -  in  the  bay  -  and  the  'heart  that  'expanded  with  it.  '  In  this  way  object  and  subject 
are  synthesised  through  the  extended  metaphor  -  Berkeley's  dissociation  is  resolved.  The 
picture  is  concluded  by  the  emergence  of  a  frame  and  self-consciousness: 
[...  ]  after  this  swift  movement,  both  of  them  looked  at  the  dunes  far  away,  and 
instead  of  merriment  felt  come  over  them  some  sadness  -  because  the  thing  was 
completed  partly,  and  partly  because  distant  views  seem  to  outlast  by  a  million  years 
[...  ]  the  gazer.  (p.  27) 
In  this  Keatsian  moment  they  are  shifted  into  time  and  subjectivity.  Idealism  and 
imagination  are  not  in  absolute  confrontation  -  though  at  any  given  moment  it  is  a  case  of 
either/or. 
Although  capable  of  such  transactions  with  landscape,  William  is  uninitiated  into  the 
painterly  concerns  of  Lily.  Woolf  uses  him  as  a  sympathetic,  intelligent  observer  in  order  to 
clarify  Lily's  more  sophisticated  vision  -  the  mode,  though,  in  which  this  vision  is 
represented  is frequently  discursive: 
It  was  Mrs  Ramsay  reading  to  James,  she  said.  She  knew  his  objection  -  that  no  one 
could  tell  it  for  a  human  shape.  But  she  had  made  no  attempt  at  likeness  [...  ]  in  that 
corner,  it  was  bright,  here,  in  this,  she  felt  the  need  of  darkness.  Simple,  obvious, 
commonplace  as  it  was,  Mr  Bankes  was  interested.  (p.  60) 
William's  own  limits  are  gently  satirised.  He  expects  images,  rich  with  association,  with 
which  he  can  comfortably  identify.  His  satisfaction  is  sanctioned  by  market  value: 
He  took  it  scientifically  in  complete  good  faith.  The  truth  was  that  all  his  prejudices 
were  on  the  other  side,  he  explained.  The  largest  picture  in  his  drawing  room, 
which  painters  had  praised,  and  valued  at  a  higher  price  than  he  had  given  for  it,  was 
of  the  cherry  trees  in  blossom  on  the  banks  of  the  Kennet.  He  spent  his  honeymoon 
on  the  banks  of  the  Kennet,  he  said.  (p.  60) 
Lily  is  moved  to  clarify  her  vision: 
The  question  being  one  of  the  relations  of  masses,  of  lights  and  shadows,  which,  to 
be  honest,  he  had  never  considered  before,  he  would  like  to  have  it  explained  [...  ]. 
She  looked.  She  could  not  show  him  what  she  wished  to  make  of  it,  could  not  see  it 
even  herself,  without  a  brush  in  her  hand.  She  took  up  once  more  her  old  painting 
position  with  the  dim  eyes  and  the  absent-minded  manner,  subduing  all  her 
impressions  as  a  woman  to  something  much  more  general;  becoming  once  more 
under  the  power  of  that  vision  which  she  had  seen  clearly  once  and  must  now  grope  for  among  hedges  and  houses  and  mothers  and  children  -  her  picture.  (pp.  60-61) 
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reflected  in  the  elaborate  subtext  of  symbolism  that  frequently  underpins  events.  It  follows, 
and  is  characteristic,  that  Woolf  s  grip  of  the  material  is  often  uncomfortably  tight.  There  is 
a  sense  of  paradox  in  that  her  intention  and  her  method  are  conceptually  at  odds. 
A  gulf  of  ten  years  separates  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  the  novel.  Sitting  in  a  boat 
which  he  is  steering  to  the  lighthouse,  James,  as  a  young  man,  is  brought  to  review  his 
relationship  with  his  father.  He  struggles  towards  insight: 
He  had  always  kept  this  old  symbol  of  taking  a  knife  and  striking  his  father  to 
the  heart.  Only  now,  as  he  grew  older,  and  sat  staring  at  his  father  in  an  impotent 
rage,  it  was  not  him,  that  old  man  reading,  whom  he  wanted  to  kill,  but  it  was  the 
thing  that  descended  on  him.  (p.  198) 
Now  James  is  able  to  differentiate  between  his  father  and  his  father's  'despotism'.  James's 
individuation  is  bound  up  in  imaginative  apprehension  that  resolves  itself  into  the  cognitive: 
Yes,  thought  James  [...  ]  there  was  a  waste  of  snow  and  rock  very  lonely  and 
austere;  and  there  he  had  come  to  feel,  quite  often  lately,  when  his  father  said 
something  which  surprised  the  others,  were  two  pairs  of  footprints  only;  his  own 
and  his  father's.  They  alone  knew  each  other.  (p.  199) 
In  this  moment  of  imagining  James  sees  his  father  in  himself.  The  recounting  of  this 
experience  is  entirely  persuasive  as  it  stands  but  Woolf  insists  upon  underlining  the  issues  in 
Freudian  symbolism: 
[...  ]  he  sought  an  image  to  cool  and  detach  and  round  off  his  feeling  in  a  concrete  shape. 
Suppose  then  that  as  a  child  sitting  in  a  perambulator,  or  on  someone's  knee,  he  had  seen  a 
wagon  crush  ignorantly  and  innocently,  someone's  foot?  Suppose  he  had  seen  the  foot  first, 
in  the  grass,  smooth,  and  whole;  then  the  wheel;  and  the  same  foot,  purple,  crushed.  But 
the  wheel  was  innocent  [...  ].  But  whose  foot  was  he  thinking  of,  and  in  what  garden  did  all 
this  happen?  (pp.  199-200) 
In  the  identification  with  Oedipus  -  the  wounded  foot  -  James  absolves  his  father  in  the 
recognition  of  a  deterministic  prescription.  The  child  had  been  in  the  thrall  of  the  myth. 
The  expressive  charge  of  the  imagery  is  compromised  by  recognition  of  the  ideology. 
Children  sometimes  outline  their  figures  in  black  crayon  -  if  the  figures  are  adequately 
realised  the  outline  is  redundant;  if  it  is  necessary,  the  figures  are  not  sufficiently  imagined. 
The  idea  that  young  readers  are  affected  subliminally  by  such  devices  seems  to  me  to  be 
unpersuasive.  As  with  all  such  token  symbolism  in  the  novel,  they  either  see  it  or  they  don't. 
123 A  danger  if  they  do  is  that  they  are  caught  in  a  rather  frenetic  urge  to  rationalise  what  they 
lack  the  tact  to  limit.  In  other  words,  they  experience  it  as  an  easy  path  to  understanding  so 
that  they  are  tempted  from  engaging  the  subtleties  of  imagining. 
There  is,  then,  a  tension,  between  a  dominant  theme  of  the  novel  -  reason  and 
imagination  -  and  the  devices  of  symbolism  which  tend  to  push  the  imagination  into  the 
abstractive  cognitive;  but  the  thematic  issue  is  effectively  resolved  in  the  depiction  of  the 
imaginative  life  of  Lily  Briscoe. 
Lily  had  abandoned  her  original  painting  ten  years  before  but  now  she  is  moved  to  begin 
again.  There  is  a  striking  association  with  Proust's  Time  Regained  in  so  far  as  the  imagining 
is  simultaneously  the  understanding  of  the  past,  the  evolving  of  an  artefact  and  the 
generation  of  meaning  that  empowers  a  self. 
It  may  be  that  Woolf  conceived  Lily's  struggle  for  expression  in  terms  of  Cezanne: 
[...  ]  the  problem  of  space  remained  [...  ].  It  glared  at  her.  The  whole  mass  of  the 
picture  was  poised  upon  that  weight.  Beautiful  and  bright  it  should  be  on  the 
surface,  feathery  and  evanescent,  one  colour  melting  into  another  like  the  colours  on 
a  butterfly's  wing;  but  beneath  the  fabric  must  be  clamped  together  with  bolts  of  iron 
[...  ].  And  she  began  to  lay  on  a  red,  a  grey,  and  she  began  to  model  her  way  into  the 
hollow  there.  (p.  185) 
These,  clearly,  were  also  the  painterly  preoccupations  of  Cezanne.  Indeed,  the  final 
stroke  of  Lily's  painting  is  a  central  line: 
[...  ]  with  a  sudden  intensity,  as  if  she  saw  it  clear  for  a  second,  she  drew  a  line  there, 
in  the  centre.  It  was  done;  it  was  finished.  Yes,  she  thought,  laying  down  her  brush 
in  extreme  fatigue,  I  have  had  my  vision.  (p.  224) 
Such  a  line  is  a  distinctive  characteristic  of  a  number  of  Cezanne's  later  works  including:  La 
Montagne  Sainte-Victoire,  The  Great  Pine  and  The  Big  Trees.  12 
The  central  stroke  -  the  achievement  of  the  balanced  picture,  the  accommodation 
represented  in  the  stone  tower  of  the  lighthouse  and  the  light,  male  and  female,  reason  and 
imagination  -  constitute  the  resolution  of  the  pictorial  quest  and  time  regained. 
It  is  important  for  Woolf's  purposes  that  Lily  should  not  be  represented  as  an  artist  of 
genius.  Though  her  struggles  involve  a  sort  of  heroic  integrity,  Lily  fully  realises  that  her 
12  Venturi  452,669  and  760. 
124 painting  is  probably  destined  to  be  rolled  up  and  shoved  in  an  attic.  It  is  the  act  of 
imagining  that  is  all  important. 
There  is,  though,  another  mode  of  symbolism  represented  in  the  novel.  Mrs  Ramsay's 
'composition'  is  achieved  at  the  dinner  table.  She  is  drawn  from  her  depression  -  as  others 
are  drawn  from  their  different  moods  and  dispositions  -  just  at  the  moment  when  the  event 
seems  about  to  disintegrate:  'something  was  lacking.  '  Her  coup  de  theatre  is  to  light  the 
candles: 
Now  eight  candles  were  stood  down  the  table,  and  after  the  first  stoop  the  flames 
stood  upright  and  drew  with  them  into  visibility  the  long  table  entire,  and  in  the 
middle  a  yellow  and  purple  dish  of  fruit.  (p.  105) 
An  important  effect  of  the  light  is  to  compose  the  picture  round  a  central  motif- 
[ 
... 
]  Rose's  arrangement  of  the  grapes  and  pears,  of  the  horny  pink-lined  shell,  of  the 
bananas,  made  her  think  of  a  trophy  fetched  from  the  bottom  of  the  sea,,  of 
Neptune's  banquet,  of  the  bunch  that  hangs  with  vine  leaves  over  the  shoulder  of 
Bacchus  (in  some  picture),  among  the  leopard  skins  and  the  torches  lolloping  red 
and  gold  ...  Thus  brought  up  suddenly  into  the  light  it  seemed  possessed  of  great 
size  and  depth,  was  like  a  world  in  which  one  could  take  one's  staff  and  climb  up 
hills,  she  thought,  and  go  down  into  valleys,  and  to  her  pleasure  [...  ]  she  saw  that 
Augustus  too  feasted  his  eyes  on  the  same  plate  of  fruit.  (p.  105) 
The  inclusion  of  the  gods  indicates  the  numinous  nature  of  the  experience. 
Such  invocation  is  represented,  for  example,  in  Paradise  Lost  where  Milton  presents  his 
exquisite,  sensuous  depiction  of  the  garden,  'blissful  Paradise/Of  God': 
Another  side,  umbrageous  Grots  and  Caves 
Of  cool  recess,  o'er  which  the  mantling  Vine 
Lays  forth  her  purple  Grape,  and  gently  creeps 
Luxuriant  [...  ]. 
The  Birds  their  choir  apply;  airs,  vernal  airs, 
Breathing  the  smell  of  field  and  grove,  attune 
The  trembling  leaves,  while  Universal  Pan, 
Knit  with  the  Graces  and  the  Hours  in  dance 
Led  on  th'  Eternal  Spring.  13 
It  could  be  argued  that  the  appearance  of  Pan  is  merely  symbolic.  But  both  Bacchus  - 
Woolf  -  and  Pan  are  associated  with  ekstasis;  they  signify  that  thresholds  have  been  crossed 
into  heightened  states  of  awareness. 
13  John  Milton,  Paradise  Lost,  ed.  by  Christopher  Ricks  (London:  Penguin,  1989),  IV.  257. 
125 The  characteristic  problem  of  such  writing  is  that,  whereas  it  can  point  to,  it  cannot 
underwrite  the  passage  to  the  numinous.  Of  course,  the  mediation  associated  with 
imagination  cannot,  of  its  nature,  be  guaranteed;  but  it  is  made  available  through  sensation. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  passage  to  the  numinous  so  energises  the  imagining  that  the  writer  is 
moved  to  indicate  the  special  nature  of  the  experience  by  using  signposts  of  token 
symbolism  or  allegory.  The  price  to  be  paid  for  such  a  resort  is  that  given  cultural  change, 
the  signposts  lose  their  efficacy.  It  is  for  this  reason  that,  to  the  inexperienced  eye,  some  of 
the  landscapes  of  Poussin  seem  remote  when  mediated  through  the  iconography  of  pastoral 
and  classical  convention;  but  with  a  glimpse  of  the  charge  of  the  icons  their  coolness 
resolves  into  passionately  realised  vision. 
Cezanne  was  making  his  way  towards  just  such  expressions  of  the  numinous  but  without 
resort  to  mythology  and  in  purely  painterly  terms,  for  example,  in  La  Montagne  Sainte- 
Victoire  (Venturi  1529): 
I  am  working  doggedly,  for  I  see  the  promised  land  before  me  [...  ].  Shall  I  be  like 
the  great  Hebrew  leader  or  shall  I  be  able  to  enter?  [...  ]  I  have  made  some  progress. 
Why  so  late  and  with  such  difficulty?  Is  art  really  a  priesthood  that  demands  the 
pure  in  heart  who  must  belong  to  it  entirely?  14 
It  is  characteristic  of  the  numinous  to  flood  the  symbol  and  its  context  with  value  - 
indeed,  perhaps  the  numinous  is  the  experience  of  unconditional  value  whether  of  persons 
or  objects.  Subsequently,  the  empowered  self,  characteristically,  invokes  the  sanction  of  the 
Divine  for  its  contextual  ideology.  This  is  strikingly  illustrated  in,  say,  the  Pentateuch. 
Mrs  Ramsay's  deepest  sense  of  herself  comes  from  such  moments: 
There  it  was,  all  round  them.  It  partook  [...  ]  of  eternity;  as  she  had  already  felt 
about  something  different  once  before  that  afternoon;  there  is  a  coherence  in  things, 
a  stability;  something,  she  meant,  is  immune  from  change,  and  it  shines  out  [...  ]  in 
the  face  of  the  flowing,  the  fleeting,  the  spectral,  like  a  ruby.  's 
But  her  vision  decays.  Her  daughter,  Rose,  reaches  out  to  take  a  pear  'and  spoils  the  whole 
thing.  '  Subsequently, 
14  Richard  Verdi,  Cezanne  and  Poussin,  op.  cit.,  p.  193. 
15  To  the  Lighthouse,  p.  113. 
126 With  her  foot  on  the  threshold  she  waited  a  moment  longer  in  a  scene  which  was 
vanishing  even  as  she  looked,  and  then,  as  she  moved  and  took  Minta's  arm  and  left 
the  room,  it  changed,  it  shaped  itself  differently;  it  had  become,  she  knew,  giving 
one  last  look  at  it  over  her  shoulder,  already  the  past.  (p.  120) 
Earlier,  Lily  and  William  Bankes  had  crossed  a  'threshold'  into  the  landscape;  now  Mrs 
Ramsay  passes  from  the  numinous  into  quotidian  time. 
In  the  second  section  of  the  book  the  narrator  seems  to  effect  a  nihilistic  demolition  of 
the  significance  of  such  moments: 
At  that  season  those  who  had  gone  down  to  pace  the  beach  and  ask  of  the  sea  and 
sky  what  message  they  reported  or  what  vision  they  affirmed  had  to  consider  among 
the  usual  tokens  of  divine  bounty  -  the  sunset  on  the  sea,  the  pallor  of  dawn,  the 
moon  rising  [...  ]  something  out  of  harmony  with  this  jocundity,  this  serenity. 
[...  ]  Did  Nature  supplement  what  man  advanced?  Did  she  complete  what  he 
began?  With  equal  complacence  she  saw  his  misery,  condoned  his  meanness,  and 
acquiesced  in  his  torture.  That  dream,  then,  of  sharing,  completing,  finding  in 
solitude  on  the  beach  an  answer,  was  but  a  reflection  in  a  mirror,  and  the  mirror 
itself  was  but  the  glassiness  which  forms  in  quiescence  when  the  nobler  powers  sleep 
beneath?  Impatient,  despairing  yet  loth  to  go  [...  ]  to  pace  the  beach  was  impossible; 
contemplation  was  unendurable;  the  mirror  was  broken.  (p.  146) 
Here  the  Romantic  tradition  of  Coleridge  and  Wordsworth  seems  to  be  finally  washed  up. 
In  this  moment  of  despair,  all  is  subjectivity.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  precisely  vision  that  is 
won  in  the  painting  of  Lily  Briscoe.  Loss  of  transcendence  is  replaced  by  the  possibility  of 
individuation  through  imagination.  Indeed,  it  may  be  that  it  is  precisely  the  loss  that  makes 
such  individuation  possible.  Woolf  can  no  longer  subscribe  to  any  empowered  ideological 
stance  -  everything  is  invested  in  imagining  itself.  Behind  the  novel  is  the  vertigo  of  a 
terrible  freedom. 
In  the  very  culture  whose  self-consciousness  leads  to  nihilism  there  emerges  a  countering 
self-consciousness  that  identifies  us  as  makers  of  our  own  meaning  -  indeed,  the  one  is  the 
very  condition  for  the  emergence  of  the  other. 
127 Chapter  Seven 
Nature  and  Imagination 
Did  the  Romantic  Imagination  mark  a  retreat  into  subjectivity  or  did  it,  indeed,  effect  a 
synthesis  of  matter  and  spirit?  Is  it  possible  to  distinguish  the  Romantic  concept  from  the 
workings  of  imagination  itself?  What  seems  to  distinguish  Wordsworth's  writing  is  the 
clarity  of  his  observations  of  nature  and  its  topographical  accuracy.  On  the  other  hand, 
he  is  emphatic  that  certain  imaginative  transactions  involve  not  only  a  shaping  power  in 
the  observing  eye  but  power  disclosed  in  nature  itself.  His  poetry  would  seem,  then,  to 
reflect  an  awareness  of  double  prescription  but  his  rationalisations  of  the  phenomenon 
resort  to  metaphysics.  Paradoxically,  Wordsworth  is  at  the  height  of  his  powers  in 
lamenting  the  passing  away  of  his  imaginative  capacity  -  his  account  of  such  experience  is, 
characteristically,  retrospective.  Romantic  symbolism  seems  to  presuppose  double 
prescription  but  within  the  context  of  a  strong  sense  of  the  purposive.  It  follows  that  when 
the  imaginative  capacity  is  lost,  so  too  is  access  to  the  numinous.  What  may  be  the  natural 
history  of  every  imagination  becomes  taken  up  in  a  myth  of  inevitable  decline. 
Virginia  Woolf  s  despairing  questions  suggest  that  the  Romantic  concept  of  imagination 
may  have  represented  Nature  as  a  mirror  so  that  it  would  reflect  our  emotional  needs, 
thence  sacrificing  the  'nobler  powers'  -  exemplified,  presumably,  in  that  heroic  reason 
characteristic  of  the  uncompromising  Mr  Ramsay.  In  other  words,  from  this  perspective  the 
Romantic  imagination  must  be  subsumed  under  identification.  Nature  has  been  imbued  with 
our  religious  longings,  has  been  supposed  to  reflect,  sustain  and,  indeed,  generate  our  moral 
values  and,  thereby,  be  a  fertile  resource  in  the  search  for  meaning  and  individuation  -  such 
a  concept  has  the  characteristics  of  a  subtle,  highly  wrought  empowering  fantasy. 
On  the  other  hand,  clearly,  in  The  Prelude  it  was  a  priority  for  Wordsworth  to  represent 
the  possibility  of  imaginative  synthesis,  to  convey  that  in  some  way  matter  and  spirit  are 
interfused  and  that,  in  certain  exalted  states  of  consciousness,  this  is  a  matter  of  experience. 
Indeed,  as  a  youngster,  long  before  such  experience  and  its  rationalisation  are  recounted  in, 
say,  'Tintern  Abbey'  or  The  Prelude,  Wordsworth  recalls: 
I  was  often  unable  to  think  of  external  things  as  having  external  existence,  and  I 
communed  with  all  I  saw  as  something  not  apart  from  but  inherent  in  my  own 
immaterial  nature.  Many  times  while  going  to  school  have  I  grasped  at  a  wall  or 
tree  to  recollect  myself  from  the  abyss  of  idealism.  ' 
'  Mary  Warnock,  Imagination  (London:  Faber  and  Faber,  1976),  p.  103.  (From  the'Fenwick  Notes',  1843, 
originally  dictated  to  Isabella  Fenwick.  ) 
128 This,  at  first  sight,  suggests  an  identification  so  complete  as  to  subvert  the  ego.  Such 
material  is,  perhaps,  the  source  of  popular  claims  that,  'Wordsworth's  view  of  nature  was 
revolutionary  [...  ]  he  conceived  of  nature  as  herself  endowed  with  life  and  powers  beyond 
the  human  scale.  '  2 
In  challenging  the  view  that  the  Romantics  were,  indeed,  revolutionary,  James  Engell 
observes  that  as  early  as  1704,  in  his  New  Essays  Concerning  Human  Understanding, 
Liebniz  envisages,  'an  organic  view  of  nature  and  argues  for  the  presence  of  a  force  in 
nature  and  in  the  mind,  la  puissance  active,  or  vis  activa  that  can  be  seen  as  a  full-fledged 
concept  of  imagination.  '  He  suggests  that, 
By  the  later  years  of  the  eighteenth  century,  a  penetrating,  articulate  philosophy  of 
the  imagination  existed  [...  ].  Romanticism  grew  round  the  imagination  in  the 
manner  that  a  storm  masses  round  a  vortex.  3 
As  an  idea,  the  Romantic  Imagination  seems  to  have  preceded  its  expression  in  art. 
It  is  interesting  that  Maurice  Bowra  argues  that  the  Romantic  imagination  was,  broadly, 
developed  in  reaction  to  'mechanistic  explanation'  -  as  exemplified  in  Locke  and  Newton  - 
for 
[...  ]  the  great  machine  of  the  world  implies  a  mechanic.  But  this  was  not  at  all  what 
the  Romantics  demanded  from  religion.  For  them  it  was  a  question  less  of  reason 
than  of  feeling,  less  of  argument  than  of  experience,  and  they  complained  that  these 
mechanistic  explanations  were  the  denial  of  their  innermost  convictions.  4 
On  the  other  hand,  James  Engell's  well  documented  argument  suggests  that  the  search  for 
imaginative  synthesis  -  the  imagination  -  was  itself  an  Enlightenment  project. 
Arguably,  The  Prelude  elaborates  a  concept  of  imagination  which,  in  its  broad 
particulars,  was  already  extant.  In  any  event,  it  is  clear  that  the  concept  is  not 
systematically  explored;  neither,  indeed,  is  the  poem  reliable  as  biography,  nor  in  its 
chronology:  rather,  its  power  lies  in  exemplification. 
2  The  Illustrated  Wordsworth's  Guide  to  the  Lakes,  ed.  by  Peter  Bicknell,  1992  (Devizes:  Selecta  Books, 
1984),  p.  7. 
3  James  Engell,  The  Creative  Imagination:  Enlightenment  to  Romanticism  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard 
University  Press,  1981),  p.  25 
4  Sir  Maurice  Bowra,  The  Romantic  Imagination,  repr.  1964  (London:  Oxford  University  Press,  1949), 
pp.  2-3. 
129 Wordsworth's  antecedents  are  strong  too,  in  terms  of  the  fashion  for  visiting  the  Lake 
District  and  enjoying  its  scenery.  Diverted  by  political  unrest  in  Europe,  those  who  would 
have  made  the  Grand  Tour  settled  upon  the  more  remote  regions  of  Britain  to  indulge 
sensibilities  shaped  by  the  work  of  Claude  Lorrain,  Salvator  Rosa,  and  Poussin's  brother-in- 
law,  Gaspard  Poussin.  By  1778  the  'first  and  most  popular  guide'  to  the  lakes  had  been 
written  by  Father  Thomas  West.  5  By  1783  Peter  Crosthwaite  had  issued  a  series  of  maps 
on  the  major  lakes,  'on  which  he  indicated  West's  stations  in  an  attempt  to  assist  the  Lakers 
in  their  search  for  the  Picturesque.  '  (p.  5)  and  by  1793  tours  were  a  matter  of  fashion  rather 
than  adventure.  The  Rev.  James  Plumptre  wrote  his  satirical play  The  Lakers  in  1797 
thereby  drawing  to  attention  the  self-conscious  posturing  that  is  indicative  of  the  decadence 
of  a  fashion. 
In  their  pursuit  of  the  picturesque  -  defined  by  its  inventor,  William  Gilpin,  as  'that  which 
would  look  well  in  a  picture'  6-  it  became  fashionable  for  tourists  to  carry  a  Claude  Glass. 
Gilpin's  On  Picturesque  Travel  was  published  in  1792;  however,  there  is  an  early 
Gainsborough  pencil  study  of  a  man  using  such  a  glass,  circa  1750-55.  (Guide,  p.  13)  He 
sits  with  his  back  to  the  view,  presumably  arranging  the  scene  according  to  the  tenets  of  a 
Lorrain  landscape.  (Fig.  1  overleaf)  In  the  manuscript  of  Gell's  A  Tour  In  The  Lakes  many  of 
the  sketches  and  water  colours  have  oval  frames  -  were  they  conceived  in  the  Claude  Glass 
or,  at  least,  do  they  reflect  a  convention  established  by  it? 
In  Gell's  notebook  there  is  a  water  colour  of  Buttermere  in  an  oval  frame.  (p.  31)  It 
includes  a  boat  with  oars  poised  in  mid  stroke.  It  strikingly  anticipates  Turner's  painting  of 
Buttermere  done  in  the  following  year.  Turner  even  has  a  boat  with  oars  in  a  similar 
position.  Gell's  landscape  is  mediated  through  the  conventions  of  the  picturesque;  Turner's 
is  charged  with  Romantic  sublimity.  (Fig.  2,  page  132) 
s  William  Gell,  A  Tour  in  the  Lakes  Made  in  1797,  cd.  by  Willim  Rollinson  (Newcastle:  Frank  Graham, 
1968),  p.  5.  (The  original  manuscript  is  in  the  Public  Library,  Barrow-in-Furness) 
6  Guide  to  the  Lakes,  p.  12. 
J.  M.  W.  Turner,  Buttermere  Lake  with  part  of  Cromack,  1798,  from  Nature  and  Industrialization,  cd.  by 
Alasdair  Clayre,  repr.  1985  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1977). 
130 I  iýurý  I.  I  liý  ni,  n  lý,  un,  lýuruuýlý,  l'cttý  i1.5'ittclv  , 
131 Figure  2a.  William  Gell,  `Buttermere  and  Fleetwith  Pike' 
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132 There  is  a  delightful  irony  in  enjoying  the  view  by  sitting  with  one's  back  to  the  landscape 
which  renders  the  fashion  faintly  absurd  -  on  the  other  hand,  consider  the  contemporary 
popularity  of  the  camera,  where  countless  people  with  more  or  less  skill  compose  -  or  at 
least,  select  -  their  own  pictures.  A  similar  imaginative  impulse  is  reflected  in  television 
programmes  and  magazines  concerned  with  garden  design.  The  three  phenomena  strikingly 
illustrate  that,  however  frail,  there  is  a  wide-spread,  intuitive  grasp  of  double  prescription  - 
the  landscape  itself  is  found  to  be  expressive,  or  can  be  made  expressive,  within  a  carefully 
judged  frame.  Indeed,  there  is  evidence  to  suppose  that  the  transformation  of  nature  to 
landscape  had  been  in  progress  for  centuries  before  the  landscape  painters  got  to  work: 
[...  ]  the  idea  of  parks  as  landscape  [...  ]  was  not  an  invention  of  the 
eighteenth  century  [...  ].  The  prototypes  are  the  parks  that  surrounded 
Henry  I's  palace  of  Woodstock  (Oxfordshire)  and  Henry  III's  palace  of 
Clarendon  (Wiltshire).  Medieval  parks,  though  usually  distant  from  the 
owner's  house,  had  their  aspects  of  pleasure  and  romance.  Did  not  the 
monks  of  Butley  (Suffolk)  in  1528  take  the  Queen  of  France  for  a'picnic 
under  the  oaks  with  fun  and  games  (joco  et  ludo)'  in  Staverton  Park?  From 
the  later  Middle  Ages  onwards  it  became  common  to  re-site  a  mansion  next 
to  a  park  or  vice  versa.  ' 
Wordsworth  affected  superiority  to  the  conventions  of  the  Picturesque: 
[...  ]  disliking  here,  and  there 
Liking,  by  rules  of  mimic  art  transferred 
To  things  above  all  art.  ' 
In  the  context  of  writing  about  the  tyranny  of  the  eye,  he  says  of  Mary Hutchison: 
[...  ]  I  knew  a  maid, 
Who,  young  as  I  was  then,  conversed  with  things 
In  higher  style;  from  appetites  like  these 
She,  gentle  visitant,  as  well  she  might, 
Was  wholly  free,  far  less  did  critic  rules 
Or  barren  intermeddling  subtleties 
Perplex  her  mind.  (XI.  199.  ) 
8  Oliver  Rackman,  The  History  of  the  Countryside,  repr.  1995  (London:  Weidenfeld  and  Nicholson,  1986), 
pp.  128-129. 
9  William  Wordsworth,  The  Prelude,  from  William  Wordsworth:  The  Prelude:  A  Parallel  Text,  ed.  by  J.  C. 
Maxwell,  repr.  1986  (London:  Penguin,  1971),  M.  153.  (Unless  otherwise  stated  references  are  to  the  1805 
text) 
133 There  is,  though,  a  possibility  that  the  famous  episode  in  The  Prelude  concerning  the  stolen 
boat  (I.  372-427)  -  where  a  lofty  crag  seems  to  rise  in  pursuit  of  the  guilty  boy  -  may  have 
originated  in  Wordsworth's  stealing  the  boat  precisely  in  order  to  see  a  sight  already  familiar 
to  connoisseurs  of  the  picturesque.  Grevel  Lindop  raises  this  intriguing  possibility.  He 
argues  that  it  is  a  phenomenon  associated  with  Stybarrow  Crag  and  certainly,  'by  1824,  the 
spectacle  was  a  well  rehearsed  part  of  a  local  boatman's  repertoire'.  10  (The  Prelude  was  not 
published  until  1850,  so  that  Wordsworth's  account  could  hardly  have  established  a 
fashion.  )  The  spell  of  identification  which  Wordsworth  conjures  from  the  material  of  The 
Prelude  is  more  literally  the  product  of  'imagination'  than  is,  perhaps,  generally  supposed. 
On  the  other  hand,  what  seems  a  significant  distinction  between  Wordsworth  and  the 
Lakers  was  the  range  and  intimacy  of  his  knowledge  of  the  Lake  District  and  that  is 
reflected  in  his  taste  in  paintings  and  drawings: 
He  was  well acquainted  with  the  prints  of  Farington,  Green  and  Westall,  artists 
whose  aim  was  to  record  the  district  with  topographical  accuracy;  so  their  views 
show  us  the  scene,  not  only  as  Wordsworth  knew  it,  but  presented  in  a  way  which 
was  familiar  to  him.  " 
Another  aspect  of  the  Picturesque  which  passes  to  Wordsworth  is  reflected  in  his 
fondness  for  the  antique.  He  refers  to  'Antiquity  [...  ]  as  the  co-partner  and  sister  of  Nature'. 
(Guide,  p.  118).  This  is  manifest  in  a  typical  passage  in  The  Prelude: 
[...  ]  a  structure  famed 
Beyond  its  neighbourhood,  the  antique  walls 
Of  that  large  abbey  which  within  the  Vale 
Of  Nightshade,  to  St  Mary's  honour  built, 
Stands  yet  a  mouldering  pile  with  fractured  arch, 
Belfry,  and  images,  and  living  trees, 
A  holy  scene!  (11.108.  ) 
Wordsworth's  monumental,  solitary  figures  -  beggars,  shepherds,  druids,  Old  William  - 
seem  to  complement  such  landscapes,  become  their  focal  figures.  However,  they  can  also 
be  seen  as  transfigurations  of  an  already  decadent  tradition.  William  Gell  -  his  tour  was  in 
10  Grevel  Lindop,  `Finding  the  Stolen  Boat',  in  The  Times  Literary  Supplement,  4694  (1993),  14.  See  also 
Lindop's,  A  Literary  Guide  to  the  Lake  District  (London: Chatto  and  Windus,  1993),  pp.  317-318. 
11  Guide  to  the  Lakes,  p.  27. 
134 1797  -  describes  the  activities  of  a  Mr  Pocklington,  obviously  striving  to  complete  his 
'picture': 
A  druid  temple  was  the  next  thing  to  employ  his  genius  and  accordingly  he  collected 
a  number  of  large  stones,  placed  them  in  a  circle,  and  had  them  fixed  upright  on  the 
southern  shore.  Unfortunately  for  all  the  lovers  of  British  antiquity  a  storm  arose  in 
the  lake,  and  the  waves  washed  down  in  one  night  the  labours  of  some  days.  On  the 
other  side  a  venerable  white-washed  gothic  building  rears  its  august  head,  in  all  the 
pride  of  pasteboard  antiquity  [...  ].  The  house  is  not  very  particular  but  a  white 
embattled  hermitage  is  situated  on  an  eminence  near  it,  where  he  has  offered  half  a 
crown  a  day  to  anyone  who  will  live  in  it,  provided  the  wretch  will  submit  to  his 
conditions,  which  are  these.  The  hermit  is  never  to  leave  the  place,  or  hold 
conversations  with  anyone  for  7  years  during  which  time  he  is  neither  to  wash 
himself  or  cleanse  himself  in  any  way  whatever,  but  is  to  let  his  hair  and  nails  both 
on  hands  and  feet,  grow  as  long  as  nature  permit  them.  12 
What  distinguishes  Wordsworth  can  hardly  be  originality  of  thought  or  idea,  nor  the 
systematic  development  of  these,  nor  is  it  the  creation  of  a  new  sensibility:  rather,  it  is  the 
intensity  with  which  he  imagined. 
In  his  discussion  of  the  Romantic  Imagination,  Bowra  identifies  key  aspects  of  the 
concept:  `imagination  and  insight  are  in  fact  inseparable  and  form  for  all  practical  purposes 
a  single  faculty.  "3  This  I  would  not  wish  to  contest  -  it  is  reflected  in  double  prescription. 
Furthermore,  the  imagination  is  distinctive  because  it  does  not  deal,  like  science,  in 
generalities  but  in  `individual  presentations': 
In  them  we  see  examples  of  what  cannot  be  expressed  directly  in  words  and  can  be 
conveyed  only  by  hint  and  suggestion.  The  powers  which  Wordsworth  saw  in 
nature  [...  ]  are  so  enormous  that  we  begin  to  understand  them  only  when  they  are 
manifested  in  single,  concrete  examples  [...  ].  The  essence  of  the  Romantic 
imagination  is  that  it  fashions  shapes  which  display  these  unseen  forces  at  work,  and 
there  is  no  other  way  to  display  them,  since  they  resist  analysis  and  description  and 
cannot  be  presented  except  in  particular  instances.  (p.  10) 
The  weakness  of  such  a  conception  is  its  obscurantism,  its  resort  to  metaphysics.  It  may  be 
possible  to  distinguish  between  the  idea  of  the  Romantic  Imagination  -  the  empowering 
myth  -  and  imagination  as  it  is  exemplified  in  Wordsworth's  art.  Did  Wordsworth 
effectively  render  the  elements  of  his  world  and  thereby  engage  that  mediation  between 
world  and  self  that  is  constitutive  of  both  illumination  and  individuation? 
12  William  Gell,  pp.  15-16. 
13  Bowra,  p.  7. 
135 Predominantly,  in  The  Prelude  the  mode  in  which  he  strives  to  effect  this  mediation  is 
discursive.  We  are  seduced  into  identification  with  the  voice.  Identification  is  re-charged 
from  time  to  time  with  vividly  realised  experience  -  it  is,  after  all,  a  kind  of  autobiography. 
But  the  characteristic  mode  and  the  strong  retrospective  sense  also  point  to  Wordsworth's 
secret  theme  -  the  attempt  to  rationalise  the  loss  of  the  numinous.  This,  paradoxically,  is 
disguised  by  his  proclaimed  theme  of  finding  his  vocation  in  the  celebration  and  presentation 
of  it. 
The  'Two  Part  Prelude'  and  'Tintern  Abbey'  record,  remarkably,  the  numinous  engaged 
not  by  direct  experience  but  by  the  memory  of  it: 
Though  absent  long, 
These  forms  of  beauty  have  not  been  to  me 
As  is  a  landscape  to  a  blind  man's  eye: 
But  oft,  in  lonely  rooms,  and  mid  the  din 
Of  towns  and  cities,  I  have  owed  to  them 
In  hours  of  weariness,  sensations  sweet  [...  ]. 
Nor  less,  I  trust, 
To  them  I  may  have  owed  another  gift, 
Of  aspect  more  sublime:  that  blessed  mood 
In  which  the  burthen  of  the  mystery  [...  ] 
Is  lighted  -  that  serene  and  blessed  mood 
In  which  the  affections  gently  lead  us  on, 
Until,  the  breath  of  this  corporeal  frame 
Almost  suspended,  we  are  laid  asleep 
In  body  and  become  a  living  soul.  '4 
The  power  of  the  poem  is in  its  catching  experience  at  the  threshold  of  the  cognitive  but, 
whereas,  in  Hopkins  -  as  in  'The  Windhover'  -  the  experience  is  frequently  realised,  in 
Wordsworth  it  is  reported.  The  detailed  description  of  the  scene  with  which  'Tintern 
Abbey'  begins  primes  the  imagination  -  but  its  meaning  and  intensity  are  represented 
discursively.  Not  only  will  the  significance  of  the  scene  be  recorded  in  verse  -  it  can  be 
reconstituted  by  proxy  in  the  projected  experience  of  Dorothy.  This  is  an  emphatic 
confirmation  of  the  logic  and  function  of  identification  -  the  love  of  his  sister  is,  effectively, 
used  as  a  sanction  for  his  own  experience  so  that  the  emotional  intensity  is  indirect  rather 
than  generated  out  of  the  experience  itself. 
la  William  Wordsworth,  'Tintern  Abbey',  from  The  Pedlar,  Tintern  Abbey,  The  Two-Part  Prelude,  ed.  by 
Jonathan  Wordsworth  (Cambridge:  Press  Syndicate  of  the  University  of  Cambridge,  1985),  1.23. 
136 Tintern  Abbey'  was  written  in  July  1798  and  'A  Slumber  Did  my  Spirit  Seal'  at  the  end  of 
that  year: 
A  slumber  did  my  spirit  seal; 
I  had  no  human  fears: 
She  seemed  a  thing  that  could  not  feel 
The  touch  of  earthly  years.  " 
A  'slumber'  suggests  a  state  from  which  one  awakes.  On  the  other  hand,  'seal',  seems 
shockingly  arbitrary:  lips  are  sealed,  windows  are  sealed  up  -  the  voice  and  the  eye  are 
denied  their  characteristic  role  in  facilitating  relation.  That  the  spirit  had  'seemed'  immortal 
now  emerges  as  a  delusion.  In  the  abdication  of  spirit,  self  and  world  are  contracted  into 
that  dualism  that  Romantic  ideology  heroically  attempted  to  transcend: 
No  motion  has  she  now,  no  force; 
She  neither  hears  nor  sees; 
Rolled  round  in  earth's  diurnal  course, 
With  rocks,  and  stones,  and  trees.  (p.  136) 
Although  the  poem  makes  no  mention  of  Lucy,  its  inclusion  by  some  editors  within  the 
group,  The  Lucy  Poems  -  as,  for  example,  by  Carlos  Baker'6  -  generates  a  teasing  ambiguity 
of  syntax.  The  emerging  possibility  is  that  'she'  refers  to  Lucy.  Now  Lucy  -  light  -  is  dead. 
The  spirit  is  associated  with  illumination  -  and  that  spirit  is  lost. 
In  April  1799,  in  a  letter  to  Thomas  Poole,  Coleridge  gives  the  poem  the  title  'Epitaph': 
Some  months  ago  Wordsworth  transmitted  me  a  most  sublime  epitaph.  Whether  it 
had  any  reality  I  cannot  say.  Most  probably,  in  some  gloomier  moment  he  had 
fancied  the  moment  in  which  his  sister  might  die.  " 
The  ambiguity  of  the  poem  is  not  resolved  by  this  -  rather,  it  is  enhanced.  In  any  event,  the 
poem  seems  to  indicate  the  possibility  of  a  world  conceived  without  the  transfiguring  power 
of  spirit.  This  reflects  a  failure  of  the  imagination,  so  that  imagining  the  imagining  -  the 
characteristic  retrospective  mode  -  becomes  the  fundamental  strategy  in  a  rearguard  action 
of  the  spirit  and  the  substance  of  Wordsworth's  vocation  as  a  poet. 
15  William  Wordsworth,  'A  Slumber  Did  my  Spirit  Seal'  from  Wordsworth:  Selected  Poetry  and  Prose,  ed. 
by  John  Butt  (London:  Oxford  University  Press,  1964),  p.  136. 
16  See  Carlos  Baker,  ed.,  William  Wordsworth:  The  Prelude  Selected  Poems  and  Sonnets,  op.  cit..  1'  Samuel  Taylor  Coleridge,  'Letter',  to  Thomas  Poole,  April  1799,  from  Letters  ofSamuel  Taylor 
Coleridge,  ed.  by  E.  H.  Coleridge  (London:  Heinemann,  1895),  vol  1  p.  284. 
137 The  inevitability  of  imaginative  decline  is  prefigured  in  David  Hartley's  Observations  on 
Man  and  is  bound  in  to  the  Platonic  myth  in  'Intimations  of  Immortality'  - 
Our  birth  is  but  a  sleep  and  a  forgetting  [...  ] 
[...  ]  trailing  clouds  of  glory  do  we  come 
From  God,  who  is  our  home  [...  ] 
Shades  of  the  prison-house  begin  to  close 
Upon  the  growing  Boy.  18 
What  Wordsworth  seemed  to  lose  was  his  access  to  the  numinous. 
In  his  depiction  of  the  chronology  of  the  growth  and  decline  of  imagination  he  is 
perfectly  clear  that  in  his  youth  he  used  Nature  to  externalise  his  own  emotions  or,  perhaps, 
to  generate  pretexts  for  emotion.  In  the  absence  of  significant  emotion  aspiring  young 
writers  and  painters  often  seek  to  generate  what  proves  to  be  pseudo  emotion  - 
characteristically,  a  sort  of  pervasive  and  self-defining  Angst  that  stands  for  experience.  We 
experience  this  as  sentimentality.  This  is  a  mode  of  imagination  that  serves  to  empower  in 
the  absence  of  power  -a  myth  of  the  unformed  self. 
Wordsworth,  in  a  beautifully  tactful  passage,  identifies  this  stage  of  growth  with  the 
operation  of  Fancy: 
But  when  that  first  poetic  faculty 
Of  plain  Imagination  and  severe 
No  longer  a  mute  influence  on  the  soul, 
An  element  of  the  nature's  inner  self, 
Began  to  have  some  promptings  to  put  on 
A  visible  shape,  and  to  the  works  of  art, 
The  notions  and  the  images  of  books, 
Did  knowingly  conform  itself,  by  these 
Enflamed,  and  proud  of  that  her  new  delight, 
There  came  among  those  shapes  of  human  life 
A  wilfulness  of  fancy  and  conceit 
Which  gave  them  new  importance  to  the  mind: 
And  Nature  and  her  objects  beautified 
These  fictions,  as  in  some  sort,  in  their  turn, 
They  burnished  her  [...  J 
when  the  foxgloves,  one  by  one, 
Upwards  through  every  stage  of  its  tall  stem, 
Had  shed  its  bells,  and  stood  by  the  wayside 
Dismantled,  with  a  single  one,  perhaps 
18  William  Wordsworth,  'Ode:  Intimations  of  Immortality  from  Recollections  of  Early  Childhood,  1.58, 
from  Selected  Poetry  and  Prose,  pp.  181-182. 
138 Left  at  the  ladder's  top,  with  which  the  plant 
Appeared  to  stoop  [...  ] 
behold! 
If  such  a  sight  were  seen,  would  Fancy  bring 
Some  vagrant  thither  with  her  babe,  and  seat  her 
Upon  the  turf  beneath  the  stately  flower 
Drooping  in  sympathy.  '9 
Fancy  is  associated  with  the  merely  decorative,  the  sentimental,  the  picturesque. 
By  contrast,  moments  of  vividly  realised  experiences  of  the  numinous  occur  in  the  'spots 
of  time'  episodes,  the  first  of  which  appears  after  he  has  been  writing  about  the  power  of 
'custom'  and  the  quotidian: 
In  truth,  this  degradation  -  howso'er 
Induced,  effect,  in  whatso'er  degree, 
Of  custom  [...  ] 
Or  [...  ]  aggravated  by  the  times, 
Which  with  their  passionate  sounds  might  often  make 
The  milder  minstrelsies  of  rural  scenes 
Inaudible  -  was  transient;  I  had  felt 
Too  forcibly,  too  early  in  my  life, 
Vistings  of  imaginative  power 
For  this  to  last.  (IX.  243) 
The  'spots  of  time'  are  examples  of  just  such  vsitings  through  which,  'our  minds/Are 
nourished  and  invisibly  repaired.  '  (XI.  264)  Unexpectedly,  the  experience  first  cited  -'A  girl 
who  bore  a  pitcher  on  her  head'  -  is  hardly  celebratory: 
[...  ]  I  should  need 
Colours  and  words  that  are  unknown  to  man, 
To  paint  the  visionary  dreariness 
Which  [..  ] 
Did  at  that  time  invest  the  naked  pool, 
The  beacon  on  the  lonely  eminence, 
The  woman  and  her  garments  vexed  and  tossed 
By  the  strong  wind.  (XI.  309) 
We  seem  to  be  in  the  territory  of  what  D.  H.  Lawrence  called  the  experience  of  `mystic 
reversion'20  similar  to  what,  perhaps,  Mrs  Moore  experiences  in  the  Marabar  caves  21  It  is 
through  such  memories  that,  for  Wordsworth, 
19  Prelude,  VIII.  511 
20  D.  H.  Lawrence,  Studies  in  Classic  American  Literature  (London:  Heinemann,  1964),  p.  148.  21  See  E.  M.  Forster,  A  Passage  to  India,  op.  cit.,  pp.  158-161. 
139 [...  ]  the  hiding  places  of  my  power 
Seem  open;  I  approach,  and  then  they  close; 
I  see  by  glimpses  now;  when  age  comes  on, 
May  scarcely  see  at  all,  and  I  would  give, 
While  yet  we  may,  as  far  as  words  can  give, 
A  substance  and  a  life  to  what  I  feel: 
I  would  enshrine  the  spirit  of  the  past 
For  future  restoration.  (XI.  336) 
This  is  the  pattern  established  in  'Tintern  Abbey'  and  it  leads  directly  to  a  re-dedication  to 
his  vocation.  It  is  a  thought  that  would  be  familiar  to  Proust. 
In  his  discussion  of  the  'Ode:  Intimations  of  Immortality  from  Recollections  of  Early 
Childhood',  Lionel  Trilling  observes  that  the  loss  of  the  'visionary  gleam'  did  not  result  in 
Wordsworth  losing  his  capacity  to  write  -  at  least  not  immediately  -  for  his  greatest  poems 
are  concerned  precisely  with  'his  near  memories  of  the  gleam'.  22  The  loss  provides  a  new 
subject  matter.  The  exploration  of  nature  gives  way  to  the  consideration  of  human  nature. 
It  is  a  progression  that  Keats  would  come  to  see  as  the  future  of  his  art.  Yet  neither  poet 
made  a  successful  transition  from  the  Romantic  to  the  tragic  vision. 
The  spontaneous  memory  seems  a  distinctively  rich  resource.  What  Proust  finds  is  that 
past  and  present  are  linked  by  some  analogy.  That  is  to  say,  there  is  an  internal  relation 
between  past  and  present. 
[...  ]  those  rare  occasions  when  the  miracle  of  an  analogy  had  made  me  escape  from 
the  present.  And  only  this  being  had  the  power  to  perform  that  task  which  had 
always  defeated  the  efforts  of  my  memory  and  my  intellect,  the  power  to  make  me 
rediscover  days  that  were  long  past,  the  Time  that  was  Lost.  23 
The  pursuit  of  the  analogy  becomes  the  distinctive  characteristic  that  distinguished  Marcel's 
own  writing  from  the  discursive  writing  associated  with  deliberate  recall  -  that  paradigm 
case  is  represented  in  the  'unpublished  Journal  of  the  Goncourts'.  (p.  728)  Marcel  claims 
that  he  lacks  the  capacity  to  write  in  that  manner:  his  own  writing  he  comes  to  see  will 
depend  on  spontaneous  memory  with  its  inherent  internal  relations,  or  'essences'.  (p.  738) 
Here  the  power  of  the  imagination  is  associated  with  the  magical  transcendence  of  time,  in 
Wordsworth,  characteristically,  it  is  the  landscape  that  is  charged  up  in  the  dimension  of 
22  Lionel  Trilling,  The  Liberal  Imagination  (London:  Mercury  Books,  1961),  p.  153.  23  Marcel  Proust,  Time  Regained,  from  Remembrance  of  Things  Past,  trans.  by  C.  K.  Scott  Moncrieff  and  Terence  Kilmartin,  and  by  Andreas  Mayor,  repr.  1989  (London:  Penguin,  1983),  vol  3,  p.  904. 
140 space.  For  Wordsworth  there  is  spontaneity  too  -  feelings  of'unremembered  pleasure'.  But 
the  'burden  of  the  mystery'  confirms  that  the  world  is  no  longer  commensurate  with  his 
desire  -  the  process  of  individuation  contingent  upon  the  acceptance  of  moral  responsibility 
is  engaged. 
Though  not  an  experience  of  mystic  reversion,  another  visiting  is  associated  with  the 
death  of  his  father.  Ten  days  before,  he  had  been  out  with  his  brothers: 
[...  ]  'twas  a  day 
Stormy,  and  rough,  and  wild,  and  on  the  grass 
I  sate  half-sheltered  by  a  naked  wall; 
Upon  my  right  hand  was  a  single  sheep, 
A  whistling  hawthorn  on  my  left,  and  there, 
With  those  companions  at  my  side,  I  watched, 
Straining  my  eyes  intensely,  as  the  mist 
Gave  intermitting  prospect  of  the  wood 
And  plain  beneath.  24 
As  is  typical  with  children  the  death  is  associated  with  guilt: 
[...  ]  I  bowed  low 
To  God,  Who  thus  corrected  my  desires; 
And,  afterwards,  the  wind  and  sleety  rain, 
And  all  the  business  of  the  elements, 
The  single  sheep,  and  the  one  blasted  tree, 
And  the  bleak  music  of  that  old  stone  wall, 
The  noise  of  wood  and  water,  and  the  mist 
Which  on  the  line  of  each  of  those  two  roads 
Advanced  in  such  indisputable  shapes; 
All  these  were  spectacles  and  sounds  to  which 
I  often  would  repair,  and  thence  would  drink, 
As  at  a  fountain.  (XI.  374) 
In  both  cases  Burke's  criteria  for  sublimity  seem  to  be  deliberately  met: 
Whatever  is  fitted  in  any  sort  to  excite  the  ideas  of  pain,  and  danger,  that  is  to  say, 
whatever  is  in  any  sort  terrible,  or  is  conversant  with  terrible  objects,  or  operates  in 
a  manner  analogous  to  terror,  is  a  source  of  the  sublime.  25 
Even  some  of  the  phrasing  of'Tintern  Abbey'  is  prefigured  in  Burke: 
The  passion  caused  by  the  great  and  sublime  in  nature,  when  those  causes  operate 
most  powerfully,  is  Astonishment;  and  astonishment  is  that  state  of  the  soul,  in 
which  all  its  motions  are  suspended,  with  some  degree  of  horror.  (p.  53) 
24  The  Prelude,  XI.  356. 
25  Edmund  Burke,  A  Philosophical  Enquiry,  op.  cit.,  p.  36. 
141 Wordsworth  writes, 
Until,  the  breath  of  this  corporeal  frame 
And  even  the  motion  of  our  human  blood 
Almost  suspended,  we  are  laid  asleep 
In  body  and  become  a  living  soul  26 
It  is  interesting  that  the  vocabulary  of  the  sublime  is  already  present  in  James  Thomson's 
Winter,  first  published  in  1726,  three  years  before  Burke  was  born: 
Nature!  great  parent!  whose  directing  hand 
Rolls  round  the  seasons  of  the  changeful  year, 
How  mighty!  how  majestick  are  thy  works! 
With  what  a  pleasing  dread  they  swell  the  soul, 
That  sees,  astonished!  and,  astonished  sings!  27 
As  in  the  case  of  Brother  Klaus,  discussed  by  Jung,  Wordsworth's  'primordial 
experience'  is  submitted  to  a  'dogmatic  revision'.  28  Such  experience  both  empowers  and 
demands  rationalisation  within  familiar  categories  -  Wordsworth  uses  the  concepts  and 
ideology  of  the  sublime.  The  need  for  structuring  concepts  is  met  in  finding  them  in 
contemporary  culture.  That  their  efficacy  is  dependent  upon  identification  with  current 
ideology  is  eventually  revealed  through  the  passage  of  time. 
In  The  Two-Part  Prelude  the  'Spots  of  Time'  passages  are  complemented  by  an  episode 
which  celebrates  the  origins  of  our  imaginative  life  in  childhood,  origins  associated  with 
the  mother's  love.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  1805  Prelude  the'Infant  Babe'  passage  follows 
discussion  of, 
[...  ]  that  false  secondary  power  by  which 
In  weakness,  we  create  distinctions,  then 
Deem  that  our  puny  boundaries  are  things 
Which  we  perceive,  and  not  what  we  have  made.  (I1.219) 
We  have  been  reminded  that  the  poem  is  addressed,  specifically,  to  Coleridge,  `my 
Friend'.  (11.2  10)  To  him  `the  unity  of  all  has  been  revealed'  (11.22  1).  Perhaps  Wordsworth 
had  in  mind,  `the  one  life  within  us  and  abroad'  that  Coleridge  invoked  in  `The  Eolian 
26  'Tintern  Abbey'.  1.44  (My  Italics) 
27  James  Thomson,  'Winter:  a  Poem',  from  The  Poetry  of  Scotland,  cd.  by  Roderick  Watson  (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh  University  Press,  1995),  pp.  258-259  (My  italics). 
28  C.  G.  Jung,  Psychology  and  Religion,  op.  cit.,  p.  321. 
142 Harp'.  29  Against  two  of  the  great  pillars  of  eighteenth  century  scientific  methodology, 
classification  and  discursive  reasoning,  Wordsworth  asserts  a  kind  of  learning  and  knowing 
that  has  its  origins  in  the  relationship  between  child  and  mother. 
The  child  not  only  drinks  in  physical  sustenance  but,  at  the  same  time,  his  mother's  love. 
Such  feelings  pass  into  the  child,  `like  an  awakening  breeze.  '  This  is  a  characteristic 
Romantic  image  for  creative  inspiration.  Thus  empowered,  the  child  effects  what  could 
reasonably  be  described  as  imaginative  apprehension.  His  mind, 
Is  prompt  and  watchful,  eager  to  combine 
In  one  appearance,  all  the  elements 
And  parts  of  the  same  object,  else  detached 
And  loth  to  coalesce.  (11.247) 
In  the  passage  that  follows  Wordsworth  further  explores  the  origins  of  creativity: 
Thus,  day  by  day, 
Subjected  to  the  discipline  of  love, 
His  organs  and  recipient  faculties 
Are  quickened,  are  more  vigorous,  his  mind  spreads, 
Tenacious  of  the  forms  which  it  receives. 
In  one  beloved  Presence,  nay  and  more, 
In  that  most  apprehensive  habitude 
And  those  sensations  which  have  been  derived 
From  this  beloved  Presence,  there  exists 
A  virtue  which  irradiates  and  exalts 
All  objects  through  all  intercourse  of  sense. 
No  outcast  he,  bewildered  and  depressed: 
Along  his  infant  veins  are  interfused 
The  gravitation  and  the  filial  bond 
Of  nature  that  connect  him  with  the  world. 
Emphatically  such  a  being  lives, 
An  inmate  of  this  active  universe; 
[...  ]  his  mind, 
Even  as  an  agent  of  the  one  great  Mind, 
Creates,  creator  and  receiver  both, 
Working  but  in  alliance  with  the  works 
Which  it  beholds.  (11.250) 
Of  the  forms  manifest  in  such  apprehension  the  child's  mind  is  `tenacious'.  The  world  is 
fascinating.  A  `virtue',  presumably  derived  from  the  love  of  the  mother,  `irradiates  and 
exalts'  the  objects.  The  language  consistently  emphasises  the  synthesis  of  subjective  and 
29  Coleridge,  `The  Aeolian  Harp',  from  Selected  Poems  of  S.  T.  Coleridge,  op.  cit.,  p.  17. 
143 objective  factors.  Objects  within  the  world  now  come  to  constitute  a  `gravitational  and 
filial  bond'  and  the  child  is  `creator  and  receiver  both'. 
What  seems  to  be  reflected  here,  in  the  exposition  of  the  origins  of  creativity,  are  the 
transactions  of  double  prescription  that  constitute  the  condition  for  imaginative  synthesis. 
It  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  intuition  of  the  `one  life'. 
There  has  been  a  characteristic  misunderstanding  that  has  arisen  from  approaching  such 
experience  in  terms  of  dualistic  categories  -  fact  and  value.  It  is  interesting  that  Basil 
Willey  accepts  Wordsworth's  own  assessment  of  himself  as  attempting  to  'animise  the 
"real"  world,  the  "universe  of  death".  30  However,  Willey  cannot  escape  from  a  dualistic 
epistemology  that  assumes  the  imagination  merely  projects  'modifying  colours',  that  it 
effects  an  essentially  subjective  supplement: 
The  fact-world  of  modern  scientific  consciousness  was  the  primary  datum.  In  this 
'inanimate  cold  world"objects,  as  objects,  are  essentially  fixed  and  dead'.  But  just 
as  a'known  and  familiar  landscape'  may  be  transmuted  by  moonlight  or'accidents 
of  light  and  shade,  '  so,  owing  to  the  bond  between  nature  and  the  soul  of  man,  this 
dead  world  may  be  brought  to  life  by  the  modifying  colours  of  the  'imagination.  '  31 
In  fact,  such  transmutations  of  landscape  reflect  the  emergence  of  alternative  inscapes  -  the 
formal  properties  of  landscape  are  defamiliarised  and  reconstituted  by  changes  of  light. 
The  process  is  analogous  to  the  refiguration  effected  by  metaphor.  There  are  two 
characteristic  sources  of  transfiguration:  that  initiated  in  nature  -  by,  for  example,  changes 
of  light  -  and  that  initiated  through  imagination.  Talk  of'modifying  colours'  is  misleading 
here  and  is  an  epistemic  consequence  of  dualism  and  articulation  in  the  discursive  mode: 
Fact  and  value  were  to  be  combined  in  the  'fine  balance  of  truth  in  observing,  with 
the  imaginative  faculty  in  modifying,  the  object  observed.  '  But  what  sort  of'truth' 
may  be  claimed  for  the  creation  which  world  and  mind  'with  blended  might 
accomplish'?  [...  ]  I  suppose  the  answer  would  be,  'psychological'  truth;  that  is  to 
say,  the  poetry  is  faithfully  expressive  of  certain  states  of  consciousness'  (p.  91) 
The  resort  to  'psychological  truth'  simply  evades  the  crucial  point.  Wordsworth  is  quite 
clear  about  the  issues  even  if  he  cannot  explain  them  conceptually: 
30  Basil  Willey,  'Wordsworth  and  the  Locke  Tradition',  from  English  Romantic  Poets:  Modern  Essays  in 
Criticism,  ed.  by  M.  H.  Abrams,  reprinted  1964  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  1960),  p.  86. 
(Quotation  from  The  Prelude.  ) 
31  Basil  Willey,  p.  88  (Quotations  from  Biographia  Literaria). 
144 [...  ]  an  ennobling  interchange 
Of  action  from  without  and  from  within; 
The  excellence,  pure  function,  and  best  power 
Both  of  the  object  seen,  and  eye  that  sees. 
(1850  Prelude,  XII.  375) 
Here  Wordsworth  has  changed  the  word  order  of  the  1805  version  -  'from  within  and  from 
without'  (XII.  377)  -  in  order  to  add  emphasis  by  providing  a  parallel  to  the  sequence 
'object'  and  'eye'. 
What  Wordsworth  describes  is,  in  effect,  the  process  of  double  prescription.  What 
begins  in  identification  is  subsequently  resolved  through  an  imaginative  transaction  that 
illuminates  some  aspect  of  the  landscape.  The  disclosed  inscape,  a  self-contained  structure, 
is  found  to  be  expressive,  charged  up.  Wordsworth  stretches  through  time  the  elements  of 
a  spontaneous  transaction.  It  is  as  if  he  contracts  the'natural  history'  of  imagination  into  the 
child's  experience  in  order  to  secure  the  services  of  the  Platonic  myth.  Subsequently,  he 
becomes  the  victim  of  the  vitiation  prefigured  in  Hartley's  Observations  on  Man. 
By  its  juxtaposition  of  episodes  'The  Two-Part  Prelude'  suggests  that  the  'Spots  of  Time' 
are  explained  by  imagination;  whereas,  in  the  1805  version  we  are  presented  with  the 
dualising  threat  of  rationalism  in  order  to  emphasise  the  importance  of  imagination. 
Generally,  Wordsworth  -  as  we,  in  our  own  time  -  makes  far  too  much  fuss  about  what 
threatens  imagination.  Imagination  is  presupposed  in  intelligibility  itself.  Commonplace 
identification  is  its  ground.  It  is  the  achievement  of  balance  in  the  exercising  of  the  modes 
of  imagination  that  is  important. 
In  one  form  or  another,  double  prescription  is  represented  again  and  again  in 
Wordsworth.  At  one  level,  as  Mary Warnock  observes,  it  is  reflected  conceptually: 
The  words  'image',  'form',  and  even  'shape'  and  'colour',  as  they  appear  in 
Wordsworth's  poetry,  all  stand  for  the  inner  and  the  outer,  the  object  and  the  idea  of 
the  object.  [...  ]  It  becomes  impossible  [...  ]  to  separate  the  function  of  the  eye  from 
that  of  the  mind  in  perception,  nor  can  either  be  separated  from  the  function  of  the 
reproductive  imagination  which  forms  and  reforms  images  of  what  has  been 
perceived  for  the  mind  to  brood  on.  32 
32  Warnock,  pp.  115-116. 
145 It  is  precisely  Wordsworth's  susceptibility  to  experiencing  double  prescription  that  is 
manifest  in  his  sense  of  the  fusing  of  inner  and  outer.  His  sensitivity  to  structure  within  the 
landscape  is  clearly  exhibited  in  an  intriguing  passage  in  his  Guide  to  the  Lakes  -  he  is 
reflecting  on  the  effects  of  whitewashed  cottages  on  the  landscape: 
How  often  do  we  see  this  exemplified  upon  a  small  scale  by  the  native  cottages,  in 
cases  where  the  glare  of  white-wash  has  been  subdued  by  time  and  enriched  by 
weather-stains!  No  harshness  is  then  seen;  but  one  of  these  cottages,  thus  coloured, 
will  often  form  a  central  point  to  a  landscape  by  which  the  whole  shall  be  connected, 
and  an  influence  of  pleasure  diffused  over  all  the  objects  that  compose  the  picture 
[...  ].  Mr.  Gilpin  [...  ]  has  also  recorded  the  just  remark  of  Mr.  Locke,  of  N-,  that 
white  destroys  the  gradations  of  distance;  and,  therefore,  an  object  of  pure  white 
can  scarcely  ever  be  managed  with  good  effect  in  landscape-painting.  Five  or  six 
white  houses,  scattered  over  a  valley,  by  their  obtrusiveness,  dot  the  surface,  and 
divide  it  into  triangles  or other  mathematical  figures  haunting  the  eye,  and  disturbing 
that  repose  which  might  otherwise  be  perfect.  (pp.  120-126) 
Here  geometrical  structures  preempt  the  more  subtle  possibilities  of  inscape.  Clearly, 
Wordsworth  would  have  understood  Cezanne's  objectives  and  his  careful,  if  not  obsessive, 
selection  of  motifs.  The  prescriptive  transactions  of  imagination  are  also  presupposed  in  the 
sense  of  discovery,  the  extension  of  self,  in  the  context  of  landscape: 
[...  ]  the  presence  of  a  lake  is  indispensable  to  exhibit  in  perfection  the  beauty  of  one 
of  these  days;  and  he  must  have  experienced,  while  looking  on  the  unruffled  waters, 
that  the  imagination,  by  their  aid,  is  carried  into  recesses  of  feeling  otherwise 
impenetrable.  The  reason  of  this  is,  that  the  heavens  are  not  only  brought  down  into 
the  bosom  of  the  earth,  but  that  the  earth  is  mainly  looked  at,  and  thought  of, 
through  the  medium  of  a  purer  element.  (p.  91) 
That  the  feeling  is  otherwise  impenetrable  distinguishes  the  mediation  effected  by  double 
prescription  from  the  possibility  of  sentimental  identification.  The  manifold  possibilities  of 
inscape  in  the  combinations  of  light,  reflection  and  water  effect  reciprocal  subtleties  in 
feeling  -  not  to  mention  endless  possibilities  for  reverie. 
Two  things  characteristically  bedevil  the  discussion  of  imagination:  the  tenacious, 
retrospective,  conceptualisations  of  dualism  involve  persistent  category  mistakes  and 
arguments  shift  apparently  seamlessly  from  identification  to  double  prescription: 
[...  ]  I  felt  that  the  array 
Of  outward  circumstance,  and  visible  form, 
Is  to  the  pleasure  of  the  human  mind 
146 What  passion  makes  it;  that  meanwhile  the  forms 
Of  nature  have  a  passion  in  themselves, 
That  intermingles  with  those  works  of  man 
To  which  she  summons  him.  (XII.  286) 
Wordsworth  is  certainly  aware  of  the  distinction:  on  the  one  hand,  identification  makes 
possible  the  appropriation  of  landscape  so  that  it  becomes  'what  passion  makes  it';  on  the 
other,  in  double  prescription,  the  landscape  itself  is  charged  with  meaning,  its  forms  'have  a 
passion  in  themselves'. 
What  is  rendered  through  double  prescription  is  inherently  creative.  The  process  is 
facilitated  for  Wordsworth  by  his  frequent  resort  to  memories.  This  reconstruction  in  the 
absence  of  the  phenomena  -  as  reflected,  for  example,  in  'Tintern  Abbey'  -  is  a  means  of 
allowing  redundancy  to  fall  away  so  that  the  inscape  can  more  freely  emerge.  In  its  self- 
consciousness  this  creative  strategy  differs  essentially  from  Proust's  spontaneous  memory. 
The  elimination  of  background  noise  allows  the  phenomena  to  be  clearly  focussed: 
[...  ]  when  we  see  in  the  mind's  eye  we  can  concentrate  upon  those  images  which  are 
meaningful,  which  we  are  enabled  indeed  to  form  because  of  the  significance  of  that 
which  they  represent.  Thus  the  feeling  engendered  by  the  image  may  be  more 
powerful  in  the  absence  than  in  the  presence  of  the  object,  or at  least  we  may  have 
more  time  to  understand  it.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  Wordsworth  held  that  poetry 
arose  out  of  recollected  emotion.  33 
This  strategy  means  that,  characteristically,  Wordsworth's  imaginative  transactions  are 
reported  rather  than  realised  in  their  immediacy  -  as  they  are  in  Proust.  However,  though 
Wordsworth's  poetry  may  have  its  origins  in  'recollected'  emotions  and  this  might,  at  first 
sight,  seem  to  suggest  that  his  work  is  merely  nostalgic  -  sentimentality  in  the  medium  of 
time  -  in,  say,  'Tintern  Abbey'  he  is  scrupulous  in  establishing  the  landscape  and  its  nature 
before  he  begins  to  reconstruct  its  significance  for  him.  It  is  as  if  the  initial  emotion  -  which 
may,  indeed,  incorporate  an  element  of  nostalgia  -  acts  as  the  intention  through  which  the 
landscape  is  subsequently  vividly  realised.  The  emotional  autonomy  of  the  poetry  is  a 
function  of  this  rendering. 
The  symbolism  of  To  the  Lighthouse  is  under  tight  cognitive  control.  It  follows  that  what 
is  presented  is  only  a  token  symbolism,  cleverly  developed  but,  ultimately,  local  in  its 
33  Warnock,  pp.  116-117. 
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relevance  and  wanting  in  imaginative  power.  On  the  other  hand,  Coleridge's  conception  of 
a  symbol  involved  seeing  'the  image  as  universally  significant'.  34  Of  Coleridge's  reflections 
on  symbolism  Mary  Warnock  observes: 
The  identity  between  seeing  or  observing  in  detail,  feeling,  and  seeing-as-symbol 
comes  out  increasingly  strongly  [...  ].  The  insights  come  from  treating  the  objects  of 
sense  as  symbolic;  from  treating  them,  that  is,  as  referring  to  something  beyond 
themselves.  It  is  the  function  of  the  imagination  to  provide  this  kind  of  seeing. 
(p.  87) 
Such  'symbolism',  far  from  reducing  imagery  to  the  merely  illustrative  -  where  the 
gravitational  force  is  exerted  by  the  idea,  the  abstraction  -  is  contingent  upon  the  double 
prescription  at  the  heart  of  imagining.  In  Hopkins  the  expressive  inscape  -a  function  of 
double  prescription  -  becomes  symbolic  when  the  apprehending  intention  is  deflected  into 
contemplation  of  the  inscape  as  something  created.  It  is  as  if  the  numinous  were  our 
designation  for  such  super-charged  inscape.  It  is  the  context  of  the  charged  image  that 
shapes  the  subsequent  rationalisation  through  which  the  trace  of  the  noumenon  -  decaying 
into  the  'phenomenon'  -  is  subsequently  placed  as  religious  or  aesthetic  experience.  The 
sense  that  the  inscape  points  beyond  itself  engages  a  purposive,  teleological  rationalisation: 
this  is  the  case  whether  the  symbol  is  a  mere  token  -  as  something  controlled  and  elaborated 
by  the  writer  -  or  in  the  context  of  nature  where  the  rationalisation  is  in  terms  of  the 
religious. 
Where  the  literary  symbol  is  a  token  -  for  example,  Woolf  s  use  of  the  wounded  foot  - 
our  response  is  pushed  inevitably  into  the  discursive.  The  token  symbol  becomes  an  aspect 
of  structure  rather  than  a  matter  of  experience.  In  the  imaginative  mode  a  symbol  has  its 
origins  in  double  prescription  but  we  settle  upon  a  sense  of  purpose  inherent  in  the  inscape 
so  that  beauty  is  at  the  same  time  revelation.  The  token  symbol  is  exhausted  merely  by  its 
reference  -  it  can  only  be  clever. 
As  we  pass  from  the  moment  of  imaginative  apprehension  the  symbol  becomes  subject  to 
that  vitiation  characteristic  of  any  other  imaginative  transaction  in  its  subjection  to 
rationalisation.  In  'The  Pedlar'  Wordsworth  fights  to  sustain  the  noumenal  -  an 
34  Wamock,  p.  82. 
148 overwhelming  sense  of  purposiveness  in  nature  -  and  balks  at  the  conventional  ascription  of 
purpose  to  the  Deity: 
Sensation,  soul,  and  form, 
All  melted  into  him;  they  swallowed  up 
His  animal  being.  In  them  did  he  live, 
And  by  them  did  he  live  -  they  were  his  life. 
In  such  access  of  mind,  in  such  high  hour 
Of  visitation  from  the  living  God, 
He  did  not  feel  the  God,  he  felt  his  works. 
Thought  was  not;  in  enjoyment  it  expired. 
Such  hour  by  prayer  or praise  was  unprofaned.  35 
Of  this  passage  Jonathan  Wordsworth  comments: 
What  follows  is  quite  unexpected.  God,  who  has  seemed  to  have  the  full  support  of 
Christian  tradition  as  he  carries  out  his  impressive  polysyllabic  'visitation',  is 
suddenly  diminished  in  a  line  of  monosyllables  that  take  from  him  all  grandeur  and 
personal  authority  [...  ].  The  definite  article  seems  especially  belittling  -  to  be'the 
God'  [...  ]  is  well on  the  way  to  being  merely  a  god.  (The  Two-Part  Prelude,  p.  4) 
To  turn  this  on  its  head,  Wordsworth  -  and  in  this,  resembling  the  more  vehement  and 
histrionic  Shelley  -  is  perfectly  clear  that  to  reach  for  the  God  of  the  tradition  is  a 
profanation.  If  the  charge  of  the  numinous  is  located  in  the  immediacy  of  an  imaginative 
transaction  and  the  aspect  of  nature  disclosed  in  this  context  can  be  designated  as  symbolic, 
then  to  'place'  such  a  symbol  by  locating  it  within  an  explanatory  ideology  may  serve  to 
empower,  by  association,  the  ideology,  but  the  shift  from  the  imagination  to  the  discursive 
results  in  the  vitiation  of  the  symbol  so  that  it  can  be  accessed  now  only  through 
identification  with  the  ideology.  The  peculiar  tensions  contingent  upon  such  shifts  in 
modality  are  characteristic  of  those  who  participate  in  religious  rituals  -  mere  attendance 
cannot  guarantee  access  to  the  symbolic  and,  indeed,  access  is  blocked  by  identification  and 
sentimentality. 
These  issues  emerge  powerfully  in  what  is,  arguably,  the  climax  of  The  Prelude  -  the 
episode  where  Wordsworth  climbs  Snowdon.  He  has  emerged  above  the  clouds  to 
experience  an  extraordinary  vista  illuminated  at  the  instant  of  emergence  by  the  moon.  The 
imagination  is  drawn  into  a  rapidly  expanding  perspective: 
35  William  Wordsworth,  'The  Pedar',  from  The  Pedlar,  Tintern  Abbey,  The  Two-Part  Prelude,  p.  23,1.103. 
149 For  instantly  a  light  upon  the  turf 
Fell  like  a  flash,  and  lo!  as  I  looked  up, 
The  Moon  hung  naked  in  a  firmament 
Of  azure  without  cloud,  and  at  my  feet 
Rested  a  silent  sea  of  hoary  mist. 
A  hundred  hills  their  dusky  backs  upheaved 
All  over  this  still  ocean;  and  beyond, 
Far,  far  beyond,  the  solid  vapours  stretched, 
In  headlands,  tongues,  and  promintory  shapes, 
Into  the  main  Atlantic.  (1850  Prelude,  XIV.  38) 
The  exhilarated  expansion  of  consciousness  is  typical  of  Emily  Dickinson's  visionary 
moments: 
While  I  state  -  the  Solemn  Petals, 
Far  as  North  -  and  East, 
Far  as  South  and  West  -  expanding  - 
Culminate  -  in  Rest  - 
36 
The  Snowdon  episode  is  effectively  brought  to  a  conclusion  by  the  shift  from  the 
imaginative  to  the  discursive: 
The  universal  spectacle  throughout 
Was  shaped  for  admiration  and  delight, 
Grand  in  itself  alone,  but  in  that  breach 
Through  which  the  homeless  voice  of  waters  rose, 
That  dark  deep  thoroughfare,  had  Nature  lodged 
The  soul,  the  imagination  of  the  whole.  (XIII.  60) 
The  pressure  to  try  to  'place'  the  experience  and  its  unconditional  value  is  irresistible.  There 
follows  an  obscure  attempt  at  rationalisation: 
[...  ]  it  appeared  to  me 
The  perfect  image  of  a  mighty  mind, 
Of  one  that  feeds  upon  infinity.  (XIII.  68) 
Perhaps  Wordsworth  lacked  faith  that  his  readers  could  enter  into  the  imaginative 
transaction  and  thence  arrive  at  its  significance  for  themselves  -  perhaps  the  lack  of  faith 
concerned  the  inadequacies  of  his  own  rendering  of  which  the  rationalisation  is  a  symptom. 
In  any  event,  Emily  Dickinson  is  often  at  her  most  powerful  when  she  eschews  the 
temptation  to  rationalise: 
36  Emily  Dickinson,  'Bloom  upon  the  Mountain  Stated',  from  Emily  Dickinson:  The  Complete  Poems,  ed. 
by  Thomas  H.  Johnson,  this  edn.  1975  (London:  Faber  and  Faber,  1970),  p.  331. 
150 Four  Trees  -  upon  a  solitary  Acre  - 
Without  Design 
Or  Order,  or  Apparent  Action  - 
Maintain  - 
The  Sun  -  upon  a  Morning  meets  them  - 
The  Wind  - 
No  nearer  Neighbour  -  have  they  - 
But  God  - 
The  Acre  gives  them  -  Place  - 
They  -  Him  -  Attention  of  Passer  by  - 
Of  Shadow,  or  of  Squirrel,  haply  - 
OrBoy  - 
What  Deed  is  Theirs  unto  the  General  Nature  - 
What  Plan 
The  severally  -  retard  -  or  further  - 
Unknown  _17 
Here,  the  apparent  denial  of  'design'  is  a  move  to  clear  away  presuppositions  so  that  the 
subtleties  of  an  imaginative  transaction  redolent  of  purpose  may  emerge.  This  is 
wonderfully  caught  in  the  verb  'maintain':  mann  tenere  -  to  hold  in  the  hand.  Here  we  have 
an  action  -  presupposing  an  intention  -  but  without  an  object  or  resolution.  We  experience 
this  as  a  sense  of  mystery  that  would  be  instantly  resolved  given  a  specific  purpose  in  a 
rationalising  orthodoxy. 
Precisely  the  opposite  experience  is  apparently  conveyed  in  Wallace  Stevens  'Anecdote  of 
the  Jar': 
I  placed  a  jar  in  Tennessee, 
And  round  it  was,  upon  a  hill. 
It  made  the  slovenly  wilderness 
Surround  that  hill. 
The  wilderness  rose  up  to  it, 
And  sprawled  around,  no  longer  wild. 
The  jar  was  round  upon  the  ground 
And  tall  and  of  a  port  in  air. 
It  took  dominion  everywhere. 
The  jar  was  gray  and  bare. 
It  did  nor  give  of  bird  or  bush, 
37  'Four  Trees'  from  The  Complete  Poems,  p.  364. 
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Here  mystery  is  destroyed  by  the  intrusion  of  a  human  artefact.  Dickinson's  trees  that 
'maintain'  are  brutally  replaced  by  an  artefact  that  asserts  'dominion'.  The  imposition  of  the 
jar  can  apparently  be  justified  in  a  context  where  nature  is  seen  as  otherwise  'slovenly'  or 
'sprawled  around'.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  an  intrinsic  irony  in  the  terms  that  convey 
such  a  view  of  nature  -  in  which  case  mystery  is implied  even  as  it  is  denied.  Both  poets 
adopt  an  oblique  approach  to  a  matter  that  could  not  survive  resort  to  the  discursive. 
Dickinson's  poem  could  stand  as  an  ostensive  definition  of  a  symbol  -  the  imagery 
presupposes  purposiveness.  Yet,  whether  or  not  it  is  manifest  as  symbol  is  a  function  not 
only  of  its  intrinsic  potential  but  of  the  relational  mode  in  which  it  is  apprehended.  A  similar 
potentiality  is  present  in  Yeats: 
0  chestnut  tree,  great-rooted  blossomer, 
Are  you  the  leaf,  the  blossom,  or  the  bole? 
O  body  swayed  to  music,  0  brightening  glance, 
How  can  we  know  the  dancer  from  the  dance?  39 
Generally,  Dickinson's  poetry  exhibits  how  the  religious  sensibility  manifest  in  the 
symbol-creating  power  of  imagination  inevitably  runs  counter  to  religious  ideology.  Her 
predicament  was,  on  occasions,  to  inhabit  the  terrible  loneliness  that  accompanies  the 
rejection  of  orthodoxy  and,  at  times,  she  gave  way  to  the  temptation  of  despair: 
The  abdication  of  Belief 
Makes  the  Behavior  small  - 
Better  an  ignis  fatuus 
Than  no  illume  at  all  _ 
40 
That  the  behaviour  is  made  'small'  in  the  absence  of  belief  is  precisely  the  predicament  that 
leads  Philip  Larkin  to  churches, 
In  whose  blent  air  all  our  compulsions  meet, 
Are  recognised,  and  robed  as  destinies.  " 
38  Wallace  Stevens,  'Anecdote  of  the  Jar',  from  Selected  Poems  by  Wallace  Stevens,  repr.  1967  (London: 
Faber  and  Faber,  1953),  p.  36. 
39  W.  B.  Yeats,  'Among  School  Children,  from  W.  B.  Yeats:  Selected  Poetry,  ed.  by  A.  Norman  Jeffares,  this 
edn.  1974  (London:  Pan,  1962),  p.  130. 
40  'Those  Dying  Then',  from  The  Complete  Poems,  p.  646. 
41  Philip  Larkin,  'Church  Going',  from  Collected  Poems,  op.  cit.,  p.  98. 
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equivalent  in  Larkin's  'compulsions'.  He  cannot  subscribe  to  an  orthodoxy  in  which 
imagining  could  find  resolution  in  purpose,  an  over-arching  meaning,  yet,  nevertheless,  is 
drawn  to  the  sanctified  ground  where  once  such  transactions  had  occurred. 
Symbolism,  in  Coleridge's  sense,  presupposes  double  prescription.  It  follows  that 
cognition,  in  this  mode,  is  inseparable  from  feeling,  from  value  and  the  prescriptions  of 
imagination  reciprocally  shape  both  world  and  self  in  simultaneous  synthesis.  Such 
transactions  are  at  the  heart  of  Wordsworth's  writing  and  he  places  them  within  the  context 
of  the  purposive  -  he  is,  fundamentally,  a  religious  writer.  On  the  other  hand,  in  seeking  to 
rationalise  such  experience  he  frequently  sought,  almost  in  spite  of  himself,  to  tie  the 
numinous  to  inherently  reductive  and  historically  relative  descriptive  modes.  The  moments 
of  intensely  rendered  experience  are  found  in  a  dramatic  context  of  imminent  loss. 
It  is  as  if  in  her  moment  of  despair  Woolf  conflated  imagination  with  Romantic  ideology  - 
which,  of  course,  is  what  Wordsworth  does.  There  is  a  tension  between  the  imagining  self 
and  the  myth  of  the  self  that  is  elaborated  through  The  Prelude.  That  is  merely  to  say,  that 
his  was  a  universal  predicament,  so  that  his  great  autobiographical  poem  is  fascinating  and 
powerful  both  in  its  realised  intentions  and  in  ways  that  he  could  not  have  intended.  At  the 
heart  of  the  matter,  Wordsworth's  case  actually  resembles  that  of  Lily  Briscoe  for  whom 
meaning  is  an  adjunct  of  imagining. 
Coleridge's  response  to  The  Prelude  is  illuminating: 
Theme  hard  as  high 
Of  smiles  spontaneous  and  mysterious  fears 
(The  first-born  they  of  Reason  and  twin-birth) 
Oftimes  obedient  to  external  force 
And  currents  self  determined;  of  moments  awful, 
Now  in  thy  inner  life  and  now  abroad, 
When  power  streamed  from  thee  and  thy  soul  received 
The  light  reflected,  as  a  light  bestowed.  42 
The  Prelude  was  completed  in  May,  1805.  Coleridge  had  published  his  revised  Dejection: 
An  Ode  in  October  1802.  On  this  evidence,  his  experience  of  imagining  was  already,  sadly, 
42  Samuel  Taylor  Coleridge,  'To  William  Wordsworth'  from  Selected  Poems  of  S.  T.  Coleridge,  cd.  by 
James  Reeves,  repr.  1990  (Oxford:  Heinemann,  1959),  p.  114. 
153 retrospective.  He  had  pushed  the  imagination  into  subjectivity.  He  had  lost  his  passage  to 
the  numinous. 
154 Chapter  Eight 
Imagination  and  Beauty 
Beauty,  for  Kant,  seems  to  involve  the  disinterested  engagement  of  the  imagination  in 
aesthetic  structures.  In  finding  them  beautiful  we  conceive  of  such  structures  as  purposive 
wholes  but  wholes  without  a  specifically  conceptual  purpose.  This  bears  a  strong 
resemblance  to  Hopkins's  notion  that  poetry  in  speech  'employed  to  carry  the  inscape  for 
the  inscape's  sake  :  But  inscape  depends  upon  a  logic  that  supposes  internal  relations 
between  structural  analogues.  In  the  drama  there  must  be  internal  relations  between  that 
which  is  represented  and  forms  of  life.  Is  it  that  Kant's  finality  of  form  presupposes 
finality  of  ends  -  that  art,  generally,  is  inseparable  from  insight?  What,  in  the  end, 
distinguishes  formal  finality  from  finality  of  ends  is  a  specific  kind  of  intention.  This 
aesthetic  mode  can  be  directly  engaged  by  forms  in  nature  -  in  which  case  purposiveness 
may  be  reconstrued  as  purpose.  Through  such  transactions  nature  becomes  symbolic,  it 
points  towards  a  creator  -  the  concrete  points  to  the  abstract. 
In  The  Winter's  Tale,  Perdita  and  Polixenes  engage  in  a  typical  Renaissance  debate 
concerning  'nature'  and  'art': 
PERDITA  [...  ]  the  fairest  flowers  o'  th'  season 
Are  our  carnations  and  streak'd  gillyvors, 
Which  some  call  nature's  bastards:  of  that  kind 
Our  rustic  garden's  barren;  and  I  care  not 
To  get  slips  of  them. 
POLIXENES  Wherefore,  gentle  maiden, 
Do  you  neglect  them? 
PERDITA  For  I  have  heard  it  said 
There  is  an  art  which,  in  their  piedness,  shares 
With  great  creating  nature. 
POLIXENES  Say  there  be; 
Yet  nature  is  made  by  no  mean 
But  nature  makes  that  mean:  so,  over  that  art, 
Which  you  say  adds  to  nature,  is  an  art 
That  nature  makes.  You  see,  sweet  maid,  we  marry 
A  gentler  scion  to  the  wildest  stock, 
And  make  conceive  a  bark  of  baser  kind 
By  bud  of  nobler  race.  This  is  an  art 
Which  does  mend  nature  -  change  it  rather  -  but 
The  art  itself  is  nature.  ' 
What  seems  to  concern  Perdita  is  not  whether  the  carnation  is  beautiful,  rather  she  is 
disturbed  by  its  artifice.  It  is  as  if  the  impulse  to  create  such  hybrids  is  indicative  of  human 
I  William  Shakespeare,  The  Minter's  Tale,  ed.  by  J.  H.  P.  Pafford,  The  Arden  Shakespeare,  repr.  1984 
(London:  Methuen,  1963),  IV.  4.81. 
155 presumption.  Polixenes's  stance  in  this  argument  is  undercut  by  subsequent  events  when  he 
refuses  to  countenance  the  marriage  of  his  son  with  this  'shepherdess',  an  eventuality  that 
would  involve,  precisely,  marrying  a'gentler  scion  to  the  wildest  stock.  '  Polixenes  wins  the 
immediate  argument  -  but  his  priorities  as  a  'prince'  predominate  in  the  end. 
Kant  uses  the  example  of  the  beauty  of  flowers  to  illustrate  his  conception  of  a  judgement 
of  'pure  taste': 
There  are  two  kinds  of  beauty:  free  beauty  [...  ]  or  beauty  which  is  merely 
dependent.  The  first  presupposes  no  concept  of  what  the  object  should  be; 
the  second  does  presuppose  such  a  concept  and,  with  it,  an  answering 
perfection  of  the  object  [...  ]. 
Flowers  are  free  beauties  of  nature.  Hardly  any  one  but  a  botanist  knows 
the  true  nature  of  a  flower,  and  even  he,  while  recognising  in  the  flower  the 
reproductive  organ  of  the  plant,  pays  no  attention  to  this  natural  end  when 
using  his  taste  to  judge  of  its  beauty.  Hence  no  perfection  of  any  kind  -  no 
internal  finality,  as  something  to  which  the  arrangement  of  the  manifold  is 
related  -  underlies  this  judgement.  2 
Kant  distinguishes  between  'internal  finality'  -  that  is,  the  relation  of  the  constituent  parts  of 
the  flower  to  the  fulfilment  of  its  purpose,  or  end  -  and  the  form  of  finality  where  we  are 
aware  that  organisation  is  displayed  in  the  arrangement  of  the  constituents,  yet  we  remain  in 
the  contemplation  of  this  organisation  without  resort  to  consideration  of  their  end.  A 
judgement  of  taste  supposes  a  response  to  purposiveness  without  reference  to  a  final 
purpose  -  the  purposive  wholes  represented  in  music,  arguably,  are  experienced  without 
reference  to  an  external  purpose. 
It  would  seem  that  Perdita's  dismissal  of  hybrids  reflects  that  her  'judgement'  is 
compromised  by  a  touch  of  puritanism.  She  cannot  free  herself  from  ideological  issues 
sufficiently  to  lose  herself  in  contemplation.  It  is  Kant's  contention  that  pure  judgements  of 
taste  must  be  free  of  all'interest'.  Interest  supposes  the  relation  of  the  object  to  an  end,  that 
is,  the  ascription  of  purpose.  The  argument  can,  perhaps,  be  simplified  in  terms  that  we 
have  previously  used:  the  judgement  that  something  is  beautiful  involves  the  contemplation 
of  'inscape  for  the  inscape's  sake'.  (See  Introduction.  ) 
2  Immanuel  Kant,  The  Critique  ofJudgement,  trans.  by  James  Creed  Meredith,  repr.  1992  (Oxford: 
Clarendon,  1952),  p.  72,  §  16. 
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affairs,  so  the  judgement  of  taste  is  quite  specific  -  it  involves  a  response  to  this  rose  or  that 
painting.  Indeed  it  seems  that  Kant's  notion  of  form  and  Hopkins's  inscape  have,  at  least,  a 
strong  family  resemblance: 
The  relation  of  matter  to  form  is  reconceived  as  that  of  the  generic  to  the  specific 
when  Kant  remarks  that  the  Aristotelian  school  "called  the  genus  matter,  but  the 
specific  difference  the  form"  [...  ].  In  reflective  specification  we  regard  nature  as  a 
genus  that  must  be  specified  into  different  species  of  objects.  3 
Could  it  be,  though,  that  the  response  to  flowers  is  a  special  case?  It  might  appear  that 
ignorance  regarding  the  purpose,  the  end,  of  this  rose  might  masquerade  as  disinterest,  for 
flowers  reflect  internal  finality  of  a  number  of  ends  -  the  flower  as  sexual  mechanism,  which 
Kant  mentions,  and  the  ends  anticipated  in  the  breeding  of  complex  hybrids,  as  in  the  tulip 
and  the  rose.  4  Research  into  hybridisation  presupposes  that  there  are  criteria  associated 
with  beauty  in  flowers  and  this  supposition  has  a  certain  utilitarian  confirmation  in  that  a 
successful  resolution  in  terms  of  ends  is  reflected  in  commercial  success  -  this  would  be  the 
case  even  in  Kant's  time:  when  he  looked  at  a  tulip  or  a  rose  Kant  would  be  responding  to  a 
complex  hybrid.  Indeed,  it  is  probable  that  there  is  an  iterated  algorithm  demonstrating  that 
the  form  of  the  rose  -  or  carnation,  Shakespeare's  `gillyvor'  -  obeys  a  mathematical  rule. 
Yet,  according  to  Kant, 
Flowers,  free  patterns  f 
... 
]  have  no  signification,  depend  upon  no  definite 
concept,  and  yet  please.  (p.  46,  §4) 
It  may  be  that  there  is  an  inherent  problem  in  using  examples  in  such  a  discussion 
because  almost  inevitably  we  regard  the  example  as  illustrative.  But  an  illustration  can 
never  underwrite  the  switch  in  intention  involved  in  shifting  from  dependent  to  free  beauty. 
Hopkins  presents  us  with  an  inscape  that  delights  by  its  accuracy  in  catching  the  play  of 
shadows  on  a  wall  -  it  fascinates  by  its  sheer  appropriateness.  On  the  other  hand,  that  same 
image  can  be  seen  as  a  constituent  of  a  complex  pattern  that  engages  the  mind  in  such  a  way 
as  to  engender  delight  -  the  poem  as  construct.  Beauty  is  dependent  upon  how  this  specific 
3  Rudolf  A  Makreel,  Imagination  and  Interpretation  in  Kant,  paperback  edn.  1994  (Chicago:  University  of 
Chicago  Press,  1990),  p.  59. 
4  Critique  ofJudgement,  p.  41,  §33. 
157 object  is  apprehended  at  this  particular  moment.  In  other  words,  Kant's  argument  seems  to 
reflect  significant  aspects  of  the  imaginative  issues  discussed  so  far:  judgements  of  taste  are 
precluded  by  identification  -  because  fantasy  is  inevitably  'interested'  -  and  by  ideological 
commitment  -  because  beauty  then  becomes  illustrative.  Judgements  of  taste  may  be 
associated  with  the  free  play  of  the  imagination  but  the  rose  is,  perhaps,  a  special  case  in  so 
far  as  it  escapes  that  pervasive  -  and  constituent  -  tension  in  art  between  illusion  and  reality 
that  Kant  would  wish  away  in  his  insistence  upon  disinterest.  A  Cdzanne  landscape,  after 
all,  reflects  the  finding  of  a  motif,  a  structural  configuration  in  the  real  world. 
That  beauty  is  a  function  of  a  distinct  mode  of  apprehension  is  implied  in  this  distinction 
between  free  and  dependent  beauty: 
In  respect  of  an  object  with  a  definite  internal  end,  a  judgement  of  taste 
would  only  be  pure  where  the  person  judging  either  has  no  concept  of  this 
end,  or makes  abstraction  from  it  in  his  judgement.  But  in  cases  like  this, 
although  such  a  person  should  lay  down  a  correct  judgement  of  taste,  since 
he  would  be  estimating  the  object  as  a  free  beauty,  he  would  still  be  found 
fault  with  by  another  who  saw  nothing  in  its  beauty  but  a  dependent  quality 
(i.  e.  who  looked  to  the  end  of  the  object)  and  would  be  accused  by  him  of 
false  taste,  though  both  would,  in  their  own  way  be  judging  correctly:  the 
one  according  to  what  he  had  present  to  his  senses,  the  other  according  to 
what  was  present  in  his  thoughts.  (p.  74,  §16) 
Clearly,  a  flower  can  be  the  object  of  different  intentional  acts  -  beauty  is  available  for 
Polixenes  but,  in  certain  circumstances,  Perdita  sees  only  artifice.  Illustration  cannot  of 
itself  resolve  such  a  discussion  because  each  stance  supposes  a  discrete  mode  of  relation, 
involvement  -  or  indeed,  entrapment  -  in  which,  condemns  the  discussion  to  be  at  cross 
purposes. 
On  the  face  of  it,  Kant's  distinction  supposes  confident  differentiation  between  faculties  - 
cognition,  feeling  and  desire  -a  typical  eighteenth  century  categorisation.  In  Coleridge's 
terms,  head  and  heart  are  clearly  differentiated.  This  allows  Kant  to  identify  the  beautiful 
exclusively  with  pleasure  but  it  is  pleasure  of  a  distinctive  kind.  We  might  assume  that  there 
is  some  kind  of  causal  relationship  between  the  object,  or  artefact,  and  pleasure  -  but  if  this 
were  the  case  then  beauty  must  be  'interested'.  On  the  other  hand,  for  Kant,  the  pleasure 
comes  from  the  play  of  the  mind  -  it  is  the  play  itself  which  is  the  source  of  pleasure.  The 
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pleasure  is  subjective  because  it  is  not  dependent  upon  a  specific  concept  -  such  play  is 
possible  because,  'no  definite  concept  restricts'  the  cognitive  powers  'to  a  particular  rule  of 
cognition.  '  (p.  58,  §9) 
Nevertheless  such  play  must  be  generated  by  something.  The  form  of  finality  supposes 
purposiveness,  and  that  operation  of  reason  within,  shall  we  say,  the  book  or  play,  is 
dependent  upon  the  ideas  that  come  to  constitute  the  world  of  that  fiction:  'Beauty  (...  ]  may 
in  general  be  termed  the  expression  of  aesthetic  ideas'.  (p.  183,  §51) 
In  his  discussion  of  such  ideas  Salim  Kemal  observes: 
We  may  further  explain  this  aesthetic  use  of  concepts  to  develop  themes  (or 
aesthetic  ideas).  In  a  play,  for  example,  the  entire  causal  history  of  any  event  is  not 
necessary  to  understanding  its  meaning.  A  handkerchief  appears  in  the  play  as  an 
instrument  the  villain  uses  to  incite  the  rage  of  a  jealous  and  suspicious  husband. 
The  causal  history  of  the  cloth  is  not  important  [...  ].  Instead  we  take  elements  from 
reality  or  nature,  and  rearrange  them  to  suit  our  purpose  of  making  this  meaning 
clear.  The  piece  of  cloth  has  connotations  in  the  play,  which  it  derives  from  its  role 
in  the  events  represented  on  the  stage,  that  it  does  not  have  outside  the  plot  [...  ]. 
Those  singular  connotations  and  individual  meanings,  Kant's  claims  suggest,  seek 
validity  not  from  being  made  part  of  a  system  of  natural  scientific  explanation  with 
its  determinate  placings  of  clearly  defined  concepts,  but  from  a  universalizable 
pleasurable  response  of  our  aesthetic  judgement.  The  latter  considers  the  events 
represented  on  the  stage  in  terms  of  the  order  of  the  play  rather  than  of  the  relation 
between  the  events  and  the  systematic  causal  nexus.  '5 
If  Kemal's  reading  is  correct  it  poses  problems  for  Kant. 
On  the  one  hand,  there  is  no  barrier  to  our  believing  that  an  actual  handkerchief  could 
accrue  such  meaning  in  real  life  -  in  other  words,  the  meaning  of  this  handkerchief  for,  say, 
Tom,  because  it  is  associated  with  his  wife's  adultery,  is  also  independent  of  the  'systematic 
causal  nexus'.  The  network  of  meaning  may  be  a  necessary  constituent  of  aesthetic 
response  but  it  is  certainly  not  sufficient  to  engage  it. 
Additionally,  through  identification  with  the  situation  depicted  in  the  play  an  observer 
might  be  more  persuaded  of  the  'reality'  of  Othello's  situation  than  he  would  ever  be  on 
hearing  an  actual  account  of  Tom's  predicament.  What  the  play  depicts  are,  in  fact,  forms 
of  life  which  are  intelligible  through  internal  relations  between  human  experience  and  what 
is  depicted.  Through  the  characteristic  devices  of  the  drama  the  structure  of  such  forms  can 
Salim  Kemal,  Kant'sAesthetic  Theory,  2nd  edn.  1997  (London:  Macmillan,  1992),  pp.  45-46. 
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be  put  into  inverted  commas,  as  it  were,  made  emphatic.  We  are  thereby  drawn  into  the 
contemplation  of  form,  but  form  as  the  expressive  mode  of  content,  a  rendering  that  is 
brought  about  by  the  engagement  of  the  aesthetic  mode.  Without  such  internal  relations  we 
could  never  be  persuaded  to  surrender  to  dramatic  illusion,  to  suspend  disbelief.  Strictly, 
we  do  not  succumb  to  illusion  -  we  are  caught  by  recognition.  It  is  precisely  because  Tom's 
situation  is  intelligible  that  drama  can  be  made  of  it.  We  move  from  identification  -a  tacit 
recognition  -  to  the  holistic  comprehension  of  form  that  we  reach  through  imagining,  where 
the  possibility  of  explicit  cognition  is  presupposed  in  our  willingness  to  surrender  to  beauty. 
In  Wordsworth,  Hopkins  and  Cezanne,  the  whole  point  of  a  crucial  aspect  of  their 
endeavour  is  to  render  the  beauty  of  the  world. 
Kant  too  acknowledges  that  pleasure  in  beauty  is  not  confined  to  the  fine  arts  but  can  be 
manifest  in  the  contemplation  of  nature.  His  broad  concern  in  The  Critique  of  Judgement  is 
to  supplement  and  extend  his  critical  work  on  Understanding  and  Reason.  Understanding  is 
the  'a  priori'  principle  presupposed  in  knowledge  of  the  world;  the  function  of  Reason  is  to 
legislate  for  the  faculty  of  Desire  and,  Kant  argues,  Judgement  is  the  principle  related  to  the 
faculty  of  Feeling  -  manifest  to  us  as  pleasure  or  displeasure.  The  crucial  role  of  Reflective 
Judgement  -  compared  to  the  schematising  Determinant  Judgement  -  is  to  establish  harmony 
between  the  world  of  nature  -  which  is  mechanistic,  posited  by  understanding  -  and 
freedom.  Thus  Reflective  Judgement  has  a  distinctive  role  within  the  range  of  critical  tasks 
that,  generally,  seek  to  explore  the  fit  between  our  mental  capacities  and  nature:  'For  our 
judgement  makes  it  imperative  upon  us  to  proceed  on  the  principle  of  the  conformity  of 
nature  to  our  faculty  of  cognition'.  6 
In  Reflective  Judgement  we  proceed  as  if  nature  is  fitted  to  our  purpose,  and  therein  lies 
the  possibility  for  judgements  of  taste  in  response  to  the  natural  world: 
Self-subsisting  natural  beauty  reveals  to  us  a  technic  of  nature  which  shows  it  in  the 
light  of  a  system  ordered  in  accordance  with  laws  the  principle  of  which  is  not  to  be 
found  within  the  range  of  our  entire  faculty  of  understanding.  This  principle  is  that 
of  a  finality  relative  to  the  employment  of  judgement  in  respect  of  phenomena  which 
6  Critique  ofJudgement,  pp.  28-29,  Introduction  vi. 
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have  thus  to  be  assigned,  not  merely  to  nature  regarded  as  aimless  mechanism,  but 
also  to  nature  regarded  after  the  analogy  of  art.  (p.  92.  §23.  ) 
We  can  regard  order  in  nature  'after  the  analogy'  of  formal  finality  in  art.  Nature  reflects  an 
organisation  in  response  to  which  we  can  experience  that  pleasure  associated  with  aesthetic 
judgement.  It  follows,  presumably,  that  the  structures  in  nature  to  which  we  respond 
aesthetically  can  be  'taken  up',  as  it  were,  and  reproduced  in  fine  art.  They  are,  though, 
rendered  through  analogy,  through  inscape  -  representational  power  is  dependent  upon  an 
internal  relation  between  object  and  representation.  Such  is  our  characteristic  fascination 
with  the  'match'  between  representation  and  world  that  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  slipping  into  a 
response  where  beauty  is  dependent.  Indeed,  the  pure  aesthetic  response  would  seem  to  be 
trivial  were  it  not  that  it  presupposed  internal  relations.  Dependent  beauty  reflects  a 
discursive  intention. 
Specifically,  in  the  aesthetic  mode  the  imagination  finds  formal  finality.  Kant's  concept 
of  form  seems  at  times  very  close  to  the  traditional  conceptualisation  of  the  form  that  is 
differentiated  from  content  -  there  is  an  echo  here  of  Kant's  differentiation  between  faculties 
in  so  far  as  sensation  cannot  be  allowed  to  play  a  fundamental  role  in  aesthetic  judgements. 
In  the  fine  arts,  'the  design  is  what  is  essential.  '  (p.  67,  §14) 
All  form  of  objects  of  sense  [...  ]  is  either  figure  or  play.  In  the  latter  case  it 
is  either  play  of  figures  (in  space:  mimic  and  dance),  or  mere  play  of 
sensations  (in  time).  The  charm  of  colours,  or  of  the  agreeable  tones  of 
instruments,  may  be  added:  but  the  design  in  the  former  and  the  composition 
in  the  latter  constitute  the  proper  object  of  the  pure  judgement  of  taste. 
(pp.  67-68,  §14) 
It  may  be  that  the  origins  of  this  notion  of  form  or  design  lie  in  the  Renaissance  and, 
ultimately,  in  Plato.  In  Vasari's  Lives  of  the  Artists,  for  example,  disegno,  design, 
draughtsmanship,  is  the  soul  of  art.  The  creative  artist  has  a  copy  of  the  divine  Idea  in  his 
mind  so  that  the  representation  of  the  natural  form  can  be  mediated  through  the  perfect 
form  -  for  Vasari,  such  mediation  was  displayed,  above  all,  in  the  work  of  Michelangelo. 
The  origin  of  the  theory  is  to  be  found  in  the  notion  that  the  human  form  was  created  in 
God's  image: 
161 Design  [...  ]  is  the  [...  ]  animating  principle  of  all  creative  processes:  and 
surely  design  existed  in  absolute  perfection  before  the  Creation  when 
Almighty  God,  having  made  the  vast  expanse  of  the  universe  and  adorned 
the  heavens  [...  ]  directed  His  creative  intellect  further,  to  the  clear  air  and  the 
solid  earth.  And  then,  in  the  act  of  creating  man,  He  fashioned  the  first 
forms  of  painting  and  sculpture  in  the  sublime  grace  of  created  things.  It  is 
undeniable  that  from  man,  as  from  a  perfect  model,  statues  and  pieces  of 
sculpture  and  the  challenge  of  pose  and  contour  were  first  derived.? 
For  Kant,  ideal  beauty  presupposes  a  concept  so  that  it  must  be  interested  -  is  there  not  an 
uneasy  sense  that  Mannerist  art  is  refined  propaganda? 
As  we  have  argued  though,  in  the  aesthetic  mode,  form  cannot  be  divorced  from  content. 
Their  separation  is  the  inevitable  consequence  of  a  shift  from  the  aesthetic  into  the 
discursive  mode.  We  are  confronted  with  the  paradox  that  the  very  mode  in  which  Kant 
accounts  for  the  experience  of  beauty  and  the  vocabulary  to  which  he  resorts  renders  that 
beauty  inaccessible  -  the  divorce  of  form  and  content  is  a  conceptual  symptom  of  an 
inapplicable  discursive  paradigm.  Where  head  is divorced  from  heart  aesthetic  judgements 
can  only  be  subjective. 
I  suggested  earlier  that  in  the  drama,  the  emergence  of  the  plot  as  a  completed  structure 
in  a  moment  of  illuminating  understanding  occurs  in  the  context  of  catharsis  and  that  this 
process  was  my  first  definition  of  imagination.  In  the  terms  we  are  now  employing, 
aesthetic  apprehension  is  followed  by  aesthetic  comprehension.  But  such  structure 
supposes  illumination  of  the  meaning  of  the  play  in  a  finality  -  the  resolution  of  its 
constituents  into  a  final  end.  It  is  precisely  the  emerging  of  the  finality  that  we  experience 
as  imaginative  power  -  this  is  a  source  of  pleasure  -  and  the  whole  manifold  of  experience 
within  the  presentation  is  presupposed  in  it.  To  differentiate  between  form  and  content  - 
that  is,  ultimately,  to  differentiate  in  terms  of  faculties  -  in  arriving  at  such  a  holistic 
comprehension  is  simply  unintelligible.  Motive,  action  and  plot,  human  and  aesthetic 
intention,  each  presupposes  the  other  in  the  consistency  of  resolution  that  underpins  the 
finality  of  the  presentation. 
7  Giorgio  Vasari,  The  Lives  of  the  Artists,  trans.  by  G.  Bull,  repr.  1997  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1965), 
p.  25. 
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precisely  because  of  the  many  strands  -  emotional,  auditory,  imaginative  and  cognitive  -  that 
the  artist  can  weave  into  the  fabric  of  his  illusion.  In  Hopkins's  terms,  Shakespeare's 
emphasis  is  a  matter  of  'overing  and  overing.  But  Shakespeare  depends  upon  the 
fundamental  intelligibility  of  situations  like  Tom's. 
It  is  as  if  finality  of  form  were  a  potentiality  within  anything  that  has  an  intelligible 
structure  -  it  is  a  possibility  that  lies  within  meaning  itself.  What  distinguishes  Tom's  story 
from  Shakespeare's  is  that  the  multiple  strands  of  Shakespeare's  account  draw  the 
experience  into  a  whole  -a  purposive  whole  -  that  is  differentiated  from  the  quotidian,  not 
only  by  its  manifest  intrinsic  structure,  but  by  the  whole  ritualistic  framing  implicit  in  the 
public  presentation  of  a  play  in  a  theatre.  Given  these  cues,  and  freedom  from  the  urgency 
of  responsive  action,  the  mind  can  delight  in  the  form  itself  -  but  form-as-content. 
In  A  Midsummer  Night's  Dream  Shakespeare  appears  to  strip away  the  ritualistic  frame 
when  he  has  Bottom  step  out  of  it  -  he  forgets  his  role  in  Pyramus  and  Thisby  and 
addresses  his  audience  directly.  The  effect  of  Bottom's  gaffe  is  reinforced  by  the  worldly- 
wise  comments  of  his  audience.  But  the  joke  is  that  despite  this  and  despite  the  absurdity  of 
the  rhetoric,  there  is  an  intrinsic  expressive  power  in  the  situation  of  the  two  lovers, 
Pyramus  and  Thisby.  It  is  preposterous  -  but  we  are  moved  by  their  predicament.  We 
recognise  a  form  of  life,  a  meaning  is  communicated  which  is  at  once  moving  and  brilliant  in 
the  challenging  minimalism  of  its  presentation.  8  The  form  of  life  is  all  we  need  as  a 
resource  for  the  imagination.  That  we  recognise  this  in  the  context  of  a  play  within  a  play  - 
its  reflexiveness  -  draws  attention  to  the  epistemology  of  the  drama,  as  it  were,  what  the 
drama  presupposes  in  hooking  on  to  the  world. 
That  the  play  is  within  a  play  cannot  allow  us  to  ignore  the  significance  of  the  ultimate 
framing  context  -  the  ritual  of  the  theatre  itself  -  but  that  merely  serves  to  incorporate  the 
epistemic  issues  within  the  themes  of  the  play,  its  exploration  of  the  interplay  between 
8  William  Shakespeare,  A  Midsummer  Night's  Dream,  from  William  Shakespeare:  The  Complete  Works, 
ed.  by  Stanley  Wells  and  Gary  Taylor,  paperback  edn.  1997  (Oxford:  Clarendon,  1988)  see  V.  1. 
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exposition,  but  exposition  that  in  the  context  of  the  aesthetic  mode  is  transfigured  into  form. 
A  frame  is  ambiguous  because  it  serves  two  functions.  On  the  one  hand  it  is  a  cue  that 
indicates  how  we  are  to  look  but  cannot  of  itself  adjust  the  looking.  On  the  other,  the  frame 
of  a  picture  constitutes  the  defining  form  for  double  prescription  -  in  the  aesthetic  mode  the 
prescriptive  limit  arranges  the  constituent  forms  that  are  manifest  in  the  holistic  intuition. 
This  is  not  to  deny  that,  initially,  the  artist  arranges  the  elements  of  the  picture  -  but  the 
arranging  always  presupposes  an  envisaging  of  the  frame. 
Imagine  that  you  have  developed  an  interest  in  astronomy.  After  frustrating  ditherings 
involving  the  matching  of  a  star  map  with  what  is  above,  you  suddenly  recognise  a 
constellation  that  is  new  for  you.  'It's  Orion  -  there  is  his  belt  and  sword!  '  The  defining 
form  -  the  Hunter  -  arranges  the  other  stars  into  his  appropriate  accoutrements  -  his  belt 
and  sword.  At  the  same  time  the  constellation  is  'lifted'  from  its  background;  it  has  emerged 
as  an  'island'  of  autonomous  intelligibility  amidst  an  ocean  of  stars.  In  a  painting  the  frame 
is  a  constituent  part  of  the  'island'. 
Kant  discusses  frames  in  a  passage  where  he  seems  to  distinguish  content  -  with  formal 
implications  -  from  the  form  of  the  purposive  whole: 
Even  what  is  called  ornamentation  (parerga),  i.  e.  what  is  only  an  adjunct,  and  not 
an  intrinsic  constituent  in  the  complete  representation  of  the  object,  in  augmenting 
the  delight  of  taste  does  so  only  by  means  of  its  form.  Thus  it  is  with  the  frames  of 
pictures  or  the  drapery  on  statues,  or  the  colonnades  of  palaces.  But  if  the 
ornamentation  does  not  itself  enter  into  the  composition  of  the  beautiful  form  -  if  it 
is  introduced  like  a  gold  frame  merely  to  win  approval  for  the  picture  by  means  of  its 
charm  -  it  is  then  called  finery  and  takes  away  from  the  genuine  beauty.  9 
My  argument  is  that  the  'frame'  is  already  constitutive  of  the  composite  nature  of  the  form  - 
it  arranges  its  constituent  elements.  In  Hopkins's  terminology  the  physical  frame  of  a 
painting  both  facilitates  and  'over  and  overs'  the  holistic  structure.  In  drawing  attention  to 
itself  a  frame  would  destroy  this  facilitating  function,  would  constitute  a  competing 
structure  for  contemplation.  A  successful  frame  is  both  seen  and  not  seen  in  the  sense  that 
9  Critique  of  Judgement,  p.  68,  §14. 
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to  underline  a  word  is  to  make  a  meaning  emphatic  -  we  are  not  distracted  by  the 
underlining  itself. 
The  response  to  an  unfamiliar  artefact  must  inevitably  be  without  a  `star  map'.  At  first 
small  areas  of  intelligibility  are  found  -  perhaps  these  first  responses  are  cognitive.  Now  we 
experience  an  aesthetic  response  to  an  image  or  series  of  images.  Here  we  are  gripped  by 
an  emotion:  empathy  -  identification  -  is  engaged.  We  may  leave  the  theatre  with  a  mere 
patchwork  of  impressions  conceived  within  different  modes  of  relation  -  we  may  not  have 
arrived  at  the  'constellation'.  On  the  other  hand,  we  may  have  an  overwhelming  sense  of  the 
'rightness'  of  the  totality,  its  integrity.  Our  accompanying  response  is  awe  that  the  human 
imagination  could  have  conceived  such  a  thing.  We  have  experienced  beauty. 
For  Kant,  imaginative  apprehension  underpins  the  very  possibility  of  understanding 
itself  -  the  intelligibility  of  the  discursive  depends  upon  it  -  but  it  is  imaginative 
comprehension  that  underwrites  the  holistic  nature  of  the  aesthetic: 
Measurement  of  a  space  [...  ]  is  at  the  same  time  a  description  of  it,  and  so  an 
objective  movement  in  the  imagination  and  a  progression.  On  the  other  hand  the 
comprehension  of  the  manifold  in  the  unity,  not  of  thought,  but  of  intuition,  and 
consequently  the  comprehension  of  the  successively  apprehended  parts  at  one 
glance,  is  a  retrogression  that  removes  the  time  condition  in  the  progression  of  the 
imagination,  and  renders  coexistence  intuitable.  (p.  107,  §27) 
Whereas  the  discursive  unfolds  through  time,  in  aesthetic  comprehension  the  arrival  at  the 
holistic  intuition  occurs  in  a  moment.  On  the  other  hand,  imaginative  comprehension  of, 
say,  the  drama  emerges  as  a  highly  wrought  inscape  but  its  constituent  parts  if  experienced 
in  the  imaginative  mode  are  themselves  inscapes.  We  may  experience  the  beauty  of  the 
parts  before  the  beauty  of  the  whole. 
Inscape  depends  for  its  representational  power  on  structural  analogues  -  as  in  metaphor  - 
and  such  analogues  presuppose  internal  relations  between  the  images  and  those  aspects  of 
the  world  that  are  represented  through  them.  As  we  have  argued,  the  integrity  which  is  a 
condition  of  formal  finality  in  aesthetic  comprehension  presupposes  objective  finality  in  the 
states  of  affairs  represented  -  in  which  case  Kant's  formal  finality  is internally  related  to  the 
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manifold  of  experience.  In  discourse  which  is  essentially  metaphorical  it  is  not  that  the 
presentation  cannot  represent  states  of  affairs  in  the  world;  it  is  merely  that  in  the  context  of 
the  aesthetic  mode  the  priority  of  representation  is  momentarily  set  aside  by  a  distinctive 
intentional  act.  We  escape  the  characteristic  dominance  of  the  discursive. 
Differentiation  into  faculties  is  necessary  for  Kant's  argument  in  order  to  distinguish 
aesthetic  from  quotidian  experience;  whereas  what  fundamentally  differentiates  aesthetic 
experience  is  that  it  is  a  discrete  mode  of  experience,  the  function  of  a  specific  kind  of 
intention  that  manifests  itself  in  double  prescription.  Criticism  is  the  discursive  exposition 
of  the  constituents  of  the  whole  but  it  cannot  underwrite  the  shift  into  the  aesthetic  mode. 
Kant  is  right  about  the  nature  of  the  discursive  but  wrong  about  the  subjectivity  of  the 
aesthetic  -  such  ascription  of  subjectivity  presupposes  discursive  scrutiny  of  a  synthesising 
apprehension  whereby  it  is  split  into  faculties.  In  a  way,  Kant's  Critiques  are  written  in  the 
wrong  order.  It  is  the  discursive  that  needs  explanation  in  terms  of  its  vitiation  of  the 
imaginative  synthesis  manifest  in  the  aesthetic  mode.  This  suggests  that  Kant's  aesthetic 
experience  occurred  within  a  paradigm  reflecting  a  dissociation  of  sensibility  into  head  and 
heart. 
Kant  comes  close  to  this  position  when  he  differentiates  between  analogy  and  association 
-  in  our  terms,  imagination  and  fancy: 
The  imagination  (as  a  productive  faculty  of  cognition)  is  a  powerful  agent 
for  creating,  as  it  were,  a  second  nature  out  of  the  material  supplied  to  it  by 
actual  nature.  It  affords  us  entertainment  where  experience  proves  too 
commonplace;  and  we  even  use  it  to  remodel  experience,  always  following, 
no  doubt,  laws  that  are  based  on  analogy,  but  still  also  following  principles 
which  have  a  higher  seat  in  reason  [...  ].  By  this  means  we  get  a  sense  of  our 
freedom  from  the  law  of  association  (which  attaches  to  the  empirical 
employment  of  the  imagination),  with  the  result  that  the  material  can  be 
borrowed  by  us  from  nature  in  accordance  with  that  law,  but  be  worked  up 
by  us  into  something  else  -  namely,  what  surpasses  nature.  (p.  176,  §49) 
The  idea  that  the  imagination  'surpasses  nature'  is  reflected  in  Kant's  assumption  that, 
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imagination)  for  which  an  adequate  concept  can  never  be  found.  (p.  210,  §57) 
But  surely  the  crucial  assumption  is  that  the  imagination  through  analogy  can  remodel 
experience.  In  conceding  this  capacity  Kant  can  no  longer  claim  that  an  aesthetic  idea 
cannot  become  a  cognition  -  analogy  presupposes  an  internal  relation.  There  is  a  crucial 
sense,  then,  in  which  aesthetic  ideas  do  surpass  nature,  are  constitutive  of  freedom.  It  is 
precisely  the  arrival  at  a  reconstituted  finality  in  the  disclosure  of  double  prescription  that 
we  experience  as  beauty  -  though  what  makes  this  possible  is  a  mode  of  relation  which  is 
disinterested.  In  the  aesthetic  mode  imagination,  manifest  in  analogy  -  metaphor  -  allows  us 
to  'jump  the  tracks'  so  that  it  becomes  possible  to  refigure  some  aspect  of  the  world.  As  I 
have  previously  argued,  this  presupposes  redundancy  -  and  that  is  only  another  way  of 
saying  that  cognition  is  selective.  Only  a  disinterested  relation  is  capable  of  releasing  us 
from  the  thrall  of  habit,  the  soothing  pragmatism  of  the  network  of  quotidian  cognition. 
The  success  of  camouflage  in  nature  -  the  disruption  of  form  -  presupposes  the  norm.  To 
turn  Kant  on  his  head,  there  are  circumstances  where  the  discursive  confines  us  to 
subjectivity. 
Failure  to  develop  the  implications  of  the  logic  of  the  analogical  -  of  metaphor  -  confines 
the  role  of  imagery  to  the  merely  decorative.  This  may  afford  us,  as  Kant  puts  it, 
'entertainment'  -  but  little  else.  This  supposes  the  dualistic  division  between  sensation  and 
cognition,  head  and  heart,  neatly  reflecting  the  differentiation  into  faculties.  It  is  out  of  this 
state  of  affairs  that  Coleridge  sought  a  synthesis. 
Kant  himself  hints  that  the  differentiation  into  faculties  may  not  have  been  altogether 
secure: 
I  may  assert  in  the  case  of  every  representation  that  the  synthesis  of  a 
pleasure  with  the  representation  (as  a  cognition)  is  at  least  possible. 
(p.  81,  §18) 
Regarding  Burke's  'physiology'  of  the  sublime  Kant  remarks: 
As  psychological  observations  these  analyses  of  our  mental  phenomena  are 
extremely  fine,  and  supply  a  wealth  of  material  for  the  favourite 
investigations  of  empirical  anthropology.  But,  besides  that,  there  is  no 
167 I 
denying  the  fact  that  all  representations  within  us,  no  matter  whether  they 
are  objectively  merely  sensible  or  wholly  intellectual,  are  still  subjectively 
associable  with  gratification  or  pain,  however  imperceptible  either  of  these 
maybe.  (p.  131,  §29) 
It  is  precisely  because  of  this  that  Kant's  own  texts  can  be  experienced  as  beautiful  and  that 
mathematicians  can  intelligibly  judge  between  proofs  on  the  grounds  of  elegance.  The 
aesthetic  -  the  imagination  -  is  a  fundamental  mode  of  apprehension  and  probably,  when  all 
is  said  and  done,  has  a  powerful  role  in  motivating  the  search  for  intelligibility. 
The  discursive  is  confined  to  cognition;  the  imagination  involves  a  synthesis  of  faculties. 
But  where  the  imagination  is  approached  through  a  discursive  paradigm  the  cognitive 
faculty  may  be  seen  to  prevail,  in  which  case  art  becomes  mere  decoration.  This  is  to 
reduce  the  imaginative  to  fancy  with  the  inevitable  corollary  that  art  becomes  didactic 
because,  in  effect,  it  remains  essentially  discursive  -a  sugared  pill,  propaganda. 
It  is  interesting  that  Sidney  defends  poetry  precisely  on  these  grounds  and  that  the 
didactic  defence  is  employed  by  Hamlet  in  discussing  the  effects  he  wishes  to  achieve  with 
The  Murder  of  Gonzago: 
[...  ]  the  purpose  of  playing,  whose  end,  both  at  the  first  and  now,  was  and  is  to  hold, 
as  'twere,  the  mirror  up  to  nature,  to  show  virtue  her  own  feature,  scorn  her  own 
image,  and  the  very  age  and  body  of  the  time  his  form  and  pressure.  10 
In  practice,  the  careful  instruction  that  Hamlet  gives  to  the  players  is  to  ensure  Claudius's 
identification  with  the  situation  and  characters  represented  in  the  play  -  clearly,  the  didactic 
response  can  only  be  retrospective,  contingent  upon  the  imaginative  response.  If  the  play 
within  the  play  were  essentially  didactic  Claudius  would  not  be  induced  to  betray  himself. 
What  characterises  the  aesthetic  mode  is  precisely  its  transcendence  of  dualism. 
Employed  in  the  domain  of  imagination  the  discursive  is  an  aberration  -  it  simply  does  not 
engage  with  the  aesthetic  or,  for  that  matter,  identity.  Freud's  discursive  symbolism,  by  the 
nature  of  its  logic,  can  only  fabricate  a  false  consciousness. 
Yet  this  is  not  to  deny  the  discursive  has  a  role  in  the  explication  of  texts  -  this  follows 
from  the  cognitive  aspect  of  the  analogical  structures  presupposed  in  internal  relations. 
Clarification  and  definition  -  for  example,  by  resort  to  historical  background  -  can 
10  William  Shakespeare,  Hamlet,  op.  cit.,  111.2.20 
168 legitimately  be  made  and  re-introduced  as  intelligible  elements  of  the  finality  of  the 
representation.  How  is  this  possible  without  contradiction?  Simply,  that  the  fruitful 
relationship  between  the  discursive  and  the  aesthetic  is  not  linear  but  dialectical. 
For  example,  the  first  chapter  of  Rousseau's  Social  Contract  begins  with  his  dramatic 
assertion  that  Man  was  born  free,  and  he  is  everywhere  in  chains'.  "  This  is  a  judgement 
about  the  author's  times,  in  which  case  it  is  reasonable  to  ask  if  his  deliberately  challenging 
observation  were  justified.  On  the  other  hand,  apprehended  in  the  aesthetic  mode  what 
becomes  available  is  the  intrinsic  irony  of  his  observation  clinched  in  paradox.  This  is 
generated  through  the  yoking  together  of  freedom  and  chains.  In  the  discursive  mode  it  is  a 
statement  about  an  historical  situation.  In  that  mode  it  is  contingent  upon  truth  for  its 
efficacy.  In  the  aesthetic  mode  the  thought  is  lifted  to  autonomy  -  it  becomes  momentarily 
disinterested  -  but  is,  thereby,  'charged  up'  for  insight.  12 
It  is  this  dialectical  logic  that  underpins  the  possibility  of  teaching  in  arts  subjects.  In 
practice,  sadly,  the  aesthetic  mode  often  cannot  be  sustained  under  the  reductive  assault  of 
information  and  ideological  commitment. 
Kant's  assertion  that  the  aesthetic  demonstrates  the  imagination  at  play  is  intelligible  in 
the  consideration  of  remodelling.  This  may  be  what  Kant  means  by  genius  -  the  'faculty  of 
aesthetic  ideas'13  involving  the  free  employment  of  cognitive  faculties'.  (p.  181,  §49)  He  is 
obliged  to  associate  it  with,  above  all,  poets,  because  the  mechanistic,  linear  logic  associated 
with  scientific  discovery  precludes  it: 
[...  ]  genius  [...  ]  is  a  talent  for  art  -  not  one  for  science,  in  which  clearly 
known  rules  must  take  the  lead  and  determine  the  procedure. 
[...  ]  Genius  [...  ]  is  the  exemplary  originality  of  the  natural  endowments  of 
an  individual  in  the  free  employment  of  his  cognitive  faculties.  On  this 
showing,  the  product  of  a  genius  [...  ]  is  an  example,  not  for  imitation  (for 
that  would  mean  the  loss  of  the  element  of  genius,  and  just  the  very  soul  of 
the  work),  but  to  be  followed  by  another  genius  -  one  whom  it  arouses  to  a 
sense  of  his  own  originality  in  putting  freedom  from  the  constraint  of  rules 
I  Jean  Jaques  Rousseau,  The  Social  Contract,  trans.  by  Maurice  Cranston  (London:  Penguin,  1968),  p.  49. 
12  I  am  grateful  to  Hywell  Thomas  for  this  example.  See  `Gerard  Manley  Hopkins  and  John  Duns  Scotus', 
in  Religious  Studies,  24  (1988),  337-364  (p.  349). 
13  Critique  ofJudgement,  p.  212,  §57 
169 so  into  force  in  his  art,  that  for  art  itself  a  new  rule  is  won.  (pp.  180-181, 
§49) 
The  logic  of  paradigm  shifts  -  the  emergence  of  an  alternative  holistic  vision  -  suggests  that 
Kant's  ascription  was  too  narrow  and  that  genius,  logically,  is  equally  a  potentiality  of  the 
imaginative  scientific  mind. 
An  important  assumption  of  Kant's  is  in  the  positing  of  a  common  sense.  He 
distinguishes  this  from  common  understanding  'which  is  also  sometimes  called  common 
sense  (sensus  communis)'.  (p.  82,  §20)  Because  they  depend  upon  pleasure,  which  is 
subjective,  Kant's  argument  for  the  universality  of  judgements  of  taste  comes  to  depend 
upon  establishing  a  consensus: 
[...  ]  the  actual  judgement  of  taste  must  satisfy  two  criteria  -  particular  judgements 
must  gain  confirmation  from  the  community  and  the  confirmed  judgement  must 
depend  on  the  subject's  autonomous  activity  in  grasping  and  ordering  some  material 
in  a  pleasurable  judgement.  In  effect  Kant's  theory  points  to  a  mutual  dependence 
between  the  subject  and  the  community.  '4 
Whereas  there  is  no  doubt  that  judgements  of  taste  do  conglomerate  into  consensus,  such 
consensus  comes  to  pre-empt  subjective  judgement  through  fashion  and  eventually 
consolidates  into  the  canonical.  Kant's  second  criterion  for  objectivity  includes  the  subject's 
'autonomous  activity'  but,  as  we  have  argued,  because  of  the  dialectical  nature  of  the 
aesthetic,  criteria  can  be  discussed.  In  the  end,  though,  the  shift  into  the  aesthetic  mode 
cannot  be  underwritten.  Kant's  argument  seems  ingenious  -  but  it  is  all  important  as  it 
evolves  into  the  transcendental  deduction  that  rationalises  the  very  heart  of  his  enterprise: 
[...  ]  a  person  who  describes  something  as  beautiful  insists  that  every  one  ought  to 
give  the  object  in  question  his  approval  and  follow  suit  in  describing  it  as  beautiful.  '5 
The  subjective  judgement  of  taste  is  rendered  universal  by  the  agreement  of  the  collective: 
The  individual  becomes  an  autonomous  subject  by  setting  aside  the  complete 
sovereignty  of  merely  subjective  responses  and  accepting  the  conditions  necessary 
for  an  intersubjective  validity  that  succeeds  by  gaining  confirmation  from  the 
aesthetic  community.  16 
14  Kemal,  p.  122. 
15  Critique  ofJudgement,  p.  82,  §19. 
16  Kemal,  p.  124. 
170 Aesthetic  judgement  involves  the  cognitive  powers  at  play  without  resolution  into  a 
definite  concept.  Common  sense,  then,  must  reflect  'the  way  the  cognitive  powers  are 
attuned  for  cognition  generally.  '17  In  other  words,  without  a  common  sense,  knowledge  and 
communication  'would  not  arise.  '  (p.  83,  §21)  Aesthetic  judgements  involve  us  in  the 
community  because  they  involve  common  rational  faculties  -  and  feelings  -  and  thereby  give 
us  the  means  to  negotiate  'intersubjective  judgements'.  18  In  this  way  aesthetic  judgement 
involves  us  in  culture. 
A  common  sense  is  a  condition  for  communication.  In  other  words,  the  intelligibility  of 
discourse  presupposes  a  common  capacity  -  but  intelligibility  in  art  presupposes  internal 
relations.  The  drama  is  intelligible  through  its  depiction  of  forms  of  life  -  it  is  forms  of  life 
that  are  inscaped  by  the  dramatist.  Such  forms  are  simply  unintelligible  when  conceived  in 
terms  of  discrete  faculties  -  feeling  or  cognition  -  and  neither  can  they  be  transparent  to  the 
discursive.  Peter  Winch  makes  a  telling  distinction  between  the  discursive  and  forms  of  life 
when  he  observes, 
[...  ]  though  extinct  ways  of  thinking  may,  in  a  sense,  be  recaptured  by  the  historian, 
the  way  in  which  the  historian  thinks  them  will  be  coloured  by  the  fact  that  he  has 
had  to  employ  historiographical  methods  to  recapture  them.  The  medieval  knight 
did  not  have  to  use  those  methods  in  order  to  view  his  lady  in  terms  of  the  notions 
of  courtly  love:  he  just  thought  of  her  in  those  terms.  19 
Kant,  in  associating  aesthetic  judgements  with  the  social  domain,  has  to  concede  how 
intelligibility  within  that  domain  proceeds  so  that,  ultimately,  finality  of  form  and  finality  of 
ends  are  merely  different  perspectives  on  the  same  structure:  the  aesthetic  is  a  mode  of 
relation.  In  so  far  as  the  articulate  imagination  remodels,  the  domain  of  cognition  must,  of 
necessity,  be  extended.  Art  is  not  a  matter  of  decoration  nor  of  propaganda. 
Though  Kant  in  his  pursuit  of  his  deduction  eschews  the  psychological  and  empirical, 
there  may  be  intriguing  evidence  for  a  common  sense  nevertheless  -  to  put  it  another  way, 
how  are  unfamiliar  forms  of  life  accessible  to  us?  The  following  example  concerns  a  culture 
17  Critique  ofJudgement,  p.  82,  §19. 
18  Kemal,  p.  127. 
19  Peter  Winch,  The  Idea  of  a  Social  Science,  this  edn.  1977  (London:  Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul,  1958), 
p.  132. 
171 as  distant  from  our  own  as  it  is  perhaps  possible  to  imagine  -  that  of  the  Yanomami  Indians 
who  live  in  an  area  on  the  borders  of  Brazil  and  Venezuela.  It  describes  a  shaman  engaged 
in  a  ritual: 
He  is  seated  under  the  high  part  of  the  roof,  somewhat  in  front  of  the  most 
forward  supporting  posts,  at  a  place  customarily  devoted  to  the  great  events 
of  social  life  [...  ].  The  low  part  between  the  two  rows  of  posts  that  support 
the  sloping  roof  is  the  place  of  family  life  and  domestic  activities.  Further 
back,  beyond  the  upright  logs  set  at  the  edge  of  the  forest,  is  the  dumping 
ground  for  household  refuse  and  dog  feces;  that  is  where  one  goes  to 
urinate.  From  the  central  plaza  to  the  forest  -  looking  from  the  inside 
toward  the  outside  -  one  can  make  out  a  series  of  concentric  rings  within 
which  specific  activities  are  carried  out.  Each  of  these  rings  is  in  turn 
divided  transversely,  each  segment  being  occupied  by  a  particular  lineage 
and  subdivided  among  different  groups  of  first  cousins.  But  that  is  not  all: 
The  great  shelter,  the  shobono,  also  reflects  the  Indian's  conception  of  the 
universe.  The  central  plaza  is  the  celestial  vault,  and  the  low  part  of  the  roof 
is  a  replica  of  the  low  part  of  the  sky  -  conceived  as  a  convex  structure  - 
where  it  meets  the  disc  of  the  earth.  When  a  shaman  goes  on  a  trip  between 
the  different  levels  of  the  universe  to  recover  a  stolen  soul,  to  "eat"  a  little 
child,  or  for  any  other  reason,  the  dwelling  is  for  him  a  convenient  geometric 
representation  where  he  can  orient  himself  perfectly.  This  exact 
convergence  of  the  social,  religious,  and  cosmological  orders  makes  a 
microcosm  of  the  Yanomami  dwelling.  20 
What  counts  here,  initially,  is  the  intelligibility  of  the  phenomenon  to  the  enquiring 
imagination  of  the  observer:  the  arriving  at  the  finality  of  the  Yanomami  conception 
presupposes  its  intelligibility  both  for  us  and  for  them  and  at  the  same  time  underwrites  its 
availability  as  a  thing  of  beauty.  From  another  perspective,  it  is  a  striking  example  of  the 
scientific  spirit,  the  quest  to  make  sense  of  the  world  and  ourselves. 
In  this  context  it  is  possible  to  illustrate  what  Kant  means  when  he  writes  that  'the 
beautiful  is  the  symbol  of  the  morally  good.  '  21  A  condition  of  the  possibility  of  morality  is  a 
common  sense,  that  is,  the  world  of  the  other  must  be  intelligible. 
All  intuitions  by  which  a  priori  concepts  are  given  a  foothold  are,  therefore, 
either  schemata  or  symbols.  Schemata  contain  direct,  symbols  indirect, 
presentations  of  the  concept.  Schemata  effect  this  presentation 
demonstratively,  symbols  by  the  aid  of  analogy  [...  ]  in  which  analogy 
20  Jacques  Lizot,  Tales  of  the  Yanomami,  trans.  by  E.  Simons,  Canto  edn.  1991  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University  Press,  1977),  p.  88. 
21  Critique  ofJudgement,  p.  223,  §59. 
172 judgement  performs  a  double  function:  first  in  applying  the  concept  to  the 
object  of  a  sensible  intuition,  and  then,  secondly,  in  applying  the  mere  rule  of 
its  reflection  upon  that  intuition  to  quite  another  object,  of  which  the  former 
is  a  symbol.  In  this  way  a  monarchical  state  is  represented  as  a  living  body 
when  it  is  governed  by  constitutional  laws,  but  as  a  mere  machine  (like  a 
hand-mill)  when  it  is  governed  by  an  individual  absolute  will;  but  in  both 
cases  the  representation  is  merely  symbolic.  (pp.  222-223,  §59) 
Given  that  what  underpins  the  analogical  is  an  internal  relation,  Kant  is  describing  the 
logic  of  metaphor  rather  than  of  symbolism  in  the  generally  accepted  sense  -  there  is,  for 
example,  no  internal  relation  between  Scotland  and  the  Saltire.  What  counts  is  the  rule  that 
underpins  the  internal  relation.  The  imagination  that  arrives  at  the  meaning  of  the  structure 
of  the  shobono  for  the  Yanomami  -  tracing  the  rule  as  it  proceeds  -  reproduces  the  very 
journey  of  the  moral  imagination  in  arriving  at  insight  into  our  common  humanity.  Our 
kinship  is  bound  in  to  the  possibility  of  mediation  through  symbolic  systems.  If  the 
language  of  the  Yanomami  is  translatable  then  we  must  share  forms  of  life  and  the  senses 
communis  is  confirmed. 
If  the  common  sense  offers  the  possibility  of  understanding  across  cultural  and 
geographical  divides  it  also  underpins  the  possibility  of  History.  Vasari  was  certainly  alert 
to  the  importance  of  establishing  the  historical  context  through  the  understanding  of  which 
something  of  the  presuppositions,  aims  and  values  implicit  in  an  artefact  could  be  reached. 
But  out  of  this  unearthing  of  differences  there  often  emerges,  paradoxically,  with  a  shock  of 
familiarity,  a  sense  of  a  common  life.  Given  the  limitations  of  the  discursive,  as  noted  by 
Winch,  what  it  was  to  be  an  Elizabethan  presupposes  imaginative  access  to  that  culture. 
The  imagination  in  entering  into  the  world  of  the  book  describes  a  parallel  path  to  its  entry 
into  the  circumstances  of  persons.  The  one  is  a  rehearsal  for  the  other;  both  extend  the 
community. 
Through  Kant's  conception  of  the  common  sense  can  be  seen  the  misconception  at  the 
heart  of  both  absolutism  and  relativism.  These  are  positions  posited  by  the  discursive.  The 
other  is  accessible  through  the  imagination  -  in  our  moral  and  cultural  transactions  -  and  it 
follows  that  cultures  themselves  must  similarly  be  accessible.  Relativism  presupposes  a 
conceptual  awareness  of  the  ideological  ground  of  absolutism  but  fails  to  see  that 
173 presupposed  in  whatever  cluster  of  values  is  asserted  is  the  common  ground  of  what  it  is  to 
value.  From  that  common  ground,  just  as  in  the  development  of  Kant's  cultural  community 
through  shared  judgements,  it  is  possible  to  develop  shared  experience. 
Friendships  which  are  'historic'  present  difficulties.  In  these  circumstances  friends  in  their 
infrequent  encounters  may  come  to  be  trapped  into  merely  revisiting  past  experiences. 
Continuing  friendship  depends  upon  new,  common  experience  -  shared  meaning. 
We,  distinctively,  are  makers  of  meaning  and  in  that  creativity  lies  the  possibility  of  a  kind 
of  freedom  from  history  in  terms  of  the  possibility  of  its  refiguration  through  a  common 
vision.  On  the  other  hand,  absolutism  and  relativism  are  the  only  positions  available  to  the 
thinking  self  in  the  discursive  mode.  It  is  in  the  exercising  of  the  imagination,  in  the  mutual 
accommodation  of  self  and  world  associated  with  the  individuating  self  -  supposing 
interaction  with  the  other,  the  social  domain  -  that  the  common  sense  becomes  a  liberating 
resource.  In  discussing  Kant's  notion  of  'enlarged  thought'  Makkreel  writes: 
[...  ]  the  imagination  has  an  important  role  to  play  in  enlarging  our  thought. 
Enlargement  does  not  call  for  us  to  transpose  ourselves  into  the  actual  standpoint  of 
someone  else.  The  understanding  of  the  other  is  dependent  on  a  prior  enlargement 
of  one's  own  thought  based  on  imagining  possibilities  that  are  not  merely  variations 
of  the  self.  This  is  not  to  be  confused  with  the  Romantic  idea  of  empathy.  Instead 
of  projecting  ourselves  into  the  other,  we  are  to  project  a  possible  intermediary 
position  held  neither  by  the  self  nor  by  the  other.  This  provides  a  perspective,  based 
on  the  sensus  communis,  that  makes  possible  a  better  understanding  of  both  the  self 
and  the  other.  22 
Here  we  see  an  important  role  for  imagination  in  the  mediation  effected  through  culture. 
Such  transactions  are  clearly  differentiated  from  identification  -  mere  empathy. 
This  position  is  clearly  distinct  from  that  of  Shelley: 
A  poet,  as  he  is  the  author  to  others  of  the  highest  wisdom,  pleasure,  virtue  and 
glory,  so  he  ought  personally  to  be  the  happiest,  the  best,  the  wisest,  and  the  most 
illustrious  of  men.  That  he  is  the  wisest,  the  happiest,  and  the  best,  inasmuch  as  he 
is  a  poet,  is  equally  incontrovertible;  the  greatest  poets  have  been  men  of  the  most 
spotless  virtue,  of  the  most  consummate  prudence,  and,  if  we  look  into  the  interior 
of  their  lives,  the  most  fortunate  of  men.  23 
22  Makkreel,  p.  160. 
23  Percy  Bysshe  Shelley,  'The  Defence  of  Poetry',  from  Nature  and  Industrialization,  op.  cit.,  pp.  215-216. 
174 Shelley  fails  to  discriminate  between  the  distinct  intentional  acts  that  separate  the 
imagination  in  the  context  of  the  moral  and  the  aesthetic:  the  former  meets  its  end  in 
responsive  action;  the  latter  in  illuminating  contemplation.  The  one  is  a  rehearsal  of  the 
other  but  the  aesthetic  incorporates  no  sanction  for  action. 
There  are,  though,  circumstances  where  the  imagination  fails  to  arrive  at  finality, 
characteristically,  in  the  contemplation  of  nature: 
[...  ]  we  observe  that  whereas  natural  beauty  (such  as  is  self-subsisting) 
conveys  a  finality  in  its  form  making  the  object  appear,  as  it  were,  predated 
to  our  power  of  judgement,  so  that  it  thus  forms  of  itself  an  object  of  our 
delight,  that  which,  without  our  indulging  in  any  refinements  of  thought,  but, 
simply  in  our  apprehension  of  it,  excites  the  feeling  of  the  sublime,  may 
appear,  indeed,  in  point  of  form  to  contravene  the  ends  of  our  power  of 
judgement,  to  be  ill-adapted  to  our  faculty  of  presentation,  and  to  be,  as  it 
were,  an  outrage  on  the  imagination.  24 
Clearly,  the  sublime  is  a  phenomenon  within  the  aesthetic  mode  -  it  is  not  comparable  to 
a  mere  failure  of  comprehension.  In  other  words,  the  imagination  has  failed  to  find  a  limit 
and  experiences  the  unlimited  -  it  experiences  a  not  yet  realised  resolution  of  form  within  a 
double  prescription.  The  intuition  of  imminent  resolution  is  characteristic.  The  failure  to 
resolve  the  form  must,  at  the  same  time,  be  a  failure  to  establish  internal  relations  in  a 
context  where  the  imagination  is  urgently  disposed  to  find  them.  In  Kant's  terms,  the 
imagination  seeks  to  find  subjective  formal  finality.  It  follows  that  whereas,  by  clear 
implication,  for  Wordsworth  the  sublime  is  an  avenue  to  the  numinous,  such  failure  of  the 
imagination  locates  the  sublime  in  subjectivity  -  this  may  help  to  explain  what  Keats  might 
have  meant  when,  in  a  letter  he  referred  to,  'the  Wordsworthian  or  egotistical  sublime'.  25 
Kant  distinguishes  between  the  mathematical  sublime,  which  'calls  forth  that  emotion 
which  no  mathematical  estimation  of  magnitudes  by  numbers  can  evoke'  26  -  that  is  to  say,  a 
defeat  of  the  imagination  in  the  context  of  the  faculty  of  cognition  -  and  the  dynamical 
sublime,  the  effect  of  such  a  defeat  on  the  faculty  of  desire.  (p.  94,  §24)  In  the  experience  of 
the  dynamical  sublime  our  imaginative  failure  is  experienced  as  awe  in  the  face  of  the 
24  Critique  ofJudgement,  p.  91,  §23. 
25  John  Keats,  'Letter'  to  Richard  Woodhouse,  1818,  from  A  Selection  from  John  Keats,  op.  cit.,  p.  238. 
26  Critique  of  Judgement,  p.  99,  §26. 
175 overwhelming  power  of  nature.  Whereas  the  experience  of  beauty  is  the  finding  of  stasis  in 
'restful  contemplation'  -  the  completion  of  subjective  finality  -  in  the  experience  of  the 
dynamical  sublime  the'mind  feels  itself  set  in  motion'.  (p.  107,  §27)  This  is  confirmed  in  the 
kinetic  imagery  associated  with  Hopkins  and  Dickinson  in  their  arriving  at  sublimity. 
How  is  the  conviction  that  the  sublime  is  associated  with  access  to  the  numinous  to  be 
squared  with  the  assertion  that  the  sublime  is  a  failure  of  imagination  in  the  context  of  the 
subjective? 
The  beautiful  prepares  us  to  love  something,  even  nature,  apart  from  any 
interest;  the  sublime  to  esteem  something  highly  even  in  opposition  to  our 
(sensible)  interest. 
The  sublime  may  be  describe  in  this  way:  It  is  an  object  (of  nature)  the 
representation  of  which  determines  the  mind  to  regard  the  elevation  of 
nature  beyond  our  reach  as  equivalent  to  a  presentation  of  ideas. 
(p.  119,  §29) 
That  is  to  say,  we  are  directed  to  understand  nature  as  if  it  were  a  creation  -a  Creator  is 
not,  thereby,  presupposed.  Kant  has  provided  the  rationalisation  for  a  position  that  the 
Romantics  would  instantly  recognise: 
The  charms  in  natural  beauty  [...  ]  blended  [...  ]  with  beauty  of  form  [...  ] 
embody  as  it  were  a  language  in  which  nature  speaks  to  us  and  which  has  the 
semblance  of  a  higher  meaning.  (p.  161,  §42) 
However,  it  is  precisely  in  its  subjectivity  that  the  sublime  reveals  to  us  an  infinity  within 
ourselves.  There  is  a  parallel  with  the  moral  law,  in  the  exercise  of  which  lies  freedom  and 
the  positing  of  my  own  value  in  so  far  as  I  am  my  own  law-maker. 
The  regress  of  the  imagination  involved  in  the  sublime  produces  [...  ]  a 
subliminal  sense  of  one's  own  resources  and  individuating  power  [...  ]. 
Just  as  the  purposiveness  of  beauty  is  related  to  the  form  that  delimits  an 
object,  so  the  purposiveness  of  the  sublime  implies  what  we  may  call  the 
form  of  the  subject.  27 
It  is  as  if  the  purposiveness  of  the  subject  were  a  microcosm  of  the  purposiveness  that 
informs  nature.  We  create  our  own  value: 
There  remains  then  nothing  but  the  worth  which  we  ourselves  assign  to  our 
life  by  what  we  not  alone  do,  but  do  with  a  view  to  an  end  so  independent  of 
27  MaklQeel,  pp.  84-85. 
176 nature  that  the  very  existence  of  nature  itself  can  only  be  an  end  subject  to 
the  condition  so  imposed.  28 
It  is  through  culture  that  we  ultimately  define  ourselves. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  modes  through  which  we  relate  to  that  culture  are  critical: 
regarded  as  a  set  of  prescriptions  or  precepts  or  assimilated  through  identification  culture 
constitutes  a  pervasive  determinism;  assimilated  through  the  imagination  a  process  of 
reciprocal  discovery  -  self  and  world  -  is  possible. 
The  relationship  between  the  beautiful  and  the  sublime  can,  perhaps,  be  reconstrued  in 
the  consideration  of  the  relation  between  the  analogical  and  the  symbolic.  Beauty  is  bound 
up  with  a  specific  kind  of  intention  engaged  by  purposive  wholes.  The  whole  is  analogically 
constituted.  The  analogical,  of  its  nature,  depicts  the  finality  that  is  projected  through 
internal  relation.  Such  finality  is  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for  beauty  -  it 
awaits  its  fulfilment  through  the  aesthetic  mode.  Symbolism,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
associated  with  the  purposiveness  of  the  whole.  Language  is  a  symbolic  system  precisely 
because  of  the  purposiveness  of  its  concepts  - 
For  a  large  class  of  cases  -  though  not  for  all  -  in  which  we  employ  the  word 
"meaning"  it  can  be  defined  thus:  the  meaning  of  a  word  is  its  use  in  the  language.  29 
Symbolism  reflects  a  distinctive  intention  that  not  only  engages  with  the  purposiveness  of 
the  depiction  but  is  also  sensitive  to  the  power  of  the  purposiveness.  In  the  context  of  art, 
explicit  symbolism  draws  attention  to  the  expressive  purpose  of  the  artist.  This  must  be  a 
distraction  from  the  contemplation  of  the  finality  of  the  construct.  In  the  context  of  nature, 
on  the  other  hand,  and  in  the  depiction  of  nature,  awareness  of  such  purposiveness,  given  a 
certain  ideological  presupposition,  reaches  for  rationalisation  in  terms  of  a  creator. 
In  his  discussion  of  natural  selection  Richard  Dawkins  is  helpful  in  focusing  these  issues: 
Natural  selection  [...  ]  has  no  purpose  in  view.  Yet  the  living  results  of  natural 
selection  overwhelmingly  impress  us  with  the  appearance  of  design.  30 
28  Critique  of  Judgement,  Part  II:  Critique  of  Teleological  Judgement,  p.  98n.,  §23  [841. 
29  Philosophical  Investigations,  p.  20e,  43. 
30  Richard  Dawkins,  The  Blind  Watchmaker  (London:  Penguin,  1988),  p.  21. 
177 We  see  creatures  as  purposive  wholes  and  so  caught  up  are  we  in  the  sheer  appropriateness 
of  their  structures  that  we  transpose  purposiveness  into  purpose,  thereby  reflecting  'the 
power  of  the  illusion  of  design.  '  According  to  Dawkins,  William  Paley's  Natural  Theology  - 
published  in  1802,  in  the  context  of  the  Romantic  movement  -  precisely  reflects  this  illusion. 
Again,  in  the  contemplation  of  the  structures  of  living  forms,  finality  of  form  is  internally 
related  to  finality  of  ends. 
It  is  as  if  Wordsworth  found  a  passage  to  the  numinous  through  the  purposive  power  that 
emerges  in  his  readings  of  nature,  readings  which  are  analogically  rendered  in  his  poetry.  In 
effect,  the  numinous  is  a  particular  conceptual  rationalisation  of  the  charge  of  double 
prescription  arising  from  the  very  nature  of  beauty  itself  -  beauty  is  a  mode  of  response  to 
purposive  wholes.  The  sublime,  then,  supposes  the  experience  of  an  intense  purposiveness  - 
a  symbolic  apprehension  -  in  the  expectation  of  the  immanent  resolution  of  a  whole  that 
remains  without  a  limit.  Where  nature  is  understood  to  be  emblematic  we  can  assume  that 
purposiveness  has  shifted  into  a  rationalising  sense  of  purpose  and  this  rationalisation  has 
consolidated  into  an  ideological  stance. 
In  the  context  of  the  artefact  we  may  be  moved  to  draw  attention  to  the  brilliance  of  the 
execution  -  we  reverence  the  mind  that  conceived  this  Shakespeare  play  or  that  Mozart 
opera.  However,  in  the  context  of  nature,  the  landscape  itself  will  be  found  to  be  charged 
with  unresolved  purposiveness.  It  is  such  intuitions  of  purposiveness  that  seem  to  be  the 
ground  of  the  sacred  -  antecedent  to  which  must  be  apprehension  in  the  aesthetic  mode. 
Aesthetic  apprehension  is  presupposed  in  the  sublime  where  the  attempt  to  arrive  at 
comprehension  -  or,  indeed,  the  arrival  itself  -  incorporates  an  intention  directed  at 
purposiveness.  Such  intuition  arises  from  a  completed  finality  or  in  the  anticipation  of  such 
finality  -  it  is  a  matter  of  experience  that  there  can  be  a  sense  of  imminent  completion 
before  the  full  aesthetic  comprehension  itself.  The  strongest  sense  of  the  sacred  arises  in 
this  process  of  completion,  in  the  very  act  of  imagining,  hence,  the  characteristic  kinetic 
imagery. 
In  Coleridge's  'Frost  at  Midnight'  many  of  these  issues  concerning  symbolism  emerge: 
178 The  Frost  performs  its  secret  ministry, 
Unhelped  by  any  wind.  31 
The  metaphor  'ministry'  supposes  the  rendering  of  a  service  in  a  religious  context.  The 
action  of  the  frost  is  purposive  but,  as  yet,  without  a  specific  purpose.  Its  action  is  'secret' 
because  what  it  effects  is  brought  about  by  no  readily  identifiable  agency.  Frost  is 
associated  with  beauty  because  it  inscapes,  draws  the  eye  to  structures  inherent  in  the 
natural  world. 
On  the  larger  scale,  six  inches  of  snow  will  transfigure  a  mountain  landscape.  In  our 
response  to  the  same  prospect  without  snow  we  seem  to  select  cues  which  emphasise  the 
vertical  plane  of  the  mountain  -  rock  faces  and  steep  slopes  draw  the  eye.  The  snow  at  once 
defamiliarises  and  inscapes  in  such  a  way  as  to  emphasise  the  gentler  slopes  and  flatter 
surfaces  because  that  is  where  the  snow  gathers.  The  effect  is  to  shift  the  slope  towards  the 
horizontal  plane  -  the  mountain  looks  altogether  more  accessible. 
Defamiliarisation  is  the  condition  that  allows  for  the  emergence  of  new  structures.  The 
visitation  of  frost  effects  an  aesthetic  transformation  which,  precisely  because  it  is  beautiful, 
is  associated  with  purposiveness.  The  association  of  'ministy  and  inscape  draws  attention 
to  such  purposiveness.  The  whole  transaction  is  now  available  to  fulfil  a  symbolic  function 
-  the  frost  becomes  representative,  points  beyond  itself,  as  purpose  evolves  out  of 
purposiveness.  A  dualistic  polarisation  now  emerges.  The  source  of  the  aesthetic 
experience  has  now  become  ripe  for  ideological  appropriation: 
[...  ]  so  shalt  thou  see  and  hear 
The  lovely  shapes  and  sound  intelligible 
Of  that  eternal  language,  which  thy  God 
Utters,  who  from  eternity  doth  teach 
Himself  in  all,  and  all  things  in  himself.  (p.  70) 
In  fact  it  is  in  the  context  of  the  aesthetic  -  in  purposiveness  not  yet  resolved  into  purpose  - 
that  the  symbolic  effect  is  at  its  most  powerful.  Everything  at  the  far  side  of  the  aesthetic 
involves  a  vitiation. 
Strictly  speaking,  in  Coleridge's  poem  the  aesthetic  is  presupposed  in  the  initial  image. 
We  are  drawn  into  Coleridge's  perspective  from  indoors  while  we  imagine  what  is 
31  S.  T.  Coleridge,  'Frost  at  Midnight',  from  Selected  Poems,  op.  cit.,  p.  68. 
179 happening  outside  -  our  attention  is  thereby  drawn  to  the  process.  The  poem  explores  what 
it  is  to  be  a  symbol  rather  than  initiates  us  into  the  aesthetic  apprehension  itself. 
By  the  time  of  its  reiteration  towards  the  end  of  the  poem  the  'secret  ministry'  of  the  frost 
has  become  representative.  The  poem  reflects  the  decay  from  the  immediacy  of  imaginative 
apprehension  to  the  discursive.  The  imagination  is,  of  its  very  nature,  associated  with  loss  - 
the  characteristic  lyric  theme  of  mutability  is internally  related  to  the  evolving  imaginative 
process  itself. 
We  noted  earlier  that  catharsis  was  originally  a  preparatory  purgation  in  anticipation  of 
ekstasis.  It  is  as  if  the  process  were  secularised  by  Aristotle  -  that  is  to  say,  that  aesthetic 
comprehension  is  identified  with  response  to  a  specifically  human  construct.  He  set  the 
drama  free  from  religious  ritual.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  that  in  a  context  of  incipient 
secularisation  that  the  eighteenth  century  fascination  with  the  sublime  was  an  attempt  to 
give  expression  to  religious  needs  within  an  essentially  dualistic  epistemology. 
Implicit  in  the  general  argument  has  been  the  reversal  of  the  accepted  hierarchies  of 
reason  and  imagination.  That  the  sacred  is  an  adjunct  of  the  aesthetic  is,  perhaps,  for  some, 
a  more  contentious  reversal  but  it  is,  of  course,  perfectly  neutral  with  regard  to  the  mystery 
of  the  intelligibility  of  what  Kant  would  call  the  'substrate  of  nature'.  32 
Summary 
Whether  or  not  a  representation  is  experienced  as  beautiful  or,  say,  informative,  depends 
upon  the  mode  in  which  it  is  apprehended.  In  our  actual  experience  cognition  and  emotion 
are  bound  together.  In  art,  the  analogical  nature  of  representations,  because  of  the  logic  of 
internal  relations,  establishes  that  finality  within  the  representation  presupposes  objective 
finality.  Beauty  is  associated  with  the  imagination's  engaging,  through  a  specific  mode  of 
contemplation,  with  purposive  wholes.  Only  when  imagination  is  conflated  with  fancy  - 
supposing  dualistic  categories,  head  and  heart  -  is  Kant's  notion  of  free  beauty  intelligible.  In 
these  circumstances  beauty  is  a  response  to  the  decorative  -  beauty  without  a  concept. 
32  Critique  of  Teleological  Judgement,  p.  77,  §  19,  (80). 
180 Aesthetic  judgements  are  discussible  because  of  the  possibility  of  a  dialectical  movement 
across  modes.  This  transaction  allows  for  the  discursive  to  contribute  to  the  explication  of 
purposive  wholes  but  it  cannot  underwrite  the  aesthetic  response.  That  something  is  a 
symbol,  presupposes  expressiveness  in  a  context  of  purpose  where  the  purpose  becomes  an 
object  of  intention.  Aesthetic  responses  to  nature,  in  a  certain  ideological  context,  and 
given  a  certain  intensity,  resolve  into  experience  of  the  sacred. 
There  is  a  common  sense  presupposed  in  the  possibility  of  intelligibility  itself.  In  arriving 
at  this  intelligibility,  the  imagination,  whether  in  the  aesthetic  or  moral  mode,  comes  to  a 
recognition  of  our  common  humanity  and,  thereby,  to  an  awareness  of  the  unconditional 
value  of  persons.  In  these  circumstances,  to  deny  unconditionality  is  self-contradictory. 
Conditionality  is  a  product  of  discursive  scrutiny. 
181 Chapter  Nine 
Monochromatic  and  Imaginative  Readings 
In  listening  or reading  we  are  engaged  in  a  range  of  modes  of  relation.  The  mediation 
effected  through  metaphor  in  the  process  of  imagining  supposes  both  a  semantic  context 
and  a  projective  reference  whose  power  of  depiction  is  manifest  in  an  holistic  structure. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  explicative  power  of  the  discursive  is  confined  to  a  cumulative 
series  of  signs  and  referents.  Critical  discourse  tacitly  assumes  that  its  characteristic 
discursive  relation  is  the  paradigm  case  of  understanding.  However,  its  structures  of 
interpretation  must  be  beside  the  point,  establish  a  sort  of  critical  idealism  -  in  the  sense  of 
an  exalting  exaggeration  -  unless  their  role  as  elements  in  the  dialectic  of  imagining  is 
understood.  This  chapter  explores  some  of  the  epistemological  issues  inherent  in  the 
different  modes  of  relation. 
In  Howard's  End,  E.  M.  Forster  presents  a  spectrum  of  responses  in  describing  how  his 
characters  respond  to  music: 
It  will  be  generally  admitted  that  Beethoven's  Fifth  Symphony  is  the  most  sublime 
noise  that  has  ever  penetrated  into  the  ear  of  man.  All  sorts  and  conditions  are 
satisfied  by  it.  Whether  you  are  like  Mrs  Munt,  and  tap  surreptitiously  when  the 
tunes  come  [...  ]  or  like  Helen,  who  can  see  heroes  and  shipwrecks  in  the  music's 
flood;  or  like  Margaret,  who  can  only  see  the  music;  or  like  Tibby,  who  is 
profoundly  versed  in  counterpoint,  and  who  holds  the  full  score  open  on  his  knee;  or 
like  their  cousin,  Fräulein  Mosebach,  who  remembers  all  the  time  that  Beethoven  is 
'echt  Deutsch;  or  like  Fräulein  Mosebach's  young  man,  who  can  remember  nothing 
but  Fräulein  Mosebach:  in  any  case,  the  passion  of  your  life  becomes  more  vivid, 
and  you  are  bound  to  admit  that  such  a  noise  is  cheap  at  two  shillings.  ' 
These  responses  are  exaggerated  in  some  cases  for  the  purpose  of  satire  but  taken 
together  they  could  stand  for  a  rough  and  ready  exposition  of  the  experience  of  a  single 
listener  in  the  course  of  a  concert.  Helen's  response  is  indicative  of  appropriation  through 
fantasy,  nevertheless,  at  some  level,  mediation  through  the  music  is  presupposed,  if 
manifest,  predominantly,  in  affective  terms.  Tibby  is  trapped  in  the  discursive  -  mediation  is 
presupposed  here  too  but  at  the  level  of  the  cognitive  though  there  must  be  some 
motivating  value.  The  most  interesting  case  is  that  of  Meg  who  can  only  'see'  the  music. 
Why  should  Forster  employ  synaesthesia  to  reach  for  an  account  of  her  experience? 
It  is  as  if  Forster  were  distinguishing  between  the  kind  of  transaction  that  Meg  makes 
compared  to  those  of  the  others  who  'see'  in  the  music  what  they  bring  to  it  -  the  music  as 
t  E.  M.  Forster,  Howard's  End,  repr.  1979  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1941),  pp.  44-45. 
182 mirror.  Much  then  depends  upon  the  'only',  which  suggests  that  she  'sees'  the  music  in  and 
for  itself.  But  what  does  that  involve?  It  is  as  if  Forster  assumed  that  if  Meg  were 
described  as  simply  'hearing'  the  music  we  would  drift  over  the  transaction  assuming  we 
knew  what  it  meant  -  that  is,  we  would  assimilate  through  identification.  That  would, 
ironically,  engage  the  same  relation  in  the  reader  as  is  satirised  in  most  of  the  other 
characters  in  their  responses  to  Beethoven.  Does  metaphor,  then,  in  some  way,  give  us 
privileged  access? 
So  far  we  have  understood  metaphor  to  be  a  structural  analogue  which  effects  a 
mediation  with  the  world  and  with  the  capacity  to  render  experience  from  redundancy.  Paul 
Ricoeur  locates  its  imaginative  power  both  at  the  referential  and  semantic  levels: 
The  creative  moment  of  metaphor  is  concentrated  on  this  grasping  of  resemblance, 
in  the  perception  of  analogies.  [...  ]  We  now  see  a  similarity  that  nobody  had  ever 
noticed  before.  The  difficulty  [...  ]  is  to  understand  that  we  see  similarity  by 
construing  it,  that  the  visionary  grasping  of  resemblance  is,  at  the  same  time,  a 
verbal  invention.  The  iconic  element  has  therefore  to  be  included  in  the  predicative 
process  itself. 
[...  ]  a  novel  metaphor  does  not  merely  actualize  a  potential  connotation,  it  creates 
it.  It  is  a  semantic  innovation,  an  emergent  meaning.  2 
In  effect,  he  endorses  here  the  prescriptive  power  of  language.  Additionally,  in  our 
terms,  it  is  as  if  there  is  redundancy  within  language  itself:  'when  we  speak,  only  a  part  of 
the  semantic  field  of  a  word  is  used.  '  (p.  73)  It  is  through  exploiting  the  redundancy  in 
language  that  redundancy  in  the  world  rendered: 
It  is  the  very  experience  of  making  that  yields  that  of  discovering.  And 
discovering  is  to  confront  the  opacity  of  the  world.  The  world  is  included  - 
excluded  as  the  horizon  of  each  intentional  aiming.  3 
It  is  through  'intentional  aiming'  that  double  prescription  is  engaged,  and  through  such 
prescriptions  that  redundancy  is  inscaped  -  structured  -  and  thereby  charged  with  meaning. 
The  phenomenon  of  double  prescription  was  first  described  in  terms  of  visual  experience.  It 
can  be  seen  that  the  framing  intention  that  limits  and  thereby  structures  visual  experience  is 
replicated  in  the  process  of  selection  and  simultaneous  foredrawing  implicit  in  metaphor. 
2  Paul  Ricoeur,  'Word,  Polysemy,  Metaphor:  Creativity  in  Language',  from  A  Ricoeur  Reader:  Reflection 
and  Imagination,  ed.  by  Mario  J.  Valdes  (New  York:  Harvester  Wheatsheaf,  1991),  pp.  78-79. 
3  Ricoeur,  'A  Review  of  Nelson  Goodman's  Ways  of  Woridmaking',  from  A  Ricoeur  Reader,  p.  212. 
183 But  whether  such  innovation  supposes  the  priority,  as  it  were,  of  the  semantic  or  the  world 
proves  to  be  an  issue  that  involves  closer  examination  of  the  nature  of  symbolic  mediation  - 
it  is,  after  all,  the  intention  of,  say,  Wordsworth  or  Hopkins  or  Cezanne  to  render  the  world. 
In  so  far  as  a  text  or  conversation  is intelligible  at  all,  symbolic  mediation  has  occurred. 
Mediation  involves  a  simultaneous  dual  transaction.  The  consideration  of  a  single  noun  - 
'sparrow'  -  distorts  the  issues  in  that  the  noun  appears  to  depend  for  its  meaning  exclusively 
on  a  single  transaction,  its  reference,  suggesting,  fundamentally,  the  priority  of  ostensive 
definition.  On  the  other  hand,  its  meaning  -  its  use  in  the  language  -  presupposes  that  the 
sign  takes  its  place  -  becomes  a  symbol  -  as  a  constituent  in  a  complex  matrix  of  concepts  - 
'bird',  'flight',  for  example.  The  sign  becomes  a  symbol  in  the  context  of  a  language  game. 
[...  ]  words  function  as  meaningful  entities  only  within  the  framework  of  the 
sentence. 
Of  course,  words  are  based  on  lexical  entities  which  are  undoubtedly  semiotic 
things.  But  a  lexical  entity  is  not  yet  a  word.  It  is  only  the  possibility  of  a  word.  4 
Even  a  single  noun  is  intelligible  only  at  the  nexus  of  a  dual  transaction  -a  reference  and  a 
semantic  context. 
Put  in  another  way,  'sparrow'  remains  generic  -a  sign,  not  yet  a  symbol  -  until  made 
specific  through  predication:  it  follows,  that  the  reference  presupposes  a  semantic  context. 
Making  something  specific  presupposes  an  already  complex,  intelligible  structure.  Hywel 
Thomas  observes: 
[...  ]  logicians  (post-Frege)  have  accepted  that  it  is  only  in  the  context  of  a 
proposition  (i.  e.  the  representation  of  a  situation  or  state  of  affairs)  that  a  name 
succeeds  in  acquiring  a  reference;  that  is,  that  an  arbitrary  sound  becomes,  or  can  be 
construed  as  a  names 
Our  early  education  predisposes  us  to  assume  that  somehow  dictionaries  are  repositories 
of  meaning  but  in  learning  a  foreign  language  we  discover  that  they  are  never  quite  enough  - 
meaning  is  a  function  of  how  the  word  is  used.  The  predications  that  constitute  Hopkins's 
inscape  render  specific  characteristics  of  the  world  that  have  remained  redundant, 
previously  undisclosed,  or  have  been  obscured  by  familiarity.  In  this  is  revealed  the  link 
4  'Word,  Polysemy,  Metaphor',  p.  69. 
5  Hywl  Thomas,  `Gerard  Manley  Hopkins  and  John  Duns  Scotus',  op.  cit.,  p.  343. 
184 between  inscape  and  individuation:  Hopkins,  in  exploring  the  resources  of  language  through 
metaphor,  simultaneously  effects  a  definition  or  redefinition  of  some  aspect  of  the  world. 
Individuation  and  inscape  are  logically  related. 
In  the  analogical  context,  the  referential  power  of  language  is  not  a  function  of  single, 
ostensive  definitions  but  depends  on  internal  relations  between  semantic  configurations  and 
states  of  affairs  in  the  world  -  that  is  what  symbolic  mediation  means.  Reference  is  a 
product  of  successful  mediation.  Only  a  symbol  -  presupposing  a  semantic  context  -  can 
function  as  a  component  in  a  series  of  internal  relations. 
Earlier,  in  discussing  issues  concerning  the  Romantic  imagination,  I  suggested  that  for 
something  to  function  as  a  symbol  involves  a  sense  of  purposiveness  engaged  by  an  holistic 
apprehension  of  a  complex  structure.  It  seems  that  a  linguistic  symbol  becomes  so  only  in 
fulfilling  a  purposive  role  in  a  semantic  context. 
If  reference  supposes  successful  mediation  the  issue  resolves  into  the  consideration  of  the 
fit  between  analogue  and  world  -  mediation  becomes  a  function  of  the  projective  efficacy  of 
symbolic  structures.  As  we  have  already  noted,  (Chapter  4)  Wittgenstein  refers  to  'the  law 
of  projection'  in  his  discussion  of  the  relation  of  the  'symphony'  to  'the  language  of  musical 
notation.  '  6  Ricoeur  comments: 
It  is  a  fact  that  no  articulate  theory  of  imagination  is  available  which  does  justice  to 
the  basic  distinction  between  image  as  fiction  and  image  as  copy.  Stubborn 
prejudices  tend  to  identify  the  notion  of  image  with  that  of  replica  of  a  given  reality.? 
The  image  as  replica  supposes  the  priority  of  what  might  be  called  literal  reference: 
[...  ]  if  you  treat  fiction  as  a  complex  image  you  may  refer  your  elementary  images 
one  by  one  to  corresponding  entities  in  the  world.  But  you  have  only  displaced  the 
difficulty.  It's  the  new  combination  which  has  no  reference  in  a  previous  original  to 
which  the  image  would  be  a  copy.  (p.  120) 
It  is  the  consideration  of  the  projective  reference  of  the  symbolic  structure  presupposed  in 
internal  relations  that  resolves  Ricoeur's  problem.  The  assertion  of  the  priority  of  image  as 
replica  -  with  its  insistence  on  piecemeal,  literal  reference  -  is,  effectively,  a  reversal  of 
logical  priorities:  specific  reference  presupposes  projective  reference.  Mere  replication 
6  Ludwig  Wittgenstein,  Tractatus  Logico-Philosophicus,  op.  cit.,  p.  39. 
7  The  Function  of  Fiction  in  Shaping  Reality',  from  A  Ricoeur  Reader,  p.  118 
185 denies  the  prescriptive  power  of  the  mediating  structure.  The  potentiality  for  creativity  lies 
in  the  complexity  of  the  structure  that  seeks  to  effect  mediation;  that  complexity  allows  for 
the  shifting  of  emphasis  and  focus  that  renders  hidden  redundancy.  Internal  relations 
underpin  projective  reference;  creativity  within  the  analogical  structure  depends  upon  the 
development  of  constituent  relations.  But  there  is  a  simultaneous,  dual  transaction  which 
finally  denies  priority  either  to  language  or  to  the  world  -  the  analogue  is  constitutive  of 
experience  and  that  disclosure  with  its  double  prescription  is  the  paradigm  case  of 
imaginative  transactions.  At  that  moment,  to  see  and  to  discover  and  to  value  are  one  and 
the  same.  Herein  lies  the  conceptual  basis  for  imaginative  synthesis,  the  reconciliation  of 
head  and  heart. 
Seeing  things  'as  if  supposes  an  internal  relation.  The  image  then  shares  with  that  which 
is  represented,  an  aspect  of  its  constituent  form.  Projective  reference  marries  an  aspect  of 
the  necessarily  complex  form  of  the  image  with  an  aspect  of  the  complex  form  of  the 
phenomenon.  But  just  as  in  the  process  of  our  imagining  the  image  discloses  itself  as 
intelligible  -  we  unpack  the  metaphor  -  the  projective  reference  must,  in  effect,  bind  the 
aspects  of  some  state  of  affairs  in  the  world  into  a  limited  whole.  The  disclosed 
intelligibility  is  read  into  it  -  this  limitation  thereby  constituting  and  establishing  the  initial 
prescription  of  a  double  prescription.  It  is  in  this  experience  of  complexity  holistically 
realised  through  the  image  -  the  dynamic  process  of  imagining  -  that  there  is  generated  the 
possibility  of  symbolism.  Indeed,  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  some  sense  of  the  purposive  in  an 
aspect  of  the  world  so  revealed  -  it  is  inherent  in  the  fundamental  intelligibility  of  the  image. 
Hopkins's  inscapes  -  symbolic  analogues  -  are  extended  into  the  matrix  of  constituent 
relations  that  are  the  fabric  of  the  poem.  The  novel  and  the  drama  are  as  securely  inscaped 
through  symbolic  mediation  as  a  Hopkins  poem  or  a  Cezanne  landscape: 
In  his  Poetics  Aristotle  paved  the  way  for  a  generalizing  of  metaphor  conceived  as 
heuristic  fiction  by  linking  metaphor  as  a  rhetorical  trait  to  the  main  operation  of 
poetry  which  is  the  building  of  a  mythos,  of  a  fable.  The  invention  of  the  fable  in 
tragedy  is  the  creative  act  of  poetrypar  excellence.  8 
8  'Word,  Polysemy,  Metaphor',  p.  84. 
186 Ricoeur  argues  that  a  metaphor'is  a  work  in  miniature'9  Characteristically,  what  is  inscaped 
in  the  novel  and  drama  are  forms  of  life  -  this  is  presupposed  in  their  very  intelligibility. 
It  follows  that  learning  about  the  text  -  making  discoveries  about  it  -  through  exploration 
of  constituent  relations  presupposes  extension  of  the  intelligibility  of  the  ground  of 
reference  through  internal  relations,  but  the  extension  of  meaning  implicit  in  the 
presupposition  remains  a  mere  potentiality  and  waits  upon  the  act  of  imagining  for  its 
realisation.  This  is  a  departure  from  Ricoeur's  argument  which  fails  effectively  to 
differentiate  between  the  discursive  and  aesthetic  modes. 
Put  in  Kantian  terms  -  and  to  reverse  Kant's  argument  -  in  so  far  as  a  representation  is 
analogically  constituted,  objective  and  subjective  finality  coincide  in  the  aesthetic  mode  but 
not  in  the  discursive.  This  is  because  in  the  discursive  mode,  double  prescription  cannot 
take  place:  the  world  cannot,  therefore,  be  manifest  as  inscape  -  in  holistic  structures.  It 
cannot,  in  these  circumstances,  be  individuated.  In  the  discursive  mode  structure  is 
experienced  as  extended  through  time;  it  is  conceived  in  components  with  discrete 
reference.  In  the  aesthetic  mode,  dual  reference  is  irreducible. 
As  Ricoeur  says,  'mimesis  is  not  a  copying  of  reality,  but  a  redescription  in  light  of  a 
heuristic  fiction'.  10  Poetry  is  not  associated  with  making  discoveries  about  the  nature  of  the 
world,  it  'gives  no  information  in  terms  of  empirical  knowledge  [...  ].  What  is  changed  by 
poetic  language  is  our  way  of  dwelling  in  the  world.  '  (p.  85).  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be 
that  science  itself  does  something  very  similar.  Was  not  the  'discovery'  of  DNA  associated 
with  finding  a  model,  an  holistic  structure,  that  explained  the  interrelation  of  previously 
unsynthesised  data?  At  a  fundamental  level,  paradigm  shifts  change  the  nature  of  what  we 
take  to  be  the  world.  It  could  be  argued  that  these  alter  the  scientific  community's  way  of 
'dwelling  in  the  world'.  It  is  not  the  nature  of  their  imagining  that  distinguishes  the  poet 
from  the  scientist  but  their  distinctive  intentions  in  the  contexts  of  different  kinds  of  assent. 
Newton  himself  is  perfectly  clear  that  what  is  revealed  by  the  empirical  method  is  inherent 
purposiveness  and  from  that  insight  he  takes  the  further  step  into  the  ascription  of  purpose: 
9  Metaphor  and  the  Main  Problem  of  Hermaneutics',  from  A  Ricoeur  Reader,  p.  305. 
10  'Word,  Polysemy,  Metaphor',  p.  84. 
187 As  in  mathematics,  so  in  natural  philosophy,  the  investigation  of  difficult  things  by 
the  method  of  analysis,  ought  ever  to  precede  the  method  of  composition.  This 
analysis  consists  in  making  experiments  and  observations,  and  in  drawing  general 
conclusions  from  them  by  induction  [...  ].  And  if  natural  philosophy  in  all  its  parts, 
by  pursuing  this  method,  shall  at  length  be  perfected,  the  bounds  of  moral 
philosophy  will  also  be  enlarged.  For  so  far  as  we  can  know  by  natural  philosophy 
what  is  the  First  Cause,  what  power  He  has  over  us,  and  what  benefits  we  receive 
from  Him,  so  far  our  duty  towards  Him,  as  well  as  that  towards  one  another,  will 
appear  to  us  by  the  light  of  Nature.  " 
The  nature  of  Romantic  symbolism  is  adumbrated  in  this. 
From  the  author's  perspective  (the  pursuit  of  reality)  the  exposition  of  insight  gleaned  in 
his  world  in  the  process  of  analogical  development  -  that  is,  through  symbolic  mediation  - 
drives  the  subtlety  of  the  constituent  matrix.  From  the  reader's  perspective,  obscurity  is 
inevitably  generated  according  to  the  degree  of  novelty  of  the  insight.  To  confront  this  is, 
in  effect,  to  enter  into  a  process  of  defamiliarisation,  which  is  a  precondition  for  the 
conceptual  shifts  that  allow  for  the  establishment  of  novel  projective  reference  -  new 
insight.  Ricoeur  associates  such  defamiliarisation  with, 
[...  ]  the  central  paradox  of  the  theory  of  fiction,  namely,  that  only  the  image  which 
does  not  already  have  its  referent  in  reality  is  able  to  display  a  world. 
[...  ]  fiction  reveals  its  ability  to  transform  or  transfigure  reality  only  when  it  is 
inserted  into  something  as  a  labour,  in  short,  when  it  is  a  work  [...  ].  When  the 
image  is  made,  it  is  also  able  to  remake  a  world.  It  is  at  this  stage  that  the  break 
with  philosophic  tradition  is  most  difficult  to  perform  and  preserve.  The  constant 
tendency  of  classical  philosophy  to  reduce  fiction  to  illusion  closes  the  way  to  an 
ontology  of  fiction.  Kant  himself  has  rendered  this  step  most  difficult  both  in 
insisting  on  the  subjectivity  of  the  judgement  of  taste  and  in  placing  fiction  within 
the  aesthetics  of  genius.  12 
In  the  aesthetic  mode,  it  is dual  reference  -  the  lateral,  semantic  relation  in  combination 
with  projective  reference  -  and  the  consequent  coinciding  of  objective  and  subjective  finality 
that  release  art  from  subjectivity  and  establishes  imagining  as  the  paradigm  case  of 
intelligibility. 
But  here  there  is  a  problem:  the  actual  shift  and  accompanying  double  prescription  is  not 
directly  available  through  linear  logic  -  the  shift  is,  of  its  nature,  spontaneous.  The  shift  can 
II  Sir Isaac  Newton,  Optics,  from  Great  Books  of  the  Western  World,  cd.  by  R.  M.  Hutchins  (London: 
Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  1952),  p.  543. 
12  The  Function  of  Fiction  in  Shaping  Reality',  p.  129. 
188 be  worked  for  but  the  very  working  may  serve  merely  to  consolidate  the  discursive  mode. 
This  explains  why  the  creative  imagination  -  as  in  the  case  of  Wordsworth  -  can  be  had  and 
lost.  It  also  explains  why  a  new  configuration  of  reality  may  not  be  engaged.  Ricoeur  hints 
at  such  spontaneity  when  he  refers  to  the  'visionary  grasping  of  resemblance'.  13 
In  identification  the  reader  is  denied  the  full  potential  of  dual  reference  because  the 
cognitive  is  reduced  to  recognition,  which  merely  slides  over  obscurity  -  every  reader  must 
have  experienced  being  hit  by  an  image  or  line  in  a  familiar  text  that  they  have  never  'seen' 
before  -  and  is  thereby  responsive  only  to  the  minimal  cues  necessary  to  sustain  an 
impoverishing  stereotype.  In  this  mode  discovery  is  precluded  for  it  is  contingent  upon  the 
dual  transaction. 
Just  as  the  sign  is  not-yet-a-symbol  when  denied  its  semantic  context  so  the  semantic  - 
the  potentiality  of  meaning  -  is  vitiated  when  denied  projective  reference  through  mediation 
by  way  of  internal  relation:  this  reflects  the  dual  nature  of  the  transaction.  Deconstruction, 
for  example,  is  condemned  to  play  within,  effectively,  locked  sets.  It  is  in  these  terms,  also, 
that  the  vitiation  effected  both  by  the  discursive  and  identification  are  explicable.  The 
discursive  is  denied  access  to  holistic  structures  and  the  inherent  value  disclosed  in  double 
prescription;  in  identification,  value  is  a  function  of  the  narcissistic  appropriation  of 
structures  which  then  serve  as  pretexts  for  emotion  -  the  imagination  is  blocked  because 
identification  reduces  structures  to  stereotypes. 
Learning  to  drive  involves  participation  in  a  complex  symbolic  matrix.  The  priority  here 
is  to  shift  perception  as  quickly  as  possible  into  the  recognition  of  signs,  deliberately  to 
cultivate  stereotypical  responses  so  that  they  become  a  matter  of  reflex.  The  sanctions  for 
learning  effective  responsive  action  are  danger  and  expense.  These  preclude  the  desirability 
of  alternative  iterations  -  imagine  being  stuck  at  traffic  lights  while  the  person  in  front  works 
through  the  possible  permutations  in  the  sequence  of  colours.  It  is  our  habituated  reflexes 
in  the  context  of  responsive  action  -  the  pressures  of  life  -  that  make  full  symbolic  mediation 
unavailable  if  not  absurd  for  most  of  us.  Given  the  constant  reinforcing  of  vitiating  modes 
13  'Word,  Polysemy,  Metaphor',  p.  79.  (My  italics). 
189 of  relation  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  for  many  of  us  reading  habits  are  confined  to  the  mode 
of  identification. 
Many  children  are  initially  unresponsive  to  literary  texts  not  because  they  are  stupid  but 
because  their  reductive  modes  of  assimilation  are  being  frequently  reinforced  by  their  life's 
experiences.  In  difficult  family  circumstances  the  last  thing  a  child  may  be  moved  to  do  is 
imagine  -  this  does  not  preclude  indulgence  in  fantasy. 
In  summary,  it  can  now  be  seen  that  defamiliarisation  is  a  pre-condition  for  double 
prescription.  The  prescriptive  power  of  the  novel  configuration  implicit  in  metaphor  not 
only  reconfigures  the  world  but  simultaneously  renders  the  revealed  structure  expressive. 
In  an  imagination  that  operates  within  a  teleological  context  this  expressive  power  is 
interpreted  as  the  work  of  a  Creator  -  as  with  Hopkins  or  Coleridge.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  whole  transaction  is  intelligible  within  the  logic  of  imagination  and,  indeed,  constitutes 
its  paradigm  case.  It  is  essentially  neutral  with  regard  to  religious  commitment  but, 
nevertheless,  serves  to  sharpen  the  mystery  of  there  being  intelligibility  at  all. 
It  follows,  that  the  idea  that  the  text  exists  only  at  the  semantic  level  involves  a  circularity 
consolidated  by  the  characteristics  of  the  assimilating  mode  -  the  discursive.  This  is  not  to 
say  that  discursive  iterations  are  condemned  to  be  reductive  fantasy  -  they  can  be 
reconstituted  as  elements  of  the  constituent  matrix,  elements  of  inscape,  available  for  the 
imaginative  transaction  -  but  the  spontaneous  nature  of  imagining  allows  for  no  guarantee 
that  it  will  happen.  What  counts,  is  the  mode  of  relation  with  the  text. 
Identification  presupposes  intelligibility  but  is  blind  to  innovation.  It  is,  therefore,  blind 
to  double  prescription  -  its  rewards  are  available  as  a  sort  of  narcissistic  recognition  with  the 
possible  admixture  of  fantasy.  The  discursive  becomes  blindness  when  it  stands  for 
interpretation,  usurps  the  imagination  by  arrogating  to  itself  the  power  of  the  text  which  is, 
ultimately,  a  function  of  the  imagination,  an  expressive  power  derived  from  double 
prescription. 
We  can  be  richly  appreciative  of  the  brilliance  of  the  discursive  iteration  but  it  is 
condemned  to  relativism,  condemned  to  be  perpetually  beside  the  point  unless  it  becomes 
bound  in  to  the  matrix  and  thence  becomes  a  constituent  in  imaginative  refiguration. 
190 There  is  an  inherent  difficulty  in  the  discussion  of  specifically  imaginative  transactions  in 
that  it  is  possible  to  indicate  that  here  they  occur  or  have  occurred,  but  the  explication  is 
inevitably  discursive.  The  problem  is  extended  through  the  elaboration  of  discursive 
interpretative  models  which  may  be  entirely  independent  of  the  actual  experience  of 
imagining  -a  sort  of  ideal,  Platonic  form  of  explanation,  a  product  of  pure,  transcendental 
reasoning.  This  is  the  stock-in-trade  of  much  that  passes  for  education:  we  elaborate 
structures  of  interpretation  for  experiences  that  we  haven't  had  and  these  become  canonical 
for  the  learning  community. 
We  can  recognize  the  value  contingent  in  the  mediation  effected  through,  say,  a  poem  - 
but  that  value  is  not  thereby  located  within  the  world  as  it  is  for  Hopkins  -  or  Cezanne,  for 
that  matter.  For  the  imagination,  the  poem  is  a  means  to  an  end,  an  attempted  mediation 
with  reality;  for  the  discursive,  the  poem  is  an  end  in  itself  -  the  aesthetic  is  reduced  to 
aestheticism.  The  search  for  that  lucidity  where  objective  and  subjective  finalities  coincide 
is,  for  Hopkins  and  Cezanne,  the  whole  point  and  finding  it  would  constitute  their  success. 
The  discursive,  with  its  rewards  of  cleverness,  seduces  us  from  the  final  and  only  significant 
imaginative  transaction  that  would  restore  us  to  the  world  and  simultaneously  disclose  and 
proclaim  its  value.  It  seeks  to  establish  reference  -  and  thereby  authenticate  itself  -  and  in 
reference  achieves  only  objectification.  Such  reference  is  merely  a  local  contingency  and  is, 
thereby,  inevitably  reductive  -  it  awaits  upon  its  apotheosis  in  the  synthesis  of  double 
prescription. 
Discursive  iterations  are,  inevitably,  monochromatic.  They  establish  a  relativism  that  can 
see  daylight  only  in  its  constituent  elements  -  as  a  spectrum.  The  imaginative  and  the 
religious  suppose  a  common,  synthesising  transaction  -  double  prescription  -  the  final 
outcome  of  which  depends  upon  differentiating  mediations,  contexts  of  significance.  The 
movement  from  the  discursive  to  the  aesthetic  is  dialectical  in  its  nature,  but  it  involves  a 
shift  across  modes,  it  is  not  a  straightforward  synthesis  of  monochromatic  readings.  Such 
readings  are,  in  effect,  reductive  fantasies  if  they  remain  unsynthesised. 
Ricoeur  describes  a  dialectic  depending  on  a  synthesis  effected  by  the  reader  between 
two  modes  of  mimesis.  The  primary  ground  of  intelligibility  of  a  text  presupposes  a  'prior 
191 acquaintance'14  with  the  sufferings  and  actions  that  constitute  life.  This  'pre-understanding' 
(p.  142)  -  mimesis'  -  is  the  ground  of  a  second  mimesis  'which  is  textual  and  literary'  (p.  142). 
The  material  'prefigured'  in  mimesis'  is  'configured'  through  mimesis2. 
In  the  context  of  narrative,  this  configuration 
[...  ]  consists  in  'grasping  together'  the  details  [...  ]  of  the  story.  From  these  diverse 
events  it  draws  together  the  unity  of  one  temporal  whole.  We  cannot 
overemphasise  the  kinship  between  this'grasping  together'  [...  ]  and  Kant's 
presentation  of  the  operation  of  judging,  where  the  transcendental  meaning  of  a 
judgement  consists  not  so  much  in  joining  a  subject  and  a  predicate  as  in  placing 
some  intuitive  manifold  under  one  concept.  (p.  146) 
This  configuration  is  essentially  what  Hopkins  calls  'inscape'  and  for  him,  as  we  have 
seen,  the  writing  of  the  poem  involves  'overing  and  overing',  a  process  of  'accentuating  the 
message  "for  its  own  sake"'.  15  This  seems  close  to  what  Ricoeur  calls  'iconic  augmentation' 
-a  term  which  he  takes  from  Francois  Dagonet: 
What  is  iconically  augmented  is  the  preliminary  readability  that  action  owes  to  the 
interpretants  that  are  already  at  work  in  it.  Human  action  can  be  oversignified 
because  is  already  pre-signified  by  all  the  modalities  of  its  symbolic  articulation.  16 
That  human  action  is  oversignified  -  over  and  overed  -  in,  say,  the  context  of  the  drama, 
amounts  to  a  clarification  of  inscape  so  that  redundancy  can  be  cleared  away  for  the 
emergence  of  an  emphatic,  expressive  structure  -  but  that  is  contingent  upon  an  imaginative 
transaction.  In  the  discursive  mode  this  clarity  can  be  appropriated  as  a  didactic  feature  : 
[...  ]  I  think  it  may  be  manifest  that  the  poet,  with  that  same  hand  of  delight,  doth 
draw  the  mind  more  effectually  than  any  other  art  doth.  And  so  a  conclusion  not 
unfitly  ensues:  that,  as  virtue  is  the  most  excellent  resting  place  for  all  worldly 
learning  to  make  this  end  of,  so  poetry,  being  the  most  familiar  to  teach  it,  and  the 
most  princely  to  move  towards  it,  in  the  most  excellent  work  is  the  most  excellent 
workman.  '? 
Thus  Sidney  makes  use'of  Aristotle's  didactic  defence. 
14  'Mimesis  and  Representation',  from  A  Ricoeur  Reader,  p.  140.  (In  what  follows  I  have  preserved  the 
superscript  in  which  Ricoeur  designates  the  different  types  of  mimesis  though  I  have  represented  it  in  italic 
to  distinguish  it  from  footnote  numbers.  ) 
15  Norman  White,  Hopkins:  A  Literary  Biography,  op.  cit.,  p.  143. 
16  'Mimesis  and  Representation',  p.  150. 
17  Sidney,  A  Defence  of  Poetry,  op.  cit.,  p.  42. 
192 In  our  terms,  mimesis'  supposes  identification  as  its  relational  mode  -  this  involves  tacit 
recognition  of'forms  of  life'.  To  be  effective,  mimesis-'  involves  the  dialectical  twist  across 
modes  into  holistic  apprehension  -  in  other  words,  imagination.  To  speak  of  the  'textual 
and  literary'  could  be  misleading  in  so  far  as  it  suggests  discursive  analysis  whereas  the 
imagination  supposes  a  dynamic  process,  the  actual  mediating  effected  through  our 
experiencing,  say,  metaphor.  Nevertheless,  excursions  into  the  discursive  mode  are 
necessary  to  indicate  the  facilitating  'literary'  characteristics  of  the  text. 
What  must  be  remembered  are  the  epistemological  implications  of  the  relational  modes. 
Identification  is  the  'speed  reading'  of  the  imagination.  It  finds  cues  for  the  engagement  of 
habits  of  perception,  stereotypes  of  behaviour.  It  is  blind  to  anomaly  and  experiences  value 
as  convention.  It  effects  rapid  assimilation  within  familiar  and,  thereby,  secure  paradigms. 
It  shades  into  fantasy  -  in  this  mode  fantasy  and  identification  cannot  often  be  effectively 
distinguished.  The  'text',  therefore,  can  have  no  clear  autonomy.  Tipped  into  fantasy  the 
relational  mode  posits  the  text  as  a  source  of  make-believe. 
Whereas  identification  works  through  both  association  and  the  internal  relations 
presupposed  in  recognition,  in  imagination,  perceptions,  stereotypes  and  conventions  of 
value  are  challenged,  not  for  their  own  sake,  but  implicitly  in  the  disclosure  of  new  insight 
with  its  concomitant  disclosure  of  value.  Internal  relations  are  discovered  and  in  these 
holistic  apprehensions  lie  their  symbol-making  potential.  The  relational  mode  radically 
changes  the  relationships  between  self,  text  and  world:  the  text  can  be  a  mirror  with  no 
projective  efficacy  -  as  in  identification  and  appropriation  through  fantasy  -  or  effect  a 
mediation  which  simultaneously  extends  self  and  world. 
Ricoeur  designates  these  relational  issues  mimesis3: 
[...  ]  I  shall  say  that  mimesis3,  marks  the  intersection  of  the  world  of  the  text  and  the 
world  of  the  hearer  or reader.  Therefore  it  is  the  intersection  of  the  world  unfolded 
by  fiction  and  the  world  wherein  actual  action  unfolds.  18 
He  is  aware  that  this  intersection  constitutes  'a  very  complex  problematic': 
18  'Mimesis  and  Representation',  p.  148. 
193 This  is  due  first  of  all  to  the  diversity  of  its  modalities.  A  whole  range  of  cases  is 
open,  running  from  ideological  confirmation  of  the  established  order  [...  ]  to  social 
criticism.  (pp.  148-149) 
The  problem  is  that  each  of  the  three  modes  of  relation  that  I  have  explored  -  identification, 
imagination  and  the  discursive  -  in  their  distinctive  epistemological  prescriptions  endow  the 
artefact  with  a  protean  nature  -  there  is,  in  a  sense,  no  single  artefact  any  more  than  there  is, 
say,  a  single  language  game. 
In  his  discussion  of  the  nature  of  the  relations  between  fiction  and  reality  Frank  Palmer 
observes: 
In  order  to  understand  Macbeth's  motives  for  killing  Duncan  we  have  to  enter 
Macbeth's  mind  [...  ].  For  this  we  need  to  put  ourselves  in  his  place  and  imagine,  as 
through  the  play  we  do  imagine,  what  it  feels  like  to  have  that  kind  of  ambition  [...  ]. 
It  is  not  possible  to  understand  why  Macbeth  did  what  he  knew  to  be  wrong  without 
understanding  him.  19 
I  take  it  that  such  'understanding'  is  what  Palmer  means  by  'primary  engagement'.  (p.  87) 
However,  'to  put  ourselves  in  his  place'  supposes  identification  -  Macbeth  as  mirror.  I  no 
more  feel  myself  obliged  to  do  this  than  identify  with  Genghis  Khan.  A  crucial  aspect  of  the 
drama  is  to  disclose  the  character  -  Macbeth  -  but  a  grasp  of  the  entire  tragedy  is 
presupposed  in  that.  I  might  try  to  think  myself  into  his  situation  but  that  would  suppose  a 
discursive  relation.  Palmer  does  not  adequately  differentiate  between  the  implicit  modes  - 
identification,  the  discursive  and  imagining  are  conflated.  Imagining  -  with  its  ultimate 
resolution  in  'understanding'  -  supposes  the  whole  dialectical  transaction  including  'iconic 
augmentation'.  We  don't  experience  an  inscape  and  then  experience  its  being  over-and- 
overed:  the  latter  presupposes  all  the  devices  of  the  poetry  available  to  us  bound  in  to  the 
mediation  effected  through  the  text.  That  is  not  to  deny,  of  course,  that  following  upon 
further  discursive  scrutiny  more  may  be  taken  up  into  the  dialectic  of  imagining  so  that  our 
experience  of  the  poem  is  enhanced.  Nor  is  it  to  deny  that  imagining  may  have  its  origins  in 
identification.  In  the  end  it  is  the  discursive  that  is  tacitly  endorsed  by  Palmer  and  as  a 
consequence  of  what  might  be  called  a  modal  circularity  an  epistemological  problem 
immediately  asserts  itself 
19  Frank  Palmer,  Literature  and  Moral  Understanding  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1992),  p.  137. 
194 Yet  for  all  that,  novels  and  plays  are  not  'real'  (i.  e.  actual)  life.  First,  because  it  is 
part  of  what  we  mean  by  the  term  'fictional  world'  that  no  matter  how  great  its 
resemblance  to  actual  life  or  to  actual  events  it  is  not  an  actual  world.  Secondly 
because  a  representation  is  not  just  a  copy  of  life,  but  life  seen  under  the  perspective 
of  the  artist's  work.  (p.  137) 
But  the  work  is  already  presupposed  in  the  understanding.  It  is  not  a  matter  of'resemblance' 
to  actual  life. 
Ricoeur  approaches  these  issues  when  he  considers  'the  apparent  invincible  exteriority 
between  the  inside  of  fiction  and  the  outside  of  life'  that  arises  from  considering  art  as 
'representative  illusion': 
We  must  stop  seeing  the  text  as  its  own  interior  and  life  as  exterior  to  it.  Instead  we 
must  accompany  that  structuring  operation  that  begins  in  life,  is  invested  in  the  text, 
then  returns  to  life. 
To  do  this,  we  must  balance  the  autarchy  of  a  theory  of  writing  through  a  theory 
of  reading  and  understand  that  the  operating  [op&ativitc]  of  writing  is  fulfilled  in 
the  operating  of  reading.  Indeed,  it  is  the  reader  -  or rather  the  act  of  reading  -  that, 
in  the  final  analysis,  is  the  unique  operator  of  the  unceasing  passage  from  mimesis', 
to  mimesis-'9  through  mimesis2.  That  is,  from  a  prefigured  world  to  a  transfigured 
world  through  the  mediation  of  a  configured  world.  20 
My  argument,  in  summary,  is  that  this  dialectic  cannot  occur  at  the  discursive  level  and 
awaits  the  transactions  of  imagination  for  its  realisation.  In  the  mode  of  imagination  the 
problem  of  representation  is  resolved.  Metaphor  and  its  extension  in  inscape  are 
characterised  by  projective  rather  than  specific  reference.  Projective  reference,  a  function  of 
complex  structure,  is  consolidated  through  the  constituent  relations  wrought  in  the  artefact. 
Familiar  structures  -  inviting  identification  -  are  thereby  defamiliarised  thus  opening  the  way 
for  the  dawning  of  refiguration.  The  metaphor  or  inscape  constitutes  a  framing,  or  re- 
framing,  a  prescriptive  limit  which  engages  double  prescription.  Paradoxically,  they 
contract  -  limit  and  select  -  in  order  to  extend.  In  the  discursive  mode,  what  passes  for 
imaginative  transaction  can  only  be  experienced  as  representational  for  the  nature  of 
reference  is  changed  from  projective  to  indicative  with  the  concurrent  loss  of  expressive 
power. 
It  will  not  do,  however,  to  exaggerate  the  potential  for  novelty  of  imaginative 
transactions.  Double  prescription  may  effect  a  re-valuation  of  what  is  already  familiar  -  this 
20  'Mimesis  and  Representation',  p.  151. 
195 explains  the  power  of  Vermeer,  where  the  ordinary  is  charged  with  new  significance.  It  is 
also  possible  to  envisage  how  the  implicit  narrative  of,  say,  Holbein's  Ambassadors,  which 
seems  to  locate  the  painting  within  the  discursive  mode,  can  be  transformed  through  the 
prescriptive  frame  so  that  an  holistic  structure  becomes,  simultaneously,  available  and 
charged  with  meaning.  It  is  precisely  thus  that  fiction  becomes  available  for  double 
prescription.  Joyce's  epiphanies  exhibit  the  coalescence  of  meaning  with  aesthetic  integrity, 
that  is,  dual  reference  through  imaginative  transactions. 
Metaphor,  then,  as  Ricoeur  argues,  is  the  paradigm  case  of  refiguration  through 
configuration.  That  power  is  contingent,  though,  upon  a  dialectic  across  modes  - 
discursive,  to  imaginative  -  or  is  manifest  simply  within  the  imaginative.  The  refiguration 
may  not  lead  to  anything  'new'  but  may,  in  the  end,  simply  constitute  a  re-cognition. 
The  contact  with  Vermeer  may  begin  in  identification,  remain  there,  or  arrive  through  an 
imaginative  transaction  at  a  world  essentially  unchanged  but  recharged  with  meaning.  The 
contact  with  Holbein  may  remain  at  the  narrative  or  discursive  level  -  enhancing  our 
understanding  of  a  moment  in  history  -  or  be  unforgettably  energised.  A  Cdzanne  canvas 
may  threaten  rejection  on  the  grounds  of  oddness  or  obscurity  but  the  defamiliarisation  can 
lead  to  a  refiguration  of  the  landscape.  At  the  aesthetic  level,  though  the  outcomes  may  be 
diverse,  the  imaginative  transaction  inevitably  involves  disclosure  of  value.  Perhaps  the 
most  characteristic  outcome  is  to  be  restored  to  what  we  rediscover  -  this  must  be 
differentiated  from  identification  where  value  is  in  the  familiar  but  no  imaginative 
transaction  has  been  undergone.  In  any  event,  in  identification  the  possibility  of  refiguration 
is  blocked.  There  are,  then,  a  number  of  possible  outcomes  contingent  upon  novel 
metaphor  not  necessarily  involving  refiguration. 
Additionally,  it  must  be  said  that  it  will  not  do  to  idealise  metaphor.  For  example,  in 
`The  Eve  of  St  Agnes'  at  one  point  Madeline  is  described  as  `Half-hidden,  like  a  mermaid  in 
sea-weed.  '21  This  could  hardly  be  said  to  constitute  an  insight.  The  image,  perhaps, 
exploits  an  underlying  stereotype  -  Venus,  naked  to  the  waist  -  which  engages  allure, 
21  John  Keats,  The  Eve  of  St  Agnes',  stanza  XXVI,  from  A  Selection  from  John  Keats,  op.  cit.,  p.  138. 
196 fantasy  in  identification.  On  the  other  hand,  it  fulfils  a  psychological  purpose  in  so  far  as  we 
are  given  access  as  to  how  Porphyro  sees  Madeline.  This  insight  is  set  up  in  the  contrast 
with  the  immediately  preceding  stanzas  where  the  girl's  purity  and  piety  are  stressed.  To  be 
seduced  into  the  mode  of  Porphyro's  seeing  is  a  condition  of  subsequent  imaginative  insight 
concerning  a  crucial  thematic  issue  -  the  relation  between  fantasy  and  reality.  If  we 
unthinkingly  identify  metaphor  with  insight  we  miss  the  point. 
Wordsworth's  illustration  of  the  distinction  between  Fancy  and  Imagination  is  instructive: 
[...  ]  I  will  content  myself  with  placing  a  conceit  (ascribed  to  Lord  Chesterfield)  in 
contrast  with  a  passage  from  the  Paradise  Lost:  - 
The  dews  of  the  evening  most  carefully  shun, 
They  are  the  tears  of  the  sky  for  the  loss  of  the  sun. 
After  the  transgression  of  Adam,  Milton,  with  other  appearances  of  sympathizing 
Nature,  thus  marks  the  immediate  consequence, 
Sky  lowered,  and,  muttering  thunder,  some  sad  drops 
Wept  at  completion  of  the  mortal  sin.  22 
Wordsworth  is  arguing  against  Coleridge's  assumption  that  the  fancy  is  'the  aggregative  and 
associative  power': 
[...  ]  my  objection  is  only  that  the  definition  is  too  general.  To  aggregate  and  to 
associate,  to  evoke  and  combine,  belong  as  well  to  the  Imagination  as  to  the  Fancy. 
(p.  163) 
Coleridge  responds  in  Biographia  Literaria  : 
I  reply  that  if  by  the  power  of  evoking  and  combining  Mr  W.  means  the  same  as,  and 
no  more  than,  I  meant  by  the  aggregative  and  associative,  I  continue  to  deny  that  it 
belongs  at  all  to  the  imagination;  and  I  am  disposed  to  conjecture  that  he  has 
mistaken  the  co-presence  of  fancy  with  imagination  for  the  operation  of  the  latter 
singly.  A  man  may  work  with  two  very  different  tools  at  the  same  moment.  23 
At  issue  is  the  relationship  between  the  'shaping  or  modifying  power'  of  Imagination  and  the 
'aggregative  and  associative'  power  of  Fancy.  Scrutiny  of  Wordsworth's  examples  show 
that  he  is  right  in  designating  them  as  products  of,  respectively,  fancy  and  imagination.  That 
'dews'  are'tears  of  the  sky'  is  certainly  a  metaphor.  It  might  invite  sentimental  identification 
22  William  Wordsworth,  'Preface  to  Poems',  from  Wordsworth's  Literary  Criticism,  cd.  by  Nowell  C.  Smith 
(London:  Humphrey  Milford,  1925),  p.  165. 
23  S.  T.  Coleridge,  Biographia  Literaria,  op.  cit.,  ch.  XII,  p.  160. 
197 but  establishes  nothing  other  than  an  associative  link.  The  couplet  with  its  emphatic 
rhythms  and  heavy  masculine  rhymes  seems  at  odds  with  the  sentiment,  a  force  for 
disintegration.  Of  the  Milton,  Wordsworth  observes, 
[...  ]  the  effects  from  the  act,  of  which  there  is  this  immediate  consequence  and 
visible  sign,  are  so  momentous,  that  the  mind  acknowledges  the  justice  and 
reasonableness  of  the  sympathy  in  nature  so  manifested;  and  the  sky  weeps  drops  of 
water  as  if  with  human  eyes,  as  'Earth  had  before  trembled  from  her  entrails,  and 
Nature  given  a  second  groan'.  24 
Wordsworth  is  right  when  he  points  to  the  importance  of  the  'momentous'  nature  of  the 
issues.  But  is  the  effect  of  the  metaphor  purely  a  function  of  scale?  In  a  way  it  is,  but  in 
the  intensity  of  our  identification  we  implicitly  acknowledge  a  form  of  life  -  dismay,  grief 
together  with  its  cause  -  and  the  whole  of  our  experience  of  Paradise  Lost  has  worked 
towards  this  moment.  Identification  resolves  into  imagination.  It  is  not  that  Milton's 
imagery  provides  a  correlative  for  our  emotional  needs  -  supposing  a  dualistic 
rationalisation  -  but  that  our  understanding  of  the  situation  is  presupposed  in  our  feelings. 
Here  is  the  synthesis  of  head  and  heart  that  allows  us  to  identify  an  imaginative  transaction. 
In  such  a  comparison  poor  Lord  Chesterfield  is  on  a  hiding  to  nothing,  not  least,  because 
we  have  no  knowledge  of  the  context  of  his  couplet. 
Yet  Coleridge  is  surely  right  in  his  comments  on  Wordsworth:  fancy  is  a  product  of 
association  which  engages,  at  best,  identification;  imagination  represents  forms  of  life, 
internal  relations,  its  inscapes  effect  double  prescription,  a  synthesis  of  faculties.  Fancy  and 
imagination  are  at  odds  because  they  presuppose  distinct  modes  of  relation. 
That  the  'same'  metaphor  -  'tears'/'sad  drops'  -  has  such  radically  different  imaginative 
outcomes  warns  us  that  generalisations  regarding  the  genus  are  untenable  and  that  the 
expressive  power  of  the  specific  metaphor  depends,  like  that  of  other  linguistic  symbols, 
upon  both  projective  reference  and  a  context  of  meaning. 
That  said,  Ricoeur  persuasively  identifies  the  hermeneutic  implications  of  metaphor  and 
refiguration: 
24  'Preface  to  Poems',  p.  166. 
198 Far  from  saying  that  a  subject  already  masters  his  own  way  of  being  in  the  world  and 
projects  it  as  the  a  priori  of  his  reading  [...  ]  I  say  that  interpretation  is  the  process  by 
which  the  disclosure  of  new  modes  of  being  -  or,  if  you  prefer  Wittgenstein  to 
Heidegger,  of  new  forms  of  life  -  gives  to  the  subject  a  new  capacity  of  knowing 
himself.  If  there  is  somewhere  a  project  and  a  projection,  it  is  the  reference  of  the 
work  which  is  the  project  of  a  world;  the  reader  is  consequently  enlarged  in  his 
capacity  of  self-projection  by  receiving  a  new  mode  of  being  from  the  text  itself.  25 
I  would  suggest  that  it  is  rather  odd  to  talk  of  `new  forms  of  life'.  Rather,  it  may  be  that  art 
involves  the  amplification  or,  in  discursive  terms,  the  elucidation,  of  those  we  already  know 
-  albeit  that  supposes  the  possibility  of  discoveries  within  the  forms.  Nevertheless,  in  broad 
terms,  Ricoeur's  argument  is  closely  akin  to  the  argument  I  developed  earlier  in  the  context 
of  discussing  Pinter.  It  differs,  crucially,  in  that  I  argued  that  the  movement  from  the 
projected  ego  to  the  enhanced  self  is  contingent  upon  the  transition  from  identification  or 
the  discursive  to  imagining  -  that  is,  in  the  latter  case,  contingent  upon  the  dialectic  across 
modes. 
It  is in  this  context  that  some  of  the  implications  of  the  Freudian  ideology  may  emerge 
more  clearly.  Freud's  exposition  of  dreams  is  discursive  -  inevitably  so.  But  his  conception 
of  their  mediating  symbolism  is  essentially  dualistic  -  sign  and  referent.  Dreams,  therefore, 
of  their  very  nature  are  conceived  as  discursive:  this  would  seem  to  be  another  example  of 
modal  circularity.  In  so  far  as  the  logic  of  dreams  is,  as  I  argued,  analogical,  they  are  a 
function  of  imagining;  however,  their  constitutive  relations  -  their  syntax  -  is  often  minimally 
constituted.  They  are,  as  it  were,  fictions  which,  generally,  lack  the  creative  input  of 
overing  and  overing.  It  is  precisely  in  the  weakness  of  their  constitutive  relations  that  there 
lies  potentiality  for  creativity  in  so  far  as  they  easily  'jump  the  tracks'  so  that  new  figurations 
can  arise: 
[...  ]  Kekule  [...  ]  made  the  suggestion  that  in  the  benzene  molecule  the  carbon  atoms 
it  contains  are  joined  to  each  other  in  a  ring  formation  [...  ]  chemists  had  always 
assumed  that  they  were  joined  in  a  long  chain  [...  ].  Yet  it  was  not  reasoned  out 
logically  by  Kekule:  rather,  he  thought  of  it  spontaneously  during  a  day-dream,  in 
which  he  saw  carbon-chains  like  snakes,  one  of  which  seized  its  own  tail.  Kekule's 
remarkable  conclusion  from  this  episode  was:  'Let  us  learn  to  dream,  and  then 
perhaps  we  shall  learn  the  truth.  '  26 
25  Metaphor  and  the  Main  Problem  of  Hermeneutics',  pp.  315-316. 
26  Michael  Fuller,  Atoms  and  Icons  (London:  Mowbray,  1995),  p.  25. 
199 In  so  far  as  dreams  are  coherent  then  Jung's  argument  that  they  are  directive  rather  than 
pathological  seems  persuasive  in  that  their  narrative  logic  would  suggest  the  adumbration  of 
a  self  as  distinguished  from  the  projection  of  a  consolidated  ego.  Indeed,  it  is  precisely  the 
inaccessibility  of  the  personal  unconscious  that  is  breached  by  the  subversion  of  the  ego  in 
imaginative  transactions.  This  would  suggest  that  our  psychological  health  is  bound  up  in 
our  capacity  for  imagining  both  in  the  context  of  art  and  in  our  moral  transactions. 
The  dictum,  'Where  id  was,  there  shall  ego  be'  is  double  edged.  27  Effected  through  a 
polarising  symbolism  with  a  cognitive  subtext  -  the  stuff  of  Freudian  ideology  -  such 
narrative  becomes  an  alternative  fantasy  inviting  identification  -  faith  -  for  its  efficacy. 
Within  the  imagination,  on  the  other  hand,  an  alternative  narrative,  symbolically  mediated, 
would  substantiate  freedom  in  the  context  of  commitment  to  aesthetic  and  moral 
transactions  positing,  in  their  activities,  a  dynamic  self. 
By  placing  it  within  the  context  of  imagining,  the  'hermeneutical  circle'  may  be 
understood  to  free  itself  from  the  charge  that  it  involves  the  engaging  of  'two  subjectivities, 
that  of  the  reader  and  that  of  the  author'  and  from  the  charge  that  it  is  'the  projection  of  the 
subjectivity  of  the  reader  in  the  reading  itself.  '28  It  is  a  circle  that  may  encompass  our 
individuation  in  the  activity  of  imagining. 
Thomas  Hardy,  in  a  diary  entry,  catches  the  imagination  at  work: 
As,  in  looking  at  a  carpet,  by  following  one  colour  a  certain  pattern  is  suggested,  by 
following  another  colour,  another;  so  in  life  the  seer  should  watch  that  pattern 
among  general  things  which  his  idiosyncrasy  moves  him  to  observe,  and  describe 
that  alone.  This  is,  quite  accurately,  a  going  to  Nature;  yet  the  result  is  no  mere 
photograph,  but  purely  the  product  of  the  writer's  own  mind.  29 
Hardy's  observation  is  overstated.  To  explore  and  extend  his  metaphor,  what  is discovered 
in  the  carpet  cannot  be  'purely'  a  'product  of  the  writer's  own  mind'.  In  so  far  as  the  seer  is  a 
poet  the  pattern  will  be  disclosed  through  the  mediation  of  metaphor  in  projective  reference. 
Nevertheless  the  'working'  of  the  pattern  in  terms  of  constituent  relations  will  inevitably 
27  Sigmund  Freud,  New  Introductory  Lectures,  op.  cit.,  p.  106. 
28  'Metaphor  and  the  Main  Problem  of  Hermeneutics',  p.  315. 
29  Thomas  Hardy,  Diary',  June  3rd,  1882,  from  The  Life  of  Thomas  Hardy  1840-1928,  ed.  by  Florence 
Emily  Hardy  (London:  Macmillan,  1962),  p.  153. 
200 carry  the  writer's  'signature'.  The  intelligible  structure  will  be  redeemed  from  redundancy 
where  it  lay  hidden  in  the  general  impression  of  the  carpet.  Such  disclosure  involves  an 
imaginative  transaction  which  simultaneously  discloses  value  -  double  prescription  is  clearly 
manifest  here. 
E.  M.  Forster  suggests  the  variety  of  responses  that  we  bring  to  music.  A  response  to  the 
carpet  may  involve  an  appropriation  of  cues  in  a  developing  fantasy.  A  closer  scrutiny  may 
identify  traditional  patterns  confirming,  say,  its  Islamic  origins.  The  observer  may  trace  a 
pattern  enjoying  its  ingenious  intricacies.  The  disclosed  pattern  may  then  become  a 
constituent  element  in  an  holistic  apprehension  -  the  carpet  in  its  aesthetic  wholeness.  Each 
relation  has  its  epistemological  implications,  supposes  a  distinctive  ontlogy.  A 
comprehensive  account  will  take  account  of  its  capacity  to  fascinate,  its  intricacy,  the  carpet 
in  the  totality  of  its  shape,  pattern  and  colour,  an  awareness  of  its  origins  and  place  in  a 
tradition:  yet  such  accounts  may  remain  discrete,  unresolvable  into  any  simple  sum. 
Identification  and  the  discursive  have  their  contributory  roles  but  if  they  remain  unresolved 
in  imagining  they  are  exclusive  and  reductive. 
201 Chapter  Ten 
Metaphor,  Figuralism  and  the  Dialectic  of  Imagining 
Metaphor  refigures  aspects  of  the  world  and  extends  our  ways  of  being  in  it.  This  involves 
the  disclosure  of  internal  relations  in  the  context  of  projective  reference.  Figuralism 
involves  an  internal  relation  projected  through  time.  Both  metaphor  and  fguralism  effect 
closures  but  the  latter  is,  characteristically,  couched  in  terms  of  the  fulfilment  of  God's 
purposes.  Such  closure  is  peculiarly  vulnerable  to  ideological  appropriation.  The 
parables  and  miracles  of  Jesus  exhibit  a  pattern  where  ideology  is  transcended  in  the 
dialectic  of  imagining.  The  dialectic  is  exemplified,  above  all,  in  the  climax  of  Christ's 
Passion  where  ideological  man  is  transcended  in  the  revelation  of  the  unconditional  self. 
The  pattern  is  reiterated  in  the  fiction  of  Patrick  White  where,  in  effect,  a  contemporary  re- 
working  of  the  mysteryplays  is  presented  This  suggests  that  the  dialectic  of  imagining  is  a 
key  process  in  facilitating  the  evolution  of  the  self  from  ego-identity. 
In  one  of  his  later  'terrible'  sonnets,  Hopkins  again  addresses  the  problem  of  suffering: 
My  cries  heave,  herds-long;  huddle  in  a  main,  a  chief 
Woe,  world-sorrow;  on  an  age  old  anvil  wince  and  sing  - 
then  lull,  then  leave  off.  ' 
The  image  of  the  anvil  appears  in  other  poems,  for  example,  'The  Wreck  of  the 
Deutschland': 
With  an  anvil-ding 
And  with  fire  in  him  forge  they  will.  (p.  15) 
An  additional  possibility  within  the  basic  image  emerges  in  'That  Nature  is  a  Heraclitean 
Fire  where  the  inevitable  and  universal  nature  of  suffering  appears  to  be  compounded  by 
the  tragic  brevity  of  life: 
But  quench  her  bonniest,  dearest  to  her,  her  clearest-selved  spark 
Man,  how  fast  his  firedint,  his  mark  on  mind,  is  gone.  (p.  66) 
Clearly,  the  image  grows  meanings. 
Yet  another  dimension  to  its  potentiality  is  added  in  the  contemplation  of  one  of  the 
paired  images  in  the  Speculum  Humanae  Salvationis,  a  typological  guidebook  compiled 
probably  between  1310-1324.  The  juxtaposition  in  question  involves,  on  the  one  hand,  a 
woodcut  which  depicts  the  Crucifixion  just  at  the  moment  when  the  nails  are  being 
hammered  home  -'Christ  Prays  for  his  Torturers'  -  and  on  the  other,  Tubalcain  and  his  half- 
1  Gerard  Manley  Hopkins,  'No  Worst,  There  Is  None',  from  Poems  and  Prose,  op.  cit.,  p.  61. 
202 brother  at  their  forge.  Tubalcain  and  Jubal  appear  in  the  fourth  chapter  of  Genesis, 
descendants  of  Cain.  They  establish  an  origin  myth  with  regard  to  music:  Jubal  is 
associated  with  the  harp  and  organs,  and  Tubalcain  with  the  music  wrought  from  his  anvil. 
The  explanation  for  the  juxtaposition  can  be  conceptualised  in  terms  of  figuralism:  the  New 
Testament  provides  the  'antitype'  -  Christ's  crucifixion  -  and  the  'type'  is  found  in  Genesis. 
The  Speculum  makes  clear  the  relationship  between  them: 
The  XX111  chapitle  seith  [h]ow  Crist  was  nailed  on  Rode  tree 
And  prayed  for  his  crucyfiours  of  his  ineffable  pitiee. 
Jubal,  fynder  of  musik,  figured  this  thing  properelye, 
Finding  in  Tubalkaym  hamers  and  tunes  of  melodye. 
So  Crist,  as  he  was  ruthfully  hamerd  apon  the  Croce, 
Songe  to  his  Fadire  of  heven  in  full  swete  voice: 
So  swete  and  faire  was  it,  and  full  of  all  dulcoure, 
Tat  it  convertid  thre  thovzand  men  in  tat  ilk  one  houre, 
And  Ysay  this  crucifixioune  also  prefigured.  2 
Inscape,  in  Hopkins,  generally  is  associated  with  visual  structures,  presupposing,  as  it 
were,  the  dimension  of  space.  Charged  through  double  prescription  and  experienced  in  a 
teleological  context  such  imagery  generates  symbolic  significance  and,  presumably,  has 
some  role  in  sustaining  Hopkins'  faith.  If  the  passage  in  Genesis  provides  the  type  for  the 
crucifixion,  then,  taken  together,  this  complex  of  type  and  antitype  itself  becomes  a  type  for 
Hopkins's  anvil  imagery.  It  is  as  if,  suddenly,  we  were  presented  with  an  inscape  in  the 
dimension  of  time. 
Northrop  Frye  describes  typology  as, 
[...  ]  a  figure  that  moves  in  time:  the  type  exists  in  the  past  and  the  antitype  in  the 
present  or  the  type  exists  in  the  present  and  the  antitype  in  the  future.  3 
Quoting  his  own  article,  'Figura',  Erich  Auerbach  observes: 
[...  ]  we  find  the  Fathers  pursuing  the  interpretation  of  reality  -  interpretation  above 
all  of  Scripture,  but  also  of  large  historical  contexts  [...  ]  for  the  purpose  of  bringing 
them  into  harmony  with  the  Judaeo-Christian  view  of  history.  The  method 
employed  is  almost  exclusively  that  of  figures  [...  ].  Figural  interpretation 
"establishes  a  connection  between  two  events  or  persons  in  such  a  way  that  the  first 
2  Speculum  Humanae  Salvationis,  c.  1310-1324,  from  The  Lion  and  the  Lamb,  Tibor  Fibany  (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan,  1992),  p.  106.  See  Fibany  for  an  exposition  of  these  points. 
3  Northrop  Frye,  The  Great  Code:  the  Bible  and  Literature  (London:  Routledge  &  Kegan  Paul,  1982), 
p.  78. 
203 signifies  not  only  itself  but  also  the  second,  while  the  second  involves  or  fulfils  the 
first.  The  two  poles  of  the  figure  are  separated  in  time,  but  both,  being  real  events 
or  persons,  are  within  temporality.  They  are  both  contained  in  the  flowing  stream 
which  is  historical  life,  and  only  the  comprehension,  the  intellectus  spiritualis,  of 
their  interdependence  is  a  spiritual  act.  "4 
In  common  with  metaphor,  typology  -  figuralism  -  functions  through  the  juxtaposition  of 
paradigms:  it  is  essentially  analogical.  There  is  an  enormous  compression  of  meaning 
released  through  Hopkins's  anvil  image  when  it  is  located  in  the  figural  context.  That  is 
because  figural  interpretation  is,  of  its  nature,  purposive,  and  in  re-contextualising  the  image 
that  sense  of  the  purposive  which  is  already  an  adjunct  of  double  prescription  must  be 
charged  up.  The  image  becomes  an  icon  in  the  symbolic  domain.  This  is  not,  merely,  a 
matter  of  meaning  arising  from  association  -  fundamentally,  it  becomes  a  matter  of  insight, 
a  transaction  of  the  imagination. 
It  is  clear  that  figuralism  is  a  key  element  in  the  imaginative  logic  of  the  New  Testament. 
St.  Mark's  Gospel  begins  by  establishing  John  the  Baptist  as  the  antitype  prefigured  in 
Isaiah: 
The  beginning  of  the  gospel  of  Jesus  Christ  the  son  of  God,  as  it  is  written  in  the 
prophets:  behold  I  send  my  messenger  before  thy  face,  which  shall  prepare  thy  way 
before  thee.  The  voice  of  a  crier  in  the  wilderness:  prepare  ye  the  way  of  the  Lord, 
make  his  paths  straights 
There  is  a  pattern  begun  here  which  is  deeply  problematical  on  a  number  of  counts. 
Clearly,  Mark  uses  figuralism  to  establish  again  and  again  the  credentials  of  Jesus  of 
Nazareth  as  the  Messiah.  Figuralism  here  becomes  a  device  to  establish  authority,  a 
discursive  tool.  It  is  interesting  to  see  this  process  from  a  robustly  Jewish  perspective: 
The  Old  Testament  is  far  too  strong  a  poetry  to  be  fulfilled  by  its  revisionary 
descendent,  the  self-proclaimed  New  Testament  [...  ].  We  may  wonder  whether  the 
idea  of  figura  was  ever  more  than  a  self-deception  [...  ]  I  am  an  enemy  of  the  New 
Testament.  My  enmity  is  lifelong,  and  intensifies  as  I  study  its  text  more  closely  ...  Frye's  code,  like  Erich  Auerbach's  figura  [...  ]  is  only  another  belated  repetition  of  the 
Christian  appropriation  and  usurpation  of  the  Hebrew  Bible.  6 
4  Erich  Auerbach,  Mimesis:  The  Representation  of  Reality  in  Western  Literature,  trans.  by  Willard  R. 
Trask,  paperback  edn,  10th  printing,  1991  (New  Jersey:  Princeton  University  Press,  1953),  p.  73. 
s  The  Gospel  of  Saint  Mark,  from  Tyndale's  New  Testament,  cd.  by  David  Daniell  (New  Haven:  Yale 
University  Press,  1995),  Mark  1,  p.  62. 
6  The  Lion  and  the  Lamb,  p.  11.  The  quotation  is  one  of  a  number  'conflated  from  various  writings  of 
Harold  Bloom'. 
204 In  the  context  of  prophecy  the  coalescence  of  type  and  antitype  supposes  that  the  type  is 
swallowed  up  in  the  fulfilment  -  in  effect,  the  type  is  refigured.  The  parallel  with  metaphor 
is  striking:  in  effect,  what  is  disclosed  is  an  internal  relation.  But  here  the  purposiveness 
implicit  in  the  imaginative  transaction,  characteristically,  becomes  a  resource  for  authority. 
This  is  a  similar  source  of  authority  to  that  generated  in  the  use  of  exempla.  Its  dubious 
nature  will  become  a  characteristic  focus  for  Chaucer's  irony  as,  for  example,  in  The 
Franklin's  Tale  where  Dorigen's  list  of  twenty-two  exempla  in  support  of  her  judgement 
that  death  is  preferable  to  dishonour  pushes  her  strategy  into  comic  absurdity.  The 
exemplum  is  a  dead  disclosure  -  its  imaginative  power  has  been  vitiated  by  its  employment 
in  the  discursive  mode. 
The  crucial  distinction  between  figuralism  and  metaphor  lies  in  the  nature  of  fulfilment. 
The  refiguration  effected  by  metaphor  is  a  reciprocal  matter,  constitutes  a,  perhaps, 
momentary  stasis  in  a  potentially  endless  creative  series  of  mediations  between  image  and 
world.  On  the  other  hand,  fulfilment  supposes  an  end,  the  disclosure  of  God's  purpose. 
Nevertheless,  this  points  to  an  important  tension  in  the  nature  of  imagining  itself  in  that 
its  transactions  are,  inevitably,  completed  in  closure.  The  expressive  power  released  in  such 
double  prescription  may  be  followed  by  the  exaltation  of  the  image  to  canonical  status 
thereby  inhibiting  further  imagining.  This  tension  is  at  the  heart  of  a  most  poignant  and 
devastating  contradiction  in  the  historical  unfolding  of  religious  orthodoxies.  But  the 
continuing  process  of  imagining  is  not  only  desirable  but  inevitable  given  that  its  dialectic 
will  be  stimulated  precisely  by  such  closure. 
Clearly,  to  be  successful  in  his  terms,  Mark's  text  must  involve  the  reader's  acceptance  of 
its  authority  -  in  other  words,  it  would  seem  that  unless  it  engages  identification  it  would 
fail  to  convince,  indeed,  might  serve  to  antagonise.  Denied  the  mediatory  function  of  its 
metaphor  the  text  would  be  reduced  to  empowering  fantasy.  From  the  Jewish  perspective, 
Christian  identification  merely  serves  to  generate  and  assert  an  antagonistic  authority  so  that 
the  transactions  of  imagination  are  reduced  to  an  ideologically  committed  rewriting  of  the 
Old  Testament. 
205 In  seeking  to  establish  the  authority  of  Jesus  as  Messiah,  Mark  compromises  the  very 
mode  of  imagination  that  would  engage  the  mediatory  function  of  the  art  of  his  story.  In 
other  words,  as  far  as  the  logic  of  the  imagination  is  concerned,  it  is  in  the  context  of  story 
that  the  'reality'  of  the  man  remains  to  be  established  as  a  precondition  of  any  possibility  of 
his  emergence  as  Messiah. 
Though,  fundamentally,  Mark's  text  must  be  a  self-conscious  construct,  the  context  of 
ritual  and  authority  with  which  it  is  associated  effectively  blinds  us  to  this  aspect  of  its 
origin.  That  it  is  a  construction  is  supposed  in  D.  E.  Nineham's  observation  that  in  his  first 
chapter  Mark  'depicts  a  typical  day  in  the  ministry  of  Jesus,  which  [...  ]  is  intended  as  a 
sample,  or microcosm,  of  the  whole.  '?  In  this  resort  to  typicality  the  Gospel  seems  to  share 
the  priorities  of,  say,  Solzhenitsyn's  novella  One  Day  in  the  Life  of  Ivan  Denisovich.  8  My 
primary  interest  is  to  explore,  in  the  context  of  St.  Mark's  Gospel,  aspects  of  the  imaginative 
transactions  normally  engaged  between  reader  and  text  in  reading  poetry  or  fiction. 
There  are,  however,  considerable  difficulties  in  arriving  at  St.  Mark's  Gospel  as  story. 
Not  the  least  is  the  'familiarity'  of  the  text.  I  have,  accordingly,  chosen  to  use  William 
Tyndale's  translation  of  the  New  Testament.  It  is  derived  from  the  Greek  of  Erasmus  and 
was  completed  in  November  1534.  A  number  of  factors  go  towards  enhancing  its 
imaginative  power.  Although  the  basic  text  is  recognisable  -  it  is  the  unacknowledged 
ground  of  the  so-called  Authorised  Version  published  in  1611  -  it  is  sufficiently  unfamiliar 
to  catch  the  attention.  It  has  something  of  the  effect  of  a  restored  painting  but  its  clarity  is 
also  a  function  of  a  conceptual  shift  in  so  far  as  the  text  has  been  de-familiarised  with  the 
effect  that  the  reader  is  drawn  into  reading  more  carefully. 
A  simple,  but  very  powerful  effect  follows  from  having  the  text  presented  without 
division  into  verses.  Its  narrative  sweep  is  thereby  considerably  enhanced.  The  price  of 
ease  of  reference  has  been  to  nudge  the  text  into  the  didactic  and  this  has  been  powerfully 
reinforced  by  its  characteristic  presentation  in  the  context  of  ritual. 
7  D.  E.  Nineham,  The  Gospel  of  Saint  Mark:  The  Penguin  New  Testament  Commentaries,  rcpt.  1992 
(London:  Penguin,  1963),  p.  67. 
8  Alexander  Solzhenitsyn,  One  Day  in  the  Life  oflvan  Denisovich,  trans.  by  Ralph  Parker,  1981 
(Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1963). 
206 There  is  a  significant  stylistic  immediacy  in  Tyndale.  A  typical  example  can  be  found  in 
the  conclusion  to  the  third  chapter  of  St.  Matthew.  The  Authorised  Version  has,  'and  a 
voice  came  out  of  the  heavens,  Thou  art  my  beloved  Son,  in  thee  I  am  well  pleased'.  9  This 
looks  measured  and  cool  compared  to  Tyndale's  apparent  spontaneity: 
And  there  came  a  voice  from  heaven:  Thou  art  my  dear  son  in  whom  I  delight. 
(Mark  1,  p.  62) 
The  balance  of  Tyndale's  sentence  has  been  lost  -  but  the  replacing  of  'delight'  seems  an  act 
of  vandalism.  The  Greek  root  is'thinking  well'  -  it  could  be  taken  either  way. 
The  1611  account  where  Jesus  discusses  the  implications  of  the  Parable  of  the  Sower 
has: 
But  when  the  fruit  is  ripe,  straightway  he  putteth  forth  the  sickle,  because  the 
harvest  is  come.  (Mark  4.29) 
On  the  other  hand,  Tyndale  writes: 
And  as  soon  as  the  fruit  is  brought  forth,  anon  he  thrusteth  in  the  sickle,  because  the 
harvest  is  come.  (Mark  4.  p.  67) 
Tyndale's  verb,  'thrusteth',  seems  much  more  effective. 
These  and  similar  effects  make  the  text  more  immediate  -  which  is  to  say,  they  facilitate 
mediation.  They  also  reflect  Tyndale's  own  agenda,  to  make  the  Word  directly  available  to 
the  people  through  the  vernacular. 
Tyndale's  text  is  sufficiently  different  to  defamiliarize  the  Gospel.  The  effect  is  to  open 
the  text  for  imagining  and  in  so  doing  it  reveals  itself  to  be  a  self-conscious  construct.  This 
is  not  to  deny  that  historical  research  may  have  established  the  fact  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth's 
actual  existence  and  confirmed  his  role  as  the  founder  of  a  new  religious  group  amongst  the 
Jews  of  the  first  century  -  there  is,  then,  a  biographical  element.  Accordingly,  knowledge  of 
the  times  and  their  practices  can  serve  to  illuminate  the  text  -  but  they  can  do  so,  primarily, 
only  in  the  discursive  mode. 
Any  discussion  of  the  modes  of  relation  engaged  in  reading  the  Bible  involves  peculiar 
difficulties.  On  the  one  hand,  the  first  priority  of  the  text  is  to  convey  truth.  On  the  other, 
9  The  Bible,  1611  Version  (Oxford:  Oxford  at  the  University  Press,  1891),  Mark1.11 
207 how  can  any  text  be  immune  from  the  intentional  fallacy?  The  assertion  of  the  authority  of 
God  merely  confirms  that  it  means  what  it  says  -  but  in  the  arrival  at  the  meaning  lies  the 
whole  problem.  To  assume  that  the  prior  mode  of  assimilation  should  be  discursive  throws 
the  text  into  rivalry  with  philosophy  and  science  -  to  its  detriment.  I  shall  argue  that  the  text 
is  opened  only  when  the  discursive  is  placed  within  the  dialectic  of  imagining,  and  that  this 
relational  paradigm  is  startlingly  depicted  in  the  preaching  and  fate  of  Jesus  himself.  To 
approach  St.  Mark's  text  as  a  construct,  then,  is  not  to  trivialise  its  import. 
The  art  of  the  Gospel  becomes  evident  in  the  construction  of,  say,  the  fourth  chapter. 
It  begins  by  deftly  establishing  a  context  -  Jesus  preaches  from  a  ship  to  the  crowds  on  the 
shore.  He  tells  them  the  parable  of  the  Sower.  It  is  interesting  that  the  disciples  do  not 
understand  it.  Arguably  this  allows  Mark  to  interpret  the  story  for  them  but  in  doing  so  he 
reduces  it  to  allegory: 
[...  ]  they  that  are  by  the  way's  side,  where  the  word  is  sown,  are  they  to  whom  as 
soon  as  they  have  heard  it,  Satan  cometh  immediately,  and  taketh  away  the  word 
that  was  sown  in  their  hearts.  (Mark  4,  p.  66) 
There  is  a  point  by  point  explication  of  the  parable.  Nineham  observes: 
The  German  scholar  A.  Jülicher  was  broadly  right  in  his  claim  that  this  limitation  to 
a  single  point  is  one  of  the  chief  distinguishing  features  of  the  parable  as  opposed  to 
the  allegory,  and  he  went  on  to  argue  that  if  a  parable  in  its  present  form  has  several 
lessons,  that  is  prima  facie  evidence  that  it  has  been  allegorized  in  the  course  of 
transmission.  '0 
In  a  curious  and  consistent  manner  the  disciples  are  treated  by  Mark  as  if  they  were 
naive.  This  provides  the  pretext  for  didactic  intrusion.  In  effect,  this  amounts  to  an 
extension  of  the  dramatic  irony  established  in  the  opening  sentences  of  the  Gospel  whereby 
the  fulfilment  of  the  prophecy  of  Isaiah  in  the  role  of  John  the  Baptist  gives  the  reader 
privileged  access  to  the  knowledge  that  Jesus  is  Messiah.  Mark's  strategy  in  establishing 
this  irony  is  to  have  us  marvel  at  the  ignorance  of  those  not  yet  initiated.  This  has  the 
possible  effect  of  inviting  strong  identification  precisely  in  the  manner  evoked  by  the  painful 
ignorance  of,  say,  Othello.  Again  and  again  the  Jewish  establishment,  as  well  as  the 
disciples,  are  set  at  an  ironic  distance:  the  structure  of  the  irony  resembles  that  exhibited  at 
10  Commentaries,  pp.  130-131. 
208 the  expense  of  naive  protagonists  such  as  Januarie  in  Chaucer's  The  Merchant's  Tale  or, 
perhaps,  more  appropriately,  Kafka's  Joseph  K.  Imagine  a  rather  dim  disciple,  denied  the 
key  of  the  Evangelist's  faith,  trying  to  make  head  or  tail  of  what  is  going  on:  Das  Schloss 
can  be  translated  as  The  Castle  or  The  Lock. 
It  is  entirely  appropriate,  then,  that  much  of  the  discourse  concerns  seeing: 
To  you  it  is  given  to  know  the  mystery  of  the  kingdom  of  God.  But  unto  them  that 
are  without,  shall  all  things  be  done  in  similitudes:  that  when  they  see,  they  shall  see, 
and  not  discern:  and  when  they  hear  they  shall  hear,  and  not  understand;  lest  at  any 
time  they  should  turn,  and  their  sins  should  be  forgiven  them.  And  he  said  unto 
them:  Perceive  ye  not  this  similitude?  how  then  should  ye  understand  all  other 
i  similitudes?  " 
When  the  uninitiated  seek  understanding  of  the  parable  they  shall  see,  but  not  understand. 
Is  the  parable  designed  to  baffle?  Does  Isaiah  hold  the  key  to  this  conundrum? 
And  I  heard  the  voice  of  the  Lord,  saying,  Whom  shall  I  send,  and  who  will  go  for 
us?  Then  I  said,  Here  am  I;  send  me.  And  he  said,  Go,  and  tell  this  people,  Hear  ye 
indeed,  but  understand  not;  and  see  ye  indeed,  but  perceive  not.  Make  the  heart  of 
this  people  fat,  and  make  their  ears  heavy,  and  shut  their  eyes;  lest  they  see  with 
their  eyes,  and  hear  with  their  ears,  and  understand  with  their  heart,  and  turn  again, 
and  be  healed.  12 
It  seems  that  the  Lord  does  not  wish  the  people  to  see  and  repent  because  he  wishes  them 
first  to  suffer: 
Then  said  I,  Lord,  how  long?  And  he  answered,  Until  cities  be  waste  without 
inhabitant,  and  houses  without  man,  and  the  land  become  utterly  waste,  and  the 
Lord  have  removed  men  far  away,  and  the  forsaken  places  be  many  in  the  midst  of 
the  land.  (Isaiah  6.11-12) 
The  issue  here  is  perhaps  intelligible  in  terms  of  another  lock  and  key  image. 
From  the  midst  of  another  waste  land  -  as  noted  earlier  -  the  voice  of  the  Thunder 
exhorts  us  to  'give',  'sympathise',  'control': 
Dayadhvam:  I  have  heard  the  key 
Turn  in  the  door  once  and  turn  once  only 
We  think  of  the  key,  each  in  his  prison 
Thinking  of  the  key,  each  confirms  a  prison.  13 
11  Tyndale,  Mark  4,  p.  66. 
12  Authorized,  Isaiah  6.8-10. 
13  T.  S.  Eliot,  'The  Waste  Land',  from  Selected  Poems,  op.  cit.,  p.  67. 
209 The  key  of  the  prison  is  not  to  be  found  in  thought  or  through  the  intellect  but  in  imagining 
in  the  context  of  the  moral  life. 
Regarding  Isaiah,  the  punctuation  of  the  Revised  Standard  Version  -  which  indicates 
direct  speech  -  makes  it  easier  to  perceive  that  the  words  that  God  exhorts  the  prophet  to 
utter  are  full  of  irony: 
'Hear  and  hear,  but  do  not  understand; 
see  and  see,  but  do  not  perceive'  14 
As  with  Hopkins's  anvil  image,  the  allusion  to  the  Old  Testament  suddenly  fills  the 
parable  with  meaning.  Jesus  is  to  fulfil  the  prophetic  mission  anticipated  in  Isaiah.  Israel  is 
a  waste  land  and  the  way  out  is  through  a  mode  of  understanding  unavailable  to  the  eye  and 
the  ear  in  their  quotidian  transactions.  In  this  context  the  allegorical  'translation'  is  painfully 
reductive,  indeed,  re-establishes  the  mode  of  seeing  that  the  parable  is  set  to  transcend. 
I  have  previously  argued  that  imaginative  transactions  involve  not  a  direct  assimilation 
of,  say,  the  discursive  but  a  dialectical  movement  across  exclusive  assimilating  modes,  so 
the  many  reversals  implicit  in  the  parables  and  in  the  confrontations  with  the  Jewish 
establishment  do  not  constitute  a  straightforward  reversal  of  values  but  point  towards  a 
single  paradigmatic  shift  which  is  initiated  repeatedly  and  bears  at  least  a  family  resemblance 
to  the  shift  envisaged  by  Eliot  -  from  knowing  to  a  commitment  to  a  form  of  life. 
As  the  narrative  moves  towards  its  climax  the  tension  in  the  running  irony  grows.  In 
chapter  ten,  for  example,  Jesus  succinctly  anticipates  the  events  of  the  Passion.  The  failure 
of  the  disciples  to  understand  the  astonishing  reversal  implicit  in  the  mocking,  scourging  and 
killing  of  the  Messiah  is  displayed  in  all  its  naivete  when  James  and  John  ask  that  they  'may 
sit  one  on  thy  right  hand,  and  the  other  on  thy  left  hand,  in  thy  glory.  115 
With  careful  persistence  Jesus  spells  out  the  implications  of  the  abandoning  of  social 
hierarchies: 
[...  ]  whosoever  of  you  will  be  great  among  you,  shall  be  your  minister.  And 
whosoever  will  be  chief,  shall  be  servant  unto  all.  For  even  the  son  of  man  came  not 
to  be  ministered  unto:  but  to  minister.  (Mark  10,  p.  77) 
14  The  Bible,  Revised  Standard  Version  rcpr.  1955  (London:  Nelson,  1952),  Isaiah  6.9. 
15  Tyndale,  Mark  10,  p.  77. 
210 There  follows  the  miracle  of  restoring  sight  to  blind  Bartimeus.  His  imprecation  is  the  first 
`objective'  testimony  that  Jesus  is  the  Messiah  -  `Jesus  the  son  of  David,  have  mercy  on 
me.  '  (Mark  11,  p78)  The  blind  man  sees  where  the  disciples  have  failed. 
This  is  a  striking  example  of  how,  generally,  the  miracles  are  used  as  enacted  parables. 
Whatever  their  supernatural  significance  might  be  they  are  self-consciously  integrated  into 
the  developing  narrative. 
Such  integration  makes  them  vulnerable  to  reductive  readings.  The  second  feeding 
miracle,  for  example,  is  clearly  allegorised  and  we  thereby  see  how,  perhaps,  the  first  such 
miracle  is  to  be  understood: 
And  they  had  forgotten  to  take  bread  with  them,  neither  had  they  in  the  ship  with 
them  more  than  one  loaf.  And  he  charged  them  saying.  Take  heed,  and  beware  of 
the  leaven  of  the  Pharisees,  and  of  the  leaven  of  Herod.  And  they  reasoned  among 
themselves  saying:  we  have  no  bread.  And  when  Jesus  knew  that,  he  said  unto 
them:  why  take  ye  thought  because  ye  have  no  bread?  perceive  ye  not  yet,  neither 
understand?  Have  ye  your  hearts  yet  blinded?  [...  ]  Do  you  not  remember?  When  I 
brake  five  loaves  among  five  thousand  [...  ]?  [...  ]  how  is  it  that  ye  understand  not? 
(Mark  8,  p.  73) 
The  didactic  impulse  is  clearly  illustrated  also  in  the  passage  concerning  the  cleansing  of  the 
temple.  The  episode  is  framed  by  the  story  of  the  fig  tree: 
The  temple  and  its  worship  stand  for  Jewish  life  and  religion;  the  Messiah  comes  to 
it  and  when  he  finds  that  the  outward  foliage  of  ceremony  hides  no  fruit  of 
righteousness,  his  only  possible  reaction  is  one  of  judgement  and  cleansing. 
(Nineham,  p.  300) 
Clearly,  the  miracles  are  as  vulnerable  as  the  parables  to  monochromatic  readings,  whether 
these'  are  a  result  of  critical  commentary  or of  Mark's  own  agenda. 
Generally,  in  so  far  as  the  Gospels  are  typically  assimilated  in  the  context  of  ritual  they 
are  the  subject  of  relentless  interpretation  -  the  initiate's  view  -  so  that  the  possibility  of 
imaginative  apprehension  is  destroyed  by  the  shunt  into  the  discursive.  The  ultimate 
question  is  perpetually  begged.  Whether  or not  it  is  intended,  interpretation  is,  of  its  nature, 
associated  with  power. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  feeding  miracles  can  be  seen  as  elements  in  a  figural  sequence 
which  begins,  perhaps,  in  Exodus: 
211 Then  said  the  Lord  unto  Moses:  behold,  I  will  rain  bread  from  heaven  down  to  you, 
and  let  the  people  go  out  and  gather  day  by  day,  that  I  may  prove  to  them  whether 
they  will  walk  in  my  law  or no  [...  ]. 
[...  ]  I  have  heard  the  murmuring  of  the  children  of  Israel,  tell  them  therefore  and 
say  that  at  even  they  shall  eat  flesh,  and  in  the  morning  they  shall  be  filled  with 
bread,  and  ye  shall  know  that  I  am  the  Lord  your  God.  16 
The  fulfilment  of  these  types  is  in  the  Last  Supper  and,  thereby,  in  its  on-going  re-enactment 
in  the  Mass. 
Experienced  in  the  discursive  mode  figuralism  merely  provides  exemplification,  the 
weight  of  authority.  However,  figuralism  also  has  the  potential  to  function  rather  in  the 
manner  of  certain  of  Eliot's  allusions  as  in,  say,  'The  Waste  Land'.  The  allusion  to  Spenser's 
Prothalamion'  does  not  reach  for  a  superficial  comparison  where  the  past  is  seen  to  be 
preferable  to  the  present;  rather,  in  Spenser's  vision  human  relationships  are  conceived  in 
the  context  of  the  sacred  and  are  thereby  endowed  with  a  meaning  unavailable  to  the 
modern  nymphs  and  the  heirs  of  city  directors.  Whether  or not  we  share  Spenser's  vision  is 
not  the  point  -  even  if  it  were  nonsense  the  vision  would  still  be  seen  in  its  time  to  have 
endowed  human  relationships  with  dignity  and  purpose.  In  a  figural  context  the  didactic 
can  be  recharged  with  meaning  -  but  this  would  be  an  imaginative  phenomenon. 
Generally,  left  to  speak  for  themselves,  the  characteristic  movement  within  the  parables  is 
through  the  dialectic  of  imagination  and  that  movement  finds  its  structural  analogue  in  the 
transactions  of  the  miracles.  Paradoxically,  approached  in  the  light  of  faith  they  cannot, 
logically,  have  the  imaginative  power  that  they  have  in  the  immediacy  of  disclosure.  Is  it 
that  the  full  power  of  the  text  is  available  only  to  those  without  ideological  commitment? 
To  put  it  another  way,  the  willing  suspension  of  belief  is  a  condition  for  the  suspension  of 
disbelief  that  is  the  symptom  and  condition  for  the  experience  of  the  power  of  the 
narrative.  This,  of  course,  is  precisely  the  issue  that  the  parables  illustrate:  ideology  is  to  be 
superseded  through  the  dialectical  twist  of  imaginative  transactions.  It  follows  that  'faith'  - 
if  it  is  to  be  anything  other  than  identification  -  presupposes  the  commitment  to  that  process 
as  it  is  experienced  in  the  teleological  context:  it  is  a  product  of  a  symbolic  transaction 
which  is  subsequently  rationalised  ideologically. 
16  Tyndale,  Exodus  16,  p.  111. 
212 This  point  is  strikingly  illustrated,  as  we  noted,  in  much  of  the  poetry  of  Hopkins  where 
experience  begins  in  the  natural  world,  is  subsequently  structured  through  inscape  and  the 
accompanying  double  prescription,  with  its  disclosure  of  value,  becomes  symbolic  in  the 
context  of  Divine  purpose.  'The  Windhover'  is  the  paradigm  case.  The  poems  display  the 
dialectical  twist  across  modes  that  is  implicit  in  the  parabolic  and  miraculous  in  Mark's 
Gospel. 
Such  moments  of  dawning,  of  illumination  occur  in  a  text  where,  generally,  there  is  great 
tension  between  contradictory  modes  -  between  didacticism,  the  consolidation  of  ideology, 
and  imagining  -  tension,  compounded,  of  course,  by  the  modes  of  apprehension  brought  to 
it  by  the  reader. 
Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  these  tensions,  gradually,  as  the  text  unfolds,  a  paradigm  of  the 
self  is  posited  in  the  context  of  imagining.  The  logic  of  parable  and  miracle  finally  coalesces 
in  the  passion  and  crucifixion  itself.  Here  the  dialectic  of  imagining  is,  literally,  embodied  in 
a  dramatic  realisation.  As  I  have  argued,  the  disclosure  that  is  made  available  in  double 
prescription  is  inherently  purposive  and  thereby  releases  resources  for  the  possible 
subsequent  ascription  of  purpose.  Our  imaginative  transactions  thereby  assume  a  symbolic 
dimension.  The  imaginative  dialectic  has  been  rehearsed  again  and  again  in  parables  and 
miracles  -  over  and  overed  -  as  Mark's  story  unfolds  and  reaches  its  ultimate  expression  in 
the  crucifixion.  In  essence,  it  involves  the  dialectical  twist  from  conditional,  ideological 
man,  to  the  apprehension  of  unconditional  man  disclosed  in  the  act  of  suffering.  In  the 
process  of  our  experiencing  this  transaction  as  a  fulfilment  -  imagining,  in  the  teleological 
context  -  this  unconditionality  becomes  transmuted  into  an  overwhelming  sense  of  the 
numinous.  Whatever  ideological  interpretation  is  subsequently  placed  upon  this  experience 
is  outwith  my  immediate  concern  -I  merely  suggest  that  this  central  transaction  is  a 
paradigm  case  for  the  logic  of  imagining  and  points  to  the  centrality  of  imagining  in  our 
individuation.  In  this  dialectic,  ideological  man  transcends  himself  in  the  act  of  imagining. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  effects  of  subsequent  rationalisation  -  Mark's  is  the  earliest  of  the 
Gospels  -  have  tended  to  obfuscate  the  transaction  through  the  attrition  of  sentimental 
213 mythologising  and,  more  significantly,  through  transposing  the  self  disclosed  in  imagining 
into  ideological  terms  -  monochromatic  renderings. 
With  St.  Paul  the  symbolism  of  imagining  with  its  concomitant  transactions  of  mediation 
between  self  and  world,  mutual  refiguration,  is  reduced  to  evidence  for  fulfilment.  In  this 
monochromatic  mode  symbolism  is  bifurcated  into  sign  and  idea.  Given  both  the  context  of 
the  inner  life  and  his  methodology,  Paul  becomes  the  precursor  of  Freud.  There  is  an 
explosive  self-dramatisation  that  pushes  Jewish  history  -  already  symbolically  conceived  - 
into  a  sort  of  secondary  allegory.  Gabriel  Josipovici  observes: 
[...  ]  he  systematically  takes  the  ancient  Jewish  rituals  and  transforms  them  into 
inward  events:  circumcision  must  be  of  the  heart,  the  outward  deed  is  meaningless; 
the  unleavened  bread  of  Passover,  which,  for  the  Jews,  was  a  sign  and  a  reminder 
that  their  ancestors  did  not  have  time  to  make  leavened  bread  as  they  escaped  from 
Pharaoh,  is  used  to  make  a  complex  point  about  the  inner  self  [...  ].  Indeed,  the  very 
history  of  the  Jewish  people,  and  events  in  that  history  such  as  Moses'  drawing 
water  from  the  rock,  are  allegorized  and  internalized:  'they  drank  of  that  spiritual 
Rock  that  followed  them:  and  that  Rock  was  Christ.  '17 
Yet  there  are  aspects  of  Paul's  writings  that  seem  to  endorse  the  paradigm  displayed  in 
Mark.  Paul  finds  the  law  -  as  it  is  represented  in  the  Pharisaical  ideology  previously 
practised  by  himself  -  crucially  wanting.  It  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  hypocrisy  -'thou  which 
teachest  another  teachest  not  thyself;  '8  rather,  the  imaginative  dialectic  has  not  been 
undergone.  In  a  marginal  gloss  Tyndale  writes: 
Deeds  are  an  outward  righteousness  before  the  world  and  testify  what  a  man  is 
within:  but  justify  not  the  heart  before  God.  (p.  227) 
Clearly,  the  dialectic  is  at  the  heart  of  Paul's  concerns  but  becomes  a  matter  of  justification 
through  faith: 
Now  verily  is  the  righteousness  that  cometh  of  God  declared  without  the  fulfilling  of 
the  law,  having  witness  yet  of  the  law  and  of  the  prophets.  The  righteousness  no 
doubt  which  is  good  before  God,  cometh  by  the  faith  of  Jesus  Christ  unto  all  and 
upon  all  that  believe.  19 
17  Gabriel  Josipovici,  The  Book  of  God:  A  Response  to  the  Bible,  repr.  1990  (New  Haven:  Yale  University 
Press,  1988),  pp.  242-243. 
18  Tyndale,  Romans  2,  p.  227 
19  Romans  3,  p.  228. 
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It  is  interesting  that  Luther  in  his  'Prologue  to  the  Romans'  -  which  Tyndale  includes  in  his 
own  adapted  translation  -  seems  more  sensitive  to  the  nature  of  the  dialectic  than  Paul. 
Could  it  be  that  Luther's  responses  are  shaped  by  his  reading  of  the  Gospels  -  that  he  writes 
in  the  light  of  his  experience  of  imaginative  transactions? 
Acquaint  thyself  therefore  with  the  manner  of  speaking  of  the  apostle,  and  let  this 
now  stick  fast  in  thine  heart,  that  it  is  not  both  one,  to  do  the  deeds  and  works  of  the 
law,  and  to  fulfil  the  law.  [...  ] 
To  fulfil  the  law  is,  to  do  the  work  thereof  and  whatsoever  the  law  commandeth, 
with  love,  lust  and  inward  affection  and  delectation  [...  ].  Such  lust  and  free  liberty 
to  love  the  law,  cometh  only  by  the  working  of  the  spirit  in  the  heart  [...  ]. 
And  as  the  spirit  cometh  by  faith  only,  even  so  faith  cometh  by  hearing  the  word 
or  glad  tidings  of  God,  when  Christ  is  preached  [...  ].  All  our  justifying  then  cometh 
of  faith,  and  faith  and  the  spirit  come  of  God  and  not  of  us.  20 
Certainly  the  emphasis  here  coincides  with  Luther's  larger  agenda  of  making  the  Word 
accessible. 
Gabriel  Josipovici  argues  that  the  nature  of  Paul's  conversion  obliges  him  to  resort  to 
reporting  the  event  in  order  to  establish  its  authenticity: 
He  needs  to  keep  projecting  an  image  of  what  he  was  and  what  happened  to  him  just 
because  it  all  happened  internally  and  in  an  instant.  This  is  the  reason  why  there  is 
such  an  amazing  proliferation  of  autobiography  in  the  epistles  [...  ]. 
At  the  same  time,  since  all  that  has  happened  has  happened  within  the  individual, 
there  is  a  new  insistence  on  morality  as  the  external  guarantor  of  that  inner  change.  2' 
The  self  becomes  locked  into  an  internal  battle  between  guilt  and  atonement: 
This  struggle  within  the  self  between  warring  factions  is  something  with  which 
literature  has  made  us  so  familiar  that  it  is  hard  for  us  to  realize  that  it  is  not  the  only 
way  to  think  about  the  self.  The  word  Edgar  Allan  Poe  used  to  describe  it  is 
'perversity,  and  Dostoevsky,  who  explored  the  ramifications  of  perversity  more  fully 
than  anyone  else,  made  the  explicit  point,  that  it  was  a  concept  unknown  to  Plato  or 
to  the  philosophical  tradition  descended  from  him  [...  ]. 
That  there  is  a  link  between  perversity  and  autobiography,  and,  at  a  deeper  level, 
between  the  Pauline  vision  of  man  and  the  impulse  towards  self-projection,  is  made 
manifest  by  what  is  generally  regarded  as  the  first  proper  autobiography,  St. 
Augustine's  Confessions.  (pp.  245-246) 
Paul  seems  compelled  to  compromise  the  subtle  transactions  of  imagining  by  his  heady 
literalism  that  demands  identification  with  a  truth  discursively  conceived: 
20  Tyndale,  'Prologue  to  the  Romans',  pp.  209-210.  (My  italics) 
21  The  Book  of  God,  p.  243. 
215 If  Christ  be  not  risen,  then  is  our  preaching  vain,  and  your  faith  is  also  vain.  22 
In  these  circumstances,  imagining  is inevitably  displaced  by  competition  between  Jewish  and 
Christian  ideologies:  in  Mark  the  essential  conflict  associated  with  Jesus  is  between  the  law 
and  imagining. 
In  the  context  of  issues  such  as  these  the  imaginative  power  and  immense  tact  of  Kafka's 
vision  in  The  Trial  is  thrown  into  relief.  The  pursuit  of  the  law  in  ignorance  of  the  'law  of 
righteousness'  is  shown  to  be  self-destructive.  To  arrive  at  such  understanding  supposes  a 
perspective  possible  only  for  the  reader.  We  either  see  or  fail  to  see  -  this  is  the  source  of 
Kafka's  tact.  On  the  other  hand,  Paul's  self-dramatisation  -  compare  Joseph  K's  -  is  given 
the  authority  of  identification  with  both  Jewish  history  and  the  type  of  the  Prodigal  Son. 
His  own  story  demands  our  acceptance  as  truth  and  becomes  the  source  of  authentication  of 
his  faith. 
It  is  precisely  the  capacity  of  fiction  to  present  the  possibility  for  symbolic  mediation  and 
in  so  doing,  disclose  a  self  that  is  reciprocally  extended  as  the  world  is  extended,  a  self  that 
will,  inevitably,  through  decay  into  a  discursive,  monochromatic  history,  undergo 
objectification,  but  can  be  refigured  in  subsequent  imagining.  It  is  this  cycle  of  imagining 
that  is  inhibited  by  the  urgency  of  Paul's  self-authentication. 
If  Paul's  method  anticipates  Freud,  his  notion  of  a  self  that  is  realized  in  the  context  of  an 
internal  battle  for  authenticity  anticipates  Jung.  I  would  argue  that  there  is  no  final  self. 
The  imaginative  cycle  in  its  decay  provides  the  substance  for  further  imagining.  Ideology 
becomes  the  ground,  indeed,  provides  the  urgent  motivation  for  subsequent  acts  of 
imaginative  transformation  -  this,  after  all,  is  the  underlying  pattern  revealed  in  the  teachings 
and  Passion  of  Jesus  in  the  Evangelist's  imagining. 
It  follows  that  the  imaginative  transactions  at  the  heart  of  Mark's  Gospel  have  to  be 
repeated  again  and  again  in  history,  on  the  one  hand,  because  the  inevitable  decay  into  the 
ideological  establishes  the  ground  of  the  subsequent  dialectic  and,  on  the  other,  because 
Christ's  Passion  is  perpetually  re-enacted:  the  one  is  the  logical  analogue  of  the  other. 
22  Tyndale,  Romans  15,  p.  258. 
216 Re-enactments:  Bosch  and  Patrick  White 
In  his  Christ  Crowned  with  Thorns  Hieronymus  Bosch  depicts  the  very  moment  before 
the  thorns  are  pushed  into  Christ's  head.  (Fig.  1  ovcrlcaf)  In  this  freezing  of  the  instant  the 
painting  resembles  Goya's  Execution  of  the  Rebels  on  3rd  of  May  1808  where  the  structural 
lines  of  the  painting  converge  on  the  martyred  victim's  chest  which,  in  the  next  instant,  the 
bullets  will  enter.  Both  paintings  are,  then,  intrinsically  dramatic. 
Pamela  Tudor-Craig,  Lady  Wedgwood,  has  described  how  Christ's  four  tormentors  are 
depicted  in  terms  contemporary  to  Bosch,  a  characteristic  of  late  medieval  art  and  Mystery 
plays.  23  That  his  tormentors  could  be  drawn  from  the  streets  serves  to  shock  the  observer 
into  the  recognition  that  Christ's  Passion  is  perpetually  re-enacted  -  our  own  sins  continue 
to  torment  the  body  of  Christ.  Indeed,  as  Jung  observes,  the  Mass  itself  recapitulates,  'in 
condensed  form  [...  ]  the  life  and  sufferings  of  Christ.  '24 
Inevitably  the  designation  has  shifted  from  Jesus  of  Nazareth  to  Christ  -  the  imaginative 
transaction  has  been  encompassed  ideologically.  This  leads  to  a  question:  does  the  painting 
merely  iterate  the  self  of  Pauline  allegory,  the  internal  drama  of  guilt  that  necessitates 
atonement,  or  does  it  allow  for  the  dialectical  twist  of  imagining? 
Lady  Wedgwood  exposes  more  layers  of  meaning  in  the  painting.  The  four  tormentors 
represent  all  classes  of  society,  lay  and  spiritual.  Not  only  that,  but  each  is  identified  with 
one  of  the  four  elements  -  earth,  water,  air  and  fire.  It  is  suddenly  possible  to  see  Christ  as 
man,  man  as  microcosm,  imprisoned  within  contending  dispositions,  each  associated  with 
the  elements:  torments  from  without  are  suddenly  torments  from  within.  This  has  the  effect 
of  releasing  the  four  tormentors  from  the  grip  of  caricature  -  each  can  now  be  identified  as  a 
suffering  man.  But  only  in  the  perception  of  Christ  as  suffering  man  is  the  dialectical  twist 
possible  that  is  the  ground  of  the  symbolic  transaction  that  pervades  the  depiction  with  the 
sense  of  the  numinous.  The  painting  catches  the  transaction  at  the  very  instant  when  the 
suffering  Jesus  is  about  to  be  crowned  as  the  suffering  Christ. 
23  Pamela  Tudor-Craig,  Lady  Wedgewood,  The  Secret  Life  of  Paintings:  Hieronymus  Bosch's  Christ 
Crowned  with  Thorns,  BBC,  1986. 
24  C.  G.  Jung,  Psychology  and  Religion,  op.  cit.,  p.  220. 
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Figure  1.  Hieronymus  Bosch,  Christ  Crowned  with  Thorns 
218 The  painting,  in  effect,  is  a  narrative,  a  journey  through  a  sequence  of  dawnings  that 
arrives  at  its  final  destination  in  the  revelation  of  the  quintessence,  the  fifth  element,  the 
element  of  the  Divine.  The  sequence  finds  its  paradigmatic  reflection  in  the  poems  of 
Hopkins  and  in  St.  Mark's  Gospel. 
In  the  modern  context  the  paradigm  emerges  again  in  the  writings  of  Patrick  White, 
notably,  in  Riders  in  the  Chariot.  White  recasts  the  riders  of  Ezekiel's  vision  as 
contemporary  figures.  Who,  amongst  us,  are  redeemable?  He  explores  the  question 
through  the  experiences  of  four  outcasts:  Mary  Hare,  odd  and  epileptic,  the  daughter  of  an 
ostentatious,  formerly  wealthy,  Australian  family;  Himmelfarb,  a  Jewish  intellectual,  who 
survived  the  Holocaust  to  become  a  `bloody  reffo'25  in  the  `Promised  Land'  of  Australia; 
Mrs  Godbold,  poor,  but  monumental  in  her  naive  goodness  and  Alf  Dobbo,  the  outcast, 
aboriginal  artist.  Each  is  a  mystic;  each  is  deeply  flawed.  All  suffer  cruelly  in  the  context  of 
contemporary  Australian  life  -  indeed,  the  climax  of  the  book  involves  the  mock  crucifixion 
of  Himmelfarb. 
Again,  the  protagonists  constitute  a  quaternity  -  the  theory  of  the  elements  that  provides 
a  subtext  for  Bosch  has  been  superseded  by  a  psychological  ideology  that  owes  much  to 
Jung.  In  particular  the  process  of  individuation  is  indicated  in  recurring  images  of  the 
mandala;  however,  it  is  in  terms  of  integration  through  the  recognition  and  assimilation  of 
projections  -  the  Pauline  drama  of  the  shadow  -  that  much  of  the  exploration  of  the  book 
proceeds.  26  To  say  that  such  a  concept  of  self  is  a  cultural  phenomenon  merely  reminds  us 
of  its  possible  provisional  status  -  the  work  creates  the  self  that  it  purports  to  describe:  but 
how  could  it  be  otherwise?  Nevertheless,  this  issue  is  constitutive  of  a  disturbing  ambiguity 
in  White's  mature  work. 
The  theatricality  of  self-dramatisation  manifests  itself  at  times  in  caricature  -  the 
objectification  reveals  itself  to  be  a  temptation  of  fantasy.  White's  caricatures  are  a 
symptom  of  his  own  projection  and  are,  in  some  ways,  more  instructive  in  their  revelations 
25  Patrick  White,  Riders  in  the  Chariot  (London:  Penguin,  1964),  p.  199. 
26  See  Introduction,  p.  14,  for  Jung  on  'projection'  and  the  `shadow'. 
219 than  are  his  four  'endorsed'  characters.  27  It  is  interesting  that  the  power  of  identification 
with  White's  vision  should  induce  partisan  criticism  from  Peter  Beatson: 
From  the  moment  they  come  into  being  in  his  pages  they  lack  dramatic  autonomy; 
the  analyst  and  satirist  will  not  allow  them  that  opacity  which  creates  an  allusion  of 
freedom.  They  have  little  chance  of  offering  resistance  to  their  creator,  who  knows 
them  too  well  [...  ]  his  style  probes  and  undermines  any  pretensions  to  autonomy 
they  might  have.  In  doing  so,  of  course,  he  violates  one  of  the  major  canons  of 
twentieth  century  orthodoxy.  Great  artists  seldom  feel  obliged  to  allow  themselves 
to  be  confined  by  academic  dogmatism.  (p.  125) 
But  the  point  at  issue  is  objectification  in  a  novel  whose  whole  thrust  is  towards  the 
explication  of  individuation,  the  assimilation  of  the  shadow.  There  is  a  tension  between 
White's  practice  and  his  moral  vision  that  Beatson  would  wish  away.  This  is  an  example  of 
critical  identification. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  confusion  of  modes  in  White's  text  is  characteristic  of  St.  Mark's 
Gospel:  both  texts  exhibit  in  their  construction  the  very  symptoms  that  drive  the  necessity  to 
transcend  identical  symptoms  in  the  projected  fiction.  In  White's  case,  there  is  a  strong 
sense  of  a  gnostic  schism  between  good  and  evil  which  is  cultivated  through  his  elaboration 
of  parody. 
Each  of  the  endorsed  characters  is  depicted  in  moments  of  visionary  experience.  In  the 
context  of  Mary  Hare's  imaginative  apprehensions  of  nature  the  impact  of  meaning  in  the 
context  of  the  purposive  is  so  strong  that  it  is  as  if  the  world  itself  becomes  animate: 
She  stood  still.  Thinking  very  intently.  Or  allowing  her  instinct  to  play  around  her. 
[...  ]  She  stroked  leaves  sulkily.  She  broke  a  shaggy  stick.  28 
The  metaphors  of  animation  or  implied  animation  are  tactful  here  but  in  their  proliferation 
through  the  text  they  have  a  powerful,  cumulative,  prescriptive  effect  in  the  imaginative 
landscape  of  the  novel  as  a  whole.  Mary  is  determined  to  differentiate  herself  from  the 
uninitiated  -  her  arrogance  will  be  revealed  as  an  obstacle  to  her  individuation.  These 
ordinary  mortals  are  rootless,  doomed  to  wander  like  Cain: 
27  Peter  Beatson,  The  Eye  in  the  Mandala:  Patrick  White,  A  Vision  of  Man  and  God  (London:  Paul  Elek, 
1976),  p.  125. 
28  Riders  in  the  Chariot,  p.  11. 
220 Other  people  would  drive  along  a  bush  road  looking  out  of  the  windows  of  a  car, 
but  their  minds  embraced  almost  nothing  of  what  their  flickering  eyes  saw.  Whole 
towers  of  green  remained  unclimbed,  rocks  unopened.  Or  else  the  intruders  might 
stop  their  cars,  and  go  in  search  of  water.  She  had  seen  them,  letting  themselves 
down  into  the  cold,  black,  secret  rock  pools,  while  remaining  enclosed  in  their  own 
resentful  goose-flesh.  Whereas  she,  Miss  Hare,  whose  eyes  were  always  probing, 
fingers  trying,  would  achieve  the  ecstasy  of  complete,  annihilating  liberation  without 
any  such  immersion.  (pp.  11-12) 
This  passage  presents  one  of  White's  most  characteristic  themes.  The  uninitiated  are 
distracted,  perpetually  on  the  move.  They  lack  the  sense  of  self  posited  in  imaginative 
transactions. 
White's  previous  novel,  Voss,  is  fundamentally  concerned  with  the  forging  of  identity  in  an 
epic  voyage  of  exploration  which  is  at  once  external  and  internal;  corrosive  physical 
hardship  is  correlated  with  the  bitter  trials  of  Voss's  individuation.  29  This  is  White's 
'passage'  to  Australia  -  the  country  is  thereby  made  available  for  those  who  dare  to 
approach  it:  a  parallel  journey  is  made  in  imagination  by  the  woman  who  loves  him,  Laura 
Trevelyan. 
There  is  evidence  here  for  the  reciprocity  implicit  in  imaginative  transactions  -  the 
simultaneous  configuration  of  world  and  self.  In  Wordsworth,  the  apprehension  of  the 
landscapes  of  the  Lake  District  posits  a  psyche  with  a  sense  of  the  sacred  confinable  within 
the  parameters  of  a  more  or  less  conventional  moral  ideology.  Australia,  on  the  other  hand, 
may  precipitate  gnostic  fault  lines  rather  in  the  manner  of  Forster's  India,  which  overwhelms 
Mrs  Moore's  Christianity,  and  is  more  appropriately  mythologised  in  terms  of  the  pantheon 
of  Hindu  gods. 
The  most  intense  of  Mary  Hare's  visionary  experiences  are  associated  with  her  epilepsy. 
In  such  a  moment  is  introduced  the  novel's  central  symbol,  Ezekiel's  vision  of  the  riders  in 
the  chariot: 
So  she  would  wait,  with  the  breath  fluctuating  in  her  lungs,  and  the  blood  thrilling 
through  her  distended  veins.  [...  ]  And  sure  enough,  the  wheels  began  to  plough  the 
tranquil  fields  of  white  sky.  She  could  feel  the  breath  of  horses  on  her  battered 
cheeks.  She  was  lifted  up,  the  wind  blowing  between  the  open  sticks  of  fingers  that 
she  held  extended  on  stumps  of  arms  [...  ].  She  was  aware  only  of  her  present 
29  Patrick  White,  Voss  (Harmondsworth:  Penguin,  1960). 
221 anguish.  Of  her  mind  leaving  her.  The  filthy  waves  that  floated  off  the  fragments  of 
disintegrating  flesh.  (pp.  37-38) 
In  contrast  Mrs  Flack  and  Mrs  Jolley  are  depicted  in  the  celebration  of  unholy  rites: 
At  that  moment  something  would  happen,  of  such  peculiar  subtlety  that  it  must  have 
eluded  the  perception  of  all  but  those  involved  in  the  experience.  The  catalyst  of 
sympathy  seemed  to  destroy  the  envelopes  of  personality,  leaving  the  two  essential 
beings  free  to  merge  and  float.  [...  ]  As  they  continued  sitting,  the  two  women 
would  drench  the  room  with  the  moth-colours  of  their  one  mind.  [...  ]  This  could 
have  been  the  perfect  communion  of  souls,  if,  at  the  same  time,  it  had  not  suggested 
perfect  collusion.  (p.  74) 
Here,  imaginative  transaction  is  reduced  to  enveloping  projection  that  would  'drench'  the 
room.  The  comfortable  containing  space,  the  room,  the  house,  become  symbols  for  the 
unshakeable  ego  identity  and  will  come  to  constitute  the  dimensions  of  their  hell.  On  the 
other  hand,  Mary  Hare  will  be  released  by  the  collapse  of  her  mansion,  Xanadu.  A 
pervasive  texture  of  allusion  consolidates  the  parody,  even  to  the  extent  that  they,  too,  have 
their  inverted  'visions'  where  Ezekiel's  whirlwind  is  reduced  to  an  attack  of  dyspepsia: 
For  the  owner  himself  had  just  emerged.  The  Jew.  The  two  ladies  clutched  each 
other  by  the  gloves.  They  had  never  seen  anything  so  yellow  or  so  strange.  [...  ] 
Now  the  whirlwinds  were  rising  in  honest  breasts,  that  honest  corsets  were  striving 
to  contain.  (p.  214) 
The  cruelty  of  White's  satire  can  be  almost  Swiftian  at  times.  From  the  perspective  of 
imagining,  it  is  as  if  evil  involved  the  inclusion  of  corrosive  banality,  of  cruelty  within  a 
purposive,  teleological  context.  In  White's  vision  one  senses  the  temptation  to  sanctify 
hatred  -  something  he  shares  with  D.  H.  Lawrence,  who,  clearly,  had  a  considerable 
influence  on  his  work. 
If  the  book  consisted  of  nothing  other  than  the  juxtaposition  of  objectification  and 
imagination  then  it  would  be  hopelessly  split.  However,  the  central  imaginative  transactions 
within  the  four  endorsed  characters  encompass  their  negative  as  well  as  positive  qualities. 
Mary  Hare's  arrogance  and  secret  guilts  remain  to  be  acknowledged.  Her  failure  of  love 
may  well  be  the  product  of  a  brutal  and  profound  rejection  by  her  parents  -  did  she 
contribute  to  the  drowning  of  her  father?  -  but  she  will  arrive  at  love  through  her 
communion  with  Himmelfarb. 
222 Much  of  the  imaginative  power  of  the  book  is  generated  in  the  depiction  of  the  German 
Jew's  experience  of  the  Holocaust.  There  is  a  certain  parallel  with  the  assimilation  of  the 
Australian  hinterland  in  Voss.  Himmelfarb's  failures  of  love  and  his  betrayals  are  located 
within  a  context  of  suffering  within  the  Jewish  experience  in  Germany  where  his  wife's 
loving  vision  of  him  as  a  Messiah  can,  initially,  be  seen  only  at  ironic  distance.  After  his 
escape  from  Friedensdorf  he  cannot  find  the  Promised  Land  in  Israel  and  is  moved  to 
emigrate.  In  Australia  the  Promised  Land  will  be  seen  to  be,  not  a  place,  but  a  condition  of 
the  spirit. 
Mrs  Godbold  pursues  her  loving  kindness  in  the  context  of  a  relentless  'biological'  faith 
(p.  230)  at  the  expense  of  the  humiliation  of  her  husband.  As  yet,  love  in  her  hands  is  a 
bludgeon.  It  is  in  the  context  of  another  order  of  love,  in  Mrs  Khalil's  brothel,  that  the 
whore  presents  Mrs  Godbold  with  her  revelation: 
Suddenly  she  bent  down,  for  something  to  do,  it  could  have  been,  and  got 
possession  of  the  smoky  cat.  She  laid  it  along  her  cheek,  and  asked: 
'What  are  you  after,  eh? 
So  softly.  But  it  was  heard. 
Mrs  Khalil  nearly  bust  herself.  She  answered: 
'Love,  I  expect.  Like  anybody  else.  ' 
And  Mrs  Godbold  had  to  see  that  this  was  true.  That  was  perhaps  the  most 
dreadful  part.  Now  she  really  did  understand,  she  thought,  almost  everything. 
(p.  277) 
The  novel  comes  to  its  climax  in  the  crucifixion  of  Himmelfarb.  As  in  Bosch,  the  incident 
is  given  a  vivid,  contemporary  relevance,  with  a  wealth  of  detail  and  symbolism  prefigured 
in  types  from  both  the  Jewish  and  Christian  traditions.  At  times  the  symbolism  is  token  but 
much  of  it  generates  the  power  associated  with  the  figural  imagination. 
In  the  intensity  of  his  suffering  Himmelfarb  experiences  a  vision  couched  in  the  terms  of  a 
mandala: 
From  the  beginning  Himmelfarb  had  known  that  he  possessed  the  strength,  but  did 
pray  for  some  sign.  Through  all  the  cursing,  and  trampling,  and  laughter,  and 
hoisting,  and  aching,  and  distortion,  he  had  continued  to  expect.  Until  now, 
possibly,  it  would  be  given.  So,  he  raised  his  head.  And  was  conscious  of  a  stillness 
and  clarity,  which  was  the  stillness  and  clarity  of  pure  water,  at  the  centre  of  which 
his  God  was  reflected.  (p.  413) 
Earlier  in  his  life  in  Germany  in  a  sort  of  waking,  visionary  nightmare  he  had  seen  himself: 
223 But  once  he  was  roused  from  sleep  [...  ]  to  identify  a  face.  And  got  to  his  feet,  to 
receive  the  messenger  of  light,  or  to  resist  the  dark  dissembler.  When  he  was 
transfixed  by  his  own  horror.  Of  his  own  image,  but  fluctuating,  as  though  in  fire  or 
water.  So  that  the  long-awaited  moment  was  reduced  to  a  reflection  of  the  self. 
(pp.  136-37) 
Just  as  Bosch  built,  amongst  other  things,  the  theory  of  the  humours  into  his  Christ 
Crowned  with  Thorns,  so  White  uses  contemporary  psychological  theory.  Himmelfarb's 
vision  is  anticipated  in  Jung: 
The  goal  of  psychological  [...  ]  development  is  self-realization,  or  individuation.  But 
since  man  knows  himself  only  as  an  ego,  and  the  self,  as  a  totality,  is  indescribable 
and  indistinguishable  from  a  God-image,  self-realisation  -  to  put  it  in  religious  or 
metaphysical  terms  -  amounts  to  God's  incarnation.  That  is  already  expressed  in  the 
fact  that  Christ  is  the  son  of  God.  And  because  individuation  is  an  heroic  and  often 
tragic  task  [...  ]  it  involves  suffering,  a  passion  of  the  ego:  the  ordinary,  empirical 
man  we  once  were  is  burdened  with  the  fate  of  losing  himself  in  a  greater  dimension 
and  being  robbed  of  his  fancied  freedom  of  will.  He  suffers,  so  to  speak,  from  the 
violence  done  to  him  by  the  self.  The  analogous  passion  of  Christ  signifies  God's 
suffering  on  account  of  the  injustice  of  the  world  and  the  darkness  of  man.  30 
It  is  interesting  why  White's  symbolic  touchstones  of  individuation  do  not  survive 
removal  from  their  imaginative  context.  In  the  discursive  mode  they  are  instantly  reduced 
to  components  of  allegory  -  they  become  merely  symbolic.  Embedded  in  narrative,  the 
narrative  of  an  imagined  life,  they  may  be  taken  up  into  the  text  and  have  the  power  to 
effect  dawnings  through  the  dialectic  of  imagining. 
In  a  number  of  important  ways  White's  text  bears  a  striking  resemblance  to  medieval 
allegory.  In  his  account  of  the  Spanish  chivalric  romance,  Libero  del  Cavallero  Zifar, 
James  Burke  outlines  the  characteristic  devices: 
The  author  of  the  Zifar  [...  ]  gave  names  to  persons,  places  and  things  in  the  work 
which  allegorically  describe  their  function  within  his  framework  of  meaning. 
[...  ]  The  second  way  by  means  of  which  the  author  [...  ]  aided  his  reader  [...  ]  was 
to  set  the  actions  of  the  book,  performed  by  characters  with  symbolic  titles  in  places 
with  meaningful  names,  against  a  background  of  the  liturgical  seasons.  By  skilful 
allusion  to  the  circumstances  of  the  event  being  commemorated  or  recalled  in  the 
liturgy,  he  is  able  to  identify  his  character  in  time  and  space  with  the  biblical  figure 
or  event.  31 
30  Psychology  and  Religion,  p.  157. 
31  James  F.  Burke,  History  and  Vision:  The  Figural  Structure  of  the  "Libro  del  Cavallero  Zifar" 
(London:  Tamesis,  1972),  p.  47. 
224 Such  symbolism  is  systematically  developed  by  White  -  but  it  is  token  symbolism.  The 
purpose  of  medieval  allegory  is  to  reveal  how,  through  figural  correspondences  with  human 
types,  actions  and  circumstances,  divine  truth,  the  book  of  God,  can  be  read.  But  to 
succeed  as  imaginative  experience  the  fiction  must  first  function  persuasively  at  the  human 
level  so  that  the  sense  of  purposiveness  may  be  generated  through  the  dialectical  twist 
entering  into  the  teleological.  In  the  context  of  imagination  divine  truth  becomes  a  function 
of  art. 
In  the  end,  it  is  not  given  to  Himmelfarb  to  'expiate  the  sins  of  the  world'  (p.  418)  How 
could  it  be?  On  the  other  hand,  at  the  point  of  death,  he  comes  to  an  understanding  of  'the 
mystery  of  failure'.  (p.  427)  Himmelfarb  is  now,  transparently,  a  man.  As  such,  he  is  at  the 
centre  of  the  unconditional  love  of  Ruth  Godbold  and  Mary Hare. 
It  is,  above  all,  the  artist,  Alf  Dubbo,  whose  imaginative  power  transfigures  these  events. 
Philoctetes  is,  clearly,  the  type  for  Dubbo.  His  invisibility  as  a  black,  his  experience  of 
homosexual  abuse,  venereal  disease  and  tuberculosis  constitute  the  wounds  which  seek 
exorcism.  An  encounter  with  a  prostitute  exemplifies  that  he  is  caught  in  the  apparently 
inexorable  logic  of  passing  on  the  blow: 
The  couple  proceeded  to  make  love,  or rather,  they  vented  on  each  other  their 
misery  and  rage.  [...  ]  As  he  held  her  by  the  thighs,  he  could  have  been  furiously 
ramming  a  wheelbarrow  against  the  darkness.  But  her  misfortunes  were  alleviated, 
for  the  time  being,  and  until  she  discovered  they  had  been  increased.  (p.  343) 
The  pattern,  the'laws,  is  articulated  in  Saul  Bellow's  Henderson  the  Rain  King: 
Man  is  a  creature  who  cannot  stand  still  under  blows.  [...  ]  When  he  cannot  get  rid  of 
a  punishment,  his  heart  is  apt  to  rot  from  it.  [...  ]  All  wish  to  rid  themselves  and  free 
themselves  and  cast  the  blow  upon  the  others.  And  this  I  conceive  of  as  the  earthly 
dominion.  32 
How  is  the  sequence  to  be  stopped? 
To  the  window  of  the  factory  where  Himmelfarb  is  employed,  his  fellow  workers  crowd 
to  see  a  passing  circus: 
32  Saul  Bellow,  Henderson  the  Rain  King,  repr.  1986  (London:  Penguin,  1959),  p.  213. 
225 Most  comical  was  one  of  the  clowns  who  pretended  to  enact  a  public  hanging  on  the 
platform  of  a  lorry.  Nothing  but  the  jolting  and  his  own  skill  prevented  him  from 
adapting  his  neck  to  the  noose. 
[...  ]  'They  will  kill  the  silly  bugger  yet!  '  screamed  one  of  the  grannies  of  Rosetree's 
Brighta  Bicycle  Lamps.  (p.  404) 
There  is  confusion  in  the  street  when  the  circus  merges  with  a  passing  funeral  procession: 
As  the  clown  spun  at  the  edge  of  his  rope  [...  ]  a  woman  rose  in  the  first  funeral  car 
[...  ]  it  could  have  been  the  widow  [...  ]  pointing,  as  if  she  recognised  at  last  in  the 
effigy  of  the  clown  the  depth,  and  duration,  and  truth  of  grief,  which  she  had  failed 
to  grasp  in  connection  with  that  exacting  male  her  now  dead  husband.  The  woman 
was  screeching  dry  screams.  (Riders,  p.  404) 
The  woman  arrives  at  the  truth  through  the  art  of  the  clown.  Retrospectively,  it  emerges 
that  this  episode  is  a  parable  designed  to  provide  an  interpretative  clue  to  the  crucifixion 
that  follows.  The  woman  finds  a  passage  to  her  grief  through  the  Grand  Guignol  whereas 
the  denizens  of  the  factory  find  a  pretext  for  passing  on  the  blow  through  exorcism, 
objectification  in  the  scapegoat: 
Now  several  [...  ]  realized  what  a  very  scraggy,  funny,  despicable  sight  the  Jew-cove 
presented.  One  who  suspected  that  a  joke  was  being  prepared,  laughed  quite  short 
and  high.  (p.  407) 
Himmelfarb  is  cast  as  the  clown: 
It  was  possible  to  practise  all  manner  of  cruelties  provided  the  majority  might  laugh 
them  off  as  practical  jokes.  And  there  is  almost  no  tragedy  which  cannot  be  given  a 
red  nose.  (p.  408) 
Alf  Dubbo,  the  artist,  is  doubly  removed  from  intervention  in  the  spectacle:  this  confirms 
the  pattern  of  betrayal  established  in  his  childhood  but  subsequently  projected  into  his  own 
actions  -  Alf  as  St.  Peter  -  and,  as  an  artist,  he  is  condemned  to  be  a  spectator. 
But  this  distance  is  seen  to  be  a  condition  essential  for  the  generation  of  his  vision: 
Because  he  was  as  solitary  in  the  crowd  as  the  man  they  had  crucified,  it  was  again 
the  abo  who  saw  most.  All  that  he  had  ever  suffered,  all  that  he  had  failed  to 
understand,  rose  to  the  surface  in  Dubbo  [...  ].  As  he  watched,  the  colour  flowed 
through  the  veins  of  the  cold,  childhood  Christ  [...  ].  Nothing  was  asked.  So  he 
began  also  to  understand  acceptance.  How  he  could  at  last  have  conveyed  it,  in  its 
cloak  of  purple,  on  the  blue  tree,  the  green  lips  of  detached,  contemplative  suffering. 
(pp.  412-13) 
What  remains  a  clown  for  the  mob  becomes  transfigured  through  Dubbo's  vision. 
226 At  one  level  we  see  confirmed  here  the  crucial  role  of  imagining  in  individuation. 
Objectification  is  seen  to  be  a  transaction  of  the  shadow;  the  scapegoat  is  a  function  of  the 
blow  that  is  passed  on.  On  the  other  hand,  we  are  presented  with  the  possibility  of  the 
transfiguration  of  human  suffering  in  the  context  of  imagining.  Located  within  the 
teleological,  the  spectacle  of  the  suffering  man  becomes  a  symbolic  transaction  where  the 
experience  of  the  individual  is  transfigured  in  the  bestowing  of  the  grace  of  a  divine 
purpose.  For  Dubbo,  the  sequence  of  blows  is  arrested  through  'the  love  that  he  had  never 
dared  express  in  life.  '  (p.  453) 
It  is  in  the  act  of  imagining  that  the  Christ  is  manifest,  whether  in  the  painting  of  Dubbo 
or  in  the  writing  of  St.  Mark.  The  process  is  undergone  again  and  again,  in  the  painting  of 
Bosch,  in  the  poems  of  Hopkins,  in  the  contemporary  Mystery  play  of  Riders  in  the 
Chariot.  That  the  transaction,  the  paradigm  case  of  symbolic  imagining,  might  be  explicable 
conceptually  is,  of  course,  perfectly  neutral  with  regard  to  ultimate  questions. 
Individuation  is  not  a  once-for-all  achievement:  it  is  an  undergoing  where  the  self  is 
posited  in  imagining.  This  involves  the  mutual  refiguration  of  world  and  self.  The  process 
can,  of  course,  be  hijacked  into  the  transcription  of  an  ego-identity  but  then  the  value 
disclosed  in  imagining  merely  serves  to  empower.  We  are  caught  up  in  this  dialectical 
tension.  Figural  thinking  rehearses  this  dialectic  whereby  the  type  perpetually  anticipates  its 
transfiguration  -  the  symbolic  transaction  subsequently  endows  time  with  purpose  so  that,  in 
Larkin's  phrase,  our  compulsions  become'robed  as  destinies'.  33  Rendered  ideologically,  the 
elusive  processes  of  imagining  with  its  concomitant  self  become  allegorised. 
This  is,  perhaps,  strikingly  depicted  in  Bosch's  testimony  to  sin  and  folly,  The  Haywain. 
It  reflects  the  notion  that  the  triumph  of  one  deadly  sin,  in  this  case  avarice,  inoculates  the 
soul  so  that  the  one  vice  proliferates  into  the  other  six  -  in  Chaucer's  Pardoner's  Tale,  for 
example,  the  initial  inoculation  is  of  gluttony.  As  in  The  Garden  of  Earthly  Delights,  the 
central  panel  is  flanked  between  visions  of  heaven  and  hell.  There  are,  though,  two 
33  Philip  Larkin,  'Church  Going,  '  from  Collected  Poems,  op.  cit.,  p.  98. 
227 additional  panels  to  the  left  and  right  of  the  triptych,  so  that  the  allegorical  drama  is, 
effectively,  the  interiorised  experience  of  a  wayfarer: 
Bosch's  pilgrim  makes  his  way  through  the  treacherous  world  whose  vicissitudes  are 
represented  in  the  landscape.  Some  of  the  dangers  are  physical,  such  as  the  robbers 
or  the  snarling  dog  [...  ].  The  dancing  peasants  [...  ]  connote  a  moral  danger;  like  the 
lovers  on  top  of  the  haywain,  they  have  succumbed  to  the  music  of  the  flesh.  In 
expressing  the  spiritual  predicament  of  all  mankind,  the  pilgrim  thus  resembles 
Everyman.  34 
Some  ten  years  later,  Bosch,  in  The  Wayfarer,  returned  to  the  same  theme.  (Fig.  2  ovcrlcaf) 
The  removal,  effectively,  of  the  intervening  panels  of  The  Haywain  has  immense  centripetal 
force  as  it  causes  the  issues  to  coalesce  in  the  single  figure  at  the  centre  of  the  circular 
frame.  The  allegory  of  The  Haywain,  however,  is  now  reduced  to  suggestion.  Two  more 
or  less  parallel,  transverse  lines  create  the  dynamic  of  the  painting.  Pursuit  of  the  Wayfarer's 
line  of  vision  takes  in  what  looks  like  a  ladle  on  his  pack,  the  sign  of  the  inn,  the  woman's 
head  in  the  window  and  the  couple  ambiguously  groping  in  the  doorway.  The  inn  sign  may 
be  the  swan  associated  with  Venus.  The  parallel  line  is  established  by  the  wayfarer's  stick. 
It  runs  through  his  arm  and  arrives  at  the  foot  of  the  Cross  on  the  distant  hill.  35  The  lines 
pull  sharply  in  opposite  directions:  the  pilgrim  is  torn. 
We  are  drawn  into  imaginative  apprehension  of  his  predicament.  Whatever  its  intentions 
-  perhaps,  Pauline  commentary?  -  we  are  caught  in  a  moment  of  autonomous  drama: 
This  is  the  time  of  tension  between  dying  and  birth.  36 
Emphatically,  the  pilgrim  is  in  the  world  -  he  has  not  gone  through  the  gate.  This  is  no 
serene  affirmation,  no  wholesale  ideological  identification. 
After  an  imaginative  excursion  into  the  painting  we  return  changed,  perhaps,  in  terms  of 
[...  ]  internal  difference, 
Where  the  Meanings,  are.  37 
34  Benedikt  Taschen,  Hieronymus  Bosch  c.  1450-1516:  Between  Heaven  and  Hell  (London: Thames  and 
Hudson,  1994),  p.  61. 
35  See  Taschen,  p.  63. 
36  T.  S.  Eliot,  'Ash  Wednesday',  from  Selected  Poems,  p.  92. 
37  Emily  Dickinson,  'There's  a  Certain  Slant  of  Light',  from  The  Complete  Poems,  op.  cit.,  p.  118. 
228 Figure  2.  Hieronymus  Bosch,  The  Wayfarer 
229 However,  we  are  likely  to  be  confronted  in  the  next  instant  with  another  imaginative 
challenge.  There  is  no  guarantee  of  success,  only  the  awareness  that  other  transactions 
have  been  productively  negotiated  in  the  past.  Our  vulnerable  imaginative  negotiations  with 
the  painting  parallel  the  essentially  elusive  imaginative  transactions  at  the  heart  of  St.  Mark's 
Gospel,  and,  thereby,  at  the  heart  of  the  Mass. 
230 Chanter  Eleven 
Myth,  Symbolism  and  Individuation 
In  'The  Birth  of  Tragedy'  the  immediate  aim  of  Nietzsche's  study  was  to  explore  Hellenic 
art  and  culture.  Whatever  his  insight  into  his  ostensible  subject,  in  effect,  he  illuminates 
something  of  the  nature  of  the  modes  of  imagination  and  explores  aspects  of  their 
ontological  and  epistemological  implications.  In  his  responses  both  to  Nietzsche  and 
Schiller,  Jung  acknowledges  their  contributions  to  the  understanding  of  individuation  -  he 
can  see  reflected  in  their  work  his  theory  of  psychological  types  -  but  judges  that  their 
'aestheticism'  is  a  serious  shortcoming.  Jung  would  locate  the  psychological  issues  in  the 
religious  domain.  Any  discussion  of  aesthetics  that  assumes  a  Kantian  disinterestedness 
may  be  open  to  Jung's  charge.  However,  our  imaginative  transactions  and  their  evolution 
into  symbolism  -  the  rn  revelation  of  value  in  a  purposive  context  -  are  one  avenue  to  the 
sacred  and  may  take  us  further  than  Jung  had  supposed  Indeed,  the  possibility  of 
refiguration  through  metaphor  and  the  contingent  achievement  of  impossible  perspectives 
through  fictions  suppose  differentiation  from  the  shadow.  All  the  modes  of  imagination 
have  roles  in  facilitating  or  obstructing  individuation.  As  we  shift  from  one  to  another  so 
Proteus  changes  his  shape  -  but  only  in  one  mode  will  he  surrender  his  revelation. 
In  his  discussion  of  Nietzsche's  The  Birth  of  Tragedy  Jung  observes: 
Nietzsche  considers  the  reconciliation  of  the  Delphic  Apollo  with  Dionysus  a  symbol 
of  the  reconciliation  of  these  opposites  in  the  breast  of  the  civilised  Greek.  But  here 
he  forgets  his  own  compensatory  formula,  according  to  which  the  gods  of  Olympus 
owe  their  splendour  to  the  darkness  of  the  Greek  psyche.  By  this  token,  the 
reconciliation  of  Apollo  and  Dionysus  would  be  a  "beautiful  illusion,  "  a  desideratum 
evoked  by  the  need  of  the  civilised  Greek  in  his  struggle  with  his  own  barbarian  side, 
the  very  element  that  broke  out  unchecked  in  the  Dionysian  rout.  I 
Jung's  designation  of  the  Dionysian  and  Apollinian  as  Nietzsche's  'fundamental  pair  of 
opposites'  (p.  137)  does,  in  truth,  reflect  something  of  Nietzsche's  own  remarks  which 
categorise  these  deities  as  'opposites',  but  Jung,  in  pursuing  his  own  agenda  -  in  identifying 
psychological  types  in  terms  of  opposing  functions  and  the  possibilities  of  psychological 
integration  -  is  diverted  from  the  conceptual  point  that,  in  the  end,  Apollo  provides  the 
forms  through  which  Dionysus  finds  expression.  Behind  Jung's  remarks  lie  his  assumptions 
concerning  the  inadequacies  of  what  he  regards  as  Nietzsche's  aestheticism. 
In  working  out  the  nature  of  Jung's  partial  perspective  on  Nietzsche,  it  may  be  possible  to 
demonstrate  how  the  modes  of  imagination  are  implicit  in  Nietzsche's  mythological  vision 
and  identify  those  aspects  of  imagining  which  are  peculiarly  illuminated  through  Nietzsche's 
1  C.  G.  Jung  Psychological  Types,  op.  cit.,  p.  I39. 
231 method.  At  the  same  time,  imagining  can  be  demonstrated  to  be  a  key  element  in  Jung's 
notions  concerning  individuation. 
Though  Nietzsche  would  not  countenance  the  terminology,  in  effect,  there  are  three  key 
'concepts'  developed  in  The  Birth  of  Tragedy  and  these  are  represented  in  Dionysus,  Apollo 
and  Socrates.  At  this  stage  in  Nietzsche's  writing  Dionysus  seems  to  owe  much  to 
Schopenhauer's  'will';  Apollo  seems  associated  with  the  'principium  individuationis'  -  he 
brings  the  'essential  forms  of  natural  knowledge',  the  idea.  2  In  this  scheme  Socrates  seems 
close  to  the'knowing  consciousness'  operating  through  the'principle  of  sufficient  reason': 
The  principle  of  sufficient  reason  is  [...  ]  the  form  into  which  the  Idea  enters  when  it 
comes  to  the  knowledge  of  the  subject  as  individual.  The  particular  thing  that 
manifests  itself  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason  is  thus  only  an 
indirect  objectification  of  the  thing-in-itself  (which  is  the  will),  for  between  it  and  the 
thing-in-itself  stands  the  Idea  as  the  only  direct  objectivity  of  the  will.  (pp.  99-100) 
Nietzschds  Dionysus  seems  to  be  the  thing-in-itself,  the  will,  made  manifest.  But  in 
rendering  Dionysus,  in  the  very  naming,  his  nature  must  change  in  such  a  way  that  he  and 
Apollo  can  no  longer  be  regarded  as  opposites  -  for  how,  conceivably,  could  the  one  be 
manifest  without  the  other?  Whatever  is  articulated  concerning  Dionysus  presupposes 
conceptualisation.  Nietzsche  seems,  eventually,  to  concede  their  mutual  dependence. 
[...  ]  the  difficult  relationship  of  the  Apolline  and  the  Dionysiac  in  tragedy  could 
really  be  symbolized  by  a  fraternal  bond  between  the  two  deities.  Dionysus  speaks 
the  language  of  Apollo,  but  Apollo  finally  speaks  the  language  of  Dionysus,  and  thus 
is  attained  the  supreme  goal  of  tragedy  and  of  art  in  general.  3 
However,  Nietzsche  begins  his  exploration  of  the  relationship  by  elaborating  a  metaphor 
couched  in  terms  of  the  differentiation  between  the  sexes: 
[...  ]  art  derives  its  continuous  development  from  the  duality  of  the  Apolline  and  the 
Dionysiac;  just  as  the  reproduction  of  species  depends  on  the  duality  of  the  sexes 
[...  ].  These  terms  are  borrowed  from  the  Greeks,  who  revealed  the  profound 
mysteries  of  their  artistic  doctrines  [...  ]  not  in  concepts  but  in  the  vividly  clear  forms 
of  their  deities.  To  the  two  gods  of  art,  Apollo  and  Dionysus,  we  owe  our 
recognition  that  in  the  Greek  world  there  was  a  tremendous  opposition  [...  ]  between 
the  Apolline  art  of  the  sculptor  and  the  non-visual,  Dionysiac  art  of  music.  These 
2  Arthur  Schopenhauer,  The  World  as  Will  and  Idea,  cd.  by  David  Berman,  trans.  by  Jill  Berman  (London: 
Dent,  1995),  p.  210. 
3  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  The  Birth  of  Tragedy,  trans.  by  Shaun  Whiteside,  cd.  by  Michael  Tanner  (London: 
Penguin,  1993),  p.  104. 
232 two  very  different  tendencies  walk  side  by  side,  usually  in  violent  opposition  to  one 
another,  enciting  one  another  to  ever  more  powerful  births  [...  ]  until,  finally  [...  ]  the 
two  seemed  to  be  coupled,  and  in  this  coupling  they  seem  at  last  to  beget  the  work 
of  art  that  is  as  Dionysiac  as  it  is  Apolline  -  Attic  tragedy.  (p.  14) 
Jung's  repeated  'reconciliation'  -  he  has  his  eye  on  psychological  integration  -  seems  far  from 
the  'coupling  envisaged  by  Nietzsche  -  the  latter  allows  for  the  retention  of  independence  in 
the  production  of  something  distinct  from  both.  The  image  of  coupling  is  suggestive  of  the 
dialectical  nature  of  imagining.  The  fraternal'bond',  then,  evolves  into  the  mediation  of  the 
Dionysian  through  the  Apolline. 
For  Nietzsche  visual  images  presuppose  mediation,  whereas  music  is  'a  general  mirror  of 
the  universal  will'  (p.  83)  -  in  Schopenhauer's  sense.  Paraphrasing  Schopenhauer,  Nietzsche 
writes: 
[...  ]  he  said  that  music  differed  in  character  and  origin  from  all  the  other  arts, 
because  unlike  them  it  was  not  a  replica  of  phenomena,  but  the  direct  replica  of  the 
will  itself,  and  complemented  everything  physical  in  the  world  with  a  representation 
of  the  thing-in-itself,  the  metaphysical.  (p.  76) 
However,  to  experience  music  at  all  presupposes  that  it  already  has  an  intelligible  structure, 
that  it  is  already  individuated  or,  in  Hopkin's  terms,  inscaped.  Arnold  Schoenberg,  for 
example,  identifies  the  significance  of  form  in  music: 
Without  organisation  music  would  be  an  amorphous  mass,  as  unintelligible  as  an 
essay  without  punctuation  [...  ]. 
The  chief  requirement  for  the  creation  of  a  comprehensible  form  are  logic  and 
coherence.  The  presentation,  development  and  interconnexion  of  ideas  must  be 
based  on  relationship. 
[...  ]  Man's  mental  limitations  prevent  him  from  grasping  anything  which  is  too 
extended.  Thus  appropriate  subdivision  facilitates  understanding  and  determines  the 
form.  4 
Clearly,  though,  Apollo  gives  expression  to  a  prior  visitation  of  Dionysus: 
A  composer  does  not,  of  course,  add  bit  by  bit,  as  a  child  does  in  building  with 
wooden  blocks.  He  conceives  an  entire  composition  as  a  spontaneous  vision.  Then 
he  proceeds,  like  Michelangelo  who  chiselled  his  Moses  out  of  the  marble  without 
sketches,  complete  in  every  detail,  thus  directly  forming  his  material.  (pp.  1-2) 
4  Arnold  Schoenberg,  Fundamentals  of  Musical  Composition,  cd.  by  Gerald  Strang  and  Leonard  Stcin 
(London:  Faber  and  Faber,  1967),  p.  1. 
233 Music  is  unintelligible  without  form  and,  to  transpose  the  point,  what  sense  can  be  made 
of  the  concept  of  a  will  beyond  any  identifiable  act  of  willing?  Nietzsche  will  later  write: 
Language  belongs  in  its  origin  to  the  age  of  the  most  rudimentary  form  of 
psychology:  we  find  ourselves  in  the  midst  of  a  rude  fetishism  when  we  call  to  mind 
the  basic  presuppositions  of  the  metaphysics  of  language  -  which  is  to  say,  of 
reason.  It  is  this  which  sees  everywhere  deed  and  doer;  this  which  believes  in  will 
as  cause  in  general  [...  ].  At  the  beginning  stands  the  great  fateful  error  that  the  will 
is  something  which  produces  an  effect  -  that  will  is  a  faculty  [...  ].  Today  we  know  it 
is  merely  a  word.  5 
By  this  time  Nietzsche  conceives  of  language  as  a  pragmatically  evolved  defence  mechanism 
through  which  we  provide  ourselves  with  saving  illusions.  Language  gives  no  access  to  the 
truth  let  alone  to  a  world  behind  our  world. 
On  the  other  hand,  an  important  difference  between  music  and  verbal  discourse  may  lie  in 
the  nature  of  the  analogues  through  which  each  communicates.  It  may  be  that  the 
expressive  power  of  music  is  located  in  generic  rather  than  specific  correlatives  for 
emotion.  Schopenhauer  suggests  as  much: 
[...  ]  music,  if  it  is  regarded  as  an  expression  of  the  world,  is  in  the  highest  degree  a 
universal  language  that  is  even  related  to  the  universality  of  concepts  much  as  those 
concepts  are  related  to  particular  things  [...  ].  In  this  respect  it  is  like  geometrical 
figures  and  numbers,  which  are  the  universal  forms  of  all  possible  objects  of 
experience,  a  priori  applicable  to  them  all,  and  yet  are  not  abstract,  but  perceptible 
and  thoroughly  definite.  6 
There  is  perhaps  some  analogy  with  Petrarch's  use  of  imagery  in  Canzone  CXXV  where, 
as  I  suggested  earlier,  the  generic  imagery  invites  identification.  Rationalised  in  Platonic 
terms  the  generic  is  open  to  illusory  interpretation  in  terms  of  'forms'  or  universals  thus 
allowing  for  a  metaphysical  interpretation;  whereas  the  nature  of  the  identification  that 
generic  imagery  invites,  locates  responses  squarely  in  the  realm  of  the  phenomenal. 
It  is  important  for  Nietzsche,  though,  that  Dionysus  should  be  associated  with  the 
transcending  of  form  or,  at  least,  with  its  dissolution.  Dionysus  is,  above  all,  associated 
with  the  numinous.  On  the  other  hand,  Socrates  is  associated  with  the  imposition  of  form 
where  form  is  inappropriate.  Characteristically,  Socratic  reason  is  employed  as  a  defence 
3  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  Twilight  of  the  Idols,  from  Twilight  of  the  Idols  and  The  Anti-Christ,  trans.  by 
RJ.  Hollingdale  (London:  Penguin,  1990),  p.  48. 
6  Arthur  Schopenhauer,  World  as  Will  and  Representation,  quoted  in  The  Birth  of  Tragedy,  p.  77. 
234 against  pessimism,  the  inevitable  adjunct  of  willing  -  later,  as  we  have  noted,  reason  will  be 
seen  to  be  hypostatised  in  language,  the  dead  metaphor  of  illusion.  Nietzsche  identifies  such 
pessimism  in  Hamlet: 
This  is  something  that  Dionysiac  man  shares  with  Hamlet:  both  have  truly  seen  to 
the  essence  of  things,  they  have  understood,  and  action  repels  them;  for  their  action 
can  change  nothing  [...  ]  they  consider  it  ludicrous  or  shameful  that  they  should  be 
expected  to  restore  order  to  the  chaotic  world.  Understanding  kills  action,  depends 
on  a  veil  of  illusion  [...  ].  True  understanding,  insight  into  the  terrible  truth, 
outweighs  every  motive  for  action,  for  Hamlet  and  Dionysiac  man  alike.? 
I  suggested  earlier  that  absurdity  followed  upon  consciousness  of  a  paradigm  as  having 
limits,  that  awareness  of  its  edges  presupposes  that  a  paradigm  has  been  superseded. 
Another  way  of  putting  it  is  that  absurdity  is  symptomatic  of  the  exhaustion  of  imagining. 
The  dead  model  or  figure  is  bereft  of  the  numinous,  the  charge  of  double  prescription,  so 
that  it  has  lost  its  symbolic  efficacy  and  is  thereby  irremediably  located  within  the  discursive. 
In  the  context  of  imagination  the  Socratic  spirit  seeks  to  define  that  which  is  already  fled. 
What  flies  is  meaning.  In  Nietzsche's  terms: 
We  have  already  grown  beyond  whatever  we  have  words  for.  In  all  talking  there 
lies  a  grain  of  contempt.  Speech,  it  seems,  was  devised  only  for  the  average, 
medium,  communicable.  The  speaker  has  already  vulgarized  himself  by  speaking.  8 
I  would  argue,  however,  that  this  is  applicable  only  when  language  is  used  discursively. 
Nietzsche  identifies  the  predicament  of  Hamlet  with  'Dionysiac  man'.  What  begins  in 
Hamlet  as  desolation  and  grief  -  the  crumbling  of  the  circumscribing  social  dimension  of 
meaning,  the  threat  to  that  identity  ordinarily  sustained  through  mutual  interaction  with 
others  -  resolves  eventually  into  an  intellectual  problem:  that  is  to  say,  the  predicament  is 
lived  by  Hamlet  but  discussed  in  the  extended  play.  Loss  of  meaning  manifests  itself  in 
failure  to  act,  for  action  presupposes  the  possibility  of  change,  at  the  least,  tacitly  couched 
in  terms  of  the  evaluation  of  the  components  of  choice.  The  play  widely  explores  the  nature 
of  what  it  is  to  act  -  through  introspection,  through  different  characters  in  similar  situations. 
Even  the  clowns  are  involved  in  this: 
7  Birth  of  Tragedy,  p.  39. 
8  Twilight  of  the  Idols,  p.  94. 
235 If  the  man  go  to  this  water  and  drown  himself,  it  is,  will  he  nill  he,  he  goes;  mark 
you  that.  But  if  the  water  come  to  him  and  drown  him,  he  drowns  not  himself. 
Argal,  he  that  is  not  guilty  of  his  own  death,  shortens  not  his  own  life.  9 
Hamlet's  situation  can  be  recognised  in  the  terms  Nietzsche  ascribes  to  Schopenhauer 
when  he  writes  of 
[...  ]  the  tremendous  dread  that  grips  man  when  he  suddenly  loses  his  way  amidst  the 
cognitive  forms  of  appearance,  because  the  principle  of  sufficient  reason,  in  one  of 
its  forms,  seems  suspended.  '° 
Nietzsche  continues: 
If  we  add  to  this  dead  the  blissful  ecstasy  which,  prompted  by  the  same 
fragmentation  of  the  principium  individualionis,  rises  up  from  man's  innermost  core, 
indeed  from  nature,  we  are  vouchsafed  a  glimpse  in  to  the  nature  of  the  Dionysiac, 
most  immediately  understandable  to  us  in  the  analogy  of  intoxication.  (pp.  16-17) 
But  to  escape  from  constraint  through  'singing  and  dancing'  (p.  17)  or  in  the  football 
crowd,  or  whatever,  seems  very  far  from  the  predicament  of  Hamlet.  The  fate  of  Ophelia 
points  to  a  potential  development  in  psychosis  and  the  exploitation  of  the  absence  of 
constraint  finds  a  terrible  extension,  for  example,  in  the  horrors  of  Conrad's  Heart  of 
Darkness  which  serves  as  the  type  for  a  characteristic  relationship  between  colonising  and 
indigenous  peoples. 
There  can  be,  then,  a  terrible  price  to  pay  for  elevating  the  inchoate  into  a  metaphysical 
principle.  But  the  Dionysiac  is  unintelligible  outside  specific  contexts  of  constraint:  it  is  the 
nature  of  the  constraint  that  defines  its  associated  freedom.  To  exalt  such  'freedom'  as  a 
principle  is  to  endow  a  symbol  with  literal  autonomy  -a  characteristic  human  strategy  that 
in  animating  the  world  provides  the  sanction  of  divinity  for  our  own  projections.  In  other 
words,  the  metaphysical  will  and  the  Dionysiac  are  coextensive  but  the  intelligibility  of  each 
supposes  a  defining  context. 
I  have  argued  that  the  numinous  is  associated  with  symbolic  imagining.  It  is  as  if 
Dionysus  were  the  fictional  projection  that  gave  expression  to  that  ecstatic  potentiality  - 
that  would  make  the  god  contingent  upon  the  process  of  imagining  itself.  Such  a  view 
9  Hamlet,  op.  cit.,  V.  1.16 
10  Birth  of  Tragedy,  p.  16. 
236 would  involve  the  reversal  of  the  conventional  assumption  regarding  the  flow  of  energy  - 
the  god  would  be  imaginary  because  imagined. 
Convention  has  it  that  electricity  flows  from  positive  to  negative  but,  in  fact,  the  negative 
electrons  move  in  the  opposite  direction.  That  we  continue  to  employ  the  convention 
testifies  to  the  residual  power  of  an  ingrained  paradigm. 
Dionysus  is,  indeed,  manifest  through  myth,  but  exclusively  so.  This  explains  why 
Dionysus'  representative,  the  satyr,  is  caught  so  effectively  in  Nietzsche's  oxymoron  -  'the 
invented  natural  being.  '  (p.  38)  Dionysus  is  a  function  of  myth  -  he  is  already  individuated. 
Dionysus  and  Apollo  are  inconceivable  in  the  simple,  straightforward,  abutting  opposition 
that  is  implied  in  Jung's  'reconciliation'  of  these  'opposites'.  That  they  can  be  so  conceived  is 
a  consequence  of  imagining  mediated  through  literal  rationalisation  in  a  discursive  mode. 
Nietzsche  seems  to  identify  two  phases  in  the  Greeks'  encounter  with  absurdity.  Epic 
poetry  has  its  origins  in  dreaming,  in  fantasy.  Dreaming  is  representative  of  artistic  powers 
'which  spring  from  nature  itself,  without  the  mediation  of  the  human  artist.  (p.  18)  This 
assumption  fails  to  meet  the  objection  already  expressed  regarding  Dionysus  -  dreaming  is 
already  mediated  through  its  imagery  and  story.  Nevertheless,  the  Apolline  response  to 
absurdity  is  to  effect  a  further  mediation  of  the  dream  world  into  a  sustaining  illusion  : 
The  Greeks  knew  and  felt  the  fears  and  horrors  of  existence:  in  order  to  be  able  to 
live  at  all  they  had  to  interpose  the  radiant  dream-birth  of  the  Olympians  between 
themselves  and  those  horrors.  (p.  22) 
If  the  Socratic  impulse  is  decadent  in  interposing  rationalisation  between  the  self  and  the 
world  is  not  the  saving  lie  of  epic  poetry  equally  misleading? 
On  the  face  of  it  the  Socratic,  the  scientific  spirit,  disengages  itself  from  the  mythic. 
However,  as  we  have  previously  argued,  the  discursive  can  be  bound  back  into  story 
through  the  dialectic  of  imagining  and  it  may  be  that  the  Socratic  spirit  finds  its  essential 
motivation  in  exactly  this  way.  A  hint  of  this  possibility  is  provided  by  Nietzsche  himself: 
[...  ]  just  as  the  immediate  effect  of  a  Socratic  impulse  led  inexorably  to  the 
dissolution  of  Dionysiac  tragedy,  a  profound  experience  from  the  life  of  Socrates 
himself  obliges  us  to  ask  whether  there  was  necessarily  a  polar  opposition  between 
Socratism  and  art,  and  whether  the  idea  of  the  birth  of  an'artistic  Socrates'  is  itself  a 
contradiction  in  terms. 
237 [...  ]  Might  art  even  be  a  necessary  correlative  and  supplement  to  science? 
(pp.  70-71) 
What  Nietzsche  has  immediately  in  mind  is  the  'Hymn  to  Apollo'  written  while  Socrates  was 
in  prison.  However,  behind  the  scientific  spirit  is  a  profound,  sustaining  illusion, 
[...  ]  which  first  entered  the  world  in  the  person  of  Socrates  -  the  unshakeable  belief 
that  rational  thought,  guided  by  causality,  can  penetrate  to  the  depth  of  being,  and 
that  it  is  capable  not  only  of  knowing  but  even  of  correcting  being.  This  sublime 
metaphysical  illusion  is  an  instinctual  accompaniment  to  science,  and  repeatedly 
takes  it  to  its  limits,  where  it  must  become  art:  which  is  the  true  purpose  of  this 
mechanism.  '  (p.  73) 
It  is  only  at  the  limits  of  science  that  the  sustaining  illusion  breaks  down  -  that  is,  at  the 
dawning  of  absurdity  -  and  following  the  confrontation  with,  by  now,  an  essentially  'tragic 
knowledge'  art  is  sought  'as  both  protection  and  remedy,  if  we  are  to  bear  it.  '  (pp.  74-75) 
Science  seems  to  have  its  distinctive,  sublime  Apolline  illusion  which,  in  the  face  of  its 
collapse  into  absurdity,  reaches  for  tragic  art  as  its  remedy. 
The  Socratic  spirit  is  sustained  by  illusion  and  is  vulnerable  to  the  intrusion  of  absurdity 
in  a  similar  way  to  Apolline  art.  Whereas  the  Greek  response  was  in  terms  of  tragedy,  it 
will  become  Nietzsche's  passionate  concern  to  identify  the  modern  crisis  -  to  look  it  in  the 
face  -  and  to  exhort  us  to  celebrate  it  in  terms  of  a  new  tragic  vision. 
It  is  striking  that  significant  aspects  of  Nietzsche's  vision  seem  to  be  anticipated  in  the 
poetry  of  Keats.  In  'Ode  to  a  Nightingale',  it  is  as  if  Dionysus  were  manifest  in  the 
intoxicating  beauty  of  the  bird's  song.  This  music  is  individuated  through  Apolline  imagery: 
I  cannot  see  what  flowers  are  at  my  feet, 
Nor  what  soft  incense  hangs  upon  the  boughs 
But,  in  embalmed  darkness,  guess  each  sweet 
Wherewith  the  seasonable  month  endows 
The  grass,  the  thicket,  and  the  fruit  tree  wild.  '' 
The  beautiful  illusion  stands  over  and  against  the  intolerable  reality: 
Here,  where  men  sit  and  hear  each  other  groan  [...  ] 
Where  but  to  think  is  to  be  full  of  sorrow 
And  leaden-eyed  despairs.  (p.  82) 
1t  John  Keats,  'Ode  to  a  Nightingale',  from  A  Selection  from  John  Keats,  op.  cit.,  p.  83. 
238 Presumably,  for  Keats  such  despair  is  no  romantic  indulgence  -  he  had  given  up  his 
apprenticeship  as  a  surgeon  a  mere  month  before  he  would  become  qualified.  That  his 
decision  weighed  heavily  upon  him  is,  perhaps,  evident  in  'The  Fall  of  Hyperion'  in  his 
confrontation  with  Moneta.  Her  challenges  oblige  him  to  explore  in  detail  how  he  can 
justify  his  vocation  as  poet: 
What  benefit  canst  thou  do,  or  all  thy  tribe, 
To  the  great  world?  Thou  art  a  dreaming  thing, 
A  fever  of  thyself.  '2 
What  is  a  dreamer?  The  issue  hangs  on  the  nature  of  the  poetry  produced. 
'Art  thou  not  of  the  dreamer  tribe? 
The  poet  and  the  dreamer  are  distinct, 
Diverse,  sheer  opposite,  antipodes.  '  (1.198  p.  95) 
The  Apolline  illusion  begins  in  fantasy,  elaborates  an  alternative  to  reality.  What  Keats 
aspires  to,  on  the  other  hand,  is  to  articulate  something  very  like  the  tragic  vision  and  that 
will  be  made  available  to  him  through  Moneta's  gift  of  the  story  of  the  Titans  -  or,  at  least,  it 
will  point  the  way.  'The  Fall  of  Hyperion'  is  essentially  discursive  with  regard  to  his 
vocation  -  it  is  not  yet  an  achieved  vision.  Keats  sees  his  way  to  his  vocation  rather  in  the 
manner  of  Dante  in  La  Vita  Nuova  who  turned  from  the  introspective  indulgence  of  courtly 
love  -  supposing  identification  -  to  the  exploration  of  human  love  as  an  attribute  of  the 
Divine.  Keats  saw  that  he  must  effect  a  transition  from  'poesy'  to  a  poetry  adequate  to 
express  the  tragic  vision. 
In  'Hyperion'  it  is  Oceanus  who  outlines  the  reason  for  the  predicament  of  the  Titans. 
Nietzsche  identifies  the  Titanic  with  the  'barbaric  essence  of  the  Dionysiac'.  13  The 
Prometheus  of  Aeschylus  in  his  striving  for  justice  reveals  his  'paternal  descent  from 
Apollo'.  (p.  5  1)  Prometheus  demonstrates  that  sacrilege  is  necessary  for  the  achievement  of 
individuation,  self-knowledge  -  this  is  clearly  illustrated  in  Shelley's  Prometheus  Unbound. 
In  Keats,  tragedy  is  bound  up  in  the  inevitable  loss  of  the  Titanic  world. 
Keats  expresses  this  inevitability  in  a  law: 
12  John  Keats,  'The  Fall  of  Hyperion',  from  A  Selection  from  John  Keats,  1.167,  pp.  94-95. 
13  Birth  of  Tragedy,  p.  27. 
239 Now  comes  the  pain  of  truth  [...  ]. 
As  Heaven  and  Earth  are  fairer,  fairer  far 
Than  chaos  and  blank  darkness,  though  once  chiefs; 
And  as  we  show  beyond  that  Heaven  and  Earth 
In  form  and  shape  compact  and  beautiful, 
In  will,  in  action  free,  companionship, 
And  thousand  other  signs  of  purer  life; 
So  on  our  heels  a  fresh  perfection  treads, 
A  power  more  strong  in  beauty,  born  of  us 
And  fated  to  excel  us,  as  we  pass 
In  glory  that  old  darkness  [...  ]. 
Say,  doth  the  dull  soil 
Quarrel  with  the  proud  forests  it  hath  fed, 
And  feedeth  still,  more  comely  than  itself? 
Can  it  deny  the  chiefdom  of  green  groves? 
Or  shall  the  tree  be  envious  of  the  dove 
Because  it  cooeth,  and  hath  snowy  wings 
To  wander  wherewithal  and  find  its  joys? 
We  are  such  forest-trees,  and  our  fair  boughs 
Have  bred  forth,  not  pale  solitary  doves, 
But  eagles  golden-feathered,  who  do  tower 
Above  us  in  their  beauty,  and  must  reign 
In  right  thereof.  For'tis  the  eternal  law 
That  first  in  beauty  should  be  first  in  might; 
Yea,  by  that  law,  another  race  may  drive 
Our  conquerors  to  mourn  as  we  do  now.  14 
The  parallel  with  Nietzsche  is  striking: 
Now  we  see  the  struggles,  the  torment,  the  destruction  of  phenomena  as  necessary, 
given  the  constant  proliferation  of  forms  of  existence  forcing  and  pushing  their  way 
into  life,  the  exuberant  fertility  of  the  world  will.  15 
The  association  of  beauty  and  power,  given  the  source  of  the  Dionysian  in  imagining,  can 
now  be  identified  as  a  phenomenon  of  art  so  that  the  general  application  of  such  a  law  to 
life  in  general  can  be  seen  to  be  the  consequence  of  a  category  mistake.  Its  literal  rendering 
must  be  catastrophic.  From  the  situation  of  our  relative  individuation  -  with  its  incipient 
burden  of  responsibility  -  we  project  backwards  a  fictional  construct  which  is  defined  by  our 
experience  of  constraint.  In  this  case  the  projection  takes  Titanic  form  -  the  loss  cannot  be 
anything  other  than  inevitable  because  what  appears  to  have  been  a  substantial  loss  has 
always  been  a  fiction,  albeit,  energised  by  the  symbolic  imagination. 
14  'Hyperion',  1.202,  p.  72. 
15  Birth  of  Tragedy,  p.  80. 
240 The  impulse  to  provide  explanatory  retrospective  projection  is  touched  upon  by  Marx  in 
his  discussion  of  political  economy: 
Let  us  not  begin  our  explanation,  as  does  the  economist,  from  a  legendary 
primordial  condition.  Such  a  primordial  condition  does  not  explain  anything;  it 
merely  removes  the  question  into  a  grey  and  nebulous  distance.  It  asserts  as  a  fact 
or  event  what  it  should  deduce.  16 
Subsequently  Marx  uses  the  psychological  dynamics  of  religion  -  derived  from  Feuerbach  - 
as  a  model  for  his  exploration  of  the  nature  of  alienation: 
Just  as  in  religion  the  spontaneous  activity  of  human  fantasy,  of  the  human  brain  and 
heart,  reacts  independently  as  an  alien  activity  of  gods  or  devils  upon  the  individual, 
so  the  activity  of  the  worker  is  not  his  own  spontaneous  activity.  It  is  another's 
activity  and  a  loss  of  his  own  spontaneity  (p.  247) 
There  is  a  sense,  then,  in  which  we  can  become  bewitched  by  a  sort  of  symbolic  literalism 
where  the  subtle  dynamics  of  imaginative  transactions  are  rendered  discursively  yet  retain, 
though  only  by  association,  something  of  the  charge  of  the  numinous.  It  is  this  process  that 
provides  the  scaffolding  for  religious  ideology. 
In  the  two  Hyperions'  Keats,  in  effect,  will  identify  the  Titanic  as  a  dimension  of  his  own 
imagining  in  his  exploration  of  the  nature  and  evolution  of  his  own  writing.  More 
accurately,  to  begin  with,  the  Titanic  represents  unassimilated  suffering  dissociated  from  the 
imaginative  enterprise.  Saturn  is  trapped  in  bewilderment.  It  is  the  timorous  Clymene  who 
articulates  the  nature  of  the  first  phase  of  the  imaginative  enterprise  as  it  reaches  towards 
assimilation.  Rather  as  with  the  speaker  in  'Ode  to  a  Nightingale',  Clymene's  creativity 
arises  from  a  mood  that  contrasts  the  sensuous  richness  of  the  natural  world  with  her 
woefulness  generated  by  the  predicament  of  the  Titans: 
[...  ]  I  felt  a  movement  in  my  heart 
To  chide,  and  to  reproach  that  solitude 
With  songs  of  misery,  music  of  our  woes; 
And  sat  me  down,  and  took  a  mouthed  shell 
And  murmured  into  it,  and  made  melody.  ('Hyperion',  1.267.  ) 
16  Karl  Marx,  'Alienated  Labour',  from  Economic-Philosophical  Afanuscripts,  in  Nature  and 
Industrialization,  op.  cit.,  p.  246. 
241 It  is  a  narcissistic  impulse  -  felicitously  confirmed  by  the  'echo'  -  that  directs  her  song  into 
the  shell.  When  children  hold  shells  to  their  ears  to  'listen  to  the  sea'  it  is  the  course  of  their 
own  blood  that  they  hear.  And  so  Clymene,  'with  poor  skill  let  pass  into  the  breeze/The  dull 
shell's  echo.  '  (11.273) 
The  closed  circuit  of  woefulness  is  broken  when  she  hears  a  new  song,  the'blissful 
golden  melody'  (11.280)  that  comes  from  Apollo.  The  Titans  have  been  superseded  by  the 
gods;  Clymene  comes  to  recognise  the  superiority  of  the  art  of  Apollo. 
It  is  clear,  though,  from  the  framing  dream  allegory  of  'The  Fall  of  Hyperion'  that  the 
protagonist,  presumably  Keats  himself,  has  assimilated  Apollo  as  an  aller  ego.  Apollo's 
experience  with  Mnemosyne  is  rewritten  in  terms  of  the  imaginative  biography  of  the  poet 
himself.  Mnemosyne  becomes  Moneta.  There  are,  then,  two  versions  of  Apollo's/Keats's 
passage  to  knowledge.  In'Hyperion'  Apollo  reads  the  history  of  the  Titans'  suffering  in  the 
face  of  Mnemosyne: 
Knowledge  enormous  makes  a  God  of  me. 
Names,  deeds,  grey  voices,  agonies, 
Deeds,  grey  legends,  dire  events,  rebellions, 
Majesties,  sovran  voices,  agonies, 
Creations  and  destroyings,  all  at  once 
Pour  into  the  wide  hollows  of  my  brain, 
And  deify  me.  (111.113) 
In'Hyperion'  the  Titanic  experience  will  become  a  source  for  imagining,  the  source  of  the 
tragic  vision.  In'The  Fall  of  Hyperion'  it  is  as  if  the  poet  finds  his  vocation  as  he  reads  the 
face  of  Moneta: 
Then  saw  Ia  wan  face, 
Not  pined  by  human  sorrows,  but  bright-blanched 
By  an  immortal  sickness  which  kills  not. 
It  works  a  constant  change,  which  happy  death 
Can  put  no  end  to.  '7 
In  this  Nietzschean  moment  the  poet  is  about  to  enter  into  knowledge  of  the  perpetual  and 
necessary  nature  of  suffering  as  couched  in  the  story  of  the  fall  of  the  Titans.  In  effect,  the 
suffering  of  the  Titans  -  Dionysiac  man  -  is  to  be  mediated  through  the  art  of  Apollo  in  the 
17  'The  Fall  of  Hyperion!,  1.256. 
242 expression  of  the  tragic  vision.  The  issues  that  Keats  records  in  arriving  at  his  vocation  - 
with  clear  implications  for  psychological  integration  through  imagining  -  are  manifest  in  the 
larger  scale  in  Nietzsche's  'historical'  reconstruction.  The  'Hyperions'  suggest  that  The  Birth 
of  Tragedy  is  a  dramatic  projection  involving  the  workings  of  Nietzsche's  own  psyche.  As 
Nietzsche  himself  claimed  of  metaphysics,  in  another  context,  'moralities  [...  ]  are  only  a  sign 
language  of  the  emotions.  '  18 
There  is  a  strong  sense  in  the  `Hyperion's'  that  Keats  understands  where  he  has  to  get  to 
but  that  the  articulation  of  the  problem  is  no  guarantee  of  arrival  -  in  other  words,  the 
essential  meaning  of  these  poems  is  conceived  discursively.  That  is  to  say,  the  mode  is 
Socratic  and  no  matter  how  he  might  turn  and  twist  the  same  is  true  for  Nietzsche  in  The 
Birth  of  Tragedy.  This  merely  identifies  Keats  and  Nietzsche  in  these  enterprises  with  much 
critical  writing  that  justifies  in  the  name  of  an  end  which  cannot,  because  of  the  mode  of  the 
discourse,  be  realised  -a  sort  of  compulsive  idealisation  of  imagining.  Are  we  to 
understand  Nietzsche's  idea  that  'our  highest  dignity  lies  in  the  meaning  of  works  of  art'  as 
anything  other  than  such  an  idealisation,  a  saving  illusion? 
It  may  be  that  such  dignity  is  associated  with  the  capacity  to  enter  into  the  world  of  the 
book  -  or  whatever  else  engages  the  imagination.  In  this  state  of  imagining  the  ego  is,  in  a 
sense,  subverted.  The  letting  go  is  a  pre-condition  for  refiguration  in  metaphor  and 
disclosure  of  value  in  double  prescription.  The  mode  of  apprehension  is  a  necessary 
condition  for  what  is  disclosed,  allows  for  the  'fusion  of  horizons'19  and  presupposes  that 
what  is  rendered  is  a  function  of  imaginative  synthesis.  In  these  circumstances  the  self 
grows  coextensively  with  the  disclosure  of  the  world:  here,  if  anywhere,  is  that 
augmentation,  the  enhancement  of  worth,  that  constitutes  dignity  -  it  is  born  in  the  process 
of  imagining.  It  is  in  this  context,  then,  that  Nietzsche  could  come  to  see  that  the  'world' 
and  'the  existence  of  man'  is  an  aesthetic  phenomenon. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  discursive  mode, 
18  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  op.  cit.,  p.  110. 
19  Hans-Georg  Gadamer,  quoted  inA  RicoeurReader,  op  cit.,  p.  235. 
243 Truths  are  illusions  which  one  has  forgotten  are  illusions,  worn-out  metaphors 
which  have  become  powerless  to  affect  the  sense,  coins  which  have  their  obverse 
effaced  and  are  now  no  longer  of  account  as  coins  but  merely  as  metal.  20 
J.  P.  Stern  observes, 
The  'justification'  of  the  world  through'the  aesthetic  activity'  is  identical  with  the 
justification'  or  meaning  imprinted  on  the  world  through  man  the  maker  of  linguistic 
conventions,  that  is,  of  a  system  of  'metaphors'.  This  in  turn  implies  that  gnosis  on 
which  Nietzsche's  theory  of  tragedy  was  founded:  it  implies  the  existence  of  a  hostile 
universe  of  silence  before  and  beyond  language,  within  which  our  little  human  world 
of  language  is  an  oasis  of  life,  comfort  and  sustenance,  but  not  of  truth.  (p.  139) 
Such  ajustification'  would,  in  fact,  constitute  aestheticism.  But  the  argument  depends  upon 
the  association  of  metaphor  with  linguistic  conventions.  This  amounts  to  a  conflation  of 
live  and  dead  metaphor  -  the  distinction  depends  upon  the  mode  within  which  metaphor 
functions  at  a  given  moment.  A  metaphor  may  be  alive  for  one  individual  and  dead  for 
another.  In  the  teaching  situation  poetry  may,  at  times,  be  nothing  but  clinker.  On  the 
other  hand,  those  aspects  of  the  world  and  persons  revealed  through  imagining  -  in 
metaphor,  in  double  prescription  -  are  not  mere  supplements  to  reality  -  they  are 
constitutive  of  it.  In  these  circumstances  the  idea  that  there  is  a  'hostile  universe  of  silence 
before  and  beyond  language'  seems  little  but  a  rhetorical  indulgence  that  selects  one 
perspective  at  the  expense  of  the  whole.  The  problem  with  dead  metaphor  is  not  that  it 
fails  in  its  constitutive  function  established  in  imagining,  but  that  its  power  of  insight  and 
the  concomitant  disclosure  of  value  have  thinned  into  insignificance.  On  the  other  hand, 
therein,  precisely,  lies  its  pragmatic  value  -'I  caught  a  bus  at  7.30  this  morning.  '  In  certain 
circumstances  to  be  excited  by  metaphor  is  a  sort  of  lunacy. 
It  is  possible  to  see  how  the  conflation  of  modes  of  apprehension  resolved  in  favour  of 
the  discursive  could  lead  to  the  development  of  a  partial  vision  that  resolves  itself  into 
pessimistic  relativism. 
To  see  the  world,  therefore,  as  an  aesthetic  phenomenon  is  not  to  be  committed  to 
aestheticism.  The  'reconciliation  of  Apollo  and  Dionysus'  of  which  Jung  writes  can  be 
understood  as  a  rationalisation  of  imagining  couched  in  mythic  terms  which  may  or  may  not 
20  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  'On  Truth  and  Falsehood  in  an  Extra-Moral  Sense'  quoted  by  J.  P.  Stern  in 
Nietzsche,  6th  impression  1990  (London:  Fontana,  1978),  p.  136. 
244 illuminate  the  nature  of  Greek  Tragedy  but  certainly  displays  the  modes  of  imagination  as 
they  are  operative  within  the  individual  mind. 
But  Jung  is  deeply  suspicious  of  the  role  of  art  in  mediating  between  these  gods: 
[...  ]  Nietzsche  like  Schiller,  had  a  pronounced  tendency  to  credit  art  with  a 
mediating  and  redeeming  role.  The  problem  then  remains  stuck  in  aesthetics  -  the 
ugly  is  also  "beautiful",  even  beastliness  and  evil  shine  forth  enticingly  in  that  false 
glamour  of  aesthetic  beauty.  The  artistic  nature  in  both  Schiller  and  Nietzsche 
claims  a  redemptive  significance  for  itself  and  its  specific  capacity  for  creation  and 
expression.  21 
One  good  reason  for  Jung's  suspicion  is  that  he  approaches  Nietzsche  on  his  own  terms  -  as 
attempting  to  illuminate  truths  about  Greek  culture.  Jung  is  deflected  from  the  subtext  and 
its  disclosure  of  the  workings  of  the  individual  imagination.  His  suspicions  concerning 
Schiller  have  different  grounds.  These  are  revealed  in  his  discussion  of  Schiller's  On  the 
Aesthetic  Education  of  Man. 
Of  the  influences  that  are  reflected  in  the  series  of  letters  that  came  to  contribute 
Schiller's  text,  two  are  of  relevance  to  this  discussion:  Schiller  was  writing  as  the  Reign  of 
Terror  unfolded  -  it  began  in  June  1793  -  and  Kant's  Critique  of  Judgement  had  been 
published  in  1790.  From  the  former  event  seems  to  arise  Schiller's  agenda  that  the  'moral 
man'  cannot  be  born  directly  out  of  'sensuous  man'  but  only  through  the  mediation  of  art  - 
hence  his  commitment  to  aesthetic  education.  From  Kant,  Schiller  inherits  the  notion  that 
art  must  be  disinterested.  Here,  perhaps,  is  the  basis  of  Jung's  charge  that  the  aesthetic 
distorts  because,  ultimately,  it  has  to  do  with  pleasure.  On  the  other  hand,  Schiller  is 
perfectly  aware  of  the  difficulties: 
Precisely  because  taste  pays  heed  only  to  form  and  never  to  content,  it  finally  gives 
the  soul  a  dangerous  tendency  to  neglect  reality  entirely  and  to  sacrifice  truth  and 
morality  to  an  attractive  facade.  22 
It  remains  for  him  to  demonstrate  how  the  reconciliation  of  'form'  and  'content'  can  be 
brought  about. 
21  Psychological  Types,  pp.  140-141. 
22  Friedrich  Schiller,  On  the  Aesthetic  Education  of  Man,  trans.  by  Reginald  Snell  (Bristol:  Thocmmes 
Press,  1994),  p.  57. 
245 In  the  realm  of  Nature,  the  sensuous  man  is  undifferentiated  from  his  feelings  and  from 
the  world.  On  the  other  hand,  the  man  who  is  guided  by  reason  exists  in  a  world  of  forms 
abstracted  from  nature  but  at  a  distance  from  his  senses: 
[...  ]  Man  can  be  at  odds  with  himself  in  a  double  fashion:  either  as  a  savage  if  his 
feelings  rule  his  principles,  or  as  a  barbarian  if  his  principles  destroy  his  feelings. 
(p.  34). 
The  characteristics  of  each  type  constitute  a  series  of  binary  opposites:  feeling  and  thinking, 
apprehension  and  comprehension,  content  and  form.  In  a  letter  to  Goethe,  Schiller  writes: 
My  mind  works  in  a  symbolizing  way,  and  so  I  hover  [...  ]  between  concept  and 
contemplation,  between  law  and  feeling,  between  a  technical  mind  and  genius.  [...  ] 
the  poetic  mind  generally  got  the  better  of  me  when  I  ought  to  have  philosophized, 
and  my  philosophical  spirit  when  I  wanted  to  be  a  poet.  (pp.  6-7) 
In  our  terms,  generally,  the  opposites  can  be  seen  to  constitute  the  characteristics  of 
identification  or  imagination;  or,  identification  or  imagination  as  opposed  to  the  discursive. 
As  we  have  argued,  the  mediating  function  is  the  imagination.  This,  essentially,  is  Schiller's 
position. 
He  formulates  the  product  of  such  a  mediating  function  as'living  shape: 
Only  as  the  form  of  something  lives  in  our  sensation,  and  its  life  takes  form  in  our 
understanding,  is  it  living  shape,  and  this  will  everywhere  be  the  case  where  we 
judge  it  to  be  beautiful.  (p.  76). 
However,  though  suggestive,  this  coinage  does  not  take  us  far  conceptually.  No  doubt 
taking  his  cue  from  Kant,  living  shape  is  said  to  be  the'object  of  the  play  impulse'.  (p.  76.  )  It 
is  the  origin  of  the  Beautiful,  but 
[...  ]  this  equilibrium  always  remains  only  an  idea  [...  ].  In  actuality  there  will  always 
be  a  preponderance  of  one  element  or  the  other,  and  the  utmost  that  experience  can 
achieve  will  consist  of  an  oscillation  between  the  two  principles,  so  that  at  one 
moment  it  is  reality,  and  at  another  form,  that  is  predominant.  (p.  81) 
This  appears  to  be  a  discursive  rationalisation  -  it  cannot  arrive  at  imagination.  Later,  in  an 
illuminating  passage,  Schiller  outlines  the  conceptual  issues  in  a  formulation  that  confirms 
the  dialectical  nature  of  imagining: 
It  is  really  a  question  of  two  utterly  different  operations,  which  in  this  enquiry  must 
necessarily  support  each  other.  Beauty  [...  ]  links  together  two  conditions  which  are 
opposed  to  each  other  and  can  never  become  one.  It  is  from  this  opposition  that  we 
246 must  start;  we  must  comprehend  and  recognize  it  in  its  whole  purity  and  strictness, 
so  that  the  two  conditions  are  separated  in  the  most  definite  way;  otherwise  we  are 
mixing  but  not  uniting  them.  Secondly,  it  is  said  that  Beauty  combines  those  two 
opposite  conditions,  and  thus  removes  the  opposition.  But  since  both  conditions 
remain  eternally  opposed  to  one  another,  they  can  only  be  combined  by 
cancellation.  '  Our  second  business,  then,  is  to  make  this  combination  perfect,  to 
accomplish  it  so  purely  and  completely  that  both  conditions  entirely  disappear  in  a 
third,  and  no  trace  of  the  division  remains  behind  in  the  whole.  (pp.  88-89) 
The  translator  of  this  edition,  Reginald  Snell,  observes  in  a  footnote: 
The  German  word  thus  inadequately  translated  is  aufgehoben,  which  is  here  used, 
possibly  for  the  first  time,  to  mean  preserved  by  destruction  in  the  dialectical  sense. 
[...  ]  Goethe  [...  ]  sometimes  uses  Aufhebung  to  mean  disappearance  in  a  higher 
import  in  a  very  similar  sense;  but  the  peculiar  logical  context  of  this  passage  makes 
it  probable  that  it  was  from  these  Letters  that  Hegel  derived  the  characteristic 
technical  term  of  his  philosophical  system.  (pp.  88-89n.  ) 
That  the  basis  of  Schiller's  discussion  should  be  the  distinction  between  form  and  content 
supposes  that  the  imaginative  issues  are  being  approached  from  the  perspective  of  the 
discursive.  Given  this  orientation,  and  from  within  this  dualistic  epistemological  paradigm, 
the  logic  of  imagination  must  appear  as  dialectical.  What  is  presupposed  in  such  a  dualistic 
categorisation  is  the  imaginative  transaction  that  discloses  form  in  the  first  place.  The 
dialectic  is  a  conceptualisation  that  reflects  retrospective  rationalisation  in  the  discursive 
mode. 
The  pathway  from  identification  is  also  noted  by  Schiller: 
The  mind,  then,  passes  from  sensation  to  thought  through  a  middle  disposition  in 
which  sensuousness  and  reason  are  active  at  the  same  time,  but  just  because  of  this 
they  are  mutually  destroying  their  determining  power  and  through  their  opposition 
producing  negation.  (pp.  98-99) 
The  'middle  disposition'  is  imagination  manifest  in  the  synthesis  of  double  prescription.  But 
Schiller  hints  that  this  process  too  is  dialectical.  The  failure  to  discriminate  between  modes 
and  their  epistemological  implications  has  produced  a  crucial  conflation. 
It  is  important  here  to  be  clear  about  the  relationships  between  identification,  imagination 
and  the  discursive.  Approached  from  the  discursive  -  the  characteristic  critical  stance  -  the 
relation  with  imagination  must  be  dialectical.  Approached  from  identification  -  the  mode  of 
247 the  non-specialist  reader  -  the  disclosures  effected  by  metaphor  may  dislodge  blindness  with 
insight  but  the  mediation  involves  no  dialectical  twist. 
At  this  point  Schiller  re-asserts  his  Kantian  antecedents: 
This  middle  disposition,  in  which  our  nature  is  constrained  neither  physically  nor 
morally  and  yet  is  active  both  ways,  pre-eminently  deserves  to  be  called  a  free 
disposition;  and  if  we  call  the  condition  of  sensuous  determination  the  physical,  and 
that  of  rational  determination  the  logical  and  moral,  we  must  call  this  condition  of 
real  and  active  determinacy  the  aesthetic.  (p.  99) 
Tied  to  a  Kantian  conception  of  'disinterest'  the  aesthetic  is  reduced  to  a  'supplement'. 
(p.  132)  The  aesthetic  combines  the  'form'  that  is  posited  in  contemplation  with  'life'  in  so 
far  as  we  'feel'  (p.  122): 
Only  in  so  far  as  it  is  candid  (expressly  renouncing  all  claim  to  reality),  and  only  in 
so  far  as  its  is  self-dependent  (dispensing  with  all  assistance  from  reality),  is 
appearance  aesthetic.  As  soon  as  it  is  deceitful  and  simulates  reality,  as  soon  as  it  is 
impure  and  requires  reality  for  its  operation,  it  is  nothing  but  a  base  tool  for  material 
ends.  (p.  128) 
Such  a  conceptualisation,  however,  offers  no  possibility  of  insight  -  which  is  the  essential 
and  distinctive  attribute  of  imagining  in  so  far  as  it  is  manifest  in  the  refigurations  of 
metaphor  in  double  prescription. 
It  is  Jung's  intention  to  show  how,  underlying  such  opposites,  are  what  he  calls 
psychological  functions.  There  are  four  functions  conceived  in  binary  opposition:  thinking 
and  feeling;  sensation  and  intuition: 
Sensation  establishes  what  is  actually  present,  thinking  enables  us  to  recognize  its 
meaning,  feeling  tells  us  its  value,  and  intuition  points  to  possibilities  as  to  whence  it 
came  and  whither  it  is  going  in  a  given  situation.  23 
In  Jung's  scheme  each  individual  is  characterized  by  a  dominant  function  mediated  through 
an  attitude: 
[...  ]  having  an  attitude  is  synonymous  with  an  a  priori  orientation  to  a  definite  thing, 
no  matter  whether  this  be  represented  in  consciousness  or  not. 
[...  ]  This  automatic  phenomenon  is  an  essential  cause  of  the  one-sidedness  of 
conscious  orientation.  (pp.  414-415) 
23  Psychological  Types,  p.  540. 
248 It  is  the  nature  of  the  attitude  that  is  fundamental  in  categorising  the  individual  as 
extraverted  or  introverted  but 
[...  ]  introverted  and  extraverted  attitudes  can  never  be  demonstrated  per  se;  they 
appear  only  as  a  peculiarity  of  the  predominating  conscious  function.  (p.  520). 
In  the  binary  opposites  one  function  is  dominant  at  the  expense  of  the  inferiority  of  the 
other.  These  inferior  functions 
[...  ]  remain  in  a  more  or  less  primitive  and  infantile  state,  often  only  half  conscious, 
or even  quite  unconscious.  These  relatively  underdeveloped  functions  constitute  a 
specific  inferiority  which  is  characteristic  of  each  type  [...  ].  The  one-sided  emphasis 
on  thinking  is  always  accompanied  by  an  inferiority  of  feeling,  and  differentiated 
sensation  is  injurious  to  intuition  and  vice  versa.  (p.  540) 
At  least  two  forces  work  to  consolidate  such  differentiation:  the  dominant  function  is 
exploited  as  a  defence  mechanism  and,  in  a  process  that  could  be  understood  as  a 
psychological  amplification  to  Marx's  notion  of  estrangement,  the  differentiated  function  is 
in  the  fulfilment  of  a  collective,  a  social  role.  Taking  his  cue  from  Schiller,  Jung 
Man  no  longer  appears  as  a  man  in  our  collective  culture:  he  is  merely  represented 
by  a  function,  what  is  more  he  identifies  himself  completely  with  this  function  and 
denies  the  relevance  of  the  other  inferior  functions.  Thus  modern  man  is  debased  to 
a  mere  function,  because  it  is  this  that  represents  a  collective  value  and  alone 
guarantees  a  possible  livelihood.  (pp.  72-73) 
Given  this  state  of  affairs  the  question  remains  as  to  how  such  alienation  is  to  be  resolved  - 
in  Jung's  terms,  how  our  individuation  is  to  be  achieved  out  of  our  fragmentation.  What  for 
Schiller  was  a  problem  of  imagination  becomes  for  Jung  a  problem  of  psychological 
integration. 
Clearly,  Jung  is  embarked  on  a  sophisticated  exploration  of  modes  of  relation.  His 
concepts  -  the  functions  -  like  Kant's  faculties  are,  though,  uncomfortably  precise.  More 
importantly,  given  the  psychological  perspective,  the  objects  of  our  intentionality  are,  in 
effect,  regarded  as  tabulae  rasae  upon  which  we  project  unconscious  contents,  or  which  we 
introject,  or  whatever.  In  our  terms,  Jung  understands  that  our  relations  with  the  world  are 
characterised  by  identification.  The  implications  of  this  are  crucial  in  Jung's  discussion  of 
symbolism. 
249 In  the  search  for  individuation,  the  resolution  of  the  binary  opposition  is  not  to  be  found 
through  the  exercise  of  reason  because  that  would  presuppose  the  dominance  of  the 
thinking  function.  The  resolution  must  lie  in  a  mode  of  relation  which  involves 
[...  ]  thinking  by  sensing  and  sensing  by  thinking,  then,  out  of  that  experience 
(which  Schiller  calls  the  object)  a  symbol  would  arise  [...  ]. 
The  object  of  the  mediating  function,  therefore,  according  to  Schiller,  is  "living 
form,  "  for  this  would  be  precisely  a  symbol  in  which  the  opposites  are  united;  "a 
concept  that  serves  to  denote  all  aesthetic  qualities  of  phenomena  and,  in  a  word, 
what  we  call  Beauty  in  the  widest  sense  of  the  term". 
(pp.  105-106) 
Lacking  an  adequate  theory  of  imagination  Jung  makes  a  connection  between  'living  shape' 
and  'symbolism': 
The  profundity  and  pregnant  significance  of  the  symbol  appeal  just  as  strongly  to 
thinking  as  to  feeling,  while  its  peculiar  plastic  imagery,  when  shaped  into  sensuous 
form,  stimulates  sensation  as  much  as  intuition.  (p.  478) 
Having  made  this  connection  Jung  elaborates  upon  his  own  concept  of  symbolism. 
Jung  is  intent  on  taking  a  step  beyond  what  he  calls  Schiller's,  'all  too  constricting  mantle 
of  aestheticism': 
Aestheticism  is  not  fitted  to  solve  the  exceedingly  serious  and  difficult  task  of 
educating  man,  for  it  always  presupposes  the  very  thing  it  should  create  -  the 
capacity  to  love  beauty.  It  actually  hinders  a  deeper  investigation  of  the  problem, 
because  it  always  averts  its  face  from  anything  evil,  ugly  and  difficult,  and  aims  at 
pleasure,  even  though  it  be  of  an  edifying  kind.  Aestheticism  therefore  lacks  all 
moral  force,  because  au  fond  it  is  still  only  a  refined  hedonism.  (p.  121) 
This  is  persuasive  -  but  limited  in  the  scope  of  its  indictment.  As  we  have  seen,  Schiller's 
account  of  the  dialectic  is  contingent  upon  the  prior  transactions  of  imagining.  Imagination 
does  not  commit  us  to  aestheticism.  To  some  extent,  then,  Jung  is  tilting  at  a 
misconception. 
Concerning  the  aesthetic,  Schiller  argues  that  'appearance  is its  essence'.  24  On  the  other 
hand,  the  aesthetic  object  demonstrates  the  possibility  of  a  kind  of  freedom  from  reality. 
What  is  posited  through  the  aesthetic  is  'Actuality': 
24  Schiller,  p.  126. 
250 It  is  Nature  herself  that  raises  Man  from  reality  to  appearance,  by  endowing  him 
with  two  senses  which  lead  him  through  appearance  alone  to  knowledge  of  the 
actual.  [...  ]  What  we  see  through  the  eye  is  different  from  what  we  perceive. 
(p.  126) 
That  the  aesthetic  transfigures  actuality  is,  presumably,  a  product  of  the  aesthetic 
supplement.  It  is  as  if  Schiller's  intuitions  transcend  the  limitations  of  his  Kantian  stance: 
He  exercises  this  right  of  sovereignty  in  the  art  of  appearance,  and  the  more  strictly 
he  here  distinguishes  between  the  mine  and  the  thine,  the  more  carefully  he 
separates  shape  from  being,  and  the  more  self-dependence  he  is  capable  of  giving  to 
this  shape,  the  more  he  will  not  merely  extend  the  realm  of  Beauty  but  even  secure 
the  boundaries  of  Truth;  for  he  cannot  purify  appearance  from  actuality  without  at 
the  same  time  liberating  actuality  from  appearance.  (p.  127) 
The  crucial  distinction  seems  to  be  between'reality'  and  the  mediated  product  of  imagining  - 
'actuality'.  The  distinction  between  'mine'  and  'thine'  anticipates  the  role  of  imagination  in 
individuation. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  Jung's  analysis  'aestheticism'  is  set  up  as  a  foil  against  which  he  can 
develop  his  own  concept  of  symbolism.  Schiller  has  been  vulnerable  to  the  charge  of 
aestheticism  because  of  his  adoption  of  Kant's  argument  that  beauty  must  be  disinterested. 
But  Schiller's  intuition  takes  him  beyond  Kant  towards  a  conception  of  imagination  that 
anticipates  the  association  of  imagination  with  insight.  To  save  symbolism  from  its 
association  with  pleasure  Jung  lends  it  appropriate  gravitas  by  identifying  its  proper  domain 
as  the  religious: 
Devotion,  or  the  sinking  of  libido  into  the  unconscious,  reactivates  the  childhood 
complex  so  that  the  childhood  reminiscences,  and  especially  the  relations  with  the 
parents,  becomes  suffused  with  life.  The  fantasies  produced  by  this  reactivation  give 
rise  to  the  birth  of  father  and  mother  divinities  [...  ].  Characteristically,  it  is  symbols 
of  the  parents  that  become  activated  and  by  no  means  always  the  images  of  the  real 
parents.  25 
Such  transformation  of  images  of  parents  into  symbols  Jung  designates  'symbolic 
substitution'.  (p.  124) 
Humanity  came  to  its  gods  by  accepting  the  reality  of  the  symbol,  that  is,  it  came 
to  the  reality  of  thought,  which  has  made  man  lord  of  the  earth.  Devotion,  as 
Schiller  correctly  conceived  it,  is  a  regressive  movement  of  the  libido  towards  the 
primordial,  a  diving  down  in  to  the  source  of  the  first  beginnings.  Out  of  this  there 
25  Psychological  Types,  p.  124. 
251 rises,  as  an  image  of  the  incipient  progressive  movement,  the  symbol,  which  is  a 
condensation  of  all  the  operative  unconscious  factors  -  "living  form,  "  as  Schiller 
says,  and  a  God-image  as  history  proves.  (p.  125) 
There  may  well  be  symbols  whose  nature  reflects  what  Jung  describes  but  it  will  not  do  to 
equate  them  with  Schiller's  'living  form'. 
In  his  account  of  the  symbol  in  his  Definitions  in  Psychological  Types,  Jung  is  more 
circumspect  in  his  analysis.  He  discriminates  between  the  symbol  as  sign  -  where  it  is 
effectively  dead  -  and  its  dynamic  phase  -  as  I  would  argue,  in  the  context  of  imagining. 
Though  aware  that  the  mode  of  relation  is  crucial  -  one  individual's  symbol  may  be  another's 
sign  -  on  the  other  hand,  he  does  not  acknowledge  that  the  nature  of  the  symbol  may 
change  in  the  experience  of  the  same  individual.  The  ritual  and  symbolism  of  the  mass,  for 
example,  may  be  dead  on  one  occasion  yet,  subsequently,  dynamic. 
Resolved  out  of  the  imaginative  mode  the  symbol  becomes  substantive  -  in  this  mode  the 
symbol  is  complete  and  functions  as  a  sign.  But  Jung  suggests  that  the  dynamic  symbol  is 
in  some  way  incomplete  and  it  is  this  absence  that  provides  the  gap  for  a  sort  of 
psychological  intrusion: 
Every  view  which  interprets  the  symbolic  expression  as  an  analogue  or  an 
abbreviated  designation  for  a  know,:  thing  is  semiotic.  A  view  which  interprets  the 
symbolic  expression  as  the  best  possible  formulation  of  a  relatively  unknowi:  thing, 
which  for  that  reason  cannot  be  more  clearly  or characteristically  represented,  is 
symbolic.  [...  ]  an  interpretation  of  the  cross  is  symbolic  when  it  puts  the  cross 
beyond  all  conceivable  explanations,  regarding  it  as  expressing  an  as  yet  unknown 
and  incomprehensible  fact  of  a  mystical  or  transcendent,  i.  e.  psychological  nature. 
(p.  474) 
Hidden  in  these  remarks  is  the  effective  conflation  of  'analogue'  and  'abbreviated 
designation'.  Clearly,  the  latter  constitutes  a  sign.  The  former  opens  up  the  possibility  of 
metaphor  and  its  associated  refiguration.  Earlier  I  suggested  that  the  symbol  is  manifest 
exclusively  in  relation,  manifest  in  that  dawning  that  accompanies  the  emergence  of  double 
prescription  in  a  purposive  context.  Metaphor  manifest  as  symbol  is  a  sort  of  protracted 
'yes'.  The  dawning  supposes  a  delayed  fulfilment  not  an  absence  that  invites  projection  - 
'whenever  unconscious  contents  are  activated  they  appear  in  projection.  '  (p.  244) 
252 How  is  Jung  to  distinguish  between  the  unconscious  projections  that  constitute  the 
shadow  and  the  projected  contents  incorporated  in  the  symbol?  To  find  a  simple  answer  to 
what  constitutes  a  protracted  discussion  in  his  work  as  a  whole  is  unfair.  On  the  other 
hand,  at  times  he  is  suspiciously  adjectival: 
A  symbol  really  lives  only  when  it  is  the  best  and  highest  expression  for  something 
divined  but  not  yet  known  to  the  observer.  It  then  compels  his  unconscious 
participation  and  has  a  life-giving  and  life-enhancing  effect.  (p.  476) 
The  centre  of  his  argument  concerns  the  capacity  of  the  symbol  to  reconcile  the 
characteristic  differentiated  function  from  its  binary  opposite: 
[...  ]  it  cannot  be  a  onesided  product  of  the  most  highly  differentiated  mental 
functions  but  must  derive  equally  from  the  lowest  and  most  primitive  levels  of  the 
psyche.  For  this  collaboration  of  opposing  states  to  be  possible  at  all,  they  must  first 
face  one  another  in  the  fullest  conscious  opposition  [...  ].  But  when  there  is  full 
parity  of  the  opposites,  attested  by  the  ego's  absolute  participation  in  both,  this 
necessarily  leads  to  a  suspension  of  the  will.  [...  ]  for  the  will  can  no  longer  operate 
when  every  motive  has  an  equally  strong  countermotive. 
[...  ]  From  the  activity  of  the  unconscious  there  now  emerges  a  new  content, 
constellated  by  thesis  and  antithesis  in  equal  measure  and  standing  in  a 
compensatory  [...  ]  relation  to  both.  (pp.  478-479) 
Here  the  imagination  is  given  a  psychological  perspective  but  the  price  of  that  is  an 
excursion  into  psychological  metaphysics  in  support  of  an  essentially  transcendental 
argument.  My  fundamental  point  is  that  metaphor  contains  the  potential  to  refigure  that 
with  which  I  am  in  relation  -  the  world  -  and  that  we  are  empowered  in  our  search  for 
intelligibility,  new  models,  because  of  the  disclosure  of  value  and  the  reciprocal  extension  of 
self  and  world,  subject  and  object,  in  the  act  of  such  imagining.  Jung's  model  for  integration 
simply  extends  the  ego  out  of  the  hinterland  of  the  self,  a  growth  with  no  apparent 
implications  about  the  nature  of  the  world  within  which  that  self  is  located. 
It  is  as  if  Jung's  familiarity  with  his  chosen  domain  -  individual  psychology  -  had  resulted 
in  the  evolution  of  a  paradigm  that  took  into  account  the  prescriptive  nature  of  our  modes 
of  relation  with  the  world  as  a  phenomenon  of  subjectivity,  but  failed  to  acknowledge  the 
prescriptive  nature  of  concepts  -  or  the  reciprocal  possibility  of  double  prescription.  This 
limitation  is  clearly  indicated  in  Jung's  discussion  of  what  he  calls  the'subjective  factor': 
253 Sensation  [...  ]  too,  has  a  subjective  factor,  for  besides  the  sensed  object  there  is  a 
sensing  subject  who  adds  his  subjective  disposition  to  the  objective  stimulus.  In  the 
introverted  attitude  sensation  is  based  predominantly  on  the  subjective  component  of 
perception.  What  I  mean  by  this  is  best  illustrated  by  works  of  art  which  reproduce 
external  objects.  If,  for  instance,  several  painters  were  to  paint  the  same  landscape, 
each  trying  to  reproduce  it  faithfully,  each  painting  will  be  different  from  the  others 
[...  ]  chiefly  because  of  different  ways  of  seeing;  indeed,  in  some  of  the  paintings 
there  will  be  a  distinct  psychic  difference  in  mood  and  the  treatment  of  colour  and 
form.  These  qualities  betray  the  influence  of  the  subjective  factor  [...  ].  It  is  an 
unconscious  disposition  which  alters  the  sense-perception  at  its  source,  thus 
depriving  it  of  the  character  of  a  purely  objective  influence.  (pp.  393-394) 
The  issue  here  is  reflected  in  the  assumption  that  there  is  an  area  of  the  world  -  'the  same 
landscape'  -  to  which  we  can  have  some  common  access  outwith  the  mediating  and 
prescriptive  concepts  that  are  a  condition  of  intelligibility  at  all.  There  is  a  conceptual  issue 
to  which  Jung  is  blind. 
There  are  then  two  distinctive  sorts  of  discovery.  The  first  involves  abstraction  from  a 
prior  identification  whereby  the  'subjective  factor'  can  be  identified.  Such  are  the 
discoveries  made  available  through  the  irony  of  Chaucer  and  Kafka.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  is  the  discovery  that  is  contingent  upon  conceptual  change  -  paradigm  shifts  in 
science,  the  refiguration  effected  by  metaphor.  In  fact  the  two  are  distinguishable  only 
retrospectively  as  each  prior  state  is  the  very  condition  of  seeing  and  such  distinctions  are 
not  available  to  the  protagonist.  This  privileged  perspective  -  presupposing  our  imaginative 
transactions  resolving  into  abstraction  -  is  a  crucial  factor  that  fictions  make  available  for  us 
in  the  furtherance  of  individuation. 
The  worlds  of  Chaucer's  Merchant  or  Kafka's  Joseph  K.  are  monolithic,  seamless  -  that  is 
the  source  of  their  ultimate,  claustrophobic  horror.  But  the  horror  is  retrospective  and 
contingent  upon  my  imaginative  apprehension  of  the  world  of  the  book  whereby  a  world 
and  an  alternative  are  available  to  me  but  not  to  the  protagonist.  The  condition  for  letting 
go  is  provided  by  the  freedom  from  responsive  action,  the  very  freedom  that  allows  us  to 
jump  tracks  in  pursuing  the  polysemic  byways  of  language.  Metaphor  and  integration  share 
the  same  pre-condition. 
As  we  have  already  noted,  Jung  is  not  convinced  that  the  necessary  high  seriousness  is 
reflected  in  Schiller's  'aestheticism'.  However,  already  implicit  in  our  discussion  of 
254 imagination  and  its  key  expression  in  metaphor  is  the  argument  that  imagining  involves  a 
refiguration  of  the  world  and  simultaneous  extension  of  the  self. 
For  Jung  the  unconscious  is  always  manifest  in  projection: 
So  long  as  they  are  unconscious  our  unconscious  contents  are  always  projected,  and 
the  projection  fixes  upon  everything  "ours,  "  inanimate  objects  as  well  as  animals  and 
people.  And  to  the  extent  that  "our"  possessions  are  projection  carries,  they  are 
more  than  what  they  are  in  themselves  [...  ].  They  have  acquired  several  layers  of 
meaning  and  are  therefore  symbolical,  though  this  fact  seldom  or never  reaches 
consciousness.  26 
Individuation  involves  the  emergence  of  the  ego  from  the  self: 
The  conscious  mind  does  not  embrace  the  totality  of  man,  for  this  totality  consists 
only  partly  in  his  conscious  contents  [...  ].  In  this  totality  the  conscious  mind  is 
contained  like  a  smaller  circle  within  a  larger  one.  Hence  it  is  quite  possible  for  the 
ego  to  be  made  into  an  object,  that  is  to  say,  for  a  more  compendious  personality  to 
emerge  in  the  course  of  development  and  take  the  ego  into  its  service.  Since  this 
growth  of  personality  comes  out  of  the  unconscious,  which  is  by  definition 
unlimited,  the  extent  of  the  personality  now  gradually  realizing  itself  cannot  in 
practice  be  limited  either.  But  unlike  the  Freudian  superego,  it  is  still  individual.  It 
is  in  fact  individuality  in  the  highest  sense  [...  ].  (I  have  called  this  process  of 
realization  the  "individuation  process")  (p.  258) 
But  if  the  unconscious  is  manifest  in  projection  then  it  must  be  bound  up  in  identification  -  it 
is  precisely  in  transcending  the  subjective  factor  in  imagining  that  projection  can  be  prised 
away  from  the  world. 
It  can  be  seen  that  the  assimilation  of  artefacts  through  what  I  have  called  'identification' 
fails  to  identify  unconscious  projections  and  assimilates  material  by  way  of  familiar 
paradigms  and  stereotypes.  Identification  must  incorporate  the  shadow.  Such  a  process 
has  negative  implications  for  psychological  integration  -  it  merely  flatters  in  consolidating, 
empowers  the  ego-identity.  Only  in  imagining  -  specifically,  in  its  characteristic 
refiguration  of  self  and  world  -  lies  the  potential  for  the  enlargement  of  the  individual.  In 
that  context,  metaphor,  and  its  extension  in  symbolic  imagining,  is  the  key  to  individuation. 
It  is  the  strangeness  of  metaphor  that  provides  the  distance,  the  points  for  leverage,  that 
allow  us  to  prise  away  the  familiar  with  its  contaminant  shadow.  With  irony  the  work  is 
done  for  us:  Chaucer  and  Kafka  are  essentially  didactic,  for  a  perspective  based  in  approved 
26  Psychology  and  Religion,  p.  256. 
255 value  is  presupposed.  The  mode  of  assimilation  is  critical  -  the  strangeness  and 
reconfiguration  must  be  undergone.  But  the  moment  of  insight  -  Shelley's  'fading  coal'  27  - 
coalesces  into  history.  Individuation  cannot,  therefore,  be  a  process  of  step  by  step 
assimilation,  a  brick  by  brick  extension.  At  best,  it  functions  inside  a  habit  -  though, 
momentarily,  it  transcends  habit.  It  is  directed  by  an  attitude  cultivated  in  the  light  of  a 
history  of  insight  with  its  contingent  disclosure  of  value  as  reward.  Above  all,  this  is  a 
modest  process  of  enhancement  -  succeeded  by  partial  retraction  following  the  change  of 
mode  -  and  conditional  upon  a  reverence  for  what  stands  over  and  against  us.  Through  the 
dialectic  of  imagining  the  world  and  the  self  are  rendered  available  for  discursive  enquiry; 
such  underlabouring  then  establishes  the  ground  for  subsequent  imaginative  transformation 
with  its  regeneration  of  motive  and  vision. 
Nietzsche's  aim  was  to  explore  'artistic  doctrines'  in  the  manner  of  the  Greeks,  in  terms  of 
their  deities,  but  this  cannot  release  his  discourse  from  the  discursive  -  yet  what  it  points  to 
is  crucial.  The  relation  between  Dionysus  and  Apollo  mirrors  in  its  dialectic  the  workings 
of  the  imagination.  Jung  balks  at  Nietzsche's  aestheticism  but  his  analysis  of  symbolism 
again  adumbrates  the  logic  of  imagining  but  fails  to  identify  the  reciprocal  revelation  of  self 
and  world  manifest  through  it.  Indeed,  it  is  imagining  -  manifest  in  metaphor  and,  thence, 
symbolism  -  that  makes  individuation  possible. 
When  Nietzsche  observes  that  'Myth  does  not  find  adequate  objectification  in  the  spoken 
word'  28  I  would  argue  that  this  is  exactly  so  but  his  remarks  constitute  a  truism  in  that  the 
point  at  issue  is  conceptual  involving  the  logic  of  symbolism  -  the  language  of  myth.  The 
longing  for  an  undifferentiated  world  -a  prelapsarian  existence  -  at  once  exalts  and  subverts 
the  subtle  workings  of  the  imagination  in  a  way  that  binds  them  into  an  illusion  that  they 
cannot  sustain.  And  that  involves  the  paradox  that  imagining  itself  thereby  becomes  the 
objective  of  an  ideological  programme.  On  the  other  hand,  Nietzsche'  s  observation  of  our 
situation  seems  familiar: 
27  P.  B.  Shelley,  'The  Defence  of  Poetry',  from  Nature  and  Industrialization,  op  cit.,  p.  214. 
28  The  Birth  of  Tragedy,  p.  81. 
256 [...  ]  in  all  likelihood  almost  everyone,  having  subjected  himself  to  a  rigorous 
examination,  will  feel  so  undermined  by  the  critical-historical  spirit  of  our  culture 
that  it  is  only  by  scholarly  means  and  mediating  abstractions  that  the  former 
existence  of  myth  can  be  made  credible.  Myth  alone  rescues  all  the  powers  of 
imagination  and  the  Apolline  dream  from  their  aimless  wanderings.  (p.  109) 
It  is  not  myth,  however,  that  rescues  imagination  -  myth  is  a  function  of  symbolic  imagining. 
In  this  context  nostalgia  is  corrosive,  misdirects  our  energies  from  the  more  modest 
possibilities  open  to  us. 
Just  such  possibilities  -  and  the  issues  concerning  the  discursive  and  imaginative  modes  - 
are  illustrated  in  The  Tempest.  Coleridge  observed  that  the  play  'addresses  itself  entirely  to 
the  imaginative  faculty'.  29  There  is  a  hint,  though,  that  he  experienced  a  failure  of 
imagination  in  a  production  that  he  had  seen: 
[...  ]  and  although  the  illusion  may  be  assisted  by  the  effect  on  the  senses  of  the 
complicated  scenery  and  decorations  of  modern  times  yet  this  sort  of  assistance  is 
dangerous.  For  the  principal  and  only  genuine  excitement  ought  to  come  from 
within,  -  from  the  moved  and  sympathetic  imagination;  whereas,  where  so  much  is 
addressed  to  the  mere  external  senses  and  hearing,  the  spiritual  vision  is  apt  to 
languish,  and  the  attraction  from  without  will  withdraw  the  mind  from  the  proper 
and  only  legitimate  interest  which  is  intended  to  spring  from  within.  (p.  63) 
Presumably  the  presentation  of  the  masque  was  one  of  the  sources  of  Coleridge's  disquiet  - 
but  does  his  worry  about  the  production  reflect  a  certain  thinness,  a  theatricality  about  the 
masque  itself?  The  problem,  though,  would  not  seem  to  be  Shakespeare's,  for  the  text  is 
quite  explicit  that  the  masque  is  Prospero's: 
[...  ]  Spirits,  which  by  mine  art 
I  have  from  their  confines  called  to  enact 
My  present  fancies.  30 
What  then,  does  the  masque  reveal  about  Prospero's  imagining? 
The  vision  of  the  masque  has  intrinsic  beauty  -  man  and  nature  are  represented  in 
productive  harmony  in  the  terms  of  pastoral  convention.  It  is,  however,  a  harmony  of 
conscious  design  -  in  other  words,  myth  is  mediated  through  a  Socratic  attitude:  for 
29  Samuel  Taylor  Coleridge,  The  Moved  and  Sympathetic  Imagination',  from  Shakespeare: 
The  Tempest,  A  Casebook,  cd.  by  D.  J.  Palmer,  repr.  1975  (London:  Macmillan,  1968),  p.  62. 
30  William  Shakespeare,  The  Tempest,  cd  by  J.  H.  Walter,  repr.  1988  (Oxford:  Hcinemann,  1966),  IV.  1.120. 
257 Prospero,  at  this  stage,  knowledge  is  power.  This  subtle  corruption  could  justly  be 
identified  as  aestheticism. 
The  masque  is  brought  to  an  abrupt  end  when  Prospero  remembers 
[...  ]  that  foul  conspiracy 
Of  the  beast  Caliban  and  his  confederates 
Against  my  life.  (IV.  1.139) 
Prospero  is  suddenly  more  angry  than  Miranda  has  ever  seen  him  -  and  we  are  familiar  with 
his  characteristic  irascibility.  The  conspirators  are  under  the  control  of  Ariel  and  pose  not 
the  slightest  practical  problem  for  Prospero.  It  must  be  that  the  challenge  is  to  his  vision. 
Both  the  low-life  and  aristocratic  conspirators  seem  to  represent  an  intractable  element  of 
human  nature  which  reveals  the  masque  to  be  idealistic,  too  fragile  for  the  cut  and  thrust  of 
reality.  Ultimately,  his  betrothal  gift  is humiliating  in  its  inadequacy.  Prospero  falls  into  a 
moment  of  that  nihilistic  despair  so  characteristic  of  the  great  tragedies: 
[...  ]  like  the  baseless  fabric  of  this  vision, 
The  cloud-capped  towers,  the  gorgeous  palaces, 
The  solemn  temples,  the  great  globe  itself, 
Yea,  all  which  it  inherit,  shall  dissolve, 
And,  like  this  insubstantial  pageant  faded, 
Leave  not  a  rack  behind.  (IV.  1.151) 
It  is  interesting  that  Prospero's  shares  the  fate  of  other  'visions'  in  the  play.  Gonzalo's 
paraphrase  of  the  prelapsarian  vision  of  Montaigne;  Antonio's  vision  of  power  for  Sebastian 
and,  thereby,  power  for  himself,  the  plan  of  the  confederates  -  Stephano  and  Trinculo;  the 
love  of  Ferdinand  and  Miranda  couched  in  the  terms  of  courtly  love  -'Sweet  lord,  you  play 
me  false'  (V.  1.172):  all,  except  one,  are  undermined.  The  exception  is  the  vision  of  Caliban: 
Be  not  afeared.  The  isle  is  full  of  noises, 
Sounds  and  sweet  airs,  that  give  delight,  and  hurt  not. 
Sometimes  a  thousand  twangling  instruments 
Will  hum  about  my  ears;  and  sometimes  voices, 
That,  if  I  then  had  waked  after  long  sleep, 
Will  make  me  sleep  again;  and  then  in  dreaming, 
The  clouds  methought  would  open,  and  show  riches 
Ready  to  drop  upon  me,  that  when  I  waked, 
I  cried  to  dream  again.  (11.2.128) 
258 This  evocation,  couched  in  musical  imagery,  is  remarkable  in  its  association  with  Nietzsche's 
Dionysus.  Significantly,  although  Prospero  will  accept  responsibility  for  Caliban  -'this  thing 
of  darkness  I/Acknowledge  mine'  (V.  1.275)  -  he  is  entirely  ignorant  of  this  aspect  of  his 
servant's  experience  as  are  all  the  other  characters.  There  are  the  possible  exceptions  of 
Stephano  and  Trinculo  who  hear  Caliban's  words  -  but  they  are  so  mesmerised  by  material 
considerations  that  their  vision  extends  only  to  having  their  music  for  nothing  so  that  they, 
too,  are  blind  to  the  significance  of  Caliban's  experience. 
Prospero's  is  a  self-conscious  vision  of  didactic  intent.  Together  with  other  important 
realisations  of  Prospero's  moral  intentions  it  reflects  what  Nietzsche  called,  'aesthetic 
Socratism':  31 
For  now  the  virtuous  hero  must  be  dialectical,  there  must  be  a  necessary,  visible 
bond  between  virtue  and  knowledge,  faith  and  morality;  the  transcendental  justice  of 
Aeschylus  is  reduced  to  the  flat  and  impudent  principle  of  'poetic  justice',  with  its 
usual  dens  ex  machina.  (p.  69) 
Appropriately  -  reflecting  Nietzsche's  observations  -  it  is  the  more  ready  sympathy  of  Ariel, 
the  gratuitous  god,  who  nudges  Prospero  into  that  resolving  awareness  that  leads  to  the 
supersession  of  revenge  by  forgiveness. 
However,  Prospero  understands  that  the  restoration  of  the  guilty  to  'themselves' 
(V.  1.32)  though  it  may  have  been  brought  about  through  the  exercise  of  his  power  also 
entails  the  resignation  of  that  power.  Even  in  its  resignation  Prospero  relives  the  exultation 
that  he  found  in  exercising  it: 
I  have  bedimmed 
The  noontide  sun,  called  forth  the  mutinous  winds, 
And'twixt  the  green  sea  and  the  azured  vault 
Set  roaring  war.  [...  ] 
Graves  at  my  command 
have  waked  their  sleepers,  oped,  and  let  'em  forth 
By  my  so  potent  art.  (V.  1.41) 
The  continuing  seduction  of  such  power  is  revealed  in  the  extreme  measures  that  he  will  be 
driven  to  take  in  disposing  of  it: 
[...  ]  I'll  break  my  staff, 
31  The  Birth  of  Tragedy,  p.  64. 
259 Bury  it  certain  fathoms  in  the  earth, 
And  deeper  than  did  ever  plummet  sound 
I'll  drown  my  book.  (V.  1.54) 
The  younger  generation  have  their  betrothal  gift  -  the  masque  -  and  it  is  left  to  them  to 
make  of  it  what  they  will.  Their  freedom  is  brought  about  by  Prospero's  resignation.  To 
attempt  the  direct  transformation  of  life  in  terms  of  art  constitutes  aestheticism  -  as  we  saw 
in  The  Portrait  of  a  Lady.  At  the  very  least,  in  these  circumstances,  art  becomes  didactic. 
On  the  other  hand,  freedom  releases  Ferdinand  and  Miranda  to  imagine  -  and  in  imagining 
lies  the  possibility  of  a  further  freedom  associated  with  the  moral  life  and  individuation. 
Prospero's  gift  now  assumes  a  far  greater  value  in  the  light  of  its  limitations  than  it  had 
when  circumscribed  in  his  didactic  intent. 
In  freeing  others,  Prospero  frees  himself,  but  he  is  restored  to  a  dangerous  world  where 
urgent,  conflicting  motives  often  prove  intractable  and  cannot  be  wished  away.  And  there 
remains  beyond  the  scope  of  his  wisdom  the  unassimilated  ecstasy  of  Caliban. 
The  resolution  of  the  play  is,  therefore,  rich  in  ambiguity.  Shakespeare's  mature  vision  is 
diagnostic  rather  than  prescriptive.  In  its  modesty  it  resolves  where  it  can.  The  artifice  of 
the  masque  is  exactly  its  point  -  it  is  a  function  of  power  rather  than  of  imagination.  The 
play  itself  stands  over  and  against  it.  As  a  phenomenon  of  imagination  the  play  becomes, 
retrospectively,  an  essential  element  of  its  own  argument  in  the  illumination  of  Prospero's 
temptation  and  final,  partial  vision.  It  provides  the  impossible  perspective.  Such  self 
awareness  on  Shakespeare's  part  would  be,  literally,  inconceivable  without,  at  least,  a  tacit 
awareness  of  the  distinction  between  imaginative  and  discursive  modes. 
A  further,  important  element  is  disclosed  through  Miranda.  Coleridge  saw  that  within  the 
greater  design  Miranda  exemplifies  psychological  integration  -  the  imagination  in  the 
context  of  the  specifically  personal: 
[...  ]  in  Shakespeare  all  the  elements  of  womanhood  are  holy,  and  there  is  the  sweet, 
yet  dignified  feeling  of  all  that  coniln  sates  society,  as  sense  of  ancestry  and  of  sex, 
with  a  purity  unassailable  by  sophistry,  because  it  rests  not  in  the  analytic  processes, 
but  in  the  sane  equipoise  of  the  faculties,  during  which  feelings  are  representative  of 
all  past  experience,  -  not  of  the  individual  only,  but  of  all  those  by  whom  she  had 
been  educated,  and  their  predecessors  even  up  to  the  first  mother  that  lived. 
Shakespeare  saw  that  the  want  of  prominence  [...  ]  was  the  blessed  beauty  of  the 
woman's  character,  and  knew  that  it  arose  not  from  any  deficiency,  but  from  the 
260 more  exquisite  harmony  of  all  parts  of  the  moral  being  constituting  one  living  total 
of  head  and  heart.  32 
It  is  striking  that  within  six  lines  of  her  first  speech  -  '0  I  have  suffered/With  those  that  I 
saw  suffer'  (1.2.5)  -  Miranda  has  arrived  at  that  state  of  integrated  vision  that  it  takes 
Gloucester  a  lifetime  and  terrible  suffering  to  reach: 
Let  the  superfluous  and  lust-dieted  man, 
That  slaves  your  ordinance,  that  will  not  see 
Because  he  does  not  feel,  feel  your  power  quickly; 
So  distribution  should  undo  excess, 
And  each  man  have  enough.  33 
Miranda's  vision  establishes  a  dramatic  irony  against  which  her  father's  inner  struggle  and 
eventual  insight  is  illuminated.  As  in  King  Lear,  there  is  no  magical  resolution  in  terms  of 
poetic  justice  -  indeed,  that  possible  outcome  is  consciously  rejected. 
In  the  end,  the  limitations  of  Prospero's  masque  render  it  absurd  -a  superseded  paradigm. 
But  it  becomes  a  crucial  element  in  a  dialectic  resolving  into  a  larger  awareness  that 
acknowledges  freedom  as  a  condition  for  the  moral  life.  Prospero  transcends  his  own 
Socratic  vision  -  this,  in  a  way,  is  the  whole  point.  There  is  a  striking  parallel  with  the 
central  imaginative  transactions  depicted  in  St.  Mark.  The  play  anticipates  Nietzsche's 
strictures  and  restores  us  to  that  imagining  exemplified  in  Miranda.  It  is  open-eyed  -  it 
refuses  to  capitulate  to  its  own  mythic  temptations  -  yet  it  offers  consolation  in  its 
understanding  of  the  possibilities  and  limitations  inherent  in  imagining. 
We  have  in  Coleridge's  assessment  and  in  King  Lear  a  cluster  of  associated  ideas 
concerning  education,  individuation  and  our  moral  transactions  with  the  world.  What  I 
have  tried  to  suggest  is  that  these  are  significantly  linked  and  that  the  key  concept  is  the 
imagination.  There  is  a  conceptual  problem  in  articulating  the  nature  of  the  link  because  it 
can  only  manifest  itself  outwith  the  discursive.  Imagining  in  the  context  of  the  arts 
rehearses  the  activity  of  the  moral  imagination  -  there  is  no  direct  link  so  that  crude  claims 
for  the  demonstration  of  the  efficacy  of  imagining  cannot  be  answered.  Nevertheless,  the 
disclosure  of  value  in  the  world  that  is  contingent  upon  imagining  empowers  our  curiosity 
32  'The  Moved  and  Sympathetic  Imagination',  p.  63. 
33  William  Shakespeare,  King  Lear,  op.  cit.,  IV.  1.66. 
261 and  sustains  our  search  for  individuation.  Even  in  the  act  of  articulation,  finding  the  words, 
there  is  a  sublimation  in  imagining,  a  value  added.  Though  myth,  of  its  nature,  is  only 
conceivable  for  us  as  a  poignant  loss,  we  recognize  how  it  came  to  be  constituted  through 
its  symbolism,  and  even  for  us,  in  the  context  of  the  modern  age  -  for  which  Shakespeare's 
play  stands  as  testimony  to  our  internal  division  -  there  is  the  potential  in  imagining  to  take 
us  across  thresholds  into  an  overwhelming  sense  of  the  purposive. 
262 Conclusions 
Definitions  and  Pedagogical  Implications 
The  aim  of  this  study  has  been  to  try  to  bring  a  little  more  conceptual  clarity  to  issues 
concerning  the  imagination.  Generally,  these  issues  have  presented  themselves  to  me  in 
the  course  of  teaching  in  a  secondary  school,  a  context  where  little  can  be  taken  for  granted 
either  in  terms  of  response  or  motivation.  Yet  there  are  peculiar  advantages  in  teaching 
groups  which  are,  largely,  not  self-selected  and  reflect  wide  ranges  of  ability.  Precisely 
how  are  texts  to  be  opened  in  these  circumstances?  Exploration  of  the  modes  of 
imagination  becomes  motivated  by  the  need  to  win  hearts  and  minds  -a  key  element  in  a 
teacher's  strategies  for  survival. 
The  context  demands  that  the  explication  of  texts  becomes  a  social  phenomenon.  In  a 
way  this  connects  the  imaginative  enterprise  to  certain  of  its  distant  origins  in  the  drama 
and  the  bardic  tradition  -  in  teaching,  there  is  a  strong  element  of  performance.  In  the 
pedagogic  strategies  of  universities  the  imaginative  transactions  are,  largely,  presupposed. 
In  schools,  the  first  and  essential  priority  is  that  some  imaginative  transaction  must  be 
engaged:  how  can  youngsters  be  expected  to  expatiate  on  experiences  they  have  not  had? 
It  is  not  my  aim  to  discuss  teaching  strategies.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  first  practical 
step  to  engage  imagining  is  to  invite  identification  and  that  in  the  absence  of  a  spontaneous 
engagement  this  can  be  encouraged  for  the  student  through  a  sort  of  infection  -  the  social 
context,  the  collective  excitement,  is  important: 
His  tale  was  over  now.  The  Phaeacians  all  fell  silent,  hushed, 
His  story  holding  them  spellbound  down  the  shadowed  halls  [...  ].  1 
There  is  no  difference  in  principle  between  the  identification  engaged  by  fictions  and  a 
characteristic  mode  of  relation  within  which  we  negotiate  large  areas  of  our  lives.  On  the 
other  hand,  successful  writing  supposes  the  effective  use  of  strategies  to  enhance 
identification  -  indeed,  a  change  in  quality  may  effect  a  change  in  essence,  a  shift  into 
imagining. 
Homer,  The  Odyssey,  trans.  by  Robert  Fagles,  this  edn  1990  (New  York:  Viking  Penguin,  1996),  p.  286. 
263 Identification  is  a  mode  of  imagination  that  is  essentially  pragmatic  in  so  far  as  it 
negotiates  with  the  world  by  abstracting  what  is  familiar  and,  thereby,  our  urgent,  day  to 
day  negotiations  within  the  world  can  proceed  efficiently.  It  is  conditioned  by  the 
requirement  for  responsive  action  contingent  upon  the  `identification'  of  minimal 
sequences  of  cues.  It  proceeds  by  the  projection  of  structures  of  significance  so  that  it  is 
useful  to  use  the  term  Gestalt  to  suggest  its  fundamentally  holistic  nature.  In  the  context  of 
art  it  appropriates  by  means  of  what  is  already  familiar.  Put  in  other  terms,  it  assimilates 
through  the  intuitive  `identification'  of  forms  of  life  as  they  are  manifest  in,  say,  fictions. 
The  interpretative  powers  of  identification  are  dependent  upon  a  sort  of  accident,  a 
coincidence  of  projected  structures  that  may  or  may  not  match  with  states  of  affairs  in  the 
world.  Identification  has  a  ready  pragmatic  endorsement.  The  projected  signification  may 
hide  anomalies  that  would  otherwise  demand  adjustment  or  reformulation.  It  is  in  this 
sense  that  identification  is  associated  with  blindness. 
Whereas  fantasy  is  always  associated  with  unreality,  identification  may  or  may  not 
engage  with  the  world  but,  characteristically,  it  allows  us  to  bask  in  the  comfortable, 
because  unquestioning,  assumption  that  it  does.  The  use  of  camouflage  in  nature  supposes 
the  disruption  of  an  identifiable  form  that  would  otherwise  provoke  a  ready  response  in, 
say,  the  victim.  Formal  cues  associated  with  the  identity  of  the  predator  are  effectively 
obscured  in  the  assumption  of  the  familiar  visual  characteristics  of  a  context  -  say,  a  patch 
of  light  and  shadow.  The  murderous  success  of  the  tiger  demonstrates  that  any 
complacency  that  might  be  founded  in  the  assumption  that  identification  unerringly  picks 
out  true  states  of  affairs  is  profoundly  misplaced. 
It  is  easy  to  see  how  in  the  assimilation  of  texts  identification  may  pass  apparently 
seamlessly  into  fantasy.  Indeed,  it  is  entirely  characteristic  that  through  identification  we 
seek  to  exert  power  over  the  world  to  make  it  negotiable  -  with  the  inherent  danger  that 
conservatism  may  pass  into  a  more  radical  denial,  into  the  mode  of  fantasy. 
Whatever  its  psychological  nature  might  be  I  would  claim  that  fantasy  is  a  mode  of 
imagination  in  so  far  as  it  presupposes  a  distinctive  relation  to  states  of  affairs  with 
demonstrable  epistemological  implications:  fantasy  is  a  negative  response  to  the  world 
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though,  especially  in  children,  where,  to  use  a  military  metaphor,  withdrawal  allows  for 
regrouping.  Compensation  in  fantasy  may  sustain  us  in  the  face  of  intolerable  reality. 
Fantasy  empowers  -  with  either  productive  or  destructive  consequences.  To  seek 
`authentication'  of  emotional  priorities  is  one  of  the  roles  of  fantasy.  This  is  the  source  of 
the  power  of  its  attempted  transformations  of  what  stands  over  and  against  us. 
We  also  use  identification  in  describing,  say,  individuals  modelling  their  behaviour  or 
appearance  upon  that  of  others.  Clearly  this  involves  an  imitative  assimilation  of  specific 
cues  and  a  matching  of  interpretative  visions.  In  being  caught  up  in  a  `fashion'  a  latent 
paradox  is  engaged  involving  the  appropriation  of  what  appears  to  be  distinctive  -  the 
projection  of  an  interesting  or  powerful  self  -  by  submission  to  a  common  identity.  To  the 
outsider,  the  adopted  fashion  has  the  characteristics  of  a  closed  paradigm  so  that  it  is  seen 
as  absurd,  a  subject  for  mockery.  What  is  fashionable  is  always  too  late.  Again, 
identification  involves  a  blindness  that  resolves  into  fantasy  characterised  by  collective 
denial. 
The  success  of  extended  fictions  more  or  less  depends  upon  the  engaging  of 
identification.  Sophisticated  didactic  intent  naturally  reaches  for  irony  to  establish 
perspectives  impossible  for  protagonists  -  with  a  concomitant  premium  upon  `seeing'. 
The  forms  of  life  projected  in  most  popular  fiction  cannot  withstand  the  assault  of  irony. 
There  readers  seek  to  find  the  gratification  of  unchallenged  denial  -  we  call  this 
`escapism'.  Such  transactions  explain  the  power  of  fictions  for  younger  readers  and  are 
crucial  in  establishing  the  habit  of  reading.  In  general,  the  value  of  the  habit  outweighs 
adult  strictures  concerning  the  `value'  of  the  literature. 
The  price  of  fantasy  is  retreat  into  private  worlds  with  the  associated  danger  that  fantasy 
may  be  narrowed  to  obsession.  On  the  other  hand,  identification  presupposes  a  distinctive 
kind  of  social  adjustment.  But  its  inherent  conservatism  involves,  in  effect,  the  abrogation 
of  an  important  area  of  personal  responsibility  in  so  far  as  it  cannot  conceive  of  alternatives 
outside  its  immediate  perspective.  Through  identification  we  are  unable  to  establish  the 
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judgements  are  couched  in  terms  that  slide  easily  into  personal  invective. 
Only  through  our  specifically  imaginative  transactions  can  we  further  our  individuation 
and  participate  in  the  moral  life.  It  is  useful  to  consider  such  issues  in  the  larger  scale,  at 
the  interface  between  cultures.  There,  to  establish  some  insight  depends  upon  a 
recognition  of  common  humanity.  This  may,  at  first  sight,  appear  to  depend  upon 
identification.  However,  to  come  to  terms  with  what  may  be  strange,  alien, 
incomprehensible,  supposes  a  passage  through  defamiliarisation.  The  impossible 
perspective  is  available  only  following  an  imaginative  leap  out  of  identification. 
Multicultural  education,  placed  within  a  context  that  develops  strategies  for  imagining, 
ceases  to  be  merely  politically  correct,  and  can  be  seen  to  encourage  alternative 
perspectives  upon  conservative  paradigms.  We  may  then  come  to  understand  more  of 
what  it  means  to  engage  the  moral  life  within  a  single  culture.  We  come  to  know  ourselves 
by  knowing  others.  Nietzsche  observes: 
It  was  precisely  because  moral  philosophers  knew  the  facts  of  morality  only 
somewhat  vaguely  in  an  arbitrary  extract  or  as  a  chance  abridgement,  as  morality  of 
their  environment,  their  class,  their  church,  the  spirit  of  their  times  [...  ]  it  was 
precisely  because  they  were  ill  informed  and  not  even  very  inquisitive  about  other 
peoples,  ages  and  former  times,  that  they  did  not  so  much  as  catch  sight  of  the  real 
problems  of  morality  -  for  these  come  into  view  only  if  we  compare  many 
moralities.  2 
The  didacticism  that  operates  through  the  generation  of  insight,  the  engaging  of 
abstractive  cognition  following  imaginative  transactions,  must  be  clearly  differentiated 
from  that  crude  didacticism  which  is  straightforwardly  prescriptive.  Teaching  should  be  at 
odds  with  indoctrination.  Clearly,  any  educational  programme  that  seeks  to  inculcate 
values  directly  can  operate  only  by  inviting  identification.  Such  a  strategy  is  inherently 
contradictory  in  so  far  as  identification  significantly  curtails  the  possibilities  available  for 
moral  choice.  Where  it  succeeds,  the  crude  didactic  approach  is  seductive  because  its 
ground  in  identification  generates  rectitude,  the  emotional  fuel  for  projection. 
2  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  Beyond  Good  and  Evil,  op.  cit.,  pp.  108-109. 
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possible  where  the  seeing  itself  is  a  function  of  conservative  structures  of  interpretation? 
Where  is  the  Archimedean  point  to  be  found  that  would  allow  the  prising  away  of  possible 
illusion  from  reality?  Having  fostered  identification  as  the  endorsed  response  to  texts,  how 
are  the  young  to  be  shifted  into  imagining? 
Important  issues  concerning  imagining  are  to  found  in  the  consideration  of  metaphor. 
Some  metaphor  involves  the  substitution  of  one  thing  for  another.  There  is  a  certain 
delight  generated  in  the  perception  of  the  resemblance  and  some  aspect  of  what  is 
described  is  enhanced.  This  is  also  a  characteristic  of  simile.  The  metaphor  focuses  our 
attention  and  rewards  with  the  pleasure  of  recognition.  Supposed  here  is  the  priority  of 
naming  and  description  in  our  use  of  language.  Metaphor  as  substitution  involves  no 
disruption  of  identification  -  indeed  it  enhances  it: 
Pike,  three  inches  long,  perfect 
Pike  in  all  parts,  green  tigering  the  gold.  3 
Another  kind  of  metaphor  presents  us  with  anomalies.  It  makes  things  strange.  Within 
the  inherent  reassurance  of  identification  it  is  an  irritant.  In  the  teaching  situation  it  might 
even  engage  protests  about  `difficulty'.  To  arrive  at  meaning  involves  a  twisting  in 
perception  that  reveals  hitherto  unseen  configurations  -  there  is  no  simple  linguistic 
substitution  but  a  redrawing  of  certain  aspects  of  reality.  What  we  took  the  world  to  be  is 
now  adjusted.  More  often  than  not,  the  adjustment  does  not  so  much  involve  the 
discovery  of  novelty  within  the  world  as  the  revelation  of  what  has  been  obscured  by 
identification.  As  Proust  observes  of  the  greatness  of  `true  art': 
[...  ]  we  have  to  rediscover,  to  reapprehend,  to  make  ourselves  fully  aware  of  that 
reality,  remote  from  our  daily  preoccupations,  from  which  we  separate  ourselves  by 
an  even  greater  gulf  as  the  conventional  knowledge  which  we  substitute  for  it  grows 
thicker  and  more  impermeable  [...  ]. 
Such  radical  metaphor  is  complex  in  that  it  has  an  articulated  structure,  which,  itself,  has 
a  crucial,  constituent  role  in  the  extended  structure  of,  say,  the  poem.  We  see  the  world 
3  Ted  Hughes,  `Pike',  from  The  New  Dragon  Book  of  Verse,  ed.  by  Michael  Harrison  and  Christopher 
Stuart-Clark,  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1977),  p.  60. 
4  Marcel  Proust,  lime  Regained,  op.  cit.,  p.  931. 
267 differently  in  the  light  of  it.  The  structure,  the  form,  constitutes  a  limit,  which,  through  its 
projective  efficacy  puts  an  aspect  of  the  world  into  inverted  commas,  as  it  were.  Such 
metaphor  engages  double  prescription.  In  these  circumstances  the  revealed  structure 
within  the  world  is  found  to  be  expressive,  characteristically,  of  an  aspect  of  our 
experience,  a  form  of  life.  We  have  experienced  a  transaction  of  the  imagination: 
Man's  spirit  will  be  flesh-bound  when  found  at  best, 
But  uncumbered:  meadow  down  is  not  distressed 
For  a  rainbow  footing  it  [...  ].  s 
In  painting,  the  first  `prescription'  is  imposed  by  the  frame;  in  metaphor,  by  the  novel 
linguistic  configuration.  Our  attention  is  now  drawn  to  the  articulation  of  the  expressive 
form,  the  disposition  of  the  parts  of  the  complex  within  the  framing  `punctuation'.  At  the 
same  time,  we  become  aware,  through  the  projective  reference  of  the  unfolding  structure, 
that  some  aspect  of  reality  is  being  revealed. 
The  second  prescription  is  effected  through  the  expressive  power  of  what  is  disclosed  - 
and  there  is  a  supplementary  excitement  in  the  disclosure.  Characteristically,  what  is 
revealed  in  landscape  paintings  are  structures  or  forms  that  were  already  inherent  in  the 
world.  Through  metaphor,  it  is  more  likely  that  some  truth  of  our  being  in  the  world  is 
made  manifest.  The  sheer  rightness  of  the  articulation  engages  a  kind  of  reverence  for  the 
artist  or  writer:  this  is  the  aesthetic  response. 
Double  prescription  in  the  context  of  nature  finds  some  of  us  predisposed  -  using  Kant's 
distinction  -  to  endow  the  purposive  articulation  with  a  sense  of  purpose.  Our  sense  of  the 
religious  is  now  engaged.  Double  prescription  allows,  perhaps,  for  a  little  more  conceptual 
clarity  concerning  our  age-old  intuitions  about  aspects  of  the  relationship  between  the 
aesthetic  and  the  religious. 
To  be  caught  up  in  the  world  of  the  book,  the  poem,  through  identification  provides  the 
emotional  and  intellectual  energy  to  take  the  reader  across  the  barrier  of  the  strange.  The 
pleasure  in  identification  is  now  extended  into  the  experience  of  the  revelatory  power  of 
the  imagination  and  in  that  form  comes  to  constitute  a  kind  of  faith  that  such  transactions 
Hopkins,  `The  Caged  Skylark',  from  Poems  and  Prose,  op.  cit.,  p.  32. 
268 are  possible.  The  student  has  now  touched  upon  a  kind  of  autonomy  that  is  at  the  heart  of 
what  it  is  to  be  educated  -  motivation  is  found  in  the  imaginative  enterprise  itself  with  its 
associated  simultaneous  disclosure  of  meaning  and  value. 
Whereas  a  successful  approach  through  identification  supposes  the  arrival  at  some 
experience  of  the  world  of  the  text  -  and  that  awaits  enhancement  -  the  approach  through 
the  discursive  has  no  such  guarantee.  So  much  teaching  is  a  waste  of  time  simply  because 
children  have  no  experience  within  which  to  locate  the  pedagogical  explication.  Their 
only  resort  is  to  pick  up  information  about  texts.  Knowing  about  texts  has  a  high  premium 
in  the  examination  system  -  this  exerts  a  pervasive,  almost  irresistible  pressure  upon  both 
students  and  teachers.  Is  there  no  role  for  the  discursive?  Are  imagining  and  the 
discursive  simply  locked  in  contradictory  antagonism?  The  assumption  that  they  are 
perhaps  lies  behind  the  debate  concerning  the  `two  cultures'. 
My  method  in  this  study  has  been  to  take  the  reader  in  and  out  of  texts  and  paintings.  I 
have  argued  that  imagination  involves  the  disclosure  of  articulated  structures  and  have 
invited  exploration  of  constituent  `parts'.  It  has  been  my  tacit  aim  in  the  discussion  of 
some  of  the  shorter  poems  to  try  to  induce  imaginative  responses  precisely  through  such 
discursive  scrutiny.  Whether  nor  not  I  have  succeeded  is  another  matter  -  the  shift  to 
imagining  is  spontaneous.  Above  all,  my  own  failures  of  imagination  cannot  be  accessible 
to  me  until  I  have  achieved,  through  a  leap  of  imagination,  a  further  impossible 
perspective. 
It  is  for  this  reason  that  negative  judgements  of  works  of  art  should  be  made  in  a  spirit  of 
humility,  should  be  acknowledged  as  provisional.  To  persuade  the  young  into  accepting 
the  epistemological  implications  of  tact  is  often  difficult  when  so  much  hangs  upon  the 
aggrandisement  associated  with  the  power  of  dismissal. 
What  are  the  characteristics  of  failure  of  imagination?  Simply,  it  involves  failure  to  see 
-  remembering  that  in  the  context  of  double  prescription  failure  to  arrive  at  how 
components  are  located  within  the  articulated  structures  involves  a  simultaneous  failure  of 
insight.  At  the  very  least  the  discussion  of  why  I  failed,  in  the  context  of  pointing  to 
undisclosed  elements  of  the  poetry  -  is  intelligible. 
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imagining  -  success  in  the  latter  would  provide,  in  effect,  ostensive  definitions  to  support 
the  argument.  However,  there  is  no  `linear'  progression  from  the  discursive  to  imagining 
because  the  relationship  is  dialectical  -  imagining  and  the  discursive  are  in  antagonistic 
relation  until  the  transactions  of  double  prescription  transfigure  discrete  components  into 
articulated  structures. 
A  reconstruction  of  the  understanding  of  a  poem,  conceived  schematically  in  the  terms 
of  the  modes  of  imagination,  would  involve,  say,  initial  identification  which  would 
generate  the  emotions  that  would  fuel  further  scrutiny.  The  imagination  might  then  be 
engaged  by  anomalies,  or  disruptions  to  identification  engendered  by  strange  metaphor. 
Moments  of  subsequent  insight  would  begin  to  reveal  aspects  of  the  articulated  form  or 
structure.  The  discursive  might  now  be  engaged  in  amplifying  this  insight  through 
knowledge  of,  say,  context  or  genre.  Further  transfiguration  of  such  knowledge  through 
imagining  would  now  extend  the  grasp  of  the  inherent  structure.  The  dialectic  would 
frequently  be  engaged  until  such  times  as  the  articulated  structure  emerged  as  an 
illuminating  whole.  Now  we  experience  the  joyous  `rightness'  of  it  -  aesthetic 
apprehension  is  engaged. 
The  logic  of  the  dialectic  suggests  that,  paradoxically,  failure  at  the  level  of  the 
discursive  may  block  the  shift  into  imagining.  Indeed,  intellectual  failure  is  sometimes 
rationalised  by  proclaiming  the  incompatibility  of  the  discursive  and  imaginative  modes 
with  a  concomitant,  sentimental,  obscurantist  exaltation  of  `art'.  On  the  other  hand, 
unsuccessful  teaching  will  arise  from  the  assumption  that  the  discursive  is  all  there  is.  It 
follows  that  value  disclosed  through  double  prescription  will  not  be  available  as 
motivation. 
It  is  also  characteristic  that  structures  revealed  through  previous  imagining  will  block  a 
more  comprehensive  vision  in  so  far  as,  becoming  `historic',  they  have  reduced  aspects  of 
the  articulated  structure  to  cues  for  identification.  In  this  way  the  `interpretation'  of  a  text 
has  become  `canonical'  for  the  individual  teacher.  At  its  worst,  such  interpretations 
become  hallowed  in  notes.  The  text  may  become  more  or  less  invisible  under  such 
270 assaults.  There  is  a  similar,  incipient  problem  associated  with  the  ready  access  to  pass 
notes,  study  guides  and  CD-ROMs.  It  is  possible  to  conceive  of  an  education,  involving 
primary,  secondary  and  tertiary  levels,  which  never  arrives  at  imagining  except  at  the  level 
of  occasional  identification.  In  teaching,  knowledge  about  texts  demands  transfiguration 
through  the  dialectic. 
Successful  teaching  often  follows  from  choosing  a  complex  poem  which  is  half  known 
so  that  excitement  is  generated  in  mutual  discovery.  The  value  experienced  through  the 
framing  and  falling  into  place  associated  with  double  prescription,  imagining,  then  has  an 
important  effect  in  consolidating  the  group. 
Intellectual  rigour,  far  from  being  redundant  in  the  process  of  imagining,  is,  in  the  right 
context,  a  condition  for  its  emergence.  With  this  realisation,  successful  examination 
results  become  not  ends  in  themselves  but  a  by-product  of  successful  imagining.  I  am 
perfectly  aware  that  the  demand  for  such  rigour  may  be  seen  as  a  reactionary,  conservative 
position.  Nevertheless,  the  modal  logic  of  the  imagination  points  to  a  crucial  role  for 
discursive  reasoning. 
Presumably  in  an  apparent  attempt  to  avoid  such  demands,  certain  recent  examination 
papers  for  GCSE  have  presented  texts  for  analysis  which  invite  strong  identification.  This 
has  the  great  danger  of  prompting  contemptuous  dismissal  in  those  candidates  who  do  not 
share  the  ideological  presuppositions  or  fashionable  standpoint  implicitly  endorsed  by 
examiners  in  their  choice  of  material.  Passages  which  engage  the  imagination  may, 
initially,  appear  to  be  more  `difficult'  but  have  the  potential  to  achieve  a  certain  autonomy 
from  preconceived  stances. 
From  the  practical  point  of  view  an  understanding  of  the  relationships  between  the 
modes  of  imagination  and  their  relation  to  the  discursive  would  allow  for  discrimination 
between  teaching  objectives.  It  is  possible  to  envisage  a  co-ordinated  programme 
projected  over  time  that,  taking  into  account  the  cognitive  development  of  children,  would 
involve  the  stimulation  of  fantasy,  identification  and  intellectual  rigour'  directed  towards 
the  end  of  imagining.  To  some  extent  this  is  already  adumbrated  in  the  curriculum  but 
without  a  clear  understanding  of  what  we  are  about. 
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didactic  approach  can  only  succeed  where  it  engages  identification.  This  merely 
establishes  conformity  -  it  may  provoke  reaction  in  those  who  are  not  engaged.  On  the 
other  hand,  in  imagining  we  experience  value,  we  find  rootedness  through  our  transaction 
with  art  or  with  the  world  and  simultaneously  gather  insight.  Of  course  our  culture  from 
the  perspective  of  the  discursive  endorses  relativistic  perspectives  -  how  could  it  be 
otherwise?  But  our  capacity  to  imagine  presupposes  Kant's  sensus  communis  and  a  world, 
thereby,  in  which  we  can  establish  a  reverence  for  what  it  is  for  ourselves  and  others  to 
have  a  home.  This  is  a  form  of  faith  -  but  it  is  rooted  in  imaginative  experience.  In  this 
broad  sense,  culture  is  profoundly  orientational.  Naive  didacticism,  in  endorsing 
identification,  can  only,  in  the  end,  promote  estrangement  and  establish  the  conditions  for 
conflict  between  ideologies. 
Here  again,  awareness  of  the  different  modes  of  imagination  and  their  epistemological, 
ontological  and  moral  implications  suggests  a  significant  role  for  multicultural  education. 
When  we  consider  culture  as  merely  supplementary  rather  than  constitutive  we  consign  art 
to  the  merely  decorative  or  conceive  of  it  as  a  domain  for  an  elite.  That  the  self  is 
inescapably  within,  and  knows  itself  through  culture  explains  why  transculiuration 
involves  mutual  refiguration.  We  are  changed  through  our  arrival at  previously  impossible 
perspectives. 
Our  sense  of  ourselves,  then,  is  bound  up  in  whatever  relational  modes  we 
characteristically  inhabit.  At  any  given  moment  that  self  cannot  be  other  than  in  the  world 
in  a  state  of  denial  or  rootedness.  An  important  aspect  of  such  denial  is  represented  in  the 
shadow.  Jung  argues  that  what  we  reject  about  ourselves  we  project.  The  shadow,  then, 
must  be  bound  in  to  identification.  But  in  the  shift  from  identification  to  imagination,  in 
negotiating  the  disturbance  of  defamiliarisation,  we  achieve  a  sort  of  fleeting  autonomy  in 
the  simultaneous  extension  of  the  world  and  the  self.  We  achieve  a  momentary  freedom  in 
imagining.  Such  insight,  arrived  at  in  negotiation  with  others,  rather  than  with  art  or 
aspects  of  the  natural  world,  forms  the  basis  for  our  moral  transactions.  In  so  far,  then,  as 
education  concerns  itself  with  identity  and  the  moral  life,  it  falls  into  self-defeat  unless  it 
272 establishes  imagining  as  the  essential  means  whereby  it  seeks  to  address  these  specific 
aims. 
Traditionally,  discussion  of  ethical  and  aesthetic  issues  has  presupposed  that  we  make 
our  judgements  within  the  discursive  mode.  In  practice,  most  of  our  judgements  are  made 
in  the  mode  of  identification.  An  implication  of  my  argument  is  that  such  judgements  can 
be  adequately  made  only  when  they  follow  imaginative  transactions.  Only  then  are  the 
structures  and  their  associated  values  that  are  latent  in  our  experience  available.  Just  as  we 
habitually  demand  that  children  should  analyse  experiences  they  have  not  had,  so,  in  the 
mode  of  identification,  we  make  judgements  on  issues,  the  real  nature  of  which  may  be 
opaque  to  us. 
But  having  experienced  such  imaginative  transactions  how  can  we  be  sure  that  what  is 
revealed  to  us  is  not  illusory,  or  that  we  have  not  brought  events  to  premature  closure? 
The  dialectical  nature  of  the  relationship  between  the  discursive  and  imagining  allows  that 
the  nature  of  the  perceived  structures  becomes  available  for  rigorous  intellectual  scrutiny. 
On  the  other  hand,  an  issue  of  premature  closure  can  only  emerge  upon  the  discovery  of  a 
further  `impossible'  perspective.  Anomalies  will  have  emerged,  again,  as  a  product  of 
intellectual  scrutiny,  but  in  this  case  they  await  the  resolution  of  a  further  imaginative 
transaction. 
No  final  certainty  can  be  available  to  us.  To  be  aware  of  this  is  itself  a  salutary  and 
necessary  contextual  assumption  for  imagining.  Our  first  ethical  commitment  is  to  the 
process  of  imagining.  It  is  a  commitment  to  a  way  of  life.  It  is  adumbrated  in  the 
parabolic  logic  of  the  New  Testament,  manifest  in  the  situation  of  Bosch's  `Wayfarer'. 
Imagining  locates  us  within  a  larger  world  extended  through  the  intelligibility  of  great 
works  of  art  and  their  capacity  to  transfigure  through  their  projective  reference.  We 
thereby  enlarge  our  understanding  of  ourselves  and  of  others.  The  world  grows  meanings 
through  increments  of  such  intelligibility  -  and  the  record  of  that  is  in  our  culture.  Our 
moral  responsibility  is  coextensive  with  this  growth.  In  an  important  sense,  those  who  are 
denied  access  to  imagining  are  consigned  to  different  worlds. 
273 In  the  end,  there  is  no  significant  choice,  no  either/or,  between  science  and  arts  subjects. 
The  dialectic  of  imagination  shows  how  both  depend  upon  intellectual  rigour  though  there 
is  differentiation  in  their  complementary  ends  -  to  know  about  the  world  and  to  find  a 
home  in  it. 
I  sit  on  a  rock  above  Gruinard  Bay  on  a  summer's  morning  looking  across  at  the 
heartbreaking  beauty  of  a  mountain,  An  Teallach  -  The  Anvil.  I  wander  away  and  return  to 
the  same  spot  an  hour  later.  An  Teallach  is  endowed  with  other  beauty  -  the  change  of 
light  has  engendered  another  inscape.  But  the  mountain  can  be  bleak,  forbidding, 
awesome.  Climbers  have  died  on  it.  Do  I  resort  to  a  classical  epistemology  -  many 
appearances,  pointing  to  an  unknowable  noumenon?  I  remember  Cezanne's  obsession 
with  La  Montagne  Sainte-Victoire.  The  struggle  in  each  painting  is  not  so  much  to  arrive 
at  a  single  underlying  entity  but  to  realise  what  makes  itself  manifest  at  any  given  time. 
The  structures  which  he  draws  to  the  eye  are  already  implicit  in  the  landscape  -  the  world 
is  protean,  dynamic. 
At  one  stage  in  his  life  Coleridge  found  himself  able  to  `see'  but  not  `feel'  the  beauty  of 
the  world.  6  In  his  `Dejection:  an  Ode'  a  cause  of  his  failure  was  attributed  to  his  habitual 
immersion  in  the  discursive.  In  his  `Dejection:  a  Letter'  the  issue  is  more  obviously 
bound  up  in  his  relationship  with  Sara  Hutchinson.  It  was  from  the  perspective  of  his 
unhappiness  that  he  wrote: 
I  may  not  hope  from  outward  Forms  to  win 
The  Passion  and  the  Life,  whose  Fountains  are  within!  (p.  95) 
In  his  despair  at  what  he  sees  as  the  failure  of  his  creativity  he  locates  the  source  of 
`passion'  in  subjectivity.  (There  is,  of  course,  no  reason  why  his  exposition  of  his  situation 
may  not  in  itself  be  `beautiful')  A  diagnosis  of  his  predicament  suggests  that,  for  one 
reason  or  another,  he  was  unable  to  engage  the  dialectical  shift  from  the  discursive  into 
imagining.  His  capacity  to  engage  double  prescription  was  lost  so  that  he  was  estranged 
from  the  source  of  his  creativity.  We  may  see  that  something  is  beautiful  and  we  may 
6  Coleridge,  `Dejection:  A  Letter',  from  Selected  Poems  of  S.  T.  Coleridge,  op.  cit.,  p.  95. 
274 circumscribe  it  in  pleasurable  associations  but  to  experience  beauty  presupposes  an 
imaginative  transaction. 
Any  question  of  the  adequacy  of  imagination  in  establishing  aesthetic  judgements  is 
replaced  by  the  realisation  that  imagining  is  a  condition  for  the  experience  of  beauty. 
Retrospectively,  of  course,  criteria  may  emerge  from  discursive  scrutiny  of  the  articulated 
structure.  But  the  dialectical  nature  of  the  passage  from  the  discursive  to  imagining 
prescribes  that  there  can  be  no  guaranteed  access  to  the  experience  of  beauty.  In  this  sense 
only,  obscurantist  arguments  can  be  seen  to  have  a  grain  of  plausibility. 
As  for  An  Teallach,  I  can  find  it  on  a  map,  establish  its  grid  reference  and  its  height, 
study  its  geology,  its  natural  history.  Whatever  the  mode  of  discursive  appraisal  I  am 
inevitably  driven  to  the  pronoun  `its'.  Is  it  simply  a  bewitchment  of  language  that  posits 
the  question  of  the  entity  within  which  all  descriptions  seem  to  inhere?  Is  there,  also,  an 
emotional  need  generated  by  our  awareness  that  the  mountain  changes  even  as  we  look  so 
that  we  are  moved  to  establish  a  transcendental  dogma,  the  noumenon  in  its  timelessness? 
Our  sense  of  mutability  is  a  rich  resource  for  the  lyrical  impulse. 
In  order  to  facilitate  our  day-to-day  transactions,  what  we  need  from  our  environment  is 
stability.  Our  customary  relational  mode  is  identification  -  it  is  inherently  conservative. 
We  need,  at  least,  the  illusion  of  stable  forms  on  which  to  base  the  urgent  judgements  that 
allow  us  to  negotiate  with  the  everyday  world.  We  endorse  identification  by  the 
assumption  that  what  we  see  through  it  is  `reality',  the  common  sense  world.  But  it  is 
precisely  mediation  in  that  mode  that  generates  characteristic  epistemological  problems 
regarding  appearance  and  reality.  The  world  posited  through  identification  is  the  domain 
of  the  shadow.  Such  a  world  is  obscured  by  what  we  have  rejected  in  ourselves. 
Through  our  imaginative  transactions  with  the  world  and  through  great  works  of  art  we 
negotiate  passages  to  reality.  The  structures  revealed  by  such  art  are  there  in  the  world  and 
in  ourselves.  Characteristically,  the  passage  to  such  structures  involves  the  negotiation  of 
instability. 
Amongst  the  most  powerful  examples  of  this  are  experienced  in  the  contemplation  of 
those  landscape  paintings  which  relate  to  scenes  with  which  we  had  assumed  more  or  less 
275 complete  familiarity.  Mediated  through  the  artist's  vision  our  familiar  world  is  suddenly 
transfigured,  enlarged,  rendered  beautiful. 
Indeed,  double  prescription  is  a  property  even  of  some  amateur  paintings  -  provided  the 
viewer  has  a  prior  familiarity  with  the  particular  setting  against  which  the  mediating 
function  can  be  judged.  Familiarity  provides  the  cues  for  initial  identification  which  the 
painting,  in  its  inadequacy,  may  not  establish  under  discursive  scrutiny. 
We  are  compelled  by  King  Lear  because  of  its  truths,  the  unfolding  of  which  are 
experienced  in  our  involvement  in  the  articulation  of  its  imagery  and  associated  structure. 
Primed  by  the  ritual  of  performance,  within  the  dramatic  frame  we  grasp  at  the  shifting 
structures  of  intelligibility  to  arrive  at  a  joyous  and  terrible  conclusion,  that  there  is  love, 
but  that  the  universe  refuses  to  comply  with  our  demands  for  justice.  Our  being  in  the 
world  is  changed  by  it.  We  cannot  return  to  the  old  dispensation.  This  is  a  truth  within  the 
text  -  it  is  as  old  as  Homer.  We  may,  of  course,  subsequently  find  a  larger  resolution  of 
the  play  that  takes  things  we  had  not  seen  into  account.  Our  imaginings  have  to  be 
tempered  by  a  necessary  humility.  If  the  world  changes  as  we  look,  that  simply  reflects 
truths  concerning  both  the  relational  conditions  of  our  seeing  it  and  the  fascinating 
complexity  of  what  stands  over  and  against  us. 
The  Franklin  and  Joseph  K.  represent  us  in  our  existential  situation.  But  we  achieve 
impossible  perspectives  through  the  distancing  ironies  of  Chaucer  and  Kafka.  This  is  a 
paradigm  case  for  imagining  that  begins  in  identification  then  evolves  through  the 
mediation  of  imaging  to  understanding.  Metaphor,  too,  provides  us  with  impossible 
perspectives  involving  projective  reference  and  its  associated  refiguring  that  adjusts  our 
ways  of  seeing  the  world  and  allows  us  fleeting  glimpses  of  the  shadow,  and,  thereby, 
provides  us  with  the  possibility  of  moral  choice.  Through  double  prescription,  the  beauty 
of  the  world  is  revealed  in  holistic  structures.  Simultaneous  disclosures  of  value  engage 
our  sense  of  the  purposive  and  thereby  generate  symbolism  which,  for  some,  is  extended 
into  a  celebration  of  purpose,  a  teleological  vision  of  nature  and  a  source  of  our  awareness 
of  the  sacred.  When  all  is  said  and  done  the  imagination  has  a  role  in  intelligibility  itself. 
276 It  is  implicit  in  the  possibility  of  thought  and  the  assessment  of  what  we  do.  To  be  a  little 
more  clear  about  its  role  may  steady  the  nerves  in  situations  where  the  projections  for  its 
immediate  well  being  in  the  context  of  the  urgencies  of  life  may  seem  inauspicious. 
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